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"PUTTING THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER IN HIS PLACE”;AN 
EVALUATION OF THE WORK OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER 
FOR ADMINISTRATION
This work evaluates the role of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration [PCA] within the United 
Kingdom*s administrative law system. This form of 
administrative redress was established by the 
Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. The encumbent of the 
office has to investigate ’maladministration* which has 
caused ’injustice* to the complainant. This test is 
established by the enabling statute. The actual procedure 
of the office is examined briefly. Some criticisms of the 
PCA system are also considered in this provision of 
background material.
A large part of the thesis considers the actual work 
of the PCA from 1967 to 1988. It identifies the types of 
administrative procedural error complained of to, and the 
remedies provided by, the PCA. This provides a full record 
of the work performed by the PCA.
Having established the functions that the PCA is 
performing, it was desired to examine them in a wider 
context. Another administrative law redress system, the 
courts, was chosen for comparison. The courts* function of 
judicial review is traditionally limited to questions of 
procedure. This provides a comparative base.
-  9 -
It was recognised, however, that a direct comparison 
between the two institutions could involve the imposition 
of either legal or administrative values on the study of 
the other institution. This would be undesirable. The 
methodological solution was to present a relatively value 
neutral list of acknowledged administrative procedural 
errors at the start of the thesis. This was named the 
Procedural Error Catalogue. It contains three general 
categories: Failure ot be Impartial; Imperfections in the 
Consultation Process; and Other Procedural Errors, 
covering the giving of reasons, and delay.
The work of the courts in the review of procedural 
error was then examined. A classification of such errors 
is presented.
In the evaluation of the work of the PCA within the 
system, it was found that two types of limitation could be 
identified. The first group was composed of internal 
limitations (self-imposed limitations) which the PCA 
placed on his own remit. The second group contained 
external limitations (superimposed limitations) which were 
placed upon the PCA*s remit by outside sources such as the 
1967 Act. The latter group is less easily remedied than 
the first. A change in the PCAfs constitutional position 
may be necessary to remove some such limitations.
Within the United Kingdom system the PCA does cover 
similar types of error as the Courts. Duplication is . 
prevented by a difference in the remedies available to
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each institution. The PGA has also developed a process to 
remedy types of error not redressed by the existing 
system. The most notable is delay within the 
administrative process.
The PCA cannot provide a remedy to any substantive 
error (one relating to the merits of the decision).This in 
itself may be a weakness within the United Kingdom system, 
but the PCA should not be criticised for this. There are 
internal limitations which hinder the full development of 
the office. These could be easily remedied.
The final conclusion is that the PCA has developed 
into a useful office, which has established redress for 
previously neglected areas of administrative procedural 
error.
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
SECTION I AIMS OF THE THESIS
The main overall purpose of this thesis is to 
evaluate the work of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration [PCA] within the administrative law system 
of the United Kingdom [U.K.]. The PCA's role, as defined 
by statute,is to investigate complaints of 
maladministration made against central government 
departments, the results of which have caused injustice to 
the complainant.(1)
Much of the work of academic writers on the PCA has 
centred around the limitations placed on his office. This 
thesis, however, will focus in the main on the actual work 
that he is performing. The main work on the PCA, by 
Gregory & Hutchesson, was published over fifteen years 
ago, and at a relatively early stage in the life of the 
office.(2) Whilst various reports, articles and 
evaluations have been written since then, no update, or 
similar form of work has appeared until recently. More 
recently there has been a renewed interest in the actual 
work the PCA is performing.(3) It must be stated clearly 
that this thesis has no upwardly mobile pretensions to be 
a replacement to the seminal work of Gregory & Hutchesson.
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Rather it hopes, in its modest way, to continue in the 
spirit of that work and more recent studies in exploring 
in an empirical sense the work of the office in an attempt 
to understand what role the PCA is playing in the 
administrative review system.
To achieve this overall aim the thesis has been 
compiled in three parts. The first and main part of the 
work is concerned with outlining the categories of 
administrative error that the office reviews. The second 
part of the work evaluates this work in comparison with 
the other major review mechanism within the system (the 
courts). The third and final point seeks to present a 
clearer view of the actual work that the PCA performs, to
examine whether there is a need for any changes in his
role within the system, and in the process to provide a 
further insight into the PCAfs definition of 
maladministration.
It is necessary to look to the actual work of the PCA
to understand fully the role of the PCA within the U.K.
administrative redress system. This therefore forms the 
major part of this thesis. The categories of 
administrative error reviewed by his office are 
investigated, as well as the remedies offered if 
maladministration is found. This provides insight into the 
PCA's own perception of his function, and whether he is 
imposing his own limitations on the range of complaints 
investigated.
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Obviously, the office cannot be taken in isolation if 
the overall position within the redress system is to be 
established. The PCA's work must be seen in comparison 
with the work of the major source of redress for 
administrative errors, the Court system through the 
process of judicial review. It is important to discover 
whether the work is being duplicated within the system: do 
both mechanisms address the same types of administrative 
error, or does the PCA cover a different jurisdiction?
Thus consideration is also given to the work done by the 
Courts in this field. This is done in order to place the 
PCAfs work within the wider context of the U.K.'s 
administrative system.
To keep the thesis within manageable proportions, as 
well as to facilitate comparison between the institutions, 
it was deemed prudent to limit consideration to 
administrative procedural error. This seemed the obvious 
choice. The terms of the 1967 Act which established the 
office of the PCA effectively limits him to investigating 
matters relating to procedure, as he is unable to question 
the merits of a decision, without first finding 
maladministration.(4) The choice was reinforced by the 
fact that this is a similar basis to the traditional model 
of judicial review: Lord Brightman in Chief Constable of 
the North Wales Police v. Evans:
"Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, 
but with the decision-making process. Unless
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that restriction on the power of the court 
is observed, the court will in my view, 
under the guise of preventing the abuse of 
power, be itself guilty of usurping power.”
This provides the common ground for a comparison of the 
work done on the review of such errors by each 
institution.
Thus, the structure of this study is as follows. 
Chapter Two gives a more detailed background to the office 
of the PCA; Chapters Three to Six then outline the 
administrative procedural errors identified by the PCA; 
Chapter Seven sets out an overview of the work of the 
Courts in relation to administrative procedural errors, 
and in effect constitutes the second part of the thesis. 
Thirdly, and in conclusion, Chapter Eight evaluates the 
findings of the preceding chapters, and widens the debate 
to consider some of the issues facing the administrative 
law system in general. Without anticipating the final 
section in any detail, one of the general underlying 
issues discussed is the ideas of J.D.B. Mitchell, 
expressed on the subject of the then, newly mooted 
’ombudsman* idea, in the early 1960s.
Mitchell’s attitude was encapsulated in the following 
epithet:
’’Remedies are to be found through law, not 
administrative palliatives.”(6)
Mitchell, however, was not advocating the use of the
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Courts in their present form. He felt that a separate 
public law system was required to tackle the main 
grievances arising from the administrative processes. The 
ombudsman scheme proposed would not be able to do so 
effectively. Thus it was a danger, in that it would divert 
attention away from the real needs of the system. It has 
to be stated from the outset, that consideration of the 
need for a separate system is beyond the remit of this 
study. It is proposed, however, to.consider whether the 
PCA has been the red herring that Mitchell predicted; and 
whether the Courts themselves remain lame ducks in the 
administrative law system.
This will be done by investigating whether any 
limitations on the PCA are self-imposed or superimposed. 
Self-imposed limitations are those placed on his function 
by the PCA's own interpretation of his role. Superimposed 
limitations are those which are placed by outside 
considerations. This includes his constitutional role as 
established by statute.
Thus the study will be complete, by placing the 
actual work of the PCA in the context of the system as a 
whole.
The remaining sections of this chapter discuss in 
more detail the approach and format of the thesis.
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Section II Methodology
One part of the general methodology has already 
been mentioned in Section I, in that the need to limit the 
study to the approach to procedural administrative error 
has been explained.
The thesis can be divided into two areas of empirical 
study: firstly, the work of the PCA; and secondly, the 
work of the Courts. Turning to the first part, it is true 
to say that the study of the case-work of the PCA is much 
more detailed than that of the Courts. Mainly, this is 
because there has been so little academic attention paid 
to his actual work, as opposed to his jurisdiction, or 
powers.(7) Such work as exists, is more than 15 years old, 
and was done at a time when the office of the PCA could be 
said to have been in its infancy.
Therefore a major study of all the published case- 
reports was undertaken. This comprises all the published 
cases from 1967 to 1988. Extracts are printed in the PCA's 
Annual Reports (from which most of the previous work was 
done). This limits the spectrum of cases available. As the 
cases included in the Annual Reports are selected for a 
different purpose, it was possible that relevant cases to 
this study might not have been included. Secondly, 
previous studies were not necessarily interested in the 
same areas of classification as this thesis. Certainly, 
many of the PCA's cases deal with matters such as
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officials* rudeness, which are excluded from this study, 
but do form part of his case-load. This has to be 
emphasised, although the cases listed in the following 
chapters, form a very substantial part of the PCA's work, 
they are not intended to be a definitive study of all the 
types of cases that he investigates.
A third reason for such a detailed study, is the fact 
that successive PCAs have been reluctant to approach their 
task on anything other than a case-by-case basis. They shy 
away from anything smacking of precedent. Consequently in 
order to develop an overall picture of the work 
undertaken, resort must be made to the individual cases. A 
classification of the PCA's work would be a useful 
exercise in itself for the benefit of administrative law. 
Again the limitations of this thesis must be stressed. 
Classification of part of the PCA's work is undertaken, 
but it is by no means a complete catalogue of the PCA's 
workload.
It should also be noted that the purpose of recording 
the empirical work of the PCA in this way is to identify 
the types of procedural error with which he deals. It is 
of secondary importance as to how frequently each type of 
case arises. In the same way it would not be profitable 
to ask how frequently each type of judicial review case 
comes before the courts. The importance lies in the fact 
that the institution recognises a particular form of 
error, and how it responds to it, not in how many times it
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does so. Therefore numerical analysis of this kind does 
not form part of the thesis
As to the work of the Courts in the area of judicial 
review, this is very well documented in a number of 
sources, so that it would be pointless to reiterate.(8) 
What has been produced, is an outline of the Courts’ 
activities in relation to the matters contained within the 
catalogue of such procedural errors constructed to aid the 
analysis and comparison of the PCA’s work. A major problem 
is, of course, that the Courts deal with a far wider range 
of decision-making bodies than the PCA - so to further the 
eventual aim of the thesis, particular emphasis has been 
placed on the cases before the Courts dealing with Central 
Government, and its associated bodies. This is a general 
aim, important cases and/or principles have not been 
excluded because they do not concern such bodies; but in 
the main, the overview is concerned with the Courts 
approach to administrative procedural error. This reflects 
the type of bodies within the jurisdictional remit of the 
PCA. Therefore comparison of the two bodies is 
facilitated.
In pursuing the second part of the research, the main 
problem which had to be overcome was that of how to 
compare the work of the PCA and the Courts. As stated, a 
common basis of review was not hard to discover, in the 
form of procedural error, in that both bodies are in the
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main, concerned with this topic. However, the temptation 
may well have been to superimpose ’judicial* concepts, 
such as the rules of natural justice, on the PCA's work, 
which in its recognised 'judicial/legal' form might be an 
inappropriate standard, for the administrative orientated 
PCA.
The proposed solution was to create a separate list 
of what might be called ’administrative procedural error’, 
drawing on a variety of sources in compilation, and thus 
avoiding the adoption of either a legal or administrative 
based standpoint. This catalogue could then be used as a 
comparison against which the work of the PCA and the 
Courts could be evaluated. From this assessment of their 
work against a common neutral standard, comparisons with 
each other's work could be drawn more satisfactorily.
The next section details the contents of this 
procedural error catalogue. However, before pursuing that 
topic, it is necessary to explain what approach has been 
taken to the study of the work of the PCA and the Courts.
SECTION III COMPILATION & CONTENTS OF THE PROCEDURAL ERROR 
CATALOGUE.
(a) Sources
In compiling the catalogue the first necessity was 
that it must be relatively neutral in its approach;
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neither exclusively administrative based, nor exclusively 
judicially based so that it would serve as a valid 
touchstone for both institutions. This was to try to 
ensure that legal principles were not superimposed on 
administrative processes, and vice-versa.
Thus three main sources were drawn upon: a Resolution 
of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
entitled 'On the Protection of the Individual in relation 
to the Acts of Administrative Authorities *(9) ; a 
Recommendation from the same body - 'Concerning the 
Exercise of Discretionary Powers by Administrative 
Authorities *(10); and the JUSTICE Report, Administration 
Under Law'(11). The value-neutral approach is hopefully 
achieved by drawing on this mixture of legal and 
administrative sources, as no source in itself can be 
completely neutral of the viewpoint of the compiler.
The above reports were more concerned with the 
promotion of good administration, rather than the 
identification of bad administration. It was necessary 
therefore to invert some of their standards for the 
purposes of this thesis.
The second guiding principle was the need to define 
’procedural', and then to identify those faults that could 
be so classified.
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(b) The Definition of 'Procedural1 Error.
'Procedural' error was chosen as the two review 
institutions (the PCA and the courts) are both limited to 
reviewing complaints regarding procedure, as opposed to 
being appeal bodies on the merits of the decision (though 
this is debatable at least as far as the courts are 
concerned(12)).
For the purposes of the thesis, the term 'procedural' 
does not include what might be deemed 'trivial' errors.
For instance, rudeness of officials (so long as it is not 
an indication of bias against the recipient), or the 
incorrect addressing or designation on an envelope (again 
providing that this does not cause misdirection). These 
errors, whilst no doubt unpleasant or irritating to the 
recipient, and unnecessary and undesirable to the 
procedure, could not be said to seriously affect the 
quality of the decision-making process itself. For, as 
shall be seen, this is an important criteria for 
'procedural' error.
Another category of error excluded from the 
definition, is that of errors affecting the jurisdiction 
of the decision-making body. Such errors are fundamental, 
for example, purporting to exercise a power which the body 
does not possess, or adjudicating on a matter not within 
its remit. The basis of the exclusion of this category is 
that they are initial errors, incurred before the
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decision-making process is implemented, and as such 
renders any subsequent action invalid.
The usual comparison/contrast made with procedural1 
error is Substantive* error. If 1 substantive* error is 
taken as meaning error which touches on the merits of the 
decision, then it can be contrasted with procedural* 
error, which is only concerned with the process by which 
the decision was made. 'Substantive* error suggests that 
the decision itself is 'wrong' or 'bad'; and could also 
suggest that the process behind the decision was not 
necessarily at fault.
'Procedural' error, on the other hand, does not 
concern itself with whether the decision is the correct 
one in the circumstances, but merely with the decision­
making process, if that is at fault, the decision itself 
may not be affected, but it has been reached by the wrong 
method; and as such must be received in the light of this 
finding. Thus the same decision reached by the correct 
procedure would be perfectly acceptable; whereas a 
'substantive' error would mean that the decision would not 
be acceptable by any method of decision-making.
So much for the theory - for when classification of 
administrative errors is attempted, the practice is not so 
straightforward. The main problems occur with the 
distinction between 'procedural' and 'substantive' error. 
It has been suggested by Marshall that elements of both 
types occur in any one error.(13) Can a 'right' decision
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ever be reached by a wrong method, if it is the right 
decision (a question of merits) xdiy worry if the wrong 
process has been used; unless that suggests that in future 
cases the wrong process could lead to the wrong decision 
(surely a question of merits again?) Conversely, a wrong 
decision is not 1 snatched from thin air1 without some 
fault in the process, be it the identification of a 
perverse decision-maker.
Thus from the argument that there are elements of 
both types in every error, it can be argued that all 
errors can be reduced to ‘procedural1 errors. For 
instance, a decision that is considered to be unreasonable 
in the circumstances of the case, may be traced back to 
the fact that there is a poor/bad administrator in the 
process, who is responsible for the 'bad1 decision.
However, having aired the possibility that all errors 
are procedural at source, the necessity of line-drawing 
for the purposes of the thesis, becomes apparent. 
Therefore, the criteria chosen is whether there is an 
error which can be clearly identified within the 
procedure. For example, the unreasonableness of a decision 
is often taken as a 'substantive* error, but where the 
unreasonableness can be traced to the omission of a 
material fact from the decision-making process, then a 
'procedural' error can be identified.
An unreasonable decision with no omissions of fact, may be 
traced to a perverse decision-maker. If there is no
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identifiable explanation for his bias (ie that could have 
been identified or suspected at the outset of the process) 
then it will be left in the province of ’substantive1 
error for the purposes of this thesis; though the argument 
could be made that the very presence of such an 
administrator, is a procedural error.
One important exercise in this line-drawing, was to 
classify the concept of ’proportionality1.(14) The concept 
can be neatly summarised as ’not using a sledgehammer to 
crack a nut.’ Thus the action taken by the body must not 
be out of proportion to what they are trying to achieve, 
and thus adversely affecting peoples’ rights to an 
unnecessary degree. This must necessarily involve the 
consideration of the merits of the case. Although the 
procedure used is in question, it is less central than the 
merits. Therefore, the concept is not included in the 
catalogue.
The catalogue is set out below.
(c) The Content of the Procedural Error Catalogue.
The catalogue has been divided into three main 
groups. The first group - Failure to be Impartial- deals 
with the necessity of objectivity in the decision-making 
process. The second group - Imperfections in Consultation 
Procedure - deals, as the name suggests, with the duty to 
consult affected parties. The third group is really an
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umbrella for other forms of procedural error that can be 
identified, but do not necessarily lie within the first 
two groups, they have been grouped together for 
convenience.
(i) Failure to be Impartial
The need for the quality of 
impartiality within the administrative process is widely 
recognised. It includes not having a personal interest in 
the outcome of the process, nor a prior involvement in a 
situation, when a fresh approach is required. It also 
includes not doing anything that might be interpreted as 
showing favour to one side or party; or that might suggest 
that a prior decision has been taken or opinion formed, 
making the process redundant. For further classification 
this could be sub-categorised as follows:
(1) Intrinsic partiality. This covers the situation 
or possible situation where the bias or possible bias is 
apparent, (or should be) before the process begins. For 
example, where the administrator has a personal interest 
(pecuniary or otherwise) in the eventual outcome. The 
interest could be malign (corruption) or merely 
unfortunate coincidence. It also encompasses prior 
involvement in the situation where the requirements now 
demand an impartial approach. Both of which give rise to 
the possibility that outside considerations (irrelevant 
factors such as the personal interest or the prior
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knowledge) will be taken into consideration. Thus a less 
than partial decision will be reached.
In dealing with administrative procedural error, it 
is essential to remember that complete impartiality is 
almost impossible to achieve in most cases. It is a 
'judicial' concept which is inappropriate to be adopted 
here. Thus, consideration will be given to the 
'acceptable' or 'legitimate' level of bias within the 
process eg. where a department has a stated policy or view 
on the matter,and an official of that department is making 
a decision on that matter, which may require consideration 
of opposing or alternative views.
(2) Spontaneous partiality. This envisages a 
situation where there is no intrinsic partiality at the 
start on the part of the administrator, but within the one 
individual case, the administrator has demonstrated 
partiality. This could be done in a variety of ways: (a) 
the use of irrelevant concerns or grounds in reaching the 
decision (other than the above category); (b) by the 
failure to ascertain and/or to take account of all the 
relevant grounds, (although attempts at second-guessing 
whether the relevant factor has been considered by 
reference to the outcome is a substantive concern).(15)
(3) Not treating like cases as like. This is a 
difficult category of procedural error, as the 
distinctions between the procedure and substance become 
blurred here.(16) The temptation to say case A was
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materially the same as case B, but the outcome was 
different, is great, but yet that really amounts to 
looking at the merits of the decision. What must be 
considered was whether the same procedure was prescribed 
for similar cases, and whether the same procedure was 
adopted. If not, were there strong enough reasons for this 
inconsistency? Thus, if guidelines are publicly announced 
for a certain set of circumstances, it would be a 
procedural error if those guidelines were not followed. To 
allow for the administrative necessity of discretion, 
there could be sufficiently strong reasons for them not to 
be followed in an individual case, but basically there 
should be a certain amount of reliance placed upon 
them.(17)
However, to expect a specific outcome from those 
guidelines would be substantive. Procedural error can 
merely look at the expectation that certain procedures 
will be followed as stated, and review is concerned with 
the departure from these, without adequate reasons 
(questioning the validity of these reasons might be seen 
as substantive, but review should be concerned to prevent 
frequent departures from stated guidelines.) It can be 
safely stated that this is one area where the 
intermingling of the two types of error can be clearly 
seen.
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(ii) Imperfections in The Consultation Procedure.
The main administrative purpose for consultation is 
to provide more information on which the decision-maker 
can act. The best decisions will be those taken with all 
the facts before them, so that the probability of 
unforeseen consequences is reduced. Errors in this area 
can be made at the outset, before the consultation process 
is under way (intrinsic error); or it may occur during the 
process (Error within the consultation process).
(1) Intrinsic error. This covers situations where no 
prior notification is given of the fact that a decision 
will be taken until the process is complete. This 
encompasses failure to consult parties affected by the 
decision, where such consultation might be expected(18).
It may be that there are cases, where the administrator 
should inform a party of the on-going process, without 
necessarily consulting the party or seeking his views. It 
is also necessary to establish which parties should be 
consulted; to decide what the criteria for consultation 
should be. The Committee of Ministers thought that parties 
whose rights, liberties, or interests were directly and 
adversely affected, should have the right to be 
consulted(19). The JUSTICE Report came down in favour of 
those parties particularly and materially affected(20). 
From the foregoing, it would seem that some form of 
specific interest is required for this right to be
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bestowed; a general interest would not be enough to make 
it a right.
Having determined which parties to consult, the 
decision-making body must take all reasonable steps to 
notify those persons of their right.(21) The lack of 
qualification of this right would mean that the 
administrative process could be completely halted if the 
decision-maker could not contact one or more of the 
affected parties.
(2) Error within the consultation process. Once the 
consultation process has been instigated, there a number 
of possible procedural errors:
(a) the choice between written procedure or oral 
procedure;(22)
(b) failure to supply enough (not necessarily all) 
relevant information from which the affected parties can 
understand all the issues involved, and on which they can 
thus base a full reply, if they are requested by the party 
to so do;(23)
(c) if not covered by (b) the right to know the 
other side's case in full, and to be given the opportunity 
to comment on it (including cross-examination in an oral 
hearing);(24)
(d) the right to assistance in the preparation and 
presentation of the case (by a friend, a lawyer or other 
independent person).(25)
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(iii) Other Procedural Errors
(1) Failure to give adequate reasons for the decision 
when required to do so. There are several reasons why an 
explanation of the chosen course of action should be given 
by the decision-making body. Without reasons, it is easy 
for the affected party to remain disgruntled and to become 
convinced that the matter has not been dealt with 
properly. It will also allow him to see whether he has 
cause to pursue the matter at an appeal level (if this is 
an option open to him). Finally, from the administrative 
body's own point of view, the necessity of providing a 
reasoned decision, means that decision-making is clearer, 
and the decisions will be better considered.
Thus the giving of reasons, at least on request, is 
considered to be important, and therefore failure to do so 
must be a procedural error.(26) There is, of course, an 
argument that as the reasons will touch on the merits of 
the decision, then such a failure is a ’substantive1 
error. However, as one of the purposes is to ensure that 
all factors have been taken into consideration, which is a 
procedural matter, then failure to evidence this, can be 
classified as procedural. Afterall, the requirement to 
give reasons, does not necessarily mean that they will be 
used to evaluate the merits of the decision, but merely to 
witness that the decision has been taken properly. 
Obviously, like any procedural error, a failure in this
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area may point to the fact that the decision is an 
improper one.As a result of this, it follows that the 
reasons given must be adequate to understand the basis of 
the decision.(27) Resolution (77) 31 also suggested that 
in some cases it would also be appropriate to indicate the 
remedies available to the affected parties.(28)
(2) Failure to complete the process within a reasonable 
time. Delay is obviously a form of procedural error as
it is the process that is being affected by the delay. 
Delay is an error as the parties affected by the possible 
decision are left in a state of limbo. Uncertainty and 
inconvenience are created by the delay, which may affect 
their ability to carry on their business or lives 
effectively.
However, the real problem lies in defining what 
exactly constitutes delay. What length of time amounts to 
a delay? The JUSTICE Report (1971) suggested that in 
performing a statutory duty, a period in excess of two 
months to complete the process, would constitute a delay, 
unless there were exceptional circumstances. If this was 
the case, an explanation must be given, and a decision 
reached as soon as possible.(29) The Recommendation of the 
Committee of Ministers on the other hand, favoured the 
more open definition of Reasonable* time.(30) What was 
'reasonable' in the circumstances would depend on a number 
of factors such as the urgency of the case (eg the
- 3 2 -
granting of a licence was mentioned as meriting swift 
attention); or the complexity of the issue. On the whole 
the latter approach must be the more realistic one; 
although the former is much more laudable, requiring only 
exceptional circumstances to justify slow procedure.
Total inactivity on the part of the decision-making 
body would also be an error.(31)
Delay can be divided into two main types, categorised 
as follows:
(a) Intrinsic delay: a situation where all such cases 
are being delayed ie they are all taking the same length 
of time to complete, and the delay is to be found within 
the entire system as a result of lack of resources, 
inefficiency and such like.
(b) Individual delay in a particular case: a 
situation where a case takes longer than normal due to 
non-routine delay in the system, such as the loss of a 
file etc.
SECTION IV - CONCLUSION
In this introductory chapter the aims and structure 
of the thesis have been set out. The overall aim of this 
thesis is to evaluate the role of the PCA within the 
administrative system.
A large part of the thesis is concerned with 
identifying the work the PCA is currently undertaking. To
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place this work in perspective, the PCA*s work is compared 
with that of the Courts. Thus the final evaluation of his 
role is made.
This chapter has also addressed the methodology 
adopted, and explained how the any anticipated problems 
were met. This chapter*s other purpose was to examine the 
solution to the one major methodological problem in 
detail. Thus the content and internal methodology of the 
General Catalogue of Procedural Error has been chronicled.
Primarily the catalogue is designed to facilitate the 
comparison of the Court System with the PCA by presenting 
an independent list of possible procedural errors. The 
argument against such the alternative - a direct 
comparison - between the two institutions is that the 
Courts are performing *judicial* functions and the PCA is 
performing * administrative1 functions. This means that a 
common base is lacking, which the General Catalogue 
provides. This common base is the universally recognised 
errors in the administrative process. It is an attempt to 
identify what the redress systems are striving to remedy 
regardless of whether they adopt an investigative 
technique or an adversarial technique within their 
respective domains.
Thus the Catalogue is a working outline devised to 
form the guide and framework necessary for one part of 
this thesis. This must be stressed. It is in no way an 
attempt at a definitive list of administrative procedural
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error. This would be well beyond the scope and remit of 
this thesis.
Having established the Catalogue, it is necessary to 
return to the first task, examining the work of the PCA. 
The Catalogue will be returned to in subsequent chapters, 
in the consideration of the empirical work of the PCA and 
the Courts.
Turning to the work of the PCA it might be helpful to 
present some material as to the PCA and his office, and as 
to how investigations are conducted before examining the 
reported cases handled by the PCA. The next chapter is 
concerned with this background material.
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CHAPTER TWO THE PCA - AN INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides general background information 
about the office of the PCA. First of all the origins and 
the history of the institution will be traced to establish 
why the office has developed. Secondly, the aims of the 
office will be investigated, from both an external and an 
internal viewpoint. The external viewpoint being that of 
the creators and promoters of the office, and the internal 
view is that of the incumbents of the office. Finally, the 
mechanics of the office will be described to explain how a 
complaint is handled when it is received. The aim of this 
chapter is merely to provide a background for the main 
thesis, therefore it is by no means a definitive account 
of these matters.
SECTION 1 THE ORIGINS AND BRIEF HISTORY OF THE OFFICE
It is quite possible to trace the ultimate origins of 
the office of the PCA right back to the last century, 
although the office itself has only been in existence 
since 1967.
The position of the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, within the UKfs unwritten constitution has made 
the control of the Executive an uncertain area. The 
Judiciary have always been reluctant to interfere in 
matters which they believe to belong to Parliament; and
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certainly since last century Parliament's importance has 
been eclipsed by that of the Executive.
Last century a reasonable balance was maintained.
Many administrative functions were performed by local 
government, central government confined itself to the 
economy and foreign affairs. Excesses, abuses of power, or 
mistakes by the local authorities could be reviewed by the 
courts. However, as the new century dawned, central 
government began to expand more into domestic affairs, 
more of local government functions became centrally 
controlled. Towards the later part of the last century, 
radical changes took place within the civil service, 
equipping it to be able to assume these tasks. Bureaucracy 
continued to grow and effect more people directly. The 
problems arose when the system produced complaints. Whose 
role was it to check the activities of this new form of 
Executive?
The courts stopped short, wary of crossing the divide 
of the separation of powers, unwilling to be seen entering 
the province of the Executive in the review of 
administrative decisions, and also unwilling to usurp what 
they saw as Parliament's function to check any abuses. 
Citizens were left with the stark choice, either the 
problem was a legal one that the courts would remedy, or 
else the remedy lay in the hands of the politicians.
The chance of a political remedy was not much 
comfort, when the realities of the situation were
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examined. The citizen needed to interest a M.P. in their 
complaint. If no satisfaction was received by the M.P. 
from the department concerned, he then faced the task of 
trying to find a slot in the ever-diminishing 
Parliamentary time, in order to take the matter up with 
the Minister concerned. To get this far, the problem would 
need to be very serious, and probably have wider 
implications than the mere personal interests of the 
individual concerned. For it is true to say that the 
nature of Parliament had also been evolving during this 
period, and was now more party political in loyalties, and 
subservient to the Government.
So by the mid 20th. Century, the growth of complaints 
about administrative abuses, had brought the political 
redress system to a crisis point; the Judiciary seemed 
determined to ignore the problem, adhere to their 
interpretation of how far judicial review could extend, 
and neatly bat the problem back to the political arena.
Thus the short-term origin of the PCA is to be found 
in the late 1950s - a period of great turmoil in the field 
of British Administration, and thus for administrative 
law. As was outlined above, there was a general feeling 
that the Courts and the process of judicial review, were 
in some way failing to check the administration; and the 
judicial reply to this was that it was not their function, 
but Parliament's to check error within the process of 
administrative functions.(1) A number of cases of 'unjust'
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treatment of citizens at the hands of Administration had 
been brought to the public's attention.(2)
The most notable was the Crichel Down Affair. The 
matter in dispute was whether a piece of land, 
compulsorily acquired by the Government, should be offered 
back to the heirs of the original owners. The whole 
episode contained many examples of maladministration. The 
claims of Commander Marten, and other local landowners 
were overlooked. As a result of this, the full facts were 
not before the Minister. A blinkered determination to 
continue with the planned course of action was also 
detected. It was widely recognised that it was the 
persistence and tenacity of Commander Marten which forced 
the Minister, Sir Thomas Dugdale, to commission an 
inquiry, which revealed the sorry muddle.(3)
In the aftermath, the Report of the Franks Committee 
was eagerly awaited. However, its remit only dealt with 
statutory tribunals and inquiries, and although the 
members of the Committee were aware of the problems in 
other areas of administration, and expressed their 
concern, their remit prevented them from addressing those 
problems.(4) Limited as the report was, nevertheless, its 
battlecry of 'openness, fairness & impartiality' was 
adopted by lawyers and politicians alike.
At the same time a great deal of interest was being 
shown in the Scandinavian system of ombudsmen - an 
independent complaints authority, directly accessible to
-  39 -
the public. Soon the cries went up for such a scheme to be 
adopted in Britain. The Swedish ombudsman was invited over 
to this country, to inform the British public of the 
nature and purpose of his office - his mission appeared to 
meet with a lukewarm response.(5)
JUSTICE(6) took up the cudgels at this point, and 
subsequently issued the Whyatt Report(7). This recommended 
that an officer, modelled on the Scandinavian ombudsman 
should be established; it wished to provide fa real 
Charter for the little man*, placing emphasis on the fact 
that many citizens would have given up long before in 
their struggles with bureaucracy.
It has to be noted that not all academics were in 
favour of the introduction of an ombudsman in Britain.
Many believed that only large scale restructuring of the 
system of administrative law in this country would aid the 
problem - other smaller scale measures were dismissed as 
piecemeal - and, some argued dangerous, as the temporary 
advantages would mask the need for major reform. Probably, 
the most able of these academics was J.D.B. Mitchell, who 
encapsulated the argument in the title of his essay -'The 
Ombudsman Fallacy*(8) This will be dealt with more fully 
in the concluding chapter.
Opposition was not limited to academics. The Government 
procrastinated. There were two interests at work here, - 
the parliamentary backbenchers, who saw the ombudsman as a 
threat to their traditional prerogative to act as trouble-
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shooters to the voting public, in matters relating to the 
civil service. The second interest was the civil service, 
though their opposition, if it existed, and was 
articulated, has not been so well documented. There were 
many suggestions that the civil service had nothing to 
fear from such an institution, and that their Scandinavian 
counterparts had welcomed the opportunity it presented to 
vindicate them in many cases.(9)
The passage of what was to become the Parliamentary 
Commissioner Act 1967 was not always smooth. The debates 
of the time are illuminating for their discussion of the 
perception of the backbencher’s role. The history of the 
Act has been well-recorded in other sources.(10) Suffice 
it to say that the ombudsman concept had metamorphosed 
into the PCA concept - gone was the idea of direct access 
for the public - instead there was to be a M.P. filter 
(albeit originally on a trial basis); gone was the wide- 
ranging jurisdiction of his investigations, - the PCA 
could only investigate named departments or bodies.(11) 
Most importantly, whilst independent of the Executive, the 
PCA was, as his title suggested, an officer of Parliament, 
modelled on the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the 
first incumbent of the office was in fact a former holder 
of that office as well.(12)
Sir Edmund Compton had been appointed PCA on 1st. 
September, 1966.(13) His duties began on 1st. April, 1967. 
His first report on the activities of his office set out
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the process by which he alerted M.P.s to his role.(14) He 
also sought to clarify areas of his remit, such as 
jurisdiction and maladministration. Gradually, the idea of 
publishing anonymous accounts of his investigations was 
adopted. If the 1967 Act was the foundation stone, Sir 
Edmund Compton completed the foundations of the office, 
whilst remaining flexible as to its future development.
Sir Alan Marre, another former civil servant, took over 
the mantle in 1971. During his term in office, he emerged 
as the role for the PCA today, with the first quarterly 
anonymised reports being published. It should be noticed 
that this practice (of publishing reports of all the cases 
investigated during the quarter) was continued until 1980, 
when Sir Cecil Clothier, with the backing of the Select 
Committee on the PCA, decided that these volumes were 
unwieldy, and most certainly unreadable and uninteresting 
to the layperson in general. (It is also submitted that 
lawyers found them hard-going). Sir Cecil decided on 
publishing quarterly reports containing selected cases, 
which appeared to him or to his staff, to highlight an 
important matter, or which illuminated the function of his 
office.(15)
The pattern of former civil servants occupying the 
office, continued with Sir Idwal Pugh, who replaced Sir 
Alan Marre in 1976. New ground was broken by the 
appointment in 1979 of Cecil Clothier - a barrister. It 
would appear that this was a successful development - it
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was certainly perceived as such by the Select Committee, 
and also the PCA office staff as well. One of the reasons 
cited for this was that a legally-trained PCA answered the 
criticism of the lack of impartial legal advice within the 
office.(16) The practice was continued with the 
appointment of Anthony Barrowclough in 1985, and during 
his term in office the general feeling of those closely 
involved with the office was that this practice would 
continue. (This proved to be wrong with the appointment of 
Sir Anthony's successor at the end of 1989, W.K Reid, a 
senior civil servant in the Scottish Home & Health 
Department).
Criticism has also been made of the fact that the 
PCA's staff almost entirely consists of seconded civil 
servants. The situation continues.(17)
This means that civil servants are investigating 
other civil servants - yet recent PCAs have defended the 
system, stating that as a result of their own knowledge of 
administration, seconded civil servants are much sterner 
critics of their 'colleagues' mistakes, than any outsider 
would be. This may well be true, but it also means that a 
civil servant approach is adopted throughout, and an even 
better system of administration is not contemplated as a 
result. There is surely an argument for having a more 
equal split between seconded civil servants, and other 
persons such as lawyers, accountants, and private sector 
administrators, thus providing the best of both worlds.
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The PCAfs jurisdiction(18) has been the major source 
of criticism. Many commentators wish to see it extended. 
The JUSTICE Report 'Our Fettered Ombudsman* listed several 
prohibited areas which they felt could be opened to the 
PCA.(19)
Commercial transactions of a Government department 
was one area, as were personnel matters relating to civil 
servants. The latter seems to be a strange suggestion - 
very few civil servants do not have recourse to their 
trade unions or at least their staff associations - 
private sector workers do not have recourse to an 
ombudsman so why should civil servants? Successive PCAs 
have feared (probably with just cause) that they could 
become inundated with requests for intervention, to the 
detriment of members of the public. Of course, it is not a 
sound argument to say that merely because the demand might 
be great, the opportunity should not be given. However, it 
is fair to ask whether this extension of jurisdiction 
would serve to further the role of the PCA. It is 
submitted that it would not for the following reasons.
Disputes between civil servants and their superiors 
relate to the relationship between master and servant, and 
therefore belong in the remit of employment law. There 
must be few cases that involve 'maladministration' as it 
is understood. Even if there are such cases, it is 
possible that they could be caught by the provisions of 
the Act, particularly if they raised wider issues.
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Finally, if there is a need for an independent 
investigation, surely it would be better to set up a 
separate ombudsman system for this purpose. This proposal 
has been mooted to deal with problems arising within the 
armed forces. (Another area excluded from the PCA's 
jurisdiction).
The PCA's jurisdiction has been extended twice since 
1967, first of all in 1981(20) with the inclusion of 
consular affairs, and secondly in 1987(21) with the 
inclusion of a number of quangos. All were relatively non- 
controversial extensions of his jurisdiction. It is a fair 
comment that unless the PCA, and the Select Committee are 
in favour of such an extension, it is unlikely to succeed. 
The PCA does push the interpretation of his jurisdiction 
in the background. For instance, there has been a long- 
running saga of line-drawing with the Lord Chancellor's 
Department as between the department's judicial (non-PCA) 
functions, and its administrative (PCA) functions.The 
PCA's office felt that the processing of cases before they 
reach the stage of the actual court hearing comes within 
the PCA's remit, the LCD denied his jurisdiction here, 
and stated that this was a judicial process. The argument 
appeared to have reached stalemate.(22) Then in early 
1990, the new Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay announced that 
this area would now be open to the PCA's jurisdiction. It 
would appear that it took a 'new broom' to break the 
deadlock.
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However, it is submitted that the view that the 
extension of his jurisdiction is the way forward for the 
PCA are misconceived. It will be argued in the following 
section that the extension of jurisdiction is worthless, 
until the PCA makes full use of his existing powers. These 
powers are not those concerning his jurisdiction, but his 
definition of 'injustice and maladministration*
Section II AIMS OF THE OFFICE OF THE PCA
As has been previously stated, the aims of the PCA 
system as introduced by the 1967 Act, were somewhat 
different from the ombudsman principles mooted before the 
enactment. It is proposed only to outline the aims of the 
PCA system, as it is the basis of this study.
The aim of the PCA system is clearly stated as 
follows: to investigate 'injustice caused by 
maladministration by a government department', within 
certain restrictions set out by the 1967 Act. The PCA can 
only investigate cases referred to him by a M.P.;(23) he 
can only investigate cases referred to an M.P. within 12 
months of the complainant becoming aware of the matter, 
unless the PCA believes that the situation warrants the 
use of his discretionary powers in this area(24); he 
cannot investigate a matter for which the complainant has
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a legal remedy, again subject to his discretionary 
powers(25). The remedy can be by means of a tribunal, or 
an appeal to the courts, it can also mean judicial review. 
The PCA's use of discretion will depend on the 
circumstances of the case, particularly in relation to the 
complainant. If the complainant is unlikely to be able to 
afford recourse to such remedies as judicial review, then 
the PCA may take up the investigation.(26)
As we have seen the first major test is whether the 
department complained of, is within the PCA's 
jurisdiction.(27) If it is outwith the list, the complaint 
is returned to the M.P. with a letter of explanation. In 
fact, this is the procedure adopted in most of the cases 
of rejection outlined above.
The PCA is also not allowed to investigate a 
discretionary decision taken in the absence of 
maladministration.(28) This was a major cause of 
complainant during the various stages of debate on the 
Bill.(29) Many people expressed the view that the need for
the power to question arbitrary decisions went to the root
of the ombudsman principle. The suggestion is that such 
powers would allow the PCA to question arbitrary and 
manifestly unfair decisions, taken in the appropriate 
administrative manner - ie to look to the merits of the 
decision, and become a sort of administrative appeal 
court.(30) It would seem that another desire was being 
articulated, that of the need for an administrative appeal
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court. It is still being articulated, as the PCA is kept 
busy either by rejecting complaints openly seeking him to 
perform such a role, or else rejecting spurious complaints 
about alleged procedural defects in the administrative 
process.
However, the definition does not preclude 
discretionary decisions being investigated if they are the 
product of maladministration. This leads to the question - 
what is maladministration? For if maladministration covers 
the fact that the decision is perverse, than there is no 
problem. However, the concept of maladministration means 
many things to many minds. The trend of evasiveness in 
this area originated with Richard Crossman, when he spoke 
of its definition in the House of Commons:
"... We might have made an attempt.... 
to define, by catalogue, all of the 
qualities which make up maladministration, 
which might count for maladministration by a 
civil servant. It would be a wonderful 
exercise - 'bias, neglect, inattention, 
delay, incompetence, inaptitude, perversity, 
turpitude, arbitrariness and so on. It would 
be a long and interesting list.11 (31)
Already arbitrariness and perversity are mentioned. It may 
be true to say that early PCAs were cautious in this 
area.(32) It is also true that from an early point, there 
was a suggestion that maladministration could be more
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loosely interpreted than had at first been thought. The 
Select Committee on the PCA, always ready to see wider 
horizons for their charge, first mooted this idea in 
1967/68. Here the members introduced the concept of the 
'Bad decision'. The Committee suggested that if the PCA 
found " a decision which, judged by its effect upon the 
aggrieved person appears to him to be thoroughly bad in 
quality, he might infer from the quality of the decision 
itself that there had been an element of maladministration 
in the taking of it and ask for its review."(33) They 
later urged him to use this power in 'borderline cases 
where in his judgment clearly wrong decisions had been 
taken."(34)
Geoffrey Marshall was one, if not the first, 
commentator to see the potential for interpretation that 
'maladministration' offered. His 1973 article raised many 
points about the concepts of maladministration and 
injustice and whether the two could be separated; as well 
as questioning whether the PCA was in fact limited to 
reviewing procedural error.(35)
Sir Cecil Clothier has stated that he sees 
maladministration as " any departure from what the average 
reasonable man would regard as fair, courteous, efficient 
and prompt administration."(36) This is perhaps somewhat 
less challenging than some of the above sentiments, but 
'fair' covers a multitude of sins - and a perverse 
decision could not be described as fair.
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Anyway procedural errors can be difficult to 
delineate from substantive errors, a system which allows a 
perverse, or at least an inappropriate decision to be 
taken, could not easily be described as procedurally 
sound, even if the error is not obvious. A decision-maker 
may be incompetent, in that he lacks the imagination to 
envisage the effects of his decision, surely a system with 
an ineffective decision-maker is procedurally flawed, at 
least in the one instance. There is a counter-argument to 
this which suggests that the merits of the case are being 
considered in the study of the effect of the decision, but 
certainly in relation to the PCA this is inevitable, as 
his remit demands that there be 'injustice1 stemming from 
the 'maladministration' - thus at the same point the 
merits of the case must be studied to identify the 
injustice, or lack of it. For the* PCA has been known to 
declare that there has been maladministration, but no 
injustice has been suffered by the complainant as a 
result.(37)
With reference to the above, it is submitted that 
JUSTICE'S suggested formula set out in their 1977 Report, 
'Our Fettered Ombudsman' is a mere tautology.(38)
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SECTION III THE OFFICE IN ACTION - THE PROGRESS OF A 
COMPLAINT.
The complaint should arrive in the PCAfs office from 
a Member of Parliament. If it has come direct from the 
complainant, the office will forward it to the 
complainant's constituency M.P., enquiring as to whether 
he wishes to refer the complaint back to the PCA.(39) On 
arrival the complaint is sifted by the Screening Unit. If 
the complaint is not sufficiently detailed, it will be 
referred back to the M.P. for further information, this 
will usually be accompanied by an indication of its prima 
facie chance of success. At the Screening Unit the 
complaint has to pass the jurisdictional, time limit, and 
other tests, before proceeding. If the complaint fails one 
of these tests, and the PCA decides not to exercise his 
discretion on these points, (if available), then the 
complaint is returned to the referring M.P. with a 
covering letter, explaining reasons for its rejection.(40) 
If the complaint is accepted for investigation, a letter 
is sent to referring M.P. also, telling him of this 
decision. Both types of letter will be drafted by the 
Screening Unit, and forwarded via the Deputy Commissioner, 
to the PCA himself for approval and signature. If the 
complaint is accepted, a statement of complaint is 
prepared by the Screening Unit. This^will contain the 
salient points of the complaint, the M.P.'s letter, and
any enclosed material.
From the Screening Unit, the complaint is passed to 
one of the Investigation Units. In 1988, there were three 
investigation units, headed by a director.(41) Under the 
director is the principal officer (Grade 7 on the civil 
service scale) and under him are three investigating 
officers (Higher Executive Officers on the Civil Service 
Scale).(42) The three investigation units are divided 
between subject area/departments, in the following manner: 
firstly, matters relating to the D.H.S.S. (as it was); 
secondly, those pertaining to the Inland Revenue and 
Customs & Excise; and lastly, a more 'generalist' unit, 
which will deal with such departments as the Home Office 
(prisons and immigration matters in the main); Department 
of the Environment (mainly planning appeals), the 
Department of Employment, and the Manpower Services 
Commission [M.S.C]
The investigation process is started by a copy of the 
complaint being sent to the Permanent Secretary of the 
relevant department.(43) Quite often, this will be this 
officials first notice of the matter in hand, and he/she 
will be willing to accept their department's 
responsibility and discuss remedies with the PCA. However, 
the PCA's investigation does not stop this point. 
Obviously, this is to ensure that there is no undetected 
maladministration in the events surrounding the complaint.
The investigating unit will then call for the
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departmental papers relating to the case. They will also 
take statements from those involved. If there is 
conflicting evidence from the department as per the 
complainant's account, the investigating officers will 
interview the complainant, and put the department's case 
to him for his comments.
In relation to obtaining papers, the PCA has wide 
statutory powers, and benefits from the fact that public 
interest immunity cannot be claimed by the department.(44) 
The only papers that the PCA might have difficulty in 
obtaining are Cabinet papers.(45) The PCA is also 
empowered to receive evidence on oath from witnesses, and 
compel them to give such evidence. However, these are 
rarely used as the PCA prefers to keep matters informal, 
and pursue an inquisitorial investigation.(46) At this 
point, a draft report will be formed. This is filtered up 
through the hierarchy to the PCA. It has been the stated 
policy of successive PCAs to be involved personally in all 
cases, the PCA will read and review all cases wherever 
possible.(47)
There is an established practice to send the final 
draft of the report to the Permanent Secretary of the 
department concerned.(48) He/she will ascertain that the 
facts are correct as far as the department's account is 
concerned, and they have the opportunity to comment on the 
balance of the report. It is also the first time that the 
Permanent Secretary will have knowledge of what remedy is
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being suggested as appropriate in the case, and he/she can 
comment on this. It has been seen that the department may 
present the PCA with acceptable reasons as to why this 
remedy is inappropriate, and the PCA may modify his 
recommendations accordingly. This also means that when the 
report is published and sent to the referring M.P., the 
PCA is able to record whether or not the department has 
accepted his proposed remedy. The report is sent only to 
the M.P. involved, not to the complainant, although, the 
office does include a copy, which the M.P. can pass onto 
the complainant, if he so desires.
The lack of involvement of the complainant in the 
process will have been noted by now. The 1967 Act makes no 
provision for the complainant to be an active participant 
in the investigation process, in that there is no 
requirement for the PCA to check that all the information 
the complainant wishes has been placed before him. The 
retort to this point, is that if the PCA or his staff feel 
that there is a need to seek further information from the 
complainant, then they will do so. However, for an 
organisation that sets great store by their belief that 
many complainants are satisfied by the chance to air their 
grievances to an independent system, it would surely be 
open to them to adopt a procedure whereby the M.P. is 
requested to verify that the complainant has fully stated 
their case - it is afterall possible that the complainant 
has only outlined the major points of their problem to the
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M.P,. As has been suggested, this may produce superfluous 
points, but surely, the office is capable of sifting this 
out. It is a small gesture, but may well make the 
complainant feel less abandoned.(49)
An even more glaring omission is the fact that a draft 
copy of the final report is sent to the department 
concerned, but not to the complainant. There appears to be 
no clear statutory requirement for this to be done. 
Therefore, there is no reason why the practice of sending 
the complainant a draft copy (via the referring M.P., if 
necessary) should not be adopted; certainly if the Select 
Committee were to approve such a development, there could 
be little objection, as the PCA is given leave to conduct 
his investigations as he sees fit.
The office is reluctant to adopt such a procedure. 
There are a number of reasons given for this reluctance. 
The first being that the complainant is criticised very 
rarely in the report, whereas the departments are 
frequently criticised, and thus the complainant needs no 
opportunity to defend himself. If a report does not uphold 
the complaint, Sir Anthony Barrowclough for one, did not 
feel that it was part of his job to be critical of the 
complainant. Only if it is felt that the complaint was 
'trumped up' will the PCA be moved to criticize the 
complainant. In such a case, it is probable that the 
complainant would be send a copy of the report for 
reference, though his comments might not be sought.(50) In
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many cases, however, the PGA may be critical of a third 
party involved in the proceedings, this occurs most 
frequently in tax cases, and the third party may be a 
solicitor, or an accountant. In these cases, a draft 
report would be sent to the third party involved, asking 
for their comments.
In this justification, one obvious point is missed, 
the report is sent to the department, regardless of 
whether it is critical of them or not.
The office also contends that this is an opportunity 
to ascertain that the facts are correct as far as 
departmental actions are concerned. The office claims that 
this prevents the embarrassment of a recalcitrant 
department appearing before the Select Committee,(51) and 
the department being able to prove that the PCA had got 
his facts wrong. Thus, they claim, they would lose the 
moral ground.(52) Presumably, it does not matter as much 
to them, that the facts may not be correct as per the 
complainant *s actions; as the complainant will not 
normally have the opportunity to embarrass the office.
Finally, the office maintains that most of the case- 
history is documented as departmental files, and thus 
through this medium, it could be established what had 
happened, so that there was 'relatively little factual 
doubt1. If there was a conflict of opinion as to the 
facts, this may well have been settled before the 
complaint arrived at the office, through the earlier
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exchanges between the department and the complainant. So, 
at that point the departmental account would have been put 
to the complainant, and he would have had an opportunity 
to comment on it.
If this had not occurred, and the conflict persists, 
or becomes apparent for the first time, and the disputed 
facts appear to be material to the case, the PCA’s staff 
would approach the complainant and seek his comments on 
the department’s case.(53)
The last reason given is that such an approach to the 
complainant, seeking his comments on the draft report 
would be a useless and time-wasting exercise; in that if 
the report did not uphold his complaint, the complainant 
would simply reiterate the facts of his case again, not 
accepting the ultimate conclusion of the report, and 
adding nothing to the some total of knowledge. It has to 
be said that on occasions, the department’s comments 
amount to a denial of responsibility, and a reluctant 
acceptance of the decision (without prejudice) in the 
nature of a costly P.R. exercise - so such a criticism can 
work both ways, though perhaps the department is less 
likely to seek to prolong the investigation. It is felt 
that unsucessful complainants, disappointed at the 
outcome, will then claim that the procedure was unfair, 
because they were not asked for further relevant 
information, which they could have provided. The office 
believes that very little of the new information, will be
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relevant - so it is not worth seeking.
The office is always ready to receive new information, 
and decide whether it is relevant to the case. If it is, 
they will reopen their investigations, and as far as the 
PCA is concerned a case is never really completely closed, 
unlike the finality of some court proceedings.
Undoubtedly, this latter fact is beneficial to the 
complainant; however, the whole procedure begs the 
question, why not ask whether there is any further 
information which the complainant wishes to add - if it is 
irrelevant, then the office can disregard it, but it must 
make more sense to make that decision whilst the case is 
current, rather than take that decision later on, say a 
month or two later, when the complainant receives his copy 
of the report from his M.P.. If as the office claims, new 
information is always considered, then why not do it as 
part of the original procedure? Perhaps the fear that 
every complainant will respond, instead of one or two 
brave souls who respond after the report is published. In 
response, it is mostly likely to be the persistent 
complainants (whom it is accepted, are blindly convinced 
of the justice of their cause) who will continue to 
complain. Most people would accept the (believed) finality 
of the report, and dismiss the procedure as further 
evidence of the faults in the Administration.(54) So, it 
is submitted, that the office could be encouraging the 
professional complainants by this attitude, rather than
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helping the more timid complainant, state his full case.
It was stated that there are often inquiries from 
complainants as to the appeal system from the PCA.(55) - 
it is submitted that this is hardly surprising. It is not 
a question that the PCA should be seen as the citizenfs 
defender - it is accepted that this is not his 
constitutional role. However, the overall appearance of 
the investigation process appears to be weighted to giving 
the department all the opportunities for comment, and it 
is cause for concern that the PCA relies on the 
departmental files for the case-history in total, and not 
just for the departments side of the case.
If the department refuses to accept the remedy 
suggested, the published report will conclude that there 
has been ’an injustice as a result of maladministration 
which has not been remedied* It is within the PCA's power 
to issue a separate report to Parliament highlighting this 
injustice.(56) The usual procedure is for the matter to be 
reported to the Select Committee. The Committee can then 
decide whether to call evidence from the department, 
usually from the Permanent Secretary but also conceivably 
from the Minister, as to why the department have refused 
the remedy recommended. They in turn can report on their 
findings.(57)
The Select Committee also monitor and support the PCA 
and his office. He will be called to account for his 
performance in the office. For example, the Select
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Committee has also regularly shown concern at the length 
of time investigations take. This has become a matter 
raised regularly, and the PCA is seeking to reduce the 
average time taken.(58) The Committee will also raise 
questions about matters contained in the PCA’s Annual 
Report. The PCA is then expected to consider and act upon 
the comments and suggestions of the Select Committee.(59).
This chapter has attempted to provide a brief history 
of the office of the PCA. Under examination, criticism has 
been made of certain aspects of the adopted complaints 
procedure. Most importantly for this thesis it has been 
noted in Section II that there is a wider interpretation 
of his statutory powers available to the PCA, should he 
choose to adopt it.
Having discussed the work of the office in general 
terms, the thesis will now move on to consider the 
specific work of the PCA in relation to the three 
categories of administrative procedural error as defined 
in the General Catalogue. Chapter Three will deal with the 
PCA’s approach to impartiality.
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CHAPTER THREE THE PCA AND THE DUTY OF IMPARTIALITY
This Chapter considers the PCA's approach to 
procedural errors which lead to the general charge of 
impartiality. The variety of cases can be divided into 
Victimisation; Inconsistency; Bias in the Decision-Making 
Process; and Inherent Bias. Each section illustrates the 
types of complaint the PCA receives and his approach to 
each type of complaint. His criteria for identifying 
maladministration or procedural errors are explored. The 
approach of this Chapter, and of Chapters Four and Five, 
is expansive in the hope of illuminating the work the PCA 
is actually carrying out, and the nature of the complaints 
the office receives.
SECTION I - VICTIMISATION
This particular category stands on its own, as it is 
difficult to relate to the other categories of 
Inconsistency and Bias. It forms a large part of the PCA's 
work in this area, but usually the mistake is not as 
serious as first alleged. It is given a separate category 
as it is very much a part of the PCA's consideration of 
this area as a result of the high instance of this form of 
complaint.
It could be seen as a form of procedural error on the
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basis that the complainant has not received impartial or 
equal treatment, without good administrative reasons. 
However, most alleged cases prove to be unfounded under 
the PCA's investigation.
Victimisation, harassment, or persecution is a common 
form of complaint of impartiality. Many complainants give 
no possible reason for their alleged persecution. Such 
cases can be divided into two main groups, 'victimisation1 
that the complaint perceives to be harassment, but which 
in fact is normal administrative procedure to which the 
complainant objects personally. Secondly, 'victimisation' 
can be unfortunate treatment which has arisen through 
administrative error, but where there is no malice towards 
the complainant.
The PCA does not accept that normal departmental 
practice amounts to persecution, as is often claimed.(1) 
Pursual of unpaid tax often causes complaint. An example 
is one case where a husband claimed that he was being 
harassed to pay tax. He felt that he should not be asked 
to pay the legally due tax as he did not have the means to
do so, and he was of the opinion that his wife should not
be expected to use her savings to pay the bill. The PCA 
stated that he would have to accept that the tax was 
due.(2)
Similarly, the necessary procedures for dealing with 
the claims in the DHSS & the Department of Employment do
not as far as the PCA is concerned (if exercised normally)
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amount to persecution.(3) For example, unannounced visits 
to the claimant's home do not constitute harassment or 
victimisation.(4)
Some 'victimisation1 complaints are in fact other 
forms of procedural error eg. delay. Here the PCA is 
concerned by the error, but is quick to point out that it 
is not actually victimisation(5)(though sometimes he 
comments that he can understand the complainant's 
suspicions).(6)
Excessive zeal on the part of officials has to be 
guarded against - this is a fault in itself, but Sir Alan 
Marre was unwilling to classify it as victimisation in the 
absence of malice:
"in the exercise of such duties, 
individual Investigation Officers must 
obviously be diligent in following up any 
evidence or suspicion of irregularities. But 
they have an equal obligation not to usurp 
the functions of those whose duty it may be 
to establish where guilt, if any, lies and 
to take action, whether by court proceedings 
or otherwise, to prevent or punish misdeeds.
It is no part of the duties of an 
Investigation Officer to decide guilt and he 
must clearly be aware of getting, as it 
were, carried away by the enthusiasm of the 
chase and of beginning to assume, or even
-  63 -
give the impression of assuming, guilt....
But I do not think Mr D was motivated by any 
malice. I have found no evidence to support 
the contention that he either positively 
alleged the complainant*s guilt or 
specifically urged a prosecution."(7)
This is also a consideration when dealing with 
complaints about the Inland Revenue. Many of the 
complaints regarding the Inland Revenue concern a 
persistent investigation into the taxpayer's affairs. This 
poses the problem for the PCA as to when this type of 
investigation is warranted by the state of the taxpayer's 
affairs, and when it has overstepped the mark. On many 
occasions the complaint simply stems from the taxpayer's 
annoyance at being subjected to scrutiny, however, as the 
PCA frequently has to point out, this is required by 
legislation, and the Inland Revenue is simply ascertaining 
that the correct amount of tax, legally due, has been 
collected.
During his investigation, the PCA and his staff will 
check that the procedure was necessary, and that there was 
sufficient reason to continue the investigation.(8)
It follows that the PCA's investigation may conclude 
that there have been no irregularities in the department's 
procedure. Otherwise the charge of victimisation in Inland 
Revenue cases is usually shown to be a charge of delay and 
prolonged inquiries, and while this may amount on
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occasions, to maladministration of another kind (eg 
delay), it is not one of victimisation.(9) Although in one 
case, the PCA felt that the investigation had been too 
protracted, as it had continued too long after the 
supporting evidence had collapsed.(10)
Complaints are sometimes accompanied with reasons 
for the alleged victimisation. These are rarely found to 
be substantiated. The ’reasons1 include, a vendetta 
against the complainant for being outspoken in her 
criticism of V.A.T.(11); victimisation because she went to 
a naturopath and not an N.H.S. doctor(12); discrimination 
because he had served a prison sentence(13); allegations 
that the Home Office, along with local authority workers 
and the electricity board were united in an oppressive 
campaign aimed at breaking up a prisoner’s family(14); and 
many more in a similar vein(15).
Complaints of discrimination because of race have 
been placed before the PCA.(16) None of these has been 
proved to the PCA’s satisfaction, and in fact one case 
provoked Sir Cecil Clothier to criticise the complainant 
severely after he had made an allegation that there were 
’Nazis, fascists and Powellites’ within the prison system. 
He commented:
"I have gone in some detail into these 
allegations about racial discrimination 
because charges on this topic are serious 
when made against any public authority but
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especially when made against those 
responsible for prisons, where any injustice 
may be less visible to the public eye.
However, from the evidence that I have seen, 
including the report of my officer who 
interviewed the complainant, I am not 
satisfied that any of the allegations are 
well-founded, and I am even doubtful whether 
they have been made in good faith. On the 
contrary, I consider that the prison 
authorities have done their reasonable best 
in difficult circumstances to treat him 
fairly, and that he for his part has used 
the fact of being black as a device for 
justifying his own misbehaviour and for 
provoking situations about which to 
complain."(17)
In general, the PCA is unwilling to attribute 
difficulties to anything more than administrative 
competence - it would be very difficult for him to prove 
more sinister motives.(18) In all the cases dealing with 
this area, only in one did the PCA feel that he could not 
explain the lack of attention that a prisoner received.
The implication was that the fact that there could well 
have been 'victimisation* as a result of the prisoner 
being a sex offender, could not be ruled out by the PC, as 
no adequate explanation had been offered.(19)
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In summary, Victimisation* could be described as 
harassment directed towards one individual. However, it is 
never usually a successful complaint in this form, despite 
the number of complaints who use this term in their 
submissions. Quite often the fault, if any, should be 
classified as delay.
SECTION II - Inconsistency
(a) Inconsistency between Cases
The first administrative form of inconsistency that 
concerns the PCA, is where one case is not treated in the 
same way as similar or identical cases.(20) However, there 
is a danger, which the PCA appears to recognise, that 
strict implementation of this principle, may fetter 
another desirable administrative principle, ie discretion. 
Therefore, when confronted with this complaint, the PCA*s 
procedure is to ascertain whether there were good reasons 
for this distinction.
When first confronted with this complaint, the PCA 
will ensure that the cases are in fact identical, or close 
enough for comparison. In quite a number of cases, he will 
discover that the cases are not in fact as similar as they 
would appear to the complainant, and the matter is not 
taken any further.(21) For instance, in one case the
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complainant suggested comparison with other cases, where 
financial assistance had been granted; however, the PCA 
discovered that one criterion used was the number of 
flying hours experience, and in comparison, the 
complainant had much less experience in this respect.(22) 
In one case there was a distinction which technically 
justified the situation - the complainants were local 
authority sub-tenants, and the tenants that received 
compensation were tenants of the department. However, the
PCA felt that the implication of this rule was harsh, and
that the department should compensate the complainants:
"I have made clear to the Department my 
misgivings about the application of their 
practices as it affected the complainants in 
this case - though I appreciate that there 
are other factors and indeed other
departments to be considered in
contemplating any change in practice to 
avoid similar difficulties arising in the 
future. I naturally scrutinize with special 
care any suggestion that maladministration 
is to be found in a Departments established 
practices which have stood the test of time 
and earned the approval of Ministers. But 
there have been occasions when my 
predecessors, with the endorsement of the 
Select Committee on The Parliamentary
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Commissioner For Administration, have 
enquired of a Department whether they have 
reviewed their established practices when it 
appeared that these bore harshly on 
individuals. I decided to follow that 
example on this occasion and therefore I 
asked the Department whether they had 
reviewed or would be prepared to review the 
practice which gave rise to the substance of 
this present complaint - especially as my 
investigation had suggested that the 
practice had not originally been formulated 
with the circumstances of local authority 
sub-tenants in mind."(23)
This is a good example of the PCA exercising his ’bad 
rule* powers, and illustrates that although there may not 
be a procedural error per se, the PCA may still feel that 
a department could do better in administrative terms; ie 
the PCA is not necessarily limited to procedural error. It 
should be noted that this is not a common occurrence.
In other cases, the circumstances may be comparable, 
yet the PCA will not find maladministration if he is 
satisfied with the department’s reasons for the 
inconsistent treatment.
Examples of reasons acceptable to the PCA include a 
change of policy. In one case, the complaint was about the 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office’s policy of not paying
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repatriation costs. The complainant's grievance was that 
although he was being made to pay his costs for 
repatriation from Pakistan, the Department were not 
seeking to recover costs from those people repatriated 
under similar circumstances from Cyprus. Sir Alan Marre 
concluded:
11 I have reported in previous cases I have 
investigated that the Department's general 
policy in seeking to recover repatriation 
costs, and retaining passports meanwhile, 
seems to me a sound safeguard for the 
protection of public funds; and it has been 
explained to Parliament on a number of 
occasions. As a very exceptional measure, in 
the circumstances of the 1974 evacuation 
from Cyprus the Department, with Treasury 
agreement, decided to depart from this 
policy. But this isolated exception does not 
seem to me to carry with it any obligation 
to abandon their long-standing practice of 
seeking to recover repatriation costs and 
retaining passports, either generally or in 
relation to the complainant's case."(24)*
Also if the outcome of the case used for comparison 
was the result of a mistake on the part of the department, 
or the result of an ex-gratia payment, the PCA will not 
support a claim for similar treatment.(25) For example, a
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complainant alleged that other colleagues had received 
repayment of tax paid on retirement testimonials, whereas 
she had not. The tax had been repaid in error. Sir Alan 
Marre explained why he did not support her claim, in that 
it would not be acceptable to compound an error, by 
repeating it for consistency1s sake in similar cases.(26) 
The PCA adopted the same approach in a slightly 
different set of circumstances. The complainant was 
aggrieved that H.M. Customs & Excise had refused to refund 
purchase tax paid on toffee apples, despite a High Court 
ruling that toffee apples were not subject to purchase 
tax. Sir Alan Marre explained that some refunds had been 
made under departmental guidelines for such situations, if 
the tax had been paid voluntarily and without query, no 
refund was made. The departments approach was backed by 
legal authority, and the PCA could find no special reason 
why the complainant1s case should not be dealt with under 
these principles.(27)
In a more specific example Sir Anthony Barrowclough 
felt that there was a suitable distinction between a 
private company (the complainant) and a publicly-funded, 
non-profit making organisation, so that the department 
were free to mention the latter, if members of the public 
asked about the services they provided. Although, he added 
reservations about the department mentioning the public 
organisation in leaflets issued by the department.(28)
There is recognition by the PCA that a certain amount
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of inconsistency is inevitable in the operation of a 
discretionary policy. Sir Cecil Clothier expressed this in 
one case:
"....But I accept that if Inland Revenue 
were less than fully consistent in applying 
the statute to all agencies to which it 
should be applied, those to which it was 
applied could reasonably claim to be 
sustaining an injustice. This injustice 
would not be caused by their being required 
to observe the law, but by being subjected 
to unfair commercial competition by those 
who should be, but were not being, required 
to do so. Such unfairness is, alas, 
something which is not wholly avoidable in 
either this, or many another, area of public 
administration. What is important, however, 
is that it should not be brought about, or 
made worse, by any avoidable administrative 
failure on the part of a government 
department to ensure full and fair 
application of the law or rules."(29)
One on-going complaint was that concerning the issue 
of tax-exemption certificates within the construction 
industry(30) One form of the certificate involved less 
formalities than the other, but as such was supposed to be 
issued only to very large construction companies. However,
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some smaller companies received them, and this put them in 
a better position to find work than similar companies with 
the more formal certificate. The complaint was partly that 
these other companies had received them, but not the 
company in question, yet, they were all similar in size 
and nature. The PCA commented:
"Clearly, if Inspectors are given the 
power to exercise their discretion in 
deciding applications there are bound to be 
cases from time-to-time where, in similar 
circumstances, one Inspector may reach a 
different decision from another."(31)
The PCA accepted that the exercise of discretion may 
well throw up anomalies, but the regulations should be 
applied as uniformly and consistently as possible - this 
had not happened in one case between the two tax offices 
concerned. As has been seen, the PCA does not accept that 
an error should be repeated in such circumstances, and 
here, he stated that it was not justifiable to grant the 
more favourable licence, merely because other companies 
had been granted them incorrectly.
Another example concerned a company which complained 
that the department had never previously enforced the 
implementation of their import licence quotas inflexibly. 
The PCA emphasised that there was no maladministration 
involved, however the department allowed the company the 
concession again. Sir Idwal Pugh stated:
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"But the Department do their best to 
administer import licensing policy with 
fairness and flexibility and minimise 
inconvenience to individual importers...
This can cause an importer always to expect 
flexibility to be exercised in his favour 
and I think that this is what the company 
have come to expect in view of their 
repeated success in obtaining alterations in 
the terms of the licences granted to them in 
accordance with their requirements...."(32)
However, inconsistency without a justifiable reason 
will attract criticism from the PGA. In another case, 
shipping agents complained that they could not compete 
with shipping agents at another nearby port, as a result 
of those agents being granted the use of radio channel 
frequencies which the complainants had been refused. The 
Radio Regulatory Department of the Home Office realised 
that there had been a mistake in granting the use of the 
channels, but decided it would be too damaging 1 to all 
parties concerned1 to revoke these licences, but resolved 
not to issue any further licences for the use of these 
channels.
The PCA found the complaint to be justified, and 
issued a fairly strong-worded criticism:
" It seems to me that the Home Officefs 
sense of fair-play was subordinated to their
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wish to avoid the embarrassment of revoking 
the licences: instead of seeking to resolve 
the problem they simply hoped that it would 
go away. The Home Office's handling of 
matters justifiably raised the accusation of 
discrimination and merits my criticism.
Uncomfortable though it might have been, the 
Home Office plainly ought to have reopened 
the question of the Port X agents' licences 
as soon as they realised that a mistake had 
been made in issuing them. They would then 
have been seen to be acting fairly and the 
position of the Port X agents would have 
been regularised much sooner."(33)
(b) Inconsistency within one case*
This category involves misleading or inconsistent 
advice being given to the complainant, so that they 
believe the process or its outcome to be different from 
what it is.(34) Or where the department fail to honour a 
previous undertaking without good reason.(35) This is an 
area where the 'case-to case' basis of the PCA's work is 
quite evident. However, some general patterns can be 
established.
A large number of cases go unresolved as the PCA is 
unable to ascertain whether or not the incorrect
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information in fact was given by the department 
concerned.(36) It is here more than anywhere else, that 
the possibility of the institutionalism of the PCA is 
apparent. He seems to require a high standard of proof 
from the complainant to allow him to take the 
complainant1s word against the departments. For instance, 
he rejected the evidence of a witness to an interview, on 
the grounds that the witness and the complainant had 
subsequently talked about what had happened at that 
meeting.(37) It is suggested that almost anyone who 
discovered that the department now appeared to be telling 
them something different, would have asked the witness, if 
they had been mistaken, before rushing off to complain to 
anyone, let alone the PCA!
The barrier that is presented to the complainant in 
this situation, is illustrated in this extract from a 
case:
"Before making use of their extra-statutory 
powers to waive or remit duty or tax on the 
ground that public faith has been pledged...
Customs require to be satisfied that the 
advice said to have been given was in fact 
given. They have considered the evidence 
available to them in this case and they have 
told me that, while they accept that the 
complainant misunderstood the position, they 
take the view, on the balance of
probabilities, that the misunderstanding was 
not due to a mistake by a member of their 
staff."(38)
The PCA's criteria will be examined more closely.
How soon (or late) after the event the allegation is 
made is a factor - if a while afterwards, the PCA is less 
likely to believe the complainant.(39) Also a negative 
consideration is whether the complainant had any correct 
information to the contrary in his possession.(40)
Another important factor in the PCA's consideration 
is whether it is likely that the advice or information 
allegedly given, was in fact tendered. The argument goes 
that if the advice is so fundamentally wrong, it is more 
unlikely that a member of the department would have given 
it. As Sir Alan Marre phrased it in one case:
"but it seems to me unlikely that that 
office would have given him information so 
totally at variance with the facts known to 
them as is suggested by the complainant's 
recollection."(41)
Factors that will assist in proving that the 
department is responsible for the incorrect information, 
include the information remaining uncorrected by the 
department,(42) and any written material which supports 
the complainant's case including misleading information 
leaflets.(43) Sometimes the PCA will merely be impressed 
with the complainant's account of events, eg Sir Cecil
-  77 -
Clothier was impressed by ’’the very clear recollection of 
events recounted to my officer by the wages clerk and the 
complainant."(44)
In cases where there is no conclusive evidence, the 
’benefit of the doubt* is sometimes given to the 
complainant. This is occasionally done by the department, 
regardless of whether the PCA feels that they are 
responsible.(45) On other occasions the PCA recommends 
this course of action.(46) His criteria for this course of 
action are not always clear, but some of the factors below 
may be involved - ie even if the misleading advice is not 
proved from the department, the benefit of the doubt may 
be given if financial hardship results.
A change in government policy which causes 
inconsistency, will not be challenged, or remedied by the 
PCA. Sir Idwal Pugh stated this: *
”lt is not open to me to question Government 
policy. But I do not think he could have 
reasonably have expected the Bank of England 
- or anyone else - to forewarn him of the 
impending change, although I appreciate that 
he might have acted differently had they 
done so.”(47)
Mention was also made of the fact that such decisions 
involving financial transactions, could cut both ways, in 
that there might be times when the situation would be 
advantageous to members of the public.
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If the department had no duty to provide advice to 
the complainant, the PCA is less likely to hold them 
responsible for the incorrect advice, or the lack of it. 
For instance, the IR is not expected to advise the 
taxpayer on the best way to minimalise their tax bill(48) 
nor are the departments responsible for welfare benefits 
expected to advise their clients on the best package(49); 
nor is it maladministration for the department responsible 
to omit to ask a client to apply for a pension, as this is 
a voluntary arrangement and not a duty.(50) However, the 
PCA has criticised a department for not informing a 
complainant of his eligibility to help from a scheme.(51) 
If there is a duty, failure in it by the department 
may amount to maladministration - Sir Cecil Clothier:
"In such circumstances failure to fulfil the 
obligation to give positive direction may be 
treated in the same way as 
misdirection."(52)
The department must answer accurately questions put to 
them by the public:
"But although they have no duty to the 
taxpayer to advise him on tax planning 
matters they do have a responsibility not to 
mislead him by giving inadequate answers to 
questions put to them, particularly where 
the impact of those inquiries should be 
plain to the tax office themselves."(53)
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The department will not be blamed if the answer they 
give does not cover the complainant1s particular 
circumstances, if the complainant does not give specific 
details.(54)
Nor will the department be blamed if the advice was 
correct at the time it was given, if circumstances beyond 
their control changed the outcome.(55)
If the department is not responsible for the 
misinformation, the PCA may still feel that it was their 
responsibility to correct the mistake.(56) This seems to 
depend on the circumstances of each case.(57)
The different interpretation by the complainant must 
be a reasonable one.(58) Also if their has been fault on 
both sides the PCA will not hold the department 
responsible, for instance in one case the department had 
misled the complainant, but he had misrepresented his 
circumstances to them.(59) If the misleading advice had no 
effect on the eventual outcome of the case no further 
action will be taken.(60)
If the misleading advice or information is 
established as originating from the department, the PCA 
will not always suggest a remedy other than an apology or 
assurance that steps are being taken to ensure that the 
situation does not recur.(61) The following extract shows 
the reaction the PCA sometimes receives from departments, 
in this case Sir Anthony Barrowclough wished the 
department to amend the wording in a document:
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"However, the Chairman said that (despite 
his foregoing comments) he entirely accepted 
that if I felt that the text of an extra- 
statutory concession was seriously 
ambiguous, that was in itself a virtually 
conclusive argument that the drafting needed 
to be reviewed and improved."(62)
Sir Idwal Pugh set out the criteria he used in deciding 
what remedy was appropriate:
"I criticize the serious error made in the 
advice given to the complainant. But I take 
the view that the giving of incorrect advice 
by the Department does not automatically 
place them under an obligation to pay 
financial compensation: each case has to be 
considered on its merits. In this case the 
Department have admitted their error, but do 
not consider that the complainant has made 
good his claim that he is worse off as a 
result of what happened. I accept this.
There can only be doubt as to what the 
complainant would have done had he known his 
true liablity."(63)
His first move is to study whether the wrong 
information changed the outcome of the process. This is 
well illustrated by a series of complaints brought before 
him, concerning incorrect information given to married
-  81 -
women as regards their national insurance 
contributions.(64) The Departmentfs policy in these cases 
was not to grant a remedy, if at the time of the incorrect 
advice, a woman would not have qualified for her own 
pension, regardless of the advice she was given by the 
Department.(65)
If contributions have been paid in these cases, they 
are refunded.(66) However, if they could have qualified, 
but were misled into not paying full contributions, then, 
if possible, they will be allowed to 'make-up* the 
necessary contributions.(67) In one exceptional case, 
where in fact the wife did not qualify, Sir Alan Marre 
suggested that she should be compensated for the private 
pension she would have invested in, if she had been 
correctly advised; his reasoning was based on the fact 
that he was convinced 'beyond reasonable doubt' that the 
wife would have taken out such a pension, if she had not 
been incorrectly advised; and her husband's argument that 
repayment of contributions would not compensate for the 
loss of the private pension.(68)
The above extract also highlights two other factors 
which the PCA considers, firstly, whether there was a 
financial loss, resulting from the incorrect information; 
and secondly, whether the complainant's subsequent actions 
were based on this information. These points will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.
However, if these can be established, then the
-  82 -
compensation will be paid. The sums involved can be quite 
considerable. For instance, Customs & Excise made an error 
as to the liability to tax of a new product, developed by 
a company - the company suffered losses when the mistake 
was discovered. Sir Alan Marre accepted that although the 
company had thus had advantages over their competitors, at 
least for a time, the company would not have started the 
venture, if the true position had been known. Compensation 
to the value of £6000 was agreed.(69)
In another case involving Customs & Excise, the 
department miscalculated the duty that would be payable on 
a drink product called Snakebite* the company went into 
production, only to be informed that the duty payable was 
much higher than they had been told. They could not be 
allowed to continue paying a lower rate, but the PCA 
decided that they should be compensated for £30,000 
expenditure involved.(70)
Another case where the PCA had considerable sympathy 
with the complainant, as a result of the undoubtedly poor 
administration on the part of the department:
"In my view the complainant with his 
articulate and carefully-worded letters, had 
made every effort to establish his probable 
pension position from 0VB[0verseas Branch] 
and I consider it reasonable for a UK 
national to rely primarily on advice given 
to him by a UK authority. He was given no
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warning that the advice should not be taken 
at face value and it is not surprising that 
he based his calculations and decisions on 
what OVB said. On five separate occasions he 
had received advice in writing that he would 
be entitled to a supplement to his pension 
and he had no reason to doubt his position.
That he received apparent confirmation from 
the French authorities does not in my view 
lessen DHSS's responsibility in the 
matter....
In response the Principal Officer told 
me that he accepted that, although the 
complainant had not lost any benefit to 
which he had a statutory title, the 
additional amounts which he had been led to 
expect were sufficient to have influenced 
his plans for the future and that the DHSS 
had some responsibility for the financial 
position in which he found himself."(71)
Other examples of successful complaints include 
having the cost of a television licence refunded to a 
complainant, after she was told, incorrectly, that she 
could 'cash it in1 if unused; the complainant had been 
waiting for the delivery of a 'television for the blind* 
which did not require a licence(72); and in an another 
case, a complainant was granted remission on the tax paid
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on £500, which he had brought into the UK, after 
assurances from the IR that it would not be subject to 
tax.(73)
As can be seen, the PCA does tend to take a dim view 
of inconsistent handling of a case, in one case, where a 
complainant had been informed by one inspector of the 
alterations to his plans necessary to make them acceptable 
for planning permission; another inspector rejected the 
amended plans; the PCA warned that such inconsistent 
decisions were undesirable.(74) However, as seen in cases 
of inconsistency between cases, there may be 
distinguishing reasons for the inconsistency.The PCA 
accepts that the exercise of discretionary power by 
different individuals may produce different results, as 
illustrated here:
"But it does not follow that,*because in 
this case a Head Office official and an 
Inspector in a different tax district (who 
had access to more recent information about 
the company*s turnover) came to a different 
decision, the original Inspector was guilty 
of maladministration in reaching his 
decision."(75)
It will also have been noted from the above examples, 
that as in the previous heading, the PCA will not expect 
the department to be held to a decision which is in 
contravention of the law or regulations.
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Finally, the PCA* dislike for this kind of error is 
illustrated in this quotation:
f,[l]it is indeed fortunate that his 
eligibility under those regulations enables 
the Department to provide such a remedy. Had 
that not been so, my criticism of their 
deficiencies in handling the father’s 
enquiries would have been in much stronger 
terms.1'(76)
SECTION III - Bias in the Decision-Making Process
This section deals with incidents which may suggest 
partiality, that occur during the actual decision-making 
process. Such bias is usually caused or allegedly caused 
by an act or omission on the part of the decision-maker. 
The borderline between this and bias inherent in the 
decision-maker is the category of collusion. It is 
included in this section on the basis that there is no
apparent reason for the partiality at the outset of the
process.
(a) Collusion
The PCA rarely upholds a complaint of collusion 
between a department and the other party. There may be
action that was considered unwise but not enough to
support collusion. For example, it was thought by the
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complainants that the Department of the Environment had 
been swayed by the Borough Council, and as a result had 
not considered the County Council's objections. Sir Idwal 
Pugh commented:
"Nevertheless, it seems to me that the 
Department, having enquired about the County 
Council*s views and had been told that a 
copy of those views was being sent to them 
by first-class post, might well have waited 
for their arrival before finally deciding 
not to intervene. This would have done much 
to remove later suspicions that the 
Department were unduly influenced by the 
Borough Council in their consideration of 
the proposals."(77)
Many of the cases are expressions of disappointment at 
the outcome of the process.(78) A slightly more serious 
incident occurred when a Ministry Representative stayed 
behind with a panel, after the complainant was asked to 
leave, and the same representative had lunch with the 
panel afterwards. The PCA expressed an opinion that the 
complainant had perhaps misjudged the standards to be 
expected from the tribunal.
"It seems to me that some of the 
complainant's misunderstanding about the 
procedures and functions of the panel arose 
from an erroneous impression that this was a
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quasi-judicial appeal procedure. The 
Ministry have explained to me that in fact 
the panel system is a non-statutory 
procedure, introduced at their own 
discretion in the interests of visibly more 
informed administration, under which farmers 
may make representations against an official 
ruling before a panel of practical farmers 
acting as advisers to the Minister, and that 
the panel does not act as a statutory 
referee between the Ministry and the 
applicant.”(79)
But he had previously stated:
"My investigation has satisfied me that 
there was nothing improper in the DEO’s [the 
Ministryfs representative] remaining with 
the panel after the complainant and his wife 
left the room: the panels often need to seek 
advice from the Ministry official on the 
regulations and matters of fact relevant to 
them, and I can see the need for this. But I 
can quite understand why the complainant 
became suspicious, especially as he had been 
told in the letter from the Ministry 
informing him of the administrative 
arrangements,that the panel would deliberate 
in private. In fact the DEO concerned on
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this occasion evidently himself felt that he 
should leave with the complainant and his 
wife, because he had to be asked 
specifically by the panel to stay behind.
Although I am satisfied that the 
complainant1s case was in no way prejudiced 
by what happened, I do think that this 
practice is open to misinterpretation. I am 
glad to report that the Ministry themselves 
now recognize this and have since 
discontinued it, amending departmental 
instructions accordingly."(80)
In another such case, the complainant alleged that the
Department had come to a secret arrangement with the owner
of another property. The suspicion arose mainly due to 
procedural faults such as lack of communication, and using
a procedure for cpo which did not give a statutory right
of objection. The PCA concluded:
"But when procedures which have been laid 
down to ensure fairness and openness are not 
properly carried out, doubts must remain
whether all interests have received fair and
equal consideration..... But the fact 
remains that it cannot be said beyond all
conjecture that the decision on the
Compulsory Purchase Order affecting him was
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reached with the absolute impartiality, 
which good administration requires."(81)
(b) Unfair Advantage
A common complaint is that during a 
planning appeal site visit, the inspector viewed the site 
from a point unfavourable to the complainant1s 
case/favourable to the other party's case, to the 
complainant's disadvantage. In one case, the complaint was 
that the site had not been viewed from the complainant's 
property; Sir Alan Marre's report recorded the following: 
"In discussion with my officers the 
inspector conceded that, from the point of 
view of justice not only being done but 
being seen to be done, there was a case for 
an inspection from the complainant's
property.....
...But having examined all the 
evidence and considered his explanation of a 
number of points, I am not persuaded that 
his failure to view the site from those 
properties of itself prevented him from 
making a reasonable assessment of the merits 
of the case. In the circumstances I do not 
feel entitled to question the appeal 
decision."(82)
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On the whole, the PCA does not usually find grounds 
for criticism in these types of complaint.(83)
Other complaints allege that the aggrieved party was 
put at a disadvantage by the inspector's conduct of the 
inquiry. For example, a complainant alleged that the 
inspector had allowed insufficient time for his case, and 
he claimed that he had concerned with the arrangements at 
the time as "he was afraid of antagonising the inspector, 
who had shown various signs of impatience and irritability
over the time he was taking to present the company's case
and cross-examine the council's witnesses." However the 
PCA concluded:
"The complainant is clearly unwilling 
to accept that his shopping centre should 
not be allowed to continue and his complaint 
to me is, in essence, that the appeals that
were made to the Secretary of State against
the Council's enforcement notices did not 
receive a fair and proper hearing. Having 
carefully studied all the evidence, I report 
that I do not consider that this was so. I 
do not find that the inspector conducted the 
inquiry into the appeals in a way that was 
prejudicial to the complainants' case and I 
consider his report was a fair one and his 
conclusions were an impartial and honest 
appreciation of the situation as he saw it.
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I have also found no evidence of prejudice 
in the Department's consideration of the 
appeals or any shortcomings in their 
handling of the case, apart from the 
unfortunate administrative shortcoming over 
the issue of the decision letter - a human 
error which did not bear on the decision 
itself and for which the Department 
apologised at the time."(84)
Departmental action sometimes does come in for 
criticism from the PCA. For instance, in one case, 
consultations and hearings were afforded to developers, 
and not to other parties objecting to developers' 
proposals. Sir Alan Marre commented:
"But in this case they did give the 
developers the opportunity of explaining 
their case orally to them and their 
professional officer. And when contrary 
views are held by two interested parties in 
a matter on which a discretionary decision 
must be made, and when the interpretation of 
the facts may be a matter of judgment, then 
it seems to me that each party should have 
equal opportunity to present their case to 
those making the judgment. While I accept 
that the Committee's letter of 8th.
September, 1972 did not advance new
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arguments, I think it could have been 
interpreted as an indication that they 
thought they could explain their point of 
view better orally than in writing. And, as 
the developers had had the opportunity to do 
that, I think it would have been appropriate 
if the Department had at least offered the 
Committee an equal opportunity of putting 
their case to them in London before finally 
making their decision."(85)
In another case, the Department relied on the view of 
one parties (the local authority) when making 
administrative arrangements for an inquiry. Sir Idwal Pugh 
stated:
"...By relying on the attitude of the 
Council, there is a danger that the 
Department will not know the full story. I 
think that was the case here... The 
Department clearly acted on the information 
they had, but I think they should have 
obtained the Council's views on the request 
for the postponement in writing. They might 
well have obtained a more accurate account 
of the current local position had they done 
s o • • • •
....At the same time it should have been 
clear from the extent of the damage to the
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listed building that the remaining fabric 
was at risk from the elements and vandalism.
In all these circumstances it seems to me 
that the Department should have had 
exceptionally good reasons for agreeing to a 
second postponement of the inquiry. But I 
have found they rested on the local 
authorityfs attitude and agreement."(86)
(c) Consideration of all Relevant Factors
Many of the complaints to the PCA allege that not all 
of the complainant’s representations were considered; or 
that the department did not have the full facts before 
them. The PCA cannot look at the merits of a decision 
taken without maladministration. Sir Cecil Clothier 
expressed well the distinction that the PCA must draw:
"As I have said at various points in the 
preceding paragraphs the question is not, 
were the right decisions taken? It will 
always be possible for people to argue after 
any event of this kind that different 
decisions would have led to better results.
But that is not an argument into which I am 
prepared to enter. I have to consider 
whether the administrative steps leading to
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those decisions were adequate and proper, 
and whether the administrative actions taken 
to implement such decisions were 
appropriate."(87)
In other words, a decision was taken without all the 
relevant facts being considered. This forms a part of the 
bias spectrum as it means that one side’s 
representations/case are/is incomplete.
The other facet of this category, is where irrelevant 
factors (ie information that is unnecessary to make an 
impartial decision) are taken into account when reaching a 
decision. This is not a problem that the PCA appears to 
encounter often.
In one case, the Department had insisted on a full 
medical examination, which the complainant was reluctant 
to undergo, the Department subsequently decided that they 
could have proceeded without insisting on this 
examination.(88) The department applied procedure for the 
disposal of land which was not appropriate to the 
circumstances of the case in question in another 
example.(89) One of the earliest (and most famous) PCA 
cases dealt with this, in the time of Sir Edmund Compton. 
This concerned compensation paid for internment in the 
Sachsenhausen concentration/prison camp. After a detailed 
investigation Sir Edmund declared:
”[l]n my view the original decision was 
based on partial and largely irrelevant
- 95 -
information, and the decision was maintained 
in disregard of additional information and 
evidence,. .."(90)
The Department had relied on information from a 
source, which was known to be limited as to the conditions 
in all parts of the camp.
Some factors which may appear to be 
irrelevant/inappropriate, may be deemed to be relevant in 
that consideration of them is unavoidable. For example:
"As for DOE, I am generally satisfied 
that the application was considered in 
accordance with the Department's procedures.
In the light of the submission that was made 
to the Minister of State I am not sure that 
the merits of the case were totally excluded 
from the consideration given to the question 
whether the application should be called in.
It is indeed difficult to divorce entirely 
questions of merit from questions of 
procedure in such cases."(91)
Returning to the consideration of all relevant facts, 
some complaints are formulated in these terms, others are 
just general grievances. In the latter cases, the PCA will 
make a point of ensuring the decision was taken in the 
knowledge of all factors and considerations. As has been 
said a large number of decisions in this category are 
found to have been competently decided.(92)
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The requirement can be qualified by administrative 
expediency: in one case the PCA decided that the 
department could have made further inquiries, but he 
judged that the expenditure would not have justified the 
small amount of information that might have been 
gained.(93)
The fact that new information comes to light later 
on, even during the PCA's investigation,(94) will not mean 
that the original decision will be deemed to have been 
taken without all relevant facts being considered.(95)
In some cases, the PCA may discover that not all the 
facts were before the decision-maker; however he will not 
suggest reconsideration of the decision, unless he deems 
the factor to have been material. His guideline for this 
appears to be whether this factor, if known, would have 
affected the outcome of the decision.(96) For example in 
one case, not all the facts about complainant's financial 
circumstances were before the Inland Revenue in deciding 
to collect tax due, without the period of grace requested. 
The PCA reported:
"Following my representations, the 
Department have reviewed the position and 
confirmed that they would not, in any event, 
have regarded the information supplied by 
the complainant as evidence of 'real 
financial hardship' in the present 
context"(97)
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Within the cases(98) where the PCA decides that 
material facts were not taken into consideration, there is 
a variety of groups. One such grouping is the cases where 
the information was actually available to the department, 
but they failed to use it.(99) In one such case, the IR 
failed to realise that a man had been given a married 
man’s tax allowance previously. If they had used this 
information, provided by the man’s oral and written 
representations, the claim could have been resolved more 
quickly.(100)
In one very unfortunate case, Sir Idwal Pugh seemed 
satisfied with the Department failing to use information 
available to them, and suggested that it was up to the 
complainant to draw the Department’s attention to it:
” When the Department informed the local 
education authority in 1974 that the 
complainant was not recognised as a 
qualified teacher, they had in their records 
information that would have enabled them to 
have given a different decision. The fact 
that they did not do so can attributed to 
the practice they follow when a local 
education authority ask them whether the 
qualifications claimed by an applicant for a 
teaching post entitle him or her to 
qualified teacher status. This practice, 
which is dictated by considerations of
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administrative economy, is one that I do not 
consider I would be justified in 
criticising, since it should produce no ill 
effects if the request to the Department 
provides all the relevant information in the 
first place. In the complainant's case it 
did not; and it was only when she herself 
told them she had successfully completed the 
course that they decided to grant her 
qualified teacher status. It is most 
unfortunate that the complainant 
subsequently lost her job at the school in 
London and has not yet been able to obtain 
comparable employment elsewhere, but the 
Department did not themselves take the 
decision to terminate her employment; nor 
were they responsible for her failure to 
obtain another teaching post. In all the 
circumstances I do not think it can be said 
that they were to blame for the situation 
giving rise to her complaint.”(101)
Failure to make adequate inquiries, and thus not 
having all the information before them in making the 
decision, is considered to be worthy of criticism by the 
PCA.(102) In one case investigated by Sir Anthony 
Barrowclough, the DHSS did not make enough inquiries 
before condemning meat as unfit for human consumption and
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causing a loss to the complainant company.(103)
In other cases where the facts are before the 
department concerned, they may not have given 'the proper 
weight' to one or some of the facts ie they have 
misinterpreted their importance to the decision-making 
process. For example, in a war pension case, the 
Department did not place enough emphasis on the fact that 
although there had been a medical recommendation to return 
to service, this had been on a trial basis only.(104)
Alternatively, too much emphasis may be placed on a 
fact which is not so important as others. In an another 
war pension case, the PCA found that too much importance 
had been placed on statements made by the complainant 
whilst he was in an unstable state of mind.(105)
It may be that the department based its decision on 
an erroneous fact. A decision on ..the date for the 
complainant's eligibility for parole, was not in 
accordance with the statutory provisions, on the discovery 
of this, all affected cases were reviewed along with the 
complainant's.(106)
Others simply involve the department not having all 
the facts before them, for a variety of reasons. Quite a 
few cases deal with war pension claims, where information 
has been overlooked, or not presented,(107) eg one 
decision was taken without a full medical 
examination.(108) Cases which are illustrative of what is 
considered material factors include one concerning the
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Department of Education & Science decision not to 
intervene in a dispute over the placement of a child in a 
particular school, between a LEA & parents; Sir Alan Marre 
discovered that the initial decision was taken in 
ignorance of certain salient facts:
"Yet at this stage they had not obtained any 
detailed information about the numbers at 
the town school or the journeys that would 
be involved, and had no information as to 
the parents' attitude to the offer of a 
place there. At that stage therefore in my 
view the Department had insufficient 
evidence to come to a considered decision. I 
find therefore that the decision conveyed in 
their letter... was taken with 
maladministration, and I criticise it 
accordingly."(109)
Secondly, Sir Idwal Pugh dealt with a claim that a 
planning inspector was not aware of the fact that the 
Secretary of State had designated the area as one of 
'outstanding architectural or historic interest'. He 
refuted the departmental claim that it would not have 
affected the outcome, so was therefore not material:
"The failure to consult caused the 
inspector to come to a decision which could 
not be said to have been made in the 
knowledge of all the relevant factors. And
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that is maladministration.”(110)
Other cases include one that Sir Cecil Clothier 
investigated, he found that the Home Office had overlooked 
a power available to them, when reaching a decision as to 
whether Prison Rules allowed a prisoner to wear his own 
special shoes.(Ill) In another case, he held that a 
'decision was based on an incorrect foundation of fact' as 
the department had ignored the fact that crop rotation 
would mean that the fields would appear different each 
year.(112)
SECTION IV - Inherent Bias
This category deals with bias or possible bias that 
should have been obvious from the start of the process.
The definition points to the decision-maker as the source 
of the bias; although this usually means the individual 
concerned, some mention will be made of departmental bias 
as well. There are a number of ways in which personal bias 
may manifest itself.
(a) Previous Involvement In The Case Or With The Parties.
Previous involvement with either, the parties, or the 
case itself, means that the decision-maker is not coming 
to the process with an open-mind. There are obvious limits
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to this principle, after all government departments deal 
regularly with local government authorities, but may need 
to adjudicate in a dispute to which they are a party. 
However, involvement on a more personal level, may give 
cause for concern.
Necessity can often excuse situations of this kind. In 
one case where a technical assessor was needed in a 
highly-specialised field, Sir Alan Marre accepted that 
most of the suitable candidates would be aquainted with 
the work of one of the parties at the inquiry; and a 
further point was that the inspector should be able to 
make allowances in his report for this particular 
consideration. The PCA noted that the department had 
sought recommendations for the post from a variety of 
organisations; and although he felt that the department 
might have probed more deeply bec'ause of the narrowness of 
the field, he did not think they had acted without 
reasonable care.(113)
Necessity aside, the PCA is unlikely to accept that 
previous altercations with a department, will make that 
department predisposed against the complainant. For 
example, Sir Alan Marre stated that he had "found nothing 
to support the complainant's belief that the inspector or 
the Department were biased against him because he was 
'awkward customer'"(114)
Sometimes previous involvement can be seen as 
helpful. In one case, a consultant had examined the
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complainant, the consultant had been involved previously 
with this case, and the complainant alleged that this made 
him prejudiced. Although partly swayed by the 
complainant's conduct prior to the complaint, the PCA also 
appeared to believe that the additional knowledge could be 
beneficial to the administrative process.(115)
However, Sir Cecil Clothier suggested that in such 
cases the additional information should be balanced with a 
report from a neutral source. In a separately-issued 
report, he conducted an investigation into a review of a 
conviction for murder. The Scottish Home and Health 
Department had commissioned a report on the effect of the 
newly discredited evidence, as regards the outcome of the 
trial, from the prosecuting counsel in the case. Sir Cecil 
felt that if such a report was necessary, it should not 
have been relied upon on its own, and that a report from 
an independent source should have been sought in 
addition.(116)
In a number of cases the PCA has expressed 
dissatisfaction with the arrangements in the case. A 
sliding scale of fault can be discerned - for instance, at 
one end, the PCA may have felt that there was nothing 
inherently wrong with the department's practice, the 
complaint lies in the fact that they did not realise that 
it might be unsuitable in the particular case. In one such 
case, the complaint was that the inspector appointed to a 
public inquiry, was personally acquainted with many of the
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officials from the Urban District Council [UDC] (one 
the parties to the case) as a result of his previous 
employment in a neighbouring borough. Sir Alan Marre 
discussed the possibility of bias as follows:
"The Department's legal advice is that there 
must be a reasonable suspicion or perhaps a 
real likelihood of bias before a decision 
will be quashed by the courts on this 
ground. And they take the view that, while a 
close personal friendship might give rise to 
a suspicion, depending on the circumstances, 
an acquaintanceship or professional 
relationship would be unlikely to do so in 
the absence of any direct community, or 
conflict, of interest between judge and 
party in the subject matter of the
case.....
I think that it was unfortunate, 
however, that the Department were not aware 
of the proximity of the site which was the 
subject of the compulsory purchase order 
either to the area in which the inspector 
had previously worked as Town Clerk or to 
his home. The Department have told me that 
in such cases they tend to exercise caution 
and, if in doubt to appoint another 
inspector. In view of the particular
inspector’s association with the area (if 
not the particular district), I think that 
it might well have been prudent for them to 
have appointed a different inspector in this 
case.
But I see no reason to criticise the 
inspector’s conduct of the
inquiry ’’(117)
Other cases may attract criticism, but if the 
department have acted correctly under their rules, the PCA 
may be more reluctant to do so. For instance, a 
complainant alleged that having the same chairman preside 
at each of his appeals did not allow his case to be 
decided impartially. The PCA found that there were no 
grounds for disqualifying the chairman, and the department 
did not think that his role could be seen as influential, 
in that he does not take part in the medical examination, 
nor does he take part in the discussions of the Board that 
he chairs. Sir Idwal Pugh, however, understood the 
complainant's feelings:
"I can well understand, however, that an 
unsuccessful claimant could find it 
difficult to believe that his case had 
received absolutely unprejudiced 
consideration when the chairman of two 
successive CPMBs [Central Pneumoconiosis 
Medical Boards] was the same, especially in
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the absence of any statutory procedure for 
appeal from the decisions of such Boards. I 
was glad, therefore, to be assured by the 
Department that they are always willing to 
consider sympathetically specific requests 
that a differently constituted Board should 
deal with a case on a second or subsequent 
occasion."(118)
Finally, the PCA may be critical of the case in 
general. One such instance was a complaint that a DHSS 
official, who had dealt with the investigation of the 
complainant's allegedly fraudulent activity as per 
invalidity benefit ( it was alleged that he was working 
whilst receiving it) had subsequently handled his claim 
for supplementary benefit, and as a result had let his 
prior knowledge affect his judgment. Sir Cecil Clothier 
concluded:
"But both parties agree that the official 
who saw the complainant reminded him of the 
previous occasion when they had met (that is 
when the official was investigating 
allegations that the complainant was working 
while drawing invalidity benefit) and 
suggested he look to his work activities to 
provide him with money. I can well 
understand that in the light of this the 
complainant may have felt that it was not
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open to him to submit a claim. The official 
maintained that if the complainant was 
dissatisfied and had persisted in his 
request for help, a full interview with an 
official from the supplementary benefit side 
of the office would have been arranged and a 
claim taken. But this is certainly not the 
impression gained by the complainant. No 
forms were made available to him and it 
seems to me that in the light of the strong 
suggestion that he was not entitled to 
benefit by an official who had already 
interviewed him in connection with the 
alleged fraud, the complainant cannot be 
blamed for believing that the issue was as 
good as decided. I consider that his 
conviction that he was denied the 
opportunity of making a formal claim for 
benefit and of having it properly determined 
was justified in the circumstances."(119)
In another case, where a fraud officer acted as a 
benefit officer, Sir Cecil Clothier was pleased to note 
that departmental instructions had been amended.(120)
-108-
(b) Pre-stated Opinion
The objection to this is similar in nature to the 
objection to previous involvement, ie the decision-maker 
is not coming to the process with an open-mind. However, 
this category does not require the person concerned to 
have had a previous connection with the case, or the 
parties, merely to have stated an opinion concerning it, 
or the matters dealt with in it.
The PCA has been somewhat thwarted in this area. 
Several cases have raised interesting points, but have 
been ruled as being outwith his jurisdiction.(121) For 
instance, a dentist complained about the panel constituted 
to consider up-grading his appointment to that of 
consultant. He alleged that two members of the panel had 
expressed opposition to the creation of such a post. Sir 
Idwal Pugh felt able to consider to review the appointment 
of the members, only to a limited extent:
"I have not seen sufficient independent 
evidence to substantiate the complainant's 
allegation that two of the members of the 
Committee were previously known to be 
opposed to the creation of a consultant post 
in dental radiology. But since it is not 
within my jurisdiction to investigate the 
way in which the decision of the Review 
Committee was reached I cannot in any case
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look into the allegation that the 
complainant's application was prejudiced by 
the attitude of individual members."(122)
It may well have been the case that the PCA would 
have been more critical of their appointment to the 
Committee if there had been more evidence.
Other possible cases have turned out to be merely 
misunderstandings. In one unfortunate case, it might be 
felt that the PCA did not probe deeply enough. A man 
complained of being classified as a seasonal worker, with 
consequent adverse effects to himself. He asserted that 
the Unemployment Benefit Office manager was prejudiced 
against seasonal workers in general, and himself in 
particular. He supported this claim by reference to a 
local newspaper which carried the manager's stated view 
that 'more and more seasonal workers had decided that life 
was easier if they just hung around for the winter and 
drew money from the State.' Thus the complainant alleged 
that the manager could not be expected to be impartial in 
matters relating to seasonal workers. The PCA appeared to 
accept the manager's explanation that he had been 
misquoted, and that it was not meant as an attack against 
genuine seasonal workers.(123) It is important to remember 
that the complainant's classification was the decision of 
the manager, but there was a suggestion that the his 
Unemployment Benefit Office could try to influence the 
Insurance Officer's decision. The PCA was satisfied that
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this was not the case here. There was no criticism of the 
rather unfortunate appearance of the misquotation, nor an 
attempt to establish whether the manager had sought to 
remedy the situation.
In another case it was alleged that the Minister of 
State had stated previously his opposition to the creation 
of any further National Parks. Sir Alan Marre was 
satisfied that this also had been a misunderstanding, in 
that the Minister had already stated, in reply to query, 
that this remark had been reported out of context, and 
that any such proposal would receive 'dispassionate, 
judicial appraisal on the basis of all the facts.'(124)
(c) Pecuniary Interest
The PCA deals with this particular form of interest 
very rarely, particularly in the form of an individual 
personal pecuniary interest on the part of the decision­
maker. In one case a complainant alleged that a DHSS 
official had formed an alliance with a local tradesman, 
and thus forced complainants to go to this tradesman if 
the DHSS were paying for the goods. The PCA believed the 
official's account (he was chosen as a reliable 'trouble­
shooter') that he had merely suggested that the tradesman 
in question offered good value for money. There was no 
question of any alliance.(125))
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(d) Conflict of Interest
This means that an interest in the outcome of the 
case, exists through another occupation or function of the 
decision-maker. In the department's case, it may be 
dealings with other government departments, or it may be 
at the personal level of the individual decision-maker.
In the second category, an illustrative example was 
where a complainant wrote a letter of complaint about the 
Official Receiver, to the Department of Trade and 
Industry. The Department's reply was signed by the person 
who was the subject of the complaint, acting in the 
capacity of his new position. The PCA was satisfied that 
there was 'nothing sinister' about this, but felt that it 
would have been better if another official had handled the 
matter.(126)
Sir Anthony Barrowclough dealt with a possible clash 
of capacity in a planning case, the complainant, an 
objector to the appeal, complained that the appellant's 
agent was an employee of the Property Services Agency 
[PSA], which was a government agency forming part of the 
Department of the Environment. Thus the complainant was 
concerned with the partiality of the inspector's decision. 
The PCA satisfied himself that the PSA had no operational 
link with the Department of the Environment (Central) and 
the Planning Inspectorate (the bodies concerned); 
secondly, the Planning Inspectorate was arranged so that
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there was no direct contact between the personnel of the 
unit and the departmental staff, and thus there could be 
little chance of the Inspector knowing the agent.(127) 
There appears to be more concern with actual bias, than 
with the appearance of bias here.
In the first category, dealings between government 
departments are usually viewed with suspicion on the 
complainant's part. This is particularly so, where it is 
one government department that has an interest in one 
side, or is in fact the other party in a planning case. In 
one such case, the Home Office [HO] sought to build a 
prison on surplus MOD land. After the inquiry, objectors 
made several complaints, including the allegation that 
there had been liaison between the departments. Sir Alan 
Marre outlined this objection and its basis, and gave his 
conclusions:
"The complainants believe that there 
must have been close collaboration between 
HO and DOE [Department of the Environment] 
on the planning issue - and by implication 
pre-judgment of it. They base their views on 
the fact that, when DOE were asked for an 
assurance that 'no officer of the Department 
of the Environment has by 
letter,telephone,orally or by other means 
been in communication with the Home Office 
or the Ministry of Defence or any other
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Government Department in relation to this 
matter [the proposed prison] without the 
knowledge of all the parties represented at 
the inquiry', they explained that they could 
not give a complete assurance of that kind 
in view of the range of the Department's 
activities.... I can understand the
feelings of local people about any proposal 
to site a prison in their midst and their 
suspicions that one government department 
might have been reluctant to reject the 
proposals of another. The variety of 
functions within DOE involved in this case 
tended to complicate matters and encourage 
the fears of objectors that departments and 
branches might arrange things*between 
themselves without due regard for the views 
that local residents might put forward. But 
I am satisfied from my detailed 
investigation of all aspects of the case 
that their suspicions of collusion, bias and 
failure to give proper consideration to all 
relevant evidence are without 
foundation."(128)
It would appear that at a departmental level, the PCA 
is satisfied that no bias enters the system by way of a 
conflict of interest. However, as illustrated above, on an
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individual basis, there is more likely to be a 
substantiated occurrence, although as of yet, there has 
not been a biased interest strong enough to be seen to 
affect the outcome of a process, and thus, the PCA has not 
questioned any decision taken, although he has suggested 
improvements in the various processes.
(e) Policy Considerations
In general, what is termed 'administrative1 or 
'departmental' bias elsewhere, is taken for granted in the 
PCA's work. Thus it has been assumed in the previous 
sections that the workings of administration, may prevent 
total impartiality. Mention has been made in the passing 
to the PCA's attitude to departmental/government policy. 
This will now be considered in more detail. As has been 
seen, the PCA sees himself as having no remit to consider 
the merits of government policy. Moving on, statutory 
provisions are unlikely to be challenged; unless they are 
made under statutory instrument, in which case there is 
the possibility of review under the 'bad rule' power.(129)
Policy may dictate that some form of 'discrimination' 
is part of the process. In one case the complaint was 
against the Manpower Services Commission [MSC], part of a 
Church's submission was that their application for 
assistance with a building project, had been turned down 
because the Church let CND use their halls. The PCA
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conducted his investigation and produced evidence that the 
Church's application had been unlikely to succeed from the 
outset. This had not been effectively conveyed to the 
Church by the MSC, nor had possible improvements in their 
scheme been explained to them. This proved there were 
viable reasons for refusal long before the mention of CND 
arose. However, the PCA also considered the allegations 
that the vicar had been closely questioned on one occasion 
about the CND's use of the hall, and the vicar felt that 
the impression that MSC would not fund a project involving 
that organisation had been conveyed to him. The PCA 
questioned the officer involved who stated that he had 
merely attempted to ascertain all groups who used the 
hall, and the extent of the CND's involvement therein. The 
PCA in his report evaluated whether this action was 
necessary for the official to perform his job properly - 
he concluded that it was. However, he did not stop there - 
he forwarded the following opinion:
"It seems to me quite possible, 
however, that in the charged atmosphere of 
the meeting the complainant may have 
misinterpreted the Link Officer's motive in 
asking about meetings held on the premises 
by the CND. As the complainant will no doubt 
now be aware from his having seen the 
'Sponsors and Agents Handbook' on the 
Community Programme, one of the criteria is
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that the projects must not bring the 
Community Programme into public controversy 
or disrepute by providing for or encouraging 
the organisation or participation in marches 
or demonstrations of any kind. I do not 
consider that if asked about the CND to 
establish the extent of their use of the 
church premises the Link Officer was doing 
anything outside his remit. The meeting 
ended with the Link Officer asking the 
Church - quite reasonably in my view - to 
provide written information on the matters 
of community use and financial 
support."(130)
However, the PCA will not condone arbitrary uses of 
power - the policy must be considered. A complainant ran 
an immigrants1 advice centre on a commercial basis. The 
Minister of State at the Home Office became increasingly 
worried about his activities, particularly his charges(on 
the basis of charging as much as he could) made for 
services that could be obtained free of charge for 
immigrants. After a meeting between the two, the Minister 
issued instructions that all immigration offices were to 
cease dealings with the complainant and his agency. The 
man complained to the PCA. Sir Idwal Pugh criticised some 
aspects of the decision:
"... I have seen no evidence to suggest
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that they considered that he had exceeded 
his powers. Nevertheless I consider the 
action to have been hasty and ill-judged.
The evidence which was held to justify such 
a serious step was not fully established and 
the intention was expressed without full 
consideration of the problems it might 
create for the Home Office to modify their 
attitude and eventually to decide that they 
should no longer distinguish the complainant 
from other paid agents or intermediaries in 
the immigration field."(131)
It would appear that if the policy is consistently 
applied, and can be justified; and if the PCA does not 
think that it is a 'bad rule*, then he will not criticise 
it. However, if it is seen to be arbitrary, he may be more 
critical - although government policy is beyond his remit.
CONCLUSION
This Chapter has attempted to illustrate the 
complaints concerning lack of impartiality investigated by 
the PCA. It would be fair to say that in many of the 
categories the PCA acts merely to reassure the individual 
complainant, that the procedure followed throughout the 
case was correct, or not as the case may be.
In contrast the area of inconsistency within one case
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has developed a conscious identity as a clear type of 
fault within the PCA's reports. This is an interesting 
development. It is also interesting to note that the PCA 
accepts that there will always be a certain amount of 
inherent bias within the administrative process. It is a 
matter of deciding on the acceptable level for this, and 
censuring the cases where these levels have been breached.
The same approach will now be taken as regards the 
PCA'S consideration of complaints alleging a breach of the 
duty to consult.
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CHAPTER FOUR THE PCA AND THE DUTY TO CONSULT
This Chapter deals with the PCA's response to errors 
within the consultation processes. It is difficult to 
specify what type of consultation processes are involved 
generally, as they cover a wide ambit. Not surprisingly, 
planning procedures used by the Department of the 
Environment, such as planning inquiries involving members 
of the public are prominent. Quite often it can be seen as 
a tri-party situation, where the department's role may be 
of 'arbitrating' between a member of the public and a 
local authority, or between two members of the public.
As in Chapter Three the approach to presenting 
information is to elucidate the empirical caseload being 
conducted on a day-to-day basis by the PCA's office. 
Quotations are given from the PCA'S reports to illustrate 
the approach adopted by him. The classification of errors 
follows the pattern of the consultation process, starting 
with Notification (Section I); through decisions as to 
persons entitled to be consulted (Section II); and 
finishing with the quality of the actual hearing (Section 
III).
-120-
Section I - The Initial Stages
(a) Absence of Prior Notice
This occurs where persons concerned or affected by a 
decision are not in fact informed of the start, or the 
existence of the decision-making process. For instance, 
failure to inform a person of their right of appeal, would 
be considered a fault by the PCA.(l) These cases however, 
usually deal with an established right of appeal, usually 
set down in statutory provisions. Where there are no such 
statutory grounds, the PCA is less clear about when prior 
notification should be granted.
If statutory provisions do not allow for consultation, 
or even notification, then the PCA may not always 
criticise their absence. In one case, an investigation was 
conducted into an incident at an airport involving the 
pilot complainant.(2) He only learnt of this inquiry as a 
result of one of his passengers being contacted. The PCA 
accepted the explanation that the Department of Trade & 
Industry had not contacted the complainant at the time, as 
there was some doubt as to the identity of the pilot( he 
was in fact told 4 months later ).
In another case, Sir Alan Marre explained why he felt 
that the lack of consultation of the owner of a building, 
which is about to be listed as being of special 
architectural or historic interest, is not
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maladministration,as there was no statutory provision for 
consultation; that the question had been aired in 
Parliament, where the Government explained that the 
anticipated problems of tracing owners etc. could mean 
delays; and that it was a 'matter for expert judgment 
based on national standards, and not one for negotiation 
with the owner.(3)
However, in another case, although there was no 
statutory provision for consultation, the Department of 
Education and Science had a practice of allowing 21 days 
for representations, however there were no provisions for 
informing affected parties of this opportunity.(4) Sir 
Idwal Pugh was critical of this:
"By the Department's own standards the 
complainants have reason to feel that they 
were denied natural justice, and I criticise 
DES for failing to make adequate 
arrangements for representations to be 
made."(5)
Sir Idwal Pugh considered that where there was a 
choice as regards the statutory procedures to adopt, the 
route allowing objections should be preferred were 
possible.(6)
Even a deviation from normal procedure may not be 
totally criticised - particularly if the PCA felt that it 
did not affect the outcome.(7)
Sir Cecil Clothier, however, was highly critical of
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the Department of the Environment for the administrative 
fbungling!, which allowed cottages to be demolished before 
the local people had a chance to air their views at a 
public inquiry:
11 The cottages have now been demolished.
Whether in breach of their statutory 
obligations or not, the Council have had 
their way, since the Department could not or 
would not do anything to stop them. Any 
opportunity that the local residents might 
have had to make representations against the 
demolition by way of public inquiry has been 
lost for ever. This has been a deplorable 
failure by a Government Department to attend 
properly to the legitimate interests of the 
private citizen. There is now no way in 
which the Department can restore the status 
quo ante."(8)
Administrative difficulties may excuse absence of 
consultation in some cases. Sir Idwal Pugh considered 
whether the local community should have been consulted 
before a local site was offered by the Home Office, as an 
alternative venue to the organisers of a pop festival:
"The Home Office have explained to me that 
they took the view that there was no point 
in engaging in local consultations until 
there was a positive possibility that a
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particular site might be offered and 
accepted. And they have told me it was not 
possible to convey to the festival 
organisers the offer of the Watchfield site, 
and the conditions on which the offer was 
made, before 16 July 1975, less than six 
weeks before the festival was due to begin.
They say that, with time for the necessary 
preparations to be made already so short, 
consultation with the people of Watchfield 
at that stage would have effectively 
precluded the use of the site. I accept 
their reasoning in principle, but I have 
sought to establish whether the decision to 
offer the Watchfield site could have been 
reached before it was.....
I am satisfied that it was never part 
of the Home Office*s policy that local 
interests should be deprived of the 
opportunity to express their views. By the 
time the possible use of the site had become 
a reality, any further delay would have 
effectively prevented the festival from 
taking place there.*'(9)
However, failure to consult possible buyers in a 
discretionary sale of land amounted to maladministration 
in the opinion of the PCA.(IO) Here, an adjoining strip of
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land which was offered for sale, was only offered to one 
neighbour, who had approached the Department - no 
inquiries were made as to the interest of other 
neighbours.
Also, Sir Cecil Clothier was uneasy about the 
practice of not informing objectors in written 
representation proceedings, of the date of the site visit, 
and was happy to note that the Department had changed this 
practice so that in the case of written representations, 
and where there is a request to the effect, they will 
inform an interested party of the arrangements for the 
site visit. It was, however, emphasised, that the 
inspector cannot listen to representations as to the 
merits of the appeal.(11)
Sir Anthony Barrowclough also thought there was a 
duty to consult a complainant before the IR agreed 
partnership accounts for tax purposes with his ex­
partner. (12)
Sir Idwal Pugh felt that there was a duty to consult 
if the department have given assurances to that effect(13) 
It would appear that the later PCAs were more 
cautious of letting the department have a free rein.
Thus, it would appear that total absence of information 
about a process or decision, unless there is statutory 
authority for this, will be, in the PCA's opinion, a fault 
in the process. He obviously feels that it is not for him 
to consider the merits of the statutory provisions, though
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as has been seen, he may investigate whether there are 
reasons for its exclusion.
(b) Inadequacy of Prior Notice
(i) Process
Notification, in itself, may not be enough. Prior 
notification can only be effective if it is adequate in 
content. One form of inadequacy would be not allowing 
enough time between notification and the event, thus 
ensuring that affected persons have enough time to prepare 
to participate in the process. This may not be the fault 
of the department. In one case, the department were merely 
giving effect to EEC regulations where the lack of warning 
was deliberate to prevent a rush of imports.(14)
What is regarded as adequate notice will depend on the 
type of case, and the circumstances involved. For 
instance, a claimant was given less than one week's notice 
of the date of an appeal tribunal despite having requested 
that this period should be given, to allow his 
representative to arrange to be there.(15) In another 
case, eight months' notice of the introduction of new 
regulations regarding the size of fishing nets, was 
considered adequate under the administrative 
circumstances, by Sir Idwal Pugh:
"My officers discussed with the Department
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whether the possibility of deferring the 
introduction of the measures had been 
considered. It was explained that it was in 
any case delayed for legislative reasons by 
three months, to 1 October 1976. This 
roughly coincided with the new sprat season 
and the Department said that further delay 
would not only have run contrary to the 
NEAFC recommendations but would have further 
aggravated the fish stock position. Bearing 
in mind that the United Kingdom had been to 
the forefront in proposing conservation 
measures to assist an urgent situation, I 
think charges of inconsistency could have 
been justifiably made if the implementation 
of the measures had been further 
delayed."(16)
Sir Cecil Clothier was also worried by a case where
the complainant could have been given more warning as to
the likely possibility that his driving licence would be
revoked. He recognised the need to act quickly in the
interests of safety, once the decision had been taken; but 
he criticised the Department for not giving a clear 
indication as to what the process might entail, given the 
important nature of driving licence to the average 
individual.(17)
The PCA will take a broad view of the attempt to
-127-
notify interested parties. For instance, in one case 
concerning the routeing of a motorway, part of the 
complaint was that not all the objectors had been 
notified.(18) The PCA's investigations revealed that the 
Department had sent out 4,500 letters, and that it was not 
a ground for a finding of maladministration on the part of 
the Department, if some of these letters were not 
subsequently received.
In another case, the publicity arrangements for the 
introduction of a mobility allowance were reviewed, and 
Sir Idwal Pugh found them to be adequate; they entailed 
circulating information to doctors and health authorities; 
making a leaflet available to the general public; and 
including references to the scheme in general information 
publications.(19)
He also appeared happy with the arrangement whereby 
the decision as to who receives notification was left to 
the local planning authority. The complainant in one case 
lived some 500 yards from the site. He was aggrieved that 
he did not receive personal notification of the inquiry - 
he did not see the notices and the advertisements placed 
in the Press. He learnt of it from other residents. The 
PCA did not feel that the Department was at fault, despite 
the fact that the complainant had felt that he had not 
adequately prepared his case as a result.(20)
Sir Alan Marre also supported the proposition that it 
was not the duty of the inspector to the inquiry to
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ascertain whether adequate notice was given.(21)
Sir Cecil Clothier dealt with a complaint that a 
public notice under the Town & Country Planning Act 1971 
had not been correctly displayed, and that the Department 
of the Environment, although informed, did not do anything 
about it. He was not critical of the posting methods, or 
the means of verifying such, but he criticised severely, 
the lack of response to the idea of independently checking 
this notice after the complaint was received.(22)
It would appear that if a reasonable attempt is made 
to disseminate information, then the PCA will be 
happy.(23)
The notification process does not need to include 
direct consultation about the inquiry date.(24) However, 
the maximum amount of notification possible must be given: 
11 In my view, the procedure for agreeing 
time and place first with the promoters... 
is sensible, and I do not accept that it 
prejudiced the interests of the objectors. I 
do, however, think that as soon as agreement 
had been reached, the objectors should have 
been notified at once. I also consider that 
an objector would not necessarily know that, 
if his objection was maintained, an inquiry 
was bound to be held and that therefore he 
could begin preparing his case immediately, 
without risk of wasting time and money."(25)
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Again, any statutory provisions will be accepted by 
the PCA.(26)
(ii) Content
Not only must there be adequate notice given, 
but the content of the notice must give the necessary 
information to the recipient. The PCA was critical in one 
case where the notification did not give full guidelines 
to a complainant, on how to proceed with his claim for 
compensation.(27)
SECTION II - Pre-Hearing Decisions
(a) Entitlement to be Heard
A further question to be answered in the initial 
stages is, who is entitled to present written or oral 
questions. This moves into the consultation process - who 
is entitled to be consulted not just notified. Although 
obviously this section has some bearing on the previous 
one.
The first consideration is who should be consulted?
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(i) Parties to be consulted.
It has already been established that some parties, such 
as owners of potential listed buildings, do not have the 
right to be consulted.(28) Other areas may be more 
ambiguous, particularly those dealing with non-statutory 
objectors, ie where there is no definite right to be 
consulted, contained within the relevant statute. Sir 
Idwal Pugh expressed satisfaction with the policy of one 
department in relation to such objections to compulsory 
purchase orders:
,f It is the Department's policy to arrange 
an inquiry even when they are not 
statutorily bound to do so, if otherwise 
they might offend public opinion. This seems 
to me to be a reasonable policy provided 
proper consideration is given to the balance 
between the interests of those with 
statutory rights and those with none. I am 
satisfied from my investigation that the 
Department gave careful consideration to all 
factors, including the knowledge that both 
the complainant and the council had reasons 
for wanting an early decision, before 
concluding that that balance in this case 
required an inquiry. And I see that the 
inspector felt that there were a number of
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objections which were relevant to the matter 
he had to decide. I see no grounds, 
therefore, for questioning the Department's 
decision to hold the inquiry."(29)
In one unusual case, Sir Anthony Barrowclough 
considered the position of a special group of objectors. 
The complainants were the owners of a property, their 
tenant appealed against an enforcement order served on 
him. To be considered as 'principal parties' (with 
associated rights) to the appeal, the complainants would 
have had to exercise their statutory right of appeal 
against the enforcement notice; however that would have 
appeared to be supporting the tenant, which was contrary 
to their purpose. The PCA recognised their dilemma, and 
their 'right* to a more important role in the proceedings, 
and was able to secure from the department an assurance 
that the procedure will be changed to allow people such as 
the complainants to be treated as 'principal parties' if 
they so request.(30)
It may be difficult to decide which 'interested 
parties* to consult. Another unusual situation arose, 
whereby , when an appeal had been remitted to the 
Secretary of State for re-hearing and determination by the 
High Court, the third party objectors had not been given 
the opportunity of making further representations, 
although their original objections were considered afresh. 
Sir Idwal Pugh was uneasy about this situation:
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"But I have seen that it is the opinion of 
the Department's solicitor and Legal Adviser 
that the Secretary of State was under no 
legal obligation to extend to the 
complainants the opportunity of making 
further representations in the circumstances 
of this case. The Lord Chancellor's Office 
have not dissented from that view. It is 
clear that the question whether third 
parties should have been given the 
opportunity to make further objections was 
not considered when preparations were being 
made after the Court Order had been issued.
I think it was unfortunate that the 
Committee were not given the opportunity to 
comment again and while I do not question 
the Department's decision in this case I am 
glad to see that the case has led the 
Department to think carefully about the 
position of third parties where an appeal is 
remitted for re-hearing and that they have 
come to the conclusion that, where the 
interests of third parties are affected by 
the issues on which further representations 
are made by the principal parties, the 
Secretary of State may not be justified in 
relying upon the absence of legal rights of
such persons."(31)
Sir Alan Marre considered that an Allotment 
Association should have been consulted before the 
appropriation of allotment land between two councils.(The 
assurance that they would be so consulted was 
overlooked)(32) Also, he felt that consolidated local 
opinion should have been considered when a decision was 
being taken on whether to amalgamate medical 
practices.(33)
This was a consistent view held by Marre ie that if 
specific groups exist representing a relevant interest, 
then those bodies should be included in the consultation 
process; for example in one case, although M.P.s, and the 
Airport Consultative Committee (which included local 
authority representatives) were consulted, the local 
authorities directly affected, and local amenity groups 
were not. The PCA held this worthy of criticism.(34)
However, such associations need only be consulted if 
their interests are not effectively represented by other 
groups. In one case, a yacht club complained that it had 
not been consulted before the construction of mooring 
facilities. Sir Alan Marre decided that their interests 
had been represented by another organisation, and as such 
it was not necessary for the Department to consult the 
club as well.(35)
In the same vein, Sir Alan Marre accepted that 
individuals could not expect to be consulted on some
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matters, if it could be assumed that their interests would 
be represented by a trade association or similar.(36)
Sir Idwal Pugh supported this in a later case.(37)
However, failure to consult by local authorities 
whilst making plans for the local educational system, does 
not give the Department of Education & Science the right 
to reject their proposals.(38)
Entitlement to be heard, in the PCA's opinion, would 
appear to depend on the subject-matter of the case. For 
instance in one case, the complainants noted that the 
Department of the Environment was willing to hold an 
inquiry to hear objections to the use of a rugby ground as 
a site for a new school; but they refused to hold an 
inquiry to hear representations about the use of an 
alternative site.(39) The PCA explained the distinction 
was due to the Secretary of State's statutory obligation 
to approve proposals to amend a Development Plan in the 
former case, as opposed to his discretion to call in for 
his own decision an application for planning permission, 
for which the local planning authority is usually 
responsible, which in the latter case, he had decided not 
to exercise.(40)
(ii) At what stage in the process?
The PCA can be concerned with when consultations are 
instigated. Obviously in some cases objectors will have
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less chance of influencing or changing decisions, if the 
decision-making process is well advanced when they are 
consulted, rather than if it is in its infancy. Where 
there is room for discretion, Sir Alan Marre seemed to 
favour as early a consultation as possible.(41)
However, Sir Alan Marre also made it clear in another 
case that he was also aware of administrative difficulties 
involved in consultation procedures.(42) The case involved 
compulsory purchase of land for a motorway. The route was 
divided into five sections, each dealt with by a separate 
public inquiry. It was open to objectors to raise the 
question of the broad strategy for the motorway, at any of 
these inquiries. However, one inquiry was concluded and 
draft compulsory purchase orders (CPOs) published, before 
the inquiry into the next direct section commenced. The 
objectors felt that this prejudiced their chances of 
altering the route proposed. Sir Alan Marre acknowledged 
this, but felt that this was an inevitable consequence:
11 The Secretary of State has made the point 
that it is possible, at each stage, to 
challenge the broad strategy of the line as 
a whole. While I accept this, it is self- 
evident that as each section is determined, 
the chance of successfully challenging the 
line as a whole becomes progressively more 
difficult. Nevertheless I recognise that 
there are sound practical reasons for
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determining the line of a major new highway 
section by sectionj and, even though the end 
points of a section may, to all intents and 
purposes, already have been determined, 
there remains scope for objectors to canvass 
variations of the line between those 
points."(43)
(b) Form of Hearing
Having decided who should be consulted and when, the 
next stage in the process is to decide in what form the 
hearing should take place - oral or written 
representations.
The PCA receives complaints that no opportunity was 
given for an oral hearing. In the absence of statutory 
requirements, the PCA appears happy to accept the 
department's discretionary decision, as to whether an oral 
hearing is necessary. The usual guidelines are whether the 
individual case was complicated enough to warrant an oral 
hearing. This tends to rely on the departmental view of 
the detail required, rather than the complainant's, who 
may feel that their objections have not been fully aired 
without an inquiry.(44) This was summarised by Sir Alan 
Marre in one case:
" I accept as a fact that Ministers 
receive numerous requests to see individuals
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and representative bodies, and it is a 
matter within their discretion which of 
these requests they meet. In the present 
case the Financial Secretary to the Treasury 
had before him information and advice 
submitted by officials of H.M. Customs and 
Excise, without intervention of Treasury 
officials. This was in accordance with
normal practice  I am satisfied that he
knew, from these official submissions, what 
were the main reasons for the Association's 
grievance, and how they thought the 
situation might be remedied. He also knew 
that the remedies suggested by the 
Association... had been referred to in the 
course of Parliamentary debates, and that 
the proposal to zero-rate the carriage of 
passengers in licensed taxis had been taken 
to a Division in the House of Commons and 
defeated. Against this background he 
concluded that a meeting of Treasury 
Ministers now with representatives of the 
Association would not serve any useful 
purpose."(45)
Considerable local interest in the subject, may well 
convince the relevant department that a local inquiry will 
be desirable to allow public feeling to be aired on the
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matter.(46)
The PCA also appreciates why the written procedure is 
perceived to be disadvantageous from a non-statutory 
objector's viewpoint:
"The complainant said that he was left in 
ignorance of the detailed arguments on which 
the Secretary of State's decision was based.
Under the written representation procedure, 
third parties are not given the opportunity 
to comment on the arguments of the other 
parties. And given that the procedure was 
intended, in appropriate cases, to be a 
means of reducing the delay in getting 
decisions on appeals, I do not think the 
argument could be sustained that all parties 
ought to be permitted to comment on other 
representations."(47)
Sir Cecil Clothier appreciated that such a decision
may give the wrong impression, but that a decision not to
hold a public inquiry, could be justified on 
administrative efficiency grounds, in that it would not 
add to the sum total of the department's knowledge of the 
situation.(48)
This also applies to the choice of the type of oral 
hearing eg the choice between a planning inquiry 
commission [PIC] and a public local inquiry.(49) In one 
case dealing with a proposed petro-chemical terminal, the
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Department's advice to the Secretary of State, was 
accepted by Sir Idwal Pugh. The advice was that:
"it recommended that, instead, there should 
be a public local inquiry of the more normal 
kind. This was because, in the Department's 
view, all the planning, economic, safety and 
other arguments could be properly examined 
and evaluated at a normal inquiry, and 
important though the proposed development 
was to the objectors, it was not of so novel 
or unusual a nature as to require such an 
unprecedented, expensive and time-consuming 
procedure as a PIC. A note could be issued 
to all concerned indicating the matters on 
which the Secretary of State would hope the 
inquiry to concentrate, but this would not 
rule out the raising of other matters, eg 
the availability of other suitable 
sites."(50)
An oral hearing may not be granted if the department 
feels that there has been adequate opportunity to present 
written representations, particularly in busy areas such 
as immigration matters(51)
However, in a tax case, Sir Cecil Clothier felt that 
the Collector had not fulfilled his duty to satisfy 
himself of one side of the case, before reaching a 
decision as to whether the employer or the employee should
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pay the back tax:
" I accept that there is a great deal 
of information in the papers which were 
before the Collector at the LA[London 
Account Office], It is contained however in 
reports of meetings written by Revenue 
officials and not in documents originating 
from the company themselves. I doubt 
therefore whether the Collector can be said 
to have fully discharged his duty of being 
required to be ’satisfied by the 
e m p l o y e r i f  he has made no attempt to hear 
their side of the story or to let them try 
to discharge the burden of satisfying him
that they had taken reasonable care....
.... the Chairman explained that 
although he accepted that natural justice 
required that the employer should have every 
reasonable opportunity of presenting his 
case, the best legal advice available to the 
Revenue was that the phrase ’satisfied by 
the employer* did not require the Collector 
to conduct an oral hearing. The Chairman 
said that his advice was that the statutory 
powers enabled the Collector to exercise his 
discretion on the basis of written material. 
Therefore, as long as the Collector who made
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the decision satisfied himself that the 
employer had been approached by, and had 
given his explanation to, another Collector 
(and provided that there were no unresolved 
doubts in his mind about the circumstances), 
he was in a position to discharge the duty 
laid on him."(52)
The other main point that can be established is that 
where there is discretion, the onus would appear to be on 
the complainant to seek an oral hearing, rather than it 
being the department* duty to offer one.(53) However, 
departments are expected to pick up on such requests. Sir 
Alan Marre dealt with a number of complaints concerning 
the authorisation of Vehicle Testing Stations.(54) In one 
such case, he expressed concern that the Department had 
not offered an interview to one affected owner, when it 
should have been clear that he was, in fact, requesting 
such a hearing.(55)
It should be noted that a chance to put your case in 
person, may not amount to a 'hearing* - merely a 
representation. The difference was explained in another 
case dealing with the withdrawal of an appointment as a 
MOT test examiner:
"The Department have told me that the 
regulations allow representations to be made 
against the withdrawal of an authorisation, 
but there is no formal hearing of the
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'appeals1 as such... Most 'appellants' 
submit only written representations, but if 
they ask to present their case in person 
their requests are accepted. It would appear 
that both the complainant and his accountant 
were under the impression that a formal 
hearing would take place, where the evidence 
would be presented as in court. This may 
well have led to a misunderstanding between 
them and the Department when discussing the 
complainant's 'appeal'. The Department have 
said that one of their staff recalls a 
telephone conversation with the complainant 
in which he asked if he could be present at 
a 'hearing'; he was advised to put his 
request in writing, but there is no record 
of a subsequent written request. It might 
have been more helpful had the complainant 
been told clearly that there would not be a 
hearing as such, but that representations in 
person could be made to the Department if he 
wished, subject to the necessary 
arrangements being made."(56)
Another consideration is whether the inquiry should be 
open to the public, or its findings made available to the 
public, or whether the matter should simply be dealt with 
by an internal inquiry. Again, this would appear to depend
on whether the Department considers it would add any 
further information.(57)
Conversely, it has been argued by complainants that 
an oral hearing was unnecessary, and that a decision could 
be reached without it. This was the point in an 
immigration case; Sir Cecil Clothier felt, however, that 
independent adjudication is preferable to internal 
adjudication by the Home Office.(58)
(c) Duty of Adequate Disclosure of Information
This section can be divided into two sub-sections - 
the first is the basic right to know the case against you 
- the need for initial basic information about the nature 
of the decision. The second is the right to know all the 
facts that will be considered in the decision-making 
process, in order that your submissions can contain 
comments on all considerations. The distinction is perhaps 
one of some sophistication.
(i) The right to know the case against you.
The PCA is keen that the reasons why an unfavourable 
decision is to be taken, should be made clear. This has 
been highlighted clearly in cases where personal loss to 
the complainant is concerned. For instance, in one case a 
local authority employee's work on road safety was
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criticised, with the effect that the Department of the 
Environment withdrew the road safety grant to the Local 
Authority - thus rendering the employee unemployed. Sir 
Alan Marre made the following criticism:
11 But I have also pointed out that the 
complainant and the Borough Council had been 
of the opinion that the Council’s road 
safety arrangements complied with the 
Department’s requirements, and that at no 
time before the Department reached their 
decision had they been informed of the 
specific respects in which the Department 
judged their arrangements to be inadequate, 
or of their view that the complainant’s 
other road safety preoccupations might be 
affecting his contribution ter the Borough.
This omission seems to me to have been 
unfortunate since it meant that the 
complainant could not consider or advise his 
Council, with full knowledge whether there 
were grounds for challenging the 
Department’s views on what changes might be 
proposed in light of these views."(59)
Although this complaint is more often found in 
personal cases as above, it can also apply where numerous 
people are affected by a decision, such as in planning 
cases. Sir Alan Marre upheld a complaint that insufficient
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information had been given as regards details, such as the 
height of proposed embankments, for the complainants to 
fully understand what was being undertaken.(60) Sir Idwal 
Pugh was particularly scathing of Departmental 
insensitivity, where such plans were such that lay-people 
would have difficulty in understanding what exactly was 
proposed:
"I have myself examined the plans... and I 
conclude that it would have been beyond the 
wit of most to trace the pedestrian route 
across the interchange. The Department told 
me that they could not see the difficulty 
but I think that attitude shows a lack of
understanding.....  In these circumstances
it seems to me that it is reasonable for the 
Department to adopt as helpful an attitude 
as possible when responding to requests for, 
and questions about, plans supporting 
statutory orders."(61)
However, the PCA also accepts that there may be other 
administrative concerns. This was illustrated in a case 
where the Department of Trade refused to authorise the 
complainant as being eligible for appointment as a company 
auditor:
"It seemed to me that in a situation like 
this it would have been in accordance with 
the principles of natural justice to give
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the applicant a fairly full explanation of 
the doubts, so that he could have the 
opportunity, by producing his own counter­
arguments, of trying to remove them. The 
Department tell me that they would indeed 
have liked to follow such a course, but felt 
that they could not do so without breaking
confidentiality with the referees.....
This case has highlighted a conflict 
between two principles, each in itself 
important. On the one hand the principle of 
fairness to the individual requires that he 
should not normally be judged on the 
strength of information which he has had no 
opportunity to comment on. Otherwise the 
risk of a decision which may be unjust to 
him is enhanced. On the other hand, the 
principle of the public interest may require 
that information should be obtained which 
can only be obtained on a promise of 
confidentiality. I am satisfied that, in 
deciding that priority must be accorded to 
the second of these two principles, even 
though they would have liked to tell the 
complainant of the reasons for their doubts, 
the Department gave proper weight to the 
arguments and I do not feel justified in
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criticising their decision."(62)
Non-disclosure of exact allegations or suspicions 
against a complainant, has been upheld where the 
administrative process requires it. For instance, it is 
standard Inland Revenue practice not to disclose to the 
taxpayer which sources of his income they suspect that he 
has not disclosed. Sir Alan Marre supported this practice, 
as being justified in the circumstances, as to disclose 
the particular sources may lead to the taxpayer continuing 
to withhold other sources.(63)
A later PCA was not happy, however, that a couple 
were not told which offence the Customs & Excise suspected 
them of perpetrating at the start of their interview, 
despite the fact that they issued a caution under the 
Judges* Rules. He did not support the Department’s view 
that they did not want to ’put all their cards on the 
table at once.*(64)
Another administrative problem in this area, is the 
use of anonymous information. This is common in Inland 
Revenue cases, where investigations are sometimes based on 
anonymous information supplied to them. Sir Alan Marre*s 
view was that this was a necessary part of the IR's 
function ie to seek to check that all legally due tax has 
been assessed and collected.(65)
Sir Cecil Clothier was unhappy about an Inland Revenue 
case where the Department refused to tell the complainants 
the source of their information (when it was known to
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them, and when they could have been expected it to have 
been possibly unreliable as the source was the 
complainant's ex-wife):
"I therefore find it difficult to accept 
that their withholding of this evidence best 
served the interests of a negotiated 
settlement, or, given its provenance, those 
of natural justice."(66)
However, both these elements were severely criticised 
by Sir Idwal Pugh, in a D.H.S.S. case, where an anonymous 
allegation that the complainant was working and claiming 
benefit, actually concerned another person with the same 
name, but as the nature of the allegation was not 
explained to him the mistake persisted; the eventual 
result was that the complainant collapsed under the 
strain.(67)
(ii) Disclosure of Necessary Information
In general, the PCA supports the proposition that each 
party should have the full facts and documentation before 
them.(68) However, he does accept that there are limits as 
to the amount of information that can be made available.
An illustrative case occurred during Sir Idwal Pugh's 
time; he outlined the situation, a prisoner carried out a 
prolonged correspondence in an attempt to elicit answers 
from forensic scientists, who gave evidence at his trial.
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He believed that this information was vital to his 
appeal.(69) Sir Idwal Pugh concluded that there had to be 
limitations:
,fIn my view, the complainant's request to be 
informed of details of all the cases in 
which one of the forensic scientists who had 
given evidence at his trial had appeared as 
a prosecution witness over a five year 
period... was not a reasonable one for him 
to make. I would naturally expect the Home 
Office to show a proper concern to ensure 
that the rights of appellants - indeed of 
all prisoners - were protected, but I 
recognise that they have a responsibility to 
allocate their resources in the manner best 
calculated to serve the interests of all 
prisoners. This implies that they must make 
judgments in individual cases as to whether 
the administrative time and cost involved in 
complying with a particular prisoner's 
request are justified. I do not criticise 
the judgment they made in this 
instance."(70)
Nor will he support claims for disclosure of 
information, if the information is considered confidential 
(as seen above). For instance, the PCA did not feel it was 
necessary to disclose the amounts of betterment levy paid
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on other properties in the complainant's area, 
particularly as an offer of a general discussion on the
subject had been offered to him.(71)
An alternative to non-disclosure, would be selective
disclosure. Sir Idwal Pugh was of the opinion that only
justifiable changes/adjustments to information should be 
made in the interests of confidentiality. In one 
particular case, he was unhappy about a report of an 
incident, which blamed the complainant, an air traffic 
controller, a copy of which was supplied to this man. As a
result of which he had been sacked by his employers:
"But a comparison of the two versions shows 
that there are differences, other than the 
simple omission of names, for which I have 
not received a satisfactory explanation. I 
consider that the carrying out of such a
revision, and the despatch of the revised
copy for the complainant without ensuring 
that it was made clear to him that the 
report differed from the original in more 
than the mere omission of names, was not an 
example of good administration, and I 
criticise it accordingly."(72)
Commercial confidentiality is another consideration.
In one case,Sir Anthony Barrowclougli considered whether 
objectors should have been give certain information; he 
accepted that the department had given due consideration
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to the matter, and had reasonably come to the conclusion 
that disclosure of the requested information could benefit 
one of the party's competitors.(73)
However, Sir Idwal Pugh held that confidentiality 
could be taken too far on occasions:
" The Department hold the view that when 
they receive approaches from industry these 
should be treated in confidence and not 
normally disclosed to other parties unless 
the firm or association making the approach 
wishes this to be done. This seems to me to 
be a reasonable general principle, 
particularly in respect of approaches from 
individual firms. In the case of 
associations, however, it seems reasonable 
to assume that they are likely to inform 
their members of the outcome of any 
discussions and, therefore, that the same 
degree of confidentiality need not 
apply...."(74)
A major problem area is in the position of medical 
reports. There are cases, mainly within the D.H.S.S. 
ambit, where full disclosure of the medical opinion may be 
harmful to the patient - this, of course, presents 
problems when the condition is discussed by a tribunal.
The Pensions Appeal Tribunal [PAT] Rules dealt with this 
occurrence; and Sir Alan Marre expressed his approval of
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their provisions, and in cases of complainant, sought to 
assure himself that they had been properly complied with 
in that case.(75) These allow the appellant's 
representative to have full access - it merely restricts 
the information given to the appellant himself.
Though Sir Cecil Clothier was happy to record that 
even fuller information and submissions were to be made 
available to PATs, after an investigation, even though he 
had made no criticism of the previous policy.(76)
In other cases he is happy if a department base the 
disclosure of medical information on the basis of 'the 
bounds of normal professional practice.1(77) However, each 
case must be dealt with on its own merits,eg the removal 
of the word 'cancer* from a report led the complainant to 
think that inaccurate information had been presented, 
whereas it was an attempt to 'protect* him. This was in 
fact, unnecessary in his case.(78)
In some cases, the PCA may feel that there is no 
justification in allowing access to the department's 
medical opinion, if the appellant is supplying his own 
medical opinion; if the same evidence has been available 
to both parties, from which to draw their conclusions.(79) 
Access to the documentation of the other side can 
also be a contentious issue. On the one hand, the 
complainant feels that he has not been able to answer the 
other side's case effectively, if denied access to their 
comments on his case. On the other, the administrative
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process must be kept within a time-limit, so that the 
process of countering the other side's arguments does not 
continue interminably.
In Sir Alan Marre's term of office, problems involving 
the intervention (or non-intervention) of the Secretary of 
State for Education, in disputes Local Education 
Authorities(LEAs) and parents, were quite common. Often 
the objectors complained that the Department had not given 
them the opportunity to to see the comments of the LEA as 
regards their objections, and thus, deprived them of 
making further comment if necessary. These complaints were 
often couched in strong terms, such as "if justice was to 
be seen to be done....”(80); & "contravention of that 
part of natural justice proclaimed in *audi alter 
partem"(81)
However, Sir Alan Marre accepted the Department's 
legal opinion that this was not necessary under the 
relevant legislation(82):
"On the basis of this advice, the Department 
confirmed that it was not their normal 
practice to supply objectors with copies of 
the authority's replies. The Department's 
practice, which I do not find unreasonable, 
is only to pass the authority's comments to 
an objector if it is found essential in 
order to enable the Secretary of State to 
reach a proper decision or if the authority
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have no objection."(83)
In another case, he also accepted the associated 
administrative difficulties as a suitable reason for not 
allowing this course of action. This extract sets out the 
scale of the task involved.
" By passing on these comments they would, 
by implication, be affording objectors an 
opportunity of making further 
representations; and the department's legal 
advice is that this would involve affording 
a suitable opportunity to every individual 
objector, so that it would not be sufficient 
to pass on the comments only to the person 
organising the petition. In many cases, 
objections to proposals under Section 13 are 
numerous, and authorities do not always 
relate their comments to specific 
objections, but comment on the issues raised 
by them. The Department consider that the 
process of relating the comments made by a 
local education authority to particular 
objections and then passing them on to each 
individual objector would add very 
substantially to the already heavy burden of 
work in handling Section 13 proposals and 
would lead to quite unacceptable delays in 
disposing of them. The petition forwarded by
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the solicitors in July 1972 had itself 18
signatories But the Department tell me
there were six other objections to proposals 
relating to the grammar school and 
altogether 3,706 individuals objected to the 
proposals, while the total number of 
individuals objecting to all the proposals 
for the reorganisation of education in the 
borough was 34,061."(84)
Sir Cecil Clothier accepted that administrative 
difficulties will mean that not every procedure is 
absolutely perfect - in one case he recognised these 
problems with the 'written representations' procedure - in 
that it would have to be accepted that one party cannot be 
sure that all their representations are seen by the other 
side and the inspector, but this was not reason enough to 
advocate changes in the system.(85)
In some cases, the PCA may not criticise a department 
for not providing supporting information in their 
published statement of case, before an inquiry, if they 
know that the information will be out-of-date, or not 
available until the inquiry, if the postponement of the 
inquiry would cause unnecessary delay, and all other 
available information has been issued.(86) The PCA will 
not criticise the department, if it is not their fault 
that the documents are not present.(87)
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Section III Quality of the Hearing
(a) The Procedure of The Hearing
(i) The Right to be Heard by the Tribunal
This may have been decided prior to the actual hearing 
(see Entitlement to be Heard above.) However, this may not 
be an immutable right. In one case where a mutually 
suitable time for giving oral evidence could not be agreed 
between the inspector of the inquiry and an objector, the 
PCA felt that the complainant had not been disadvantaged 
by not giving his evidence in person to the tribunal, as
he could have arranged for a representative to give his
evidence for him, or else he could have submitted written 
representations.(88)
Further to this, Sir Idwal Pugh considered a complaint 
that the choice of venue for the public inquiry, had 
precluded some people, particularly the elderly, from 
being able to attend the inquiry. Sir Idwal Pugh advised 
caution on the part of the Department in this area:
" While I recognise that the convenience of 
the local authority will be served by
holding a public inquiry in their own
offices, this is by no means paramount and 
there may well be cases where the 
convenience of objectors is sufficiently
-157-
important for the Department to give them 
special consideration. And I do not consider 
that they should accept too readily the 
contention of any local authority that it is 
for the convenience of all concerned that 
public inquiries should always be held in 
their offices."(89)
However, Sir Cecil Clothier felt that an inspector 
should take the public desire for evening sessions at an 
inquiry, into account, before deciding against holding 
them, though such a decision was not unreasonable.(90)
It is up to the complainant to use the available 
opportunities to be heard - in one case, Sir Idwal Pugh 
investigated a case where it was alleged that following 
his complaint, no-one from Customs & Excise had asked the 
complainant for his evidence. The'PCA found that he had 
been visited and thus approached for information, but that 
he had chosen not to supply it on that occasion. The PCA 
felt that it was up to the complainant to use that 
opportunity to present his case.(91)
A right to be heard does not mean a right to speak 
for as long as you wish. At a hearing before the Charity 
Commissioners, the complainant had been speaking for more 
than three hours, when the Chairman intervened and 
suggested that the rest of his evidence could be submitted 
in writing - the PCA found no maladministration as a 
result.(92)
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Third party objectors at inquiries may be heard at the 
discretion of the inspector. Sir Cecil Clothier was quite 
happy with one inspector's approach, which required third 
party objectors to make written application, and only hear 
them if they were personally affected by the proposals (ie 
local interest) - giving less priority (if they were heard 
at all) to those not directly involved, but who wished to 
make representations about government policy. He noted in 
that particular case that "[l]f they believe the 
inspector's actions are so unreasonable as to prevent 
natural justice they have their remedy in the courts"(93)
(ii) The Right to call witnesses
This point was raised in a case whilst Sir Idwal Pugh 
was in office. It was alleged that an objector at an 
inquiry, was not allowed to call a witness by the 
inspector. Unfortunately it would appear that there was a 
misunderstanding as to the nature of the witness - the 
objector felt that he had been denied his right, and the 
inspector felt that the objector merely wanted to call a 
corroborative witness, which in the particular 
circumstances was unnecessary. The objector had 
subsequently died, so the PCA felt unable to settle the 
matter conclusively.(94)
It is not unreasonable in the PCA*s opinion, to have 
this right denied, if you do not conform to the procedure
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of the inquiry, and seek to reopen your case by the 
introduction of a new witness.(95)
(iii) The Right to Cross-Examination
In written proceedings, cross-examination might be 
said to be in the form of the opportunity to comment on 
the other side's case. The limits of this, were studied in 
the section on disclosure of necessary information 
(above). Some public inquiries have their own rules, 
usually allowing the inspector a certain amount of 
discretion - there is no guaranteed right for all 
objectors to call evidence or cross-examine. The PCA seems 
to favour an opportunity being afforded, but the onus 
would appear to be on the complainant to seek this 
opportunity. Most of the problems seem to arise when new 
evidence is introduced during the inquiry. This is mainly 
due to the need to re-timetable the inquiry, in such 
circumstances, if the inspector has good reasons for not 
allowing it, the PCA will not criticise.(96)
A problem can arise if written representations have 
been submitted to the hearing and thus, the witnesses are 
not there in person to be challenged. It would appear that 
the onus is on the complainant to make it clear that he 
wishes to question the witnesses in person; so as to allow 
the witness to be called within the time limits of the 
inquiry.(97)
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The PCA made no adverse comment on the fact that a 
complainant was prevented from cross-examing a witness by 
an inspector, where the inspector explained to the PCA 
that the complainant had had ample opportunity to cross- 
examine that witness the previous day.(98)
There is no duty to facilitate cross-examination by 
objectors, by preparing a transcript of the inquiry 
proceedings.(99) [Tape-recording was permitted, so long as 
the speaker did not object.]
(iv) The Right to Legal Representation
The PCA rarely deals with complaints of denial of 
legal representation - Sir Edmund Compton and Sir Alan 
Marre did not do so. Sir Idwal Pugh received a complaint 
that the Home Office, through its delay in answering a 
petition, had effectively denied a prisoner the 
opportunity of legal representation before a Board Of 
Visitors. Sir Idwal found that this was not the case; and 
relied on the legal decision in Fraser v. Mudge, in answer 
to the point re legal representation at the Board - ie 
that there was no such entitlement.(100) [The Board of 
Visitors' actions are outwith the PCA's jurisdiction.] 
Though not actually related to the procedure of an 
oral hearing, it should be noted that if the PCA feels 
that departmental faults have necessitated a complainant 
seeking legal advice or assistance, then he will support a
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claim for reimbursement of the fees paid.(101) For 
instance, in IR cases there is now a set of guidelines 
laid down as to when professional fees should be 
paid.(102) The rules were explained in one case:
"...The Boardfs general rule was not to 
reimburse a taxpayer for such costs, and 
that it would consider compensation, on the 
facts of each case, only where they arose 
directly out of serious error where an 
official of the Department had done 
something which no responsible person, 
acting with good faith and proper care, 
could reasonably have done. In the 
complainant’s case there were elements of 
delay, and careless oversights in the form 
of repeated failures to copy assessments to 
her accountants. These failures merit 
criticism, but the IR do not regard them as 
within the category of serious official 
error for which they are prepared to 
consider compensation."(103)
This of course has implications for written 
procedures, as well as administrative processes in 
general. It is also interesting to note that the PCA has 
made it clear that he will not support claims for 
professional expenses in making a complainant to his 
office.(104)
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(b) Evaluation Of The Evidence
(i) Consideration of All Available Evidence
This covers whether the tribunal or decision-maker 
availed themselves of all the evidence, in reaching their 
decision. [This is close to the category in the last 
chapter, relating to the consideration of all relevant 
facts, however, that chapter was more concerned with 
matters other than oral hearings.] Sir Alan Marre felt 
that in one case the Department of the Environment should 
have asked for further evidence from the complainant, on 
one aspect of his case.(105) However, a complainant’s 
contention that a district valuer should not have reached 
a final decision on the value of the complainant’s 
property without viewing it first, was rejected by Sir 
Idwal Pugh.(106)
Also in the same vein, was the complaint that an 
inquiry was not held in the summer when the alleged damage 
to the local foliage was most apparent. As this evidence 
was not central to the purpose of the inquiry, the PCA 
felt that the above grounds were not sufficient to warrant 
the postponement of the inquiry.(107)
It may also be necessary to consider whether certain 
matters should have been included in the public inquiry. 
For example, alternative sites, or the actual need for a 
motorway. Sir Alan Marre accepted that the introduction of
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such topics depends on the purpose of the inquiry 
” The complainant maintains that the 
Inspector failed in his duty in not 
considering other possible sites for the 
telescope....
The Welsh Office have explained that 
the purpose and scope of inquiries into 
motorway proposals which emanate from a 
government department, are different from 
those of a planning inquiry to consider an 
application from a private developer for 
planning permission to develop a particular 
piece of land for some specified purpose. In 
the latter case, the choice of site is a 
matter for the prospective developer, who 
can be expected to put forward the site he 
considers best suited to his purposes and 
who in that process may well have considered 
and eliminated a number of other locations 
for one reason or another, including their 
availability to him. The Secretary of 
State’s function, and, therefore, that of 
the inquiry, in such cases is not to 
determine the best site for the proposed 
development, or whether it should be carried 
out at all, but simply whether it is 
acceptable on planning grounds at the
location which has been proposed by the 
developer. This is not to say that the 
question of alternative sites cannot be 
raised at such an inquiry. It is open to the 
parties to submit such evidence as they 
think fit on that question having regard to 
objections raised against the proposed site, 
and that evidence would be taken into 
account. But the Secretary of State is under 
a statutory obligation to give a decision on 
the merits of the submitted proposal and it 
would not, therefore, be appropriate for him 
to prompt objectors to suggest alternatives 
sites (as he does in the case of a motorway 
proposal) particularly as, in the absence of 
compulsory acquisition powers, the 
developer’s freedom of choice is limited to 
land he can acquire by agreement.
In the case of a motorway proposal which 
is promoted by the Secretary of State 
himself, a public inquiry is part of the 
process to assist him to find the 'best' 
route from all points of view and not only 
to assess the impact on the neighbourhood 
through which the road will pass. As he has 
compulsory acquisition powers to obtain the 
land needed for it, he is not fettered in
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the choice of route, as a private developer 
usually is as regards a site for his 
proposed development, and he can, therefore, 
consider any alternative suggested on its 
overall merits. An important part of an 
inquiry into a motorway proposal is to hear 
objections from those whose land would be 
required for its construction, and in that 
connection it is especially relevant that 
contentions that another route would be a 
better one should be examined.f,( 108)
As to what extent Government policy can be challenged 
at an inquiry, Sir Idwal Pugh received this clarification: 
" They [The Department] went on to say that 
it was Government policy to provide the 
country with a strategic network of modern 
roads and a freedom of choice between 
different modes of transport, and they were 
not prepared to debate these general 
policies at an inquiry. But they recognised 
that, within general policies, questions 
could arise as to whether a particular road 
was needed, and such questions could 
constitute the basis of relevant 
objections."(109)
A common complaint to the PCA is that not all of the 
complainant's objections and representations have been
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considered by the department. The PCA investigates these 
claims, but usually finds that the representations have 
been noted, the department has merely omitted to 
acknowledge the fact.(110) However, on one occasion, it 
was found that the possibility of representations had been 
overlooked:
"I have found that the immigration 
authorities did not do all they could to 
ensure that the requirements of natural 
justice were met in this case, with the 
result that the complainant and his Member 
of Parliament were effectively denied the 
opportunity to make representations on 
Mr.X’s behalf."(111)
Often the real reason is that the complainants feel
that their objection is so strong that the only way an
unfavourable decision could have been reached, would be in 
ignorance of their representation.
However Sir Cecil Clothier did criticise the actions 
of a department, in not evaluating the submissions which 
they had requested:
11 On the above evidence, I cannot escape the 
conclusion that the only the most persistent 
or respected objectors succeeded in getting 
the Department to discuss their proposals 
and that the Department ought to have made a
much more concerted effort to discuss the
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suggestions and ideas put to them. After 
all, they had invited the public to submit 
objections and representations and they 
therefore had a responsibility to give 
detailed consideration to all the
alternative proposals put to them ....
I have concluded that the Department 
did not take adequate action to consult 
individual objectors at an early enough 
stage to reassure them that their views were 
being fully considered. To that extent I 
consider that Mr. X has a valid point in 
that justice was clearly not seen to be 
done."(112)
(ii) Rejection of Evidence
Evidence can be totally rejected in certain 
circumstances. For instance, if the objections led are in 
fact related to a different matter, such as the 
development proposals in general, when the subject of the 
inquiry is a proposed 'stopping up' order for a 
highway.(113) An unusual case occurred where the inspector 
rejected evidence led by the complainant, in the mistaken 
belief that it was not within his power to recommend the 
proposition to which the evidence was directed. The PCA 
reckoned that in the circumstances of the case, the
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complainant suffered little injustice, as the outcome 
differed very little from the possible outcomes had her 
evidence been led.(114)
(iii) Consideration of Outside Information
This is also closely related to 'consideration of all 
the evidence', but raises the question of whether this 
outside information should be placed before the parties 
for their comment, or whether it is retained exclusively 
by the decision-maker.
A major complaint to the PCA is over the status of 
the inspector's/ reporter's report after an inquiry. Many 
complainants misunderstand its function and purpose, and 
feel there has been maladministration if the Secretary of 
State does not follow the report's findings.(115) Sir Alan
Marre summarised his view of the role of the PCA in such
cases:
" My investigation has been concerned with 
whether, at any stage during the decision­
making process, there were administrative
failures or shortcomings which cast doubt 
upon that decision. Having carefully studied 
the evidence, I am satisfied that it was 
open to the Secretary of State to come to 
the decision he did about the zoning of the 
land in question and that it was taken on a
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proper consideration of the relevant 
issues."(116)
To what extent should the other information that the 
Secretary of State draws upon, be available to the parties 
for their comment or challenge? Sir Alan Marre seemed 
happy with the existing rules, in that if it was a 
planning appeal, a new finding of fact, or new evidence 
(including expert opinion on a matter of fact), or a 
different finding from the inspector on a finding of fact, 
then an opportunity would be given to parties to make 
further representations.(117) However, these did not apply 
to development plan proposals, where the Secretary of 
State was free to seek the views of his own professional 
advisers without referring to parties involved in the 
inquiry.(118) The PCA did not make the comment that this 
must have been confusing for the public - although he does 
mention that complaints about the procedure adopted by 
tribunals should be addressed to the Council on Tribunals.
(c) Competency of the Tribunal
A hearing is diminished in value if the person who 
presides over it, does not have the necessary expertise 
with which to conduct it.
One form of complaint is that the inspector/reporter 
did not have enough technical knowledge to conduct the 
inquiry in that particular case. This is unlikely to be
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the complainant’s representative could play, which was 
corrected before the end of the hearing, and where it was 
not disputed that the hearing had been fair, could not be 
used as grounds for demanding a fresh inquiry.(123) Site 
visits during planning inquiries spawn a number of 
complaints, one of which is that the visit by the 
inspector was too short, ie he could not have conducted a 
thorough inspection in that time. The PCA is unlikely to 
support such contentions.(124)
In most of these cases, the PCA has expressed the 
opinion that the main problem is fundamental disagreement 
with the merits of the decision taken, - a matter which is 
not in his remit, and the above complaints are simple 
attempts to circumvent this barrier.(125)
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it can be seen that the PCA receives a 
varied selection of complaints in this area which seem to 
span the General Catalogue’s spectrum. As was noted at the 
beginning of the Chapter he only looks at procedure with a 
non-statutory basis, or else where statute gives 
discretionary powers as to the procedure to be adopted. 
This does limit his scope for a wide jurisprudence in this 
area, but as has been seen in the preceding sections, 
various encumbents have made criticisms where they felt
i/
that it was within the department's ambit to have provided
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better procedures. The quotations used illustrate the 
reluctance the PCA displays to make general statements, 
and that each case is decided on its facts alone.
It will also have been noted that the PCA's other 
constraint (apart from the statutory ones) is that of 
balancing administrative convenience. If a more desirable 
procedure was adopted, but which would extend the whole 
process beyond a reasonable length, the PCA will have to 
decide by which route better administration is to be 
achieved.
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CHAPTER FIVE - THE PCA AND OTHER PROCEDURAL
ERRORS
The two other categories of administrative procedural 
error dealt with by the PCA are that of delay (Section I) 
and the duty to give reasons (Section II). The latter is 
the quite a familiar category of error. However, delay is 
not so well-known or defined at least not within the U.K. 
system. The General Catalogue does register it as a 
possible administrative fault.
The PCA receives many complaints about delay in the 
administrative procedure. The types of delay and their 
causes vary considerably. Therefore classification was 
required for further elucidation. Thus the structure of 
Section I is based on a graduated spectrum of the forms of 
delay encountered by the PCA. This is formed on the basis 
of the likelihood of censure by him. The characteristics 
of the delay which cause the PCA to be more critical are 
simultaneously identified. This classification is 
contained within Parts (b)-(e). Part (a) of Section I 
introduces the concept of delay as a procedural error as 
understood by the PCA.
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SECTION I - Delay
(a) Delay in Context
The PCA's definition of delay is not rooted in a 
time-scale, although the complaint sent to him may be 
formulated with reference to the length of time that the 
administrative process is taking, or has taken to 
complete. Rather, his definition is based on consideration 
of the circumstances of the case itself. Thus there is no 
reference scale by which it can be stated that a certain 
length of delay will mean that maladministration has 
occurred. In one extreme example a delay of twelve years 
was considered to be justified.(1)
The length of time involved is only a major factor 
when the impact of the delay on the complainant is being 
assessed. What degree of inconvenience or worse, has the 
complainant suffered. The subject matter or area of the 
complaint seems also to be a consideration on Marre's
part. On the subject of delays in the DHSS and its benefit
functions, Marre stated:
11 The nature of supplementary benefit is
such that it may be needed immediately to
prevent difficulty and even hardship, and 
any delay in payment must be a matter for 
criticism.”(2)
Very soon after he started the job of PCA, Sir Idwal
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Pugh echoed these sentiments:
11 A person who claims to be in need of 
supplementary benefit may need it very 
urgently, and the claim therefore ought to 
be dealt with expeditiously.”(3)
Also in delays dealing with petitions from prisoners the 
PCA emphasised that there can be special considerations, 
such as when errors possibly affecting the validity of a 
committal warrant was the subject of such a petition 
"The Department have assured me that the 
importance of dealing expeditiously, 
especially with matters concerning liberty, 
is well appreciated."(4)
In other areas the PCA attaches less criticism to longer 
delays - possibly as suggested because the impact on the 
client is not so great. This is well illustrated by the 
work of the planning appeals section of the Department of
the Environment - here, long delays were often seen as
unavoidable(5)
This is only one factor in the overall assessment - 
as a very general guide though, it is true to say that the 
PCA will be concerned by a delay of weeks, or even days, 
in cases concerning the welfare provision of the DHSS. 
Whereas, delays of months or even years, will sometimes be 
acceptable in planning cases.
Having said that, there is little further
consideration of time-scales within the PCAfs treatment of
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‘‘X
delay. The PCA appears to have developed a scale by which 
he judges the acceptability of the delay by its cause. The 
PCA talks in a variety of terms of Acceptable* and 
’unacceptable1 - 'justifiable* and 'unjustifiable' delays. 
It is difficult to make a clear-cut division between these 
two forms of positive and negative 'categories' - instead, 
what emerges is a sliding scale.
At one end of this spectrum,(if it is in fact on the 
spectrum), there is the situation where the complainant 
asserts that there was delay, but the PCA is of the 
opinion that it was not in fact delay, but a perfectly 
reasonable time-scale for the procedure in question. For 
instance, in one case(6), one part of the complaint was 
that it had taken eighteen weeks for a decision to be 
taken by the Secretary of State for the Environment, after 
he had received the inspector's report from an inquiry.
The PCA considered this time, which was around the average 
time that it took to make such decisions at that time, not 
to be unreasonable, with particular regard to the fact 
that it was not an uncomplicated case. Here, although the 
time taken was considered, the PCA was also concerned with 
the circumstances of the case, which in his opinion, did 
not allow for a faster time.
This spectrum can be broken down into the following 
components:
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(b) Delay as a Product of Complexity
This category can be sub-divided into (i) procedural 
complexity and (ii) substantive complexity.
(i) Procedural complexity.
This deals with administrative 
processes which by their nature are long drawn out. That 
is, the need for good administrative practice, requires 
various steps to be taken, which may mean that more time 
is required to complete the process.(7)
The prime example in this area is the need for 
consultation.(8) Some processes necessitate detailed 
inquiries, which can take extend the time period - one 
particular process which was the subject of a number of 
complaints to Sir Alan Marre was the Inland Revenue's 
procedure for checking the validity of documents supplied 
in connection with claims for a married person's allowance 
for a wife and children overseas. Marre explained the 
problem in one case;(9) it was largely due to the fact, 
that the IR was dependent on information, which they were 
waiting to receive from the Indian Authorities.(10)
In 1974 the PCA noted that delays of one year were 
common in this type of case. The sympathetic approach to 
such situations, was well illustrated in one case by Sir 
Idwal Pugh (it is interesting to note that the case deals 
with matters affecting the liberty of prisoners, it would
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appear that the need to prepare the case properly 
outweighed the considerations of speed in this case): 
" Because of his [the Member1s] efforts and 
the readiness of Ministers and officials to 
make a dispassionate assessment of the 
evidence he produced, the Home Office had in 
their possession, by mid-October 1974, all 
the medical evidence that was largely 
responsible for the convictions ultimately 
being quashed by the Court of Appeal. It was 
not, however, until June 1975 that the case 
was referred back to the Court of Appeal. I 
make no comment on whether the advice the 
Home Office sought or the consultations they 
engaged in, after they had obtained the 
medical evidence, were essential to their 
consideration of the issues involved. I am, 
however, generally satisfied that the 
Department dealt with the case 
conscientiously and as expeditiously as the 
difficult circumstances allowed. And I do 
not think it can be said that there was any 
administrative action or inaction falling 
within the limits of my jurisdiction (see 
paragraph 8) which caused the reference to 
the Court of Appeal to be unnecessarily 
delayed."(11)
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Other types of necessary procedure may add to the delay.
It may take time to record all the details of a complex 
case.(12) Or it may be necessary in the interests of other 
aspects of good administrative practice such as !fair 
hearing1, to allow extra time; in one case, this allowed 
prolonged representations by the parties involved in a 
planning appeal.(13) Here the PCA felt that there had been 
no undue delay, when the average time for completion of 
appeals was considered. The difficulties involved in this 
were explained by Marre in another planning case, where 
the decision by the Secretary of State for the 
Environment was not to be announced until ten months after 
the relevant public inquiry:
11 The undoubted need for a decision to be 
reached as quickly as possible in order to 
resolve local uncertainty and worry over a 
proposed redevelopment scheme has to be 
balanced against the need for detailed 
consultation and careful consideration of 
all the scheme before a decision is 
taken"(14)
The necessity of complying with legal requirements of 
a process may also cause delay.(15)
Public interest requirements can also cause delay, 
again the PCA will acknowledge the right of the department 
to implement them:
" But the Department have a duty to ensure
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that proper controls exist for the payment 
of grants which they are empowered to make 
"(16)
This could also be seen as a balance between the 
administrative functions of the department.
Introduction of a new government policy will be an 
acceptable reason for delay. In one case, important 
changes in central and local government policy, meant a 
delay of five and a half years. Sir Idwal Pugh felt that 
it was right that these were considered.(17)
In cases where there is a requirement upon the 
department to issue a judicial decision taken on behalf of 
the Secretary of State, then the PCA accepts that some 
delay will arise because of the procedure which has been 
adopted. This was first recognised by Sir Idwal Pugh, who 
stated in one case:
" When an application for a formal decision 
by the Secretary of State is received each 
case is examined afresh without regard to 
any opinions previously expressed within the 
Department; and where as in this case, the 
point at issue is the accuracy of the 
Departments records over a long period of 
time, the necessary enquiries inevitably 
take time. The Department make the point 
that, while they are concerned to deal with 
the matter quickly, they consider that speed
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in the judicial field is not acceptable if 
it is at the expense of thoroughness. I 
agree, in principle, with the soundness of 
this argument.*'(18)
Another manifestation of this form of delay is where 
the department concerned is not directly responsible for 
the delay.(19) This might be as a result of waiting for 
information or submissions from local authorities or other 
public bodies. Or it might be as a result of inaction on 
the part of a private party involved in the case.(20) The 
necessity of balancing the interests is acknowledged by 
the PCA. In one case, a delay of twenty-one months from 
the submission of proposals was continuing, awaiting a 
public inquiry which was not forthcoming. The 
complainant’s house was bordered by land that was the 
subject of an application for planning permission by a 
company to build houses. The PCA emphasised that a balance 
had to be struck, and that it was for the Department to 
force action on the part of the company.(21)
These cases of course, also illustrate the 
potential overlap in categories of procedural error, such 
delay could be seen as allowing more time to one party to 
the disadvantage of the other - a form of spontaneous 
partiality.
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(ii) Substantive complexity
The second sub-category is that of substantive 
complexity. This is where the particular nature of the 
individual case necessitates a more complicated process.
For example, it may be necessary in some cases to 
obtain legal opinion before a Department can reach its 
decisions. This appears to be accepted by the PCA as a 
reason for delays in such cases, presumably because such 
opinion may take time to formulate, and also because time 
may be needed for the request to be processed and passed 
between departments or sections.
One case dealt with the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s delay in publishing a report on the 
investigation into a company’s affairs, was not 
unreasonable in light of the fact'that there were civil 
legal proceedings raised on account of an alleged breach 
of natural justice in a very similar case;(22) and as a 
result similar allegations were then raised in this case. 
It was felt necessary to contact the Director of Public 
Prosecutions as to the possible prejudice to the on-going 
proceedings presented by the publication.(23)
Another occasion involved the submission of a late 
objection by the new owner of property affected, whilst 
the Department of Environment was still considering its 
decision - it was felt necessary to take legal advice as 
to whether such an objection could be admitted. The PCA
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considered this to be proper procedure.(24)
Although there may not be any need for legal 
consultation, the complicated nature of some individual 
cases may require extra time for proper consideration. In 
one case a delay of two and a half years in preparing the 
Department’s case was accepted by the PCA as a result of 
the differences in medical opinions, which had to be 
considered.(25)
In what was acknowledged as a very rare subject-matter 
in one case, the delay resulting was criticised by Sir 
Anthony Barrowclough:
"This delay merits my strongest criticism.
In his comments to me the Principal Officer 
explained in mitigation that claims to IDN 
[industrial Disablement Benefit] in respect 
of farmer's lung are very rare and virtually 
unknown by the great majority of local 
offices. He said that the staff concerned 
with the complainant's case had no 
experience of handling such an unusual claim 
and that the inordinate length of time taken 
to resolve it was due to this and not to 
any lack of effort. My own investigation has 
not led me to take a contrary view but this 
does not excuse the delay...."(26)
Or the complicated nature of the individual case may 
slow down the process. In one case the delay was caused by
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the applicant's frequent change of address due to the 
local housing authority moving him around
accommodation(27); and in another case the delay was as a 
result of the Department of the Environment suspending 
action on a case on being told that there were 
negotiations were underway between the two parties 
involved, however these had subsequently broken down, of 
which fact the Department was unaware.(28)
The individual case can also arise where detailed 
enquiries need to be made, for example, the PCA held that 
delays in answering a prisoner's petition were justified 
on the ground that the Home Office needed to gather as 
much information as possible in order to answer the 
petition fully.(29)
(iii) Necessary Procedure To Be Followed By The Department 
In Such Cases.
In the above areas, the PCA will on the whole be 
sympathetic to the delay, as it can be seen that there is 
a case to be argued that it is necessary for good 
administration. Thus, the verdict of the PCA in such cases 
will usually be that the delay was justifiable or 
unavoidable.
However, the PCA does demand that the effects of the 
delay are mitigated wherever possible. The PCA will only 
exonerate the department concerned if he feels that they
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have taken adequate steps to minimalise the delay. The 
following can be identified as requirements by the PCA.
(1) Provision of Information.
The client or other parties involved, must be kept 
informed of the delay, and the reasons for it.(30) 
Presumably, this is to prevent the suspicion building up 
in the client's mind that his case has been forgotten. For 
instance, the length of the period of delay in the above- 
mentioned tax allowance cases should have been conveyed to 
a party concerned in such a case.(31). This is, of course, 
simply an extension of the principle of administration 
that requires reasons for decisions.
(2) Guards against inefficiency
This relates to the manner in which the procedure is 
carried out - the delay must be part of the proper 
procedure and not just an excuse for a failure in the 
system(32). Thus, the established need for consultation 
does not escape criticism if the means of consultation are 
inefficient - for example, the DHSS took nineteen weeks to 
reply to a letter of inquiry, although the reply 
necessitated the opinion of various other departments, the 
PCA felt that copies of the letter could have been sent 
simultaneously, and not the actual letter which was
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circulated in turn.(33)
Sir Idwal Pugh, however, seemed more sympathetic 
towards unnecessarily protracted administration (albeit 
subsequently corrected). He concluded in one case:
"I myself have considerable sympathy with 
him [the complainant] in complaining of the 
difficulty of having to deal with so many
different departments And I question
whether the tortuous procedures necessary to 
complete the formalities of making a formal
offer...... could be defined as good
administration. But I have been glad to 
learn that much of this has since been 
simplified, and I am satisfied that, given 
that those were the normal administrative 
procedures at that time, there was no 
avoidable delay of significance on the part 
of [the various departments involved]"(34)
A common form of consultation is where the department 
seeks responses from outwith other government departments, 
eg local authorities. The department would be expected to 
meet any delays on the part of the local authorities by 
fairly frequent reminders to them(35) or by setting time 
limits, which if not met by local authorities means that 
the procedure will simply continue without them.(36) This 
will also apply to dealings with private parties, or other 
such sources.(37) It will also apply to the need for
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international consultations, if the PCA feels that these 
are not efficient:
"Finally, on the evidence of this case, and 
the Department's comments about the 
difficulties which they often experience in 
dealing with claims when other countries are 
involved, it seems to me that there is some 
need for improvement in the existing 
international arrangements for settling such 
claims so that they can be dealt with more 
speedily. The Department have explained to 
me that this country is already 
participating in international discussions 
on this problem in the EEC and the Council 
of Europe. That is not a matter for me but 
it is one which I recommend should be 
pursued with a view to the avoidance of such 
fully justified complaints as have been made 
in this instance." (38)
In general, departments are expected to monitor cases 
and to make sure the administration of it has not come to 
a halt.(39)
(3) Provision of Interim Relief
In cases concerning financial payments, the 
possibility of interim payment or an interim grant of
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relief should be considered,(40) though it can discounted 
for good reasons.(41) If interim relief has not been 
considered, this will be grounds for criticism of the 
department concerned. Interim relief should help mitigate 
the effects of delay where the client is waiting for a 
financial payment.
(c) Delay as a Result of Resource Constraints
Delay may occur as a result of a heavy workload in the 
department concerned, with pressures of shortages of staff 
and/or finance. This moves further along the spectrum, - 
this reason for delay is more frequently not acceptable to 
the PCA. Again this is qualified by the department's 
efforts within their resources to minimalise the delay.
Occasionally, the PCA decides that the delay in such 
cases is totally unavoidable, although still not 
desirable. This is illustrated in a case concerning the 
Public Trustees and his office, where there was a delay of 
twenty months in the final distribution of a trust fund. 
The situation was explained to the PCA as follows:
"The Public Trustee has explained to me that 
there were at the time long delays in the 
preparation of accounts in his office 
because of the loss of a number of 
experienced staff, and consequent 
accumulation of arrears of work, after the
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publication in March 1972 of the White Paper 
(Cmnd.4913) announcing the Government's 
decision (reversed later) to close down the 
Public Trustee Office in its existing form."
Sir Alan Marre concluded:
"The staff shortage and arrears of work with 
which the Public Trustee was faced in 
1972/73 were the consequences of a 
Government decision (subsequently reversed) 
for which the Public Trustee cannot be held 
to blame."
However, this did not mean that he was 
happy with the situation:
" I understand the complainant's 
disquiet over the time that it took to wind 
up the trust."(42)
In another case, a delay of eighteen months in dealing 
with a claim for attendance allowance, was called 
'inordinate', but the PGA went on to state that he 
appreciated that the introduction of a new scheme, and the 
unexpectedly large number of appeals, made much of the 
delay unavoidable.(43)
However, it should be noted that the PCA has not 
always been so favourably disposed towards similar delay 
in the accounts section of the Public Trustee's office - 
although he had recognised the pressure on this section, 
he stated: "this does not diminish the dissatisfaction the
-190-
dissatisfaction or anxiety caused to private persons 
affected by the delay, and in this respect, I find the 
complaint justified."(44)
The possible difference here as far as the PCA is 
concerned could be that the delay took place before the 
Government White Paper.
Sir Idwal Pugh was happy to accept that an increase 
in the workload of a department which was sudden, not 
capable of being anticipated, and outwith their direct 
control, would fall into the former category.(45) This 
approach was continued by Sir Cecil Clothier, though if 
other causes of delay, such as administrative errors, were 
identified, then there would be criticism.(46)
Sir Anthony Barrowclough conceded that externally 
controlled workloads could mean unavoidable delays:
"I do not normally regard delays of 
eight and nine weeks in answering 
correspondence as reasonable. But the 
Principal Officer of the Department has 
explained to me that the responsibility for 
the delays in this case was shared by 
Ministers who have an overwhelming load of 
correspondence - some 25,000 letters a year.
It inevitably takes time to answer all this 
correspondence. And if the issue in question 
is one which requires a good deal of 
Ministerial attention then delays are often
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inescapable"(47)
Very often the PCA will identify 'problem1 areas (such 
as the one above) which occur due to a number of 
complaints received, all relating to the same area and 
process.
Sir Alan Marre dealt with two notable areas where the 
delays were frequent, during his time in office. The first 
of these areas was the planning appeals section of the 
Department of the Environment. In this period a large 
increase in the number of planning appeals to the 
Department occurred. As a result there were problems with 
shortages of staff, or experienced staff, and a large 
backlog of cases. In 1974, Marre noted:
"The delay in deciding appeals generally is 
a matter for concern. It is undesirable that 
appellants should have to wait as long as 
they do for decisions. But I recognise that 
the increase in appeals has created a 
serious problem of staffing and 
administration, and I hope that the steps 
the Department have taken will reduce and in 
time eliminate these delays."(48)
And in the next year, he again commented on the delays 
being experienced:
"....I have referred in earlier reports to 
the efforts that the Department have made to 
overcome these problems, particularly by
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recruiting more staff. The Department tell 
me that they have for some time now been 
putting in a sustained effort to reduce the 
backlog of outstanding cases; to improve the 
handling of the individual case; and to 
devise new procedures which will cut down 
delays and ease the load. Although quick and 
dramatic improvement cannot be expected, I 
am glad to record that their current 
experience is that, due to co-operation at 
all levels in the Department, their efforts 
are beginning to show results."(49)
Happily, Sir Idwal Pugh was able to report of 
improvements, when he investigated a case of delay from 
this period; he noted that in 1974, there was an average 
delay of 60 weeks, which he called unacceptable, but noted 
that in 1976, this had been reduced to between 23 & 34 
weeks, depending on the procedure involved.(50) It should 
be noted that 'unacceptable* must be taken to mean 
'undesirable', in that it could not be expected that 
changes could be achieved quickly when the problem was as 
intrinsic as this one.(This was acknowledged by Marre in 
the above case).So, for the purposes of this thesis the 
delays were not 'unavoidable' at that time. Whilst not 
perhaps 'justifiable', they were not totally 
'unjustifiable' under the circumstances.
This is also illustrative of the PCA's approach, as
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observed in foregoing categories, in that he checks that 
all delay has been minimalised in each case.(51) The same 
requirements can be identified such as the need to keep 
the client fully informed.(52) In this category, the 
fulfilment of these requirements may not totally mitigate 
the delay.(53)
The second area concerned matters related to the Home
Office's Immigration Section, and the introduction of the
Immigration Act 1971; combined with Pakistan's withdrawal 
from the Commonwealth and its associated immigration 
problems; as well as a loss of experienced staff. Marre 
summoned up the situation:
"But as I know from a number of other 
complaints I have investigated, there is, 
regrettably, a considerable delay in the 
preparation of statements in non-priority 
cases, caused by an acute shortage of 
trained staff in the Department and the very 
large number of appeals that are lodged. I 
have recently visited the Immigration and 
Nationality Department and seen for myself 
the pressures under which they are working 
at the present time and I have been told 
what steps the Home Office have taken to try
and reduce the delays.......
As the Home Office recognise, it is of 
little comfort to the complainants to be
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assured that the delay experienced was not 
abnormal in the circumstances, and that 
there is an explanation of the heavy arrears 
of work in the Appeals Section."(54)
As is obvious, pressure of work or related
circumstances are not always totally accepted by the PCA 
as a reason for the delays, - eg in one case the PCA did 
not totally accept that the delay of ten months (+ five
months when it was not realised that a formal decision was
required) was totally the result of pressures on the 
Department:
" The Department tell me the time taken to 
complete this case was essentially 
attributable to its intrinsic complications 
as well as staffing problems and heavy 
pressure of other cases. I accept that those 
reasons do help account for the
delay........ Certainly, it seems to me that
at least four months in total could have 
been saved without difficulty."(55)
Although in other cases the PCA has been more 
sympathetic (delay of five months):
11 I find that there have on occasions been 
lapses in the way in which the IR have dealt 
with the complainant's tax affairs. But tax 
offices, have, in recent years had to work 
under very heavy pressure, and in the
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circumstances I do not consider that this 
complaint of general inefficiency is 
justified."(56)
And in another case, he considered it "highly
regrettable that applicants generally should have to wait
as long as this"(eighteen months).(57)
Overall, it appeared that Sir Idwal Pugh(in his 
earlier years at least) was less sympathetic to this
problem than his predecessor. He was critical of the delay
in most of cases(58), even where there was an 
exceptionally high turnover in staff (of the 50 working in 
the office at the end of 1976 - 8 had been there before 
April 1975).(59)He was less critical in some cases, 
particularly one in which there had been an unexpected 
increase in work after the introduction of new legislation 
- this would appear to have been assumed to be beyond the 
control of the department(60). Also in this case steps had 
been taken to remedy the situation by the redisposition of 
staff. Both these steps would seem to have lessened the 
criticism.
As can be seen the PCA will accept this type of 
delay, only if he can satisfy himself that the system is 
working at peak efficiency within the constraints set. Sir 
Idwal Pugh dealt critically with a case where the staff 
resources had not been deployed effectively.(61)
Sir Cecil Clothier echoed this view in another case: 
"I accept that, with finite staff resources,
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the Department have to decide priorities for 
dealing with their workload, and that some 
work will inevitably have to wait its turn.
But in these circumstances, it is more 
important than ever that the Department 
should have proper monitoring arrangements 
to ensure that cases are not delayed unduly 
due to oversight or error, and the lack of 
such arrangements was plainly a factor which 
contributed to the lengthy delay in this 
case."(62)
However, Sir Idwal Pugh was less critical in a later 
case where the department had done all that was possible 
within their powers:
"The Department have told me explicitly that 
the office concerned are unat>le to speed up 
the handling of cases already submitted to 
the Department without an increase in staff.
Priority has been given to other work. I do 
not question the priorities of the 
Department have given to the various tasks 
but the situation is a most unsatisfactory 
one."(63)
Sir Anthony Barrowclough was less sympathetic in 
another case in 1987, though this may have been because 
the same section had been the subject of a similar 
complaint two years previous. He outlined what had been
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done to remedy the situation:
"The Principal Officer told me that the 
senior manager responsible, with the 
approval of his superiors in 1982 and 1984 
sought to construct procedural packages for 
handling life sentence work as a whole which 
would have reduced the burden on the staff 
concerned with this work. This was in 
accordance with the general ministerial 
policy, and good management practice, that 
officials should seek radical remedies for 
work delays rather than simply throw 
resources at them. After consideration and 
discussion Ministers did not agree to the 
suggested changes of handling procedure. The 
senior manager sought and obtained extra 
staff in 1984, and then the additional staff 
to which I have referred to above in 1985. 
Nevertheless, it was clear that there was a 
long-standing problem. An effective solution 
should have been in place earlier."(64)
This shows the high concern of the PCA with the system 
in general, and not just with the individual case.
He does not go further than this. His perceived role 
appears to be to ensure that maximum efficiency is 
achieved within the budgetary constraints. He will 
criticise the internal deployment of finance or staff, but
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he does not see it as his function to chide governments to 
provide better resources for the particular area.
Sir Cecil Clothier was more blunt in his comments than 
his predecessors:
"But I think it appropriate to observe.. 
that even the best-intentioned legislation 
can seldom be better in its actual outcome 
than the administrative capability and skill 
that the Ministers are prepared to divert 
from other purposes to implement it, and to 
express the hope that such lessons are being 
more readily learned."(65)
Thus he welcomed governmental review of a problem in 
the Nationality Division of the Home Office, in another 
case.(66)
Thus, if he is satisfied that the problems could not 
have been foreseen, or even if they could have been, they 
are now being remedied, the PCA will not be too sweeping 
in his criticism as a result. The delay will probably be 
classified as inevitable.
(d) Delay as a Result of Disruption in the System
Running into the last category, is delay caused by 
disruption in the system. This is caused by changes in the 
working practices, or the transfer of functions between 
sections or departments.
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Again the efficiency of the system will be considered 
- this is a greyish area similar to the above, in that the 
PGA is more likely to conclude that the delay was not 
justifiable.
The most obvious cause of disruption in the system is 
industrial action. Sir Cecil Clothier first dealt with 
this problem, and set the guidelines for the PCA's view in 
relation to the question of resulting delay:
"Industrial action cannot necessarily be 
regarded as sufficient for shortcomings in a 
departments performance, but I accept that 
in this particular case the Department 
cannot be blamed for the slight 
inconvenience which the complainant 
suffered. In my view the blame lies, rather 
on those civil servants as individuals, and 
their union officials, who disrupted public 
business in the furtherance of private 
ends."(67)
Therefore, in such cases, if the department take all 
possible action to prevent to keep disruption to a 
minimum, then the PCA will not hold them responsible for 
the delay.(68)
One particular case at the time of local government 
reorganisation was aggravated by the fact that the new 
local authority had inherited a large number of appeals 
from the previous authorities. Sir Alan Marre commended
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the Department of the Environment's efforts in this case, 
though he expressed the view that such delays were still 
undesirable in such simple matters. The department had 
sought to promote the choice of the shorter procedure of 
written representations, and encouraged the local 
authority to process appeals more quickly.(69)
Sir Idwal Pugh was tolerant of delay in the system 
whilst a new administrative system was experimented with. 
All applications were directed to a central office rather 
than being dealt with by local offices which were 
unfamilar with the new procedures. This did cause some 
delay, the system had subsequently reverted to local 
administration. Pugh believed this to be justifiable.(70) 
He was also uncritical of a delay when a new 
procedure was introduced at the DVLC:
"And I do not regard such a period as 
inordinately long or inconvenient to the 
public, given the large scale, complex, and 
once-for-all nature of the total nationwide 
operation involved."(71)
However, he was less inclined to be sympathetic when
the cause of the disruption was less intentional,
directional or organised. In a dispute-resolving capacity, 
the Department had no standard procedure for formal 
resolution, the case was then caught up in a
reorganisation within the Department - the PCA found the
resultant delays 'inexcusable'(72)
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In another case, the extension of Invalid Care 
Allowance to married woman caused an increase in claims, 
however, the system adopted by the department meant that 
older and more complex cases were left at the back of the 
queue, until they were eventually given priority. The PCA 
was critical of this arrangement as being inefficient.(73)
(e) Unjustifiable Delay
First in line here is delay caused by delay from 
departmental guidance.Failure to follow departmental 
instructions has also caused delay, which was deemed 
avoidable.(74) One of Sir Idwal Pugh's cases where there 
was a series of such errors, is illustrative. The case 
attracted severe criticism:
" ..But they[the Department] acknowledge 
that a mistake was made when her papers were
destroyed in 1973....... Had the proper
procedure been followed it would have been 
simple to confirm the complainant's payment 
when his daughter asked for return of her 
contributions in 1975.
But there were other mistakes in 
procedure. The records of telephone calls 
and action taken are incomplete and 
difficult to follow. And I am not now able 
to establish precisely how many times the
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family made enquiries or the Department 
tried to contact them. But I am not 
satisfied that adequate efforts were made to 
get in touch with the mother again when it
was discovered, ....  that her daughter's
papers had been destroyed. And it is clear 
that considerable delay was caused by
careless filing The Department also tell
me that there should have been no need to 
seek further information once the photocopy 
of the cheque was available: that alone 
should have been sufficient evidence of the 
right to a refund.
In my view the complainant had every 
reason to complain about the way the whole 
matter was handled, and the Department 
deserve severe criticism for their 
administrative shortcomings."(75)
The instructions need not come from the department; in 
one case delay was caused by the department failing to 
follow the instructions given by the complainant.(76) 
Alternatively, the fault may be in adhering too closely to 
instructions without sensitive adaptation to the 
particulars of the case.(77)
Also under this heading is failure in communication. 
For example, failure to explain procedure properly to the 
complainant caused a misunderstanding which was the basis
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of the delays in one case.(78) Or it might be slowness in 
communication, or lack of communication;(79) or failure to 
identify which section was responsible for the case;(80) 
or failure to pass on information.(81)
At the far end of this spectrum is what might be 
termed 'human error'.(82) This is where the delay is 
traceable to an action taken by an individual.
Delay was caused by asking a series of questions of a 
Local Authority, where the PGA reckoned that with the 
Departmental experience in such matters, they could have 
submitted one batch of questions.(83)
Other such mistakes included waiting unnecessarily 
for the outcome of an unrelated matter before implementing 
a decision,(84) and indecision after identifying an 
option,on whether to take that course of action.(85) Or it 
could be allowing negotiations to drag on.(86) Such 
mistakes could be classified as bad administrative skills 
on the part of the individual.
Another manifestation of the human error factor 
could be in losing a file or papers relating to the 
case,(87) or in the misfiling of such,(88) including the 
failure to link papers to the case file.(89)
In one such case the PCA described the fourteen week 
delay caused by the loss of a file in the review of the 
proceedings of a Mental Health Review Tribunal as 
'indefensible'.(90) Other examples include failure to 
enter information onto a computer(91) and other computer
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related difficulties,(92) as well as failure to cross 
reference papers.(93) Such an error is compounded if it is 
persistent and not just a 1 one-off1(94)
A common fault is what PCA's have described as a 
lack of urgency in administering the case, and is usually 
due to a lack of efficiency.(95) It can for instance be a 
failure to identify the case as being particularly 
urgent.(96) Sir Cecil Clothier severely criticised the 
Home Office for lack of concern, and failure to identify 
an urgent case in a separate report to Parliament on the 
review of a conviction for murder:
"A miscarriage of justice by which a man or 
a woman loses his or her liberty is one of 
the gravest matters which can occupy the 
attention of a civilised society. And it 
seems to me that when an unprecedented 
pollution of justice at its source is 
discovered, quite an exceptional effort to 
identify and remedy its consequences is 
called for. My overall impression of the way 
the Home Office administrators responded to 
the discovery of Dr. Clift's serious 
shortcomings is that they failed fully to 
grasp or face the implications. As my 
investigation has shown their response was 
in some respects prompt and efficient; but 
in others they seem to have been content to
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adopt a passive and reactive role rather 
than a positive one."(97)
And also in the following case:
"Most serious delays occurred in this case 
which, coupled with the local office's 
initial mistake of overlooking the 
complainant's claims to SHA, resulted in his 
having to wait over 11 years for a decision.
My investigation has shown that there were 
long periods of total inactivity, 
interspersed with short bouts of only partly 
effective action and that for the most of 
the time the complainant was left completely 
in the dark."(98)
The PCA is critical of an approach to a case which 
lacks coherence, ie 'a piecemeal approach*.(99)
The above extract is also a good example of the grey 
line between this category and the next.
A large number of cases involving delay seem to 
involve inexplicable delay ie failure to take action with 
no identifiable cause - what could be described 'sitting 
on a case'.(100) Sometimes this does occur in a situation 
where there is a partial explanation for this, for 
example, where work has been transfered to another 
section, where PCA described 'inadequacies in 
handling'.(101) Others have little or no explanation.(102) 
A large number of these delays of this type occurred in
-206-
the Inland Revenue and the DHSS. In the DHSS the period 
ranged from four months to issue a pension book;(103) to 
six months for a claim to supplementary benefit.(104) 
Inland Revenue cases include delays of three months;(105) 
delays in one case of one year in one aspect where the PCA 
found on the whole 'no satisfactory explanation', and one 
and a half years in another aspect,(106) to four 
years.(107)
Such delay can be found on its own, or alongside other 
forms of delay.(108) For example in one case, involving 
the IR issuing a clearance certificate relating to estate
duty, four and a half months of the total time of eleven
months was found on investigation by the PCA to be without 
reason or cause, although some of the remaining delay was 
necessary to the process.(109)
SECTION II - The Duty to Give Reasons
This is really a lack of communication between the 
decision-maker and the party/parties involved. The PCA is 
keen to promote communication at all stages in the 
process; he is not just confined to the need to give 
reasons for the end-product of the process ie the 
decision.
For instance, in one case the department did not 
keep the complainant informed about their handling of an
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outbreak of disease amongst his herd and their proposed 
action, as a result the complainant took inappropriate 
decisions which cost him £7,500 in losses. The PCA felt 
that he should have been consulted before they took the 
decisions.(110)
It has already been noted that the PCA is insistent 
that the 'clients' are kept informed of any delays in the 
procedure, and that the reasons for them. If this is done, 
he argues, it is less likely that misunderstandings, and 
misinterpretation of actions, will arise.(Ill)
This also applies to, the need for proper 
explanation of procedures,(112) and the need to reply 
adequately to questions.(113) The same logic applies to 
the need to give reasons for a decision - if reasons are 
not given, or inadequate reasons are given, then it may 
appear to the client that an arbitrary or inadequate 
decision has been taken.(114) For instance, complainants 
alleged that inadequate reasons had been given for the 
decision to grant planning permission for an oil refinery, 
following a public inquiry - the complainants alleged that 
this meant that the Scottish Office had inadequate reasons 
for that decision. After a full investigation, the PCA 
concluded that this was not in fact the case; although he 
could well understand the complainants' view.(115) In 
another case the Department of the Education & Science did 
not explain a point properly in a letter to an aggrieved 
parent:
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"...they [the Department] accept that the 
matter ought to have been properly explained 
to the mother in a full reply and that the 
Department were at fault in this respect.
...this gave the mother the impression that 
they had not properly investigated her 
complaint."(116)
Also in one case, an inspector's report did not give 
adequate reasons:
"...the inspector's findings in his report 
on the critical issue of noise amounted to 
little more than saying that, given the 
conflict of expert evidence on that issue, 
he simply preferred that of the company 
without much explanation of why he did so 
and where the Association's evidence had 
been found wanting..And,.... it is 
understandable that their [the 
Association's] suspicions were aroused that 
behind-the-scenes influences might have 
played a part in determining the outcome of 
the company's application."(117)
Sir Cecil Clothier explained that the department had a 
duty to remember that the public were not always au fait 
with the procedures used by the department:
"The complex provisions of the Noise 
Insulation Regulations 1973 make it very
-209-
difficult for house-holders to understand 
why some homes are offered insulation and 
others, in apparently worse positions, are 
excluded from that benefit. Because of this, 
it is essential, in my view, that the public 
officials who are familiar with the 
technicalities should realise that others 
are not and cannot be expected to see the 
logic in their conclusions unless trouble is 
taken to explain them in terms the layman 
can understand. I think it regrettable that 
the Welsh Office did not take more care in 
explaining to the complainants in this case 
how they had reached their decision."(118)
Obviously, the same applies to being given the wrong 
reasons for a decision. In one such case a grant awarded 
was withdrawn from the complainant.
"But the MSC acknowledged that the reason 
for the withdrawal of the grant given to the 
complainant by that EO [Employment Office] 
in their letter ... was incorrect, and that 
the different reason given by the area 
manager in his letter... was equally wrong.
Through me, MSC offer their apologies to the 
complainant for these errors and for the 
fact that he was never given a full 
explanation of their reasons for the
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withdrawal of the £400."(119)
As a result, the matter was not resolved as quickly as 
it might have been.
However, it is fairly safe to state that the PCA 
views the policy of giving full explanations as good 
administration. That does not mean that he views their 
absence as maladministration, in itself - it might 
contribute to it, but it does not constitute it.
The PCA will accept the lack of an explanation, if 
confidentiality demands it. For instance, one company had 
approached H.M. Customs & Excise with a sample of its 
product, and gained an exemption from purchase tax.
Another company objected to this, H.M. Customs & Excise 
explained that whilst they would be happy to talk to the 
objecting company about the differences between the two 
products in general terms, commercial confidentiality 
prevented them from disclosing specific details of the 
exempted product. The PCA accepted that confidentiality 
between a company and H.M.Customs & Excise was necessary 
for the department to function efficiently.(120)
Another area where confidentiality overrides the duty 
to give reasons was illustrated in the following extract: 
"As for the reasons for that decision, I 
accept the general principle that 
Departments with prosecution powers cannot 
necessarily be expected to disclose, even to 
interested third parties, detailed reasons
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why particular people have not been 
prosecuted in particular cases. There are 
sound practical and legal grounds for this, 
quite apart from such special considerations 
as the need not to breach confidence, reveal 
the identity of informers, or make public 
delicate personal information."(121)
Sir Idwal Pugh supported the DHSS in not giving 
detailed reasons for the refusal to allow a child to be 
adopted from abroad; it was enough, he felt, in such a 
case, for the Department to state that on the prima facie 
case a court would not grant an adoption order.(122)
However, confidentiality must only be extended as far 
as is necessary. In one case, the PCA accepted that a 
report on which a decision as regards the siting of a 
trunk road, was based, could not be published in its 
entirety, but the Department should release factual 
information from it, if requested.(123)
CONCLUSIONS
It is certainly true that this Chapter was mainly 
devoted to the error of delay. This is justified by the 
fact that the PCA can be said to have developed and 
refined this concept. This has been one of his major 
contributions to administrative redress. It also reflects
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his ability to temper errors with the needs of 
administration, for example in his acceptance that 
complicated procedures require longer periods to 
administer. This is of course, subject to verification 
that the procedures are not unduly complicated for the 
task in hand.
It is this sensitivity and adaptability which is one 
of the PCA's strengths. Here he has developed a response 
to a frequent complaint, which has been neglected by other 
redress mechanisms.
The second section of this Chapter also highlighted 
another of the PCA's successes. This is emphasising that 
if administration takes time to explain their procedures, 
'clients' are less likely to feel aggrieved. It is not the 
usual approach to the duty to give reasons, but rather it 
is a reminder of the philosophy behind these and other 
procedural rules and safeguards. This philosophy is best 
expressed in the judicial phrase that 'justice must be 
seen to be done'.
It is perhaps in this Chapter that the PCA has been 
seen to be more definite and more confident in his 
approach. The next Chapter considers the remedies the PCA 
suggests for the errors catalogued in this and the 
previous two chapters.
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CHAPTER SIX REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE PCA 
In this final chapter dealing exclusively with the 
work of the PCA, probably the most important aspect (at 
least for the complainant) is discussd. Whilst it is 
desirable to ascertain what procedural errors the PCA 
identifies and censures, it is arguably more important to 
analyse how he remedies the wrong. The remedies available 
to and used by the PCA are perhaps the best guide to his 
efficacy as a dispute-mechanism. How does he enforce his 
findings?
The Chapter is divided into two sections. Section I 
lists the remedies used by the PCA. Section II deals with 
the limitations, both self-imposed and superimposed, 
placed on the decision to grant any of these remedies.
SECTION I The Forms of Remedies
The remedies obtained by the PCA can be divided into 
four headings: financial compensation; the review or 
reconsideration of the individual case; apologies from the 
department for the maladministration; and revision of 
departmental practice to prevent the error recurring. The 
last category is often combined with one of the preceding, 
most often the third, ie an apology. Each form of 
procedural error has its own peculiar remedy in the sense 
that one form of remedy is more often used, or is more
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suited, to one sort of maladministration. These will be 
identified below.
(a) Financial Compensation.
To many complainants this is probably the most 
desirable remedy, short of a return to the status quo. It 
is not the most common form of remedy, and a number of 
qualifications must be satisfied before the PCA will 
recommend this action to the department involved. 
Financial compensation is most often given in cases of 
delay. It is by no means exclusive.(1)
Sir Cecil Clothier summed up the.PCA approach to 
compensation (and to some extent to the granting of 
remedies in general) in the following extract:
"I see the blame as falling on both the 
company (or their agents) and Customs. In 
reaching that conclusion, I am conscious of 
the possibility, that in law, no claim for 
damages made by an importer would lie 
against Customs - it being arguable that no 
duty of care is owed by them to the 
individual importer (or for that matter, 
exporter) in respect of the exercise of 
their surveillance responsibilities. But I 
am not a court of law. Nor, as I have 
explained to the Chairman of the Board of
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Customs and Excise, do my findings have the 
force of precedent in the way that judgments 
of a court of law do. Rather is it my duty 
to afford equitable relief against that 
injustice which may not be remediable at law 
but which in this particular case is shown 
to have flowed directly from the 
maladministrative act or omission of a 
government department. Furthermore, the 
combination of circumstances which arose in 
this case seems to me to be quite 
exceptional."(2)
Financial compensation, in the form of an ex-gratia 
award of the amount equivalent to an expected financial 
benefit, is used in some cases, particularly in cases 
where the department has mistake’nly awarded it to the 
complainant and then withdrawn it.(3)
In other cases, payment in kind is also seen. In one 
case, where a man complained that all his neighbours had 
been compensated with new brick walls in light of 
development, but that he had not(inconsistency between 
cases), the Department built a wall for him as well, 
despite the PCA stating that there were adequate reasons 
for the distinction.(4)
The PCA may also award compensation to help pay for 
professional help to sort out the departments 
maladministration^) - if he deems it justified and
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proportional to the problem(6)
The compensation may take the form of a waiver of a 
charge or charges made by the department.(7)
Compensation for a variety of forms of losses may be 
seen. It may be for the complainant1s expenses incurred in 
trying to sort out his affairs eg. telephone calls 
etc.(8). Or it may be for a more exact loss, for example, 
in one case concerning a dispute over the provision of 
education for a child, where there was deemed to be an 
inexcusable delay* on the part of the Department of 
Education and Science, the child*s parents were refunded 
the fees for a private school which they had paid during 
the delay.(9)
An interesting problem occurred in one case, where 
interest was sought on an ex-gratia payment of expenses 
incurred at a public inquiry. The delay had occurred in 
the payment of the expenses (around £4,500) at a time of 
high interest rates. The Department held out against 
making such a payment:
"They explained that there was no legal 
right to reimbursement of costs, and even 
less to reimbursement by any particular 
date, and that it had not been their 
practice in the past to pay interest on 
costs even when a considerable delay had 
occurred in repaying applicants. They added 
that it would seem rather odd to them to
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make an ex-gratia payment of interest on a 
payment which was made on an ex-gratia basis 
and they also made the point that there was 
no suggestion that the complainant had 
suffered any handicap on account of the
delay......
....But I could see nothing in this 
policy which would make it inappropriate to 
compensate a successful objector when a long 
and wholly indefensible delay in paying him 
costs had caused him loss. On the contrary, 
it seemed to me equitable that this loss 
should be recognised in the total amount 
that the Department paid. I did not consider 
the apologies given in November 1974, when 
the balance of costs was paid, was a 
sufficient recognition of the loss the 
complainant had sustained by reason of the 
delay, and therefore I invited the 
Department to reconsider their 
position."(10)
Another illustration of compensation for financial 
losses caused by delay, along with elements of the other 
forms of remedy as well, were found in one case dealing 
with delays at the DVLC. Sir Alan Marre summarised:
"The Department have been guilty of a whole 
series of inexcusable mistakes, as a result
-218-
of which the driver has lost all the 
advantages which should have accrued to him 
from his successful appeal and has been put 
to considerable expense.... I therefore 
invited the Department to consider whether, 
in addition to the apology and the offer of 
a free driving test, they should not also 
offer some recompense to the driver in 
respect of the cost of employing solicitors 
and his own expenses in his attempts to have 
the Crown Court Order implemented and his 
licence re-issued. They have agreed to this 
and they are getting in touch with his 
solicitors with a view to making an ex- 
gratia payment to cover his reasonable 
costs."(11)
(b) Limitations To Financial Compensation.
Financial compensation may be limited, or even not 
awarded, if any of the following factors is detected by 
the PCA.
(i) The loss does not stem from the department’s 
omission or failure.(12)
(ii) The loss must be quantifiable, and it must be 
real and not based on hypothetical calculations as to the 
situation if the maladministration had not occured.(13)
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In the first category, only losses directly 
associated with the maladministration will normally be 
accepted. This was illustrated in one case:
"The Company in setting out their claim 
against the Ministry and Customs, had 
included such items as the expected net 
income they would lose through being unable 
to undertake the work for the French 
company; the whole of their transportation 
costs and handling costs; the extra costs of 
materials bought for the contract but not 
used; and costs associated with having to 
dismiss staff and then subsequently employ 
and re-train new staff. The only part of 
this claim (totalling some £67,000) which it 
is appropriate to take into the reckoning in 
relation to my finding against Customs is 
the actual expenditure incurred by the 
company in having the pheasants delivered 
from the port to the company's premises; the 
company's actual costs of unpacking and re­
packing the pheasants; and the cost of 
transporting them back to the port for 
shipment."(14)
In another case the PCA ruled that the complainant's 
financial difficulties were not the fault of the 
department.(15)
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This insistence on direct financial loss can lead to
anomalies. For example, in one volume of case reports, Sir
Idwal Pugh dealt with two cases, both relating to the 
then-existing Employment Transfer Scheme. In one case a 
man was led to believe that he would be eligible, when in
fact he was not, the PCA commented:
"After reviewing all the circumstances of 
this case, I came to the conclusion that 
there were a number of aspects where MSC's 
administration was seriously deficient. I 
felt that there was sufficient doubt about 
the way his application was handled, and the 
clarity of the information he was given 
about his eligibility, to justify my 
inviting MSC to consider whether they could 
alter their decision and accept the 
complainant as eligible for assistance."(16)
[This was in fact done.]
In contrast, the complainant in the other case was 
actually told in a letter that he would be eligible. This 
error, which resulted from carelessness, was discovered, 
and his case reconsidered, and assistance refused. The PCA 
felt that there were no grounds for compensation, as he 
had not moved in anticipation of the assurance of 
assistance, and as a result there could not be said to be 
a financial loss as a result; whereas in the above case, 
the complainant stated that he could not have afforded to
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move in order to take the job, if it had not been for the 
assistance he was allegedly offered.(17) This does appear 
to be harsh, but it is an illustration of the second 
limiting factor that of direct consequence.
If the loss has not followed as a direct result of 
action taken on the advice or information tendered, then 
the PCA may not feel that compensation is justified. In 
one case, a man was possibly misled as to his entitlement 
to sickness benefit whilst on holiday abroad. As he stated 
to Sir Alan Marre, that he did not think that he would 
have cancelled his holiday, if he had known the true 
position, ie that he was not entitled to benefit, the PCA- 
did not feel that there were grounds for ex-gratia 
payment.(18)
In the second category an actual financial loss must 
be established.(19) For example, in one case, the PCA held 
that there had been no financial loss, only the 
inconvenience to a woman of not having the money to repay 
a debt to her mother.(20) Also the loss must stem from 
more than a moral obligation. For instance, a man was told 
that he would qualify for a car maintenance allowance, he 
made arrangements to buy a car, but was then told that he 
was ineligible. He felt morally obliged to buy the car, 
being 'a deeply religious man1, but the PCA felt that he 
could only expect apologies, and not financial 
compensation.(21)
Secondly hypothetical loss has rarely been allowed.
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This was illustrated in a case dealt with by Sir Cecil 
Clothier:
"in putting her complaint to me the 
complainant expressed the view that the 
Department should pay her compensation for 
the injured feelings and loss caused by the 
Department's failings. Apart from the loss 
of opportunity to bid for the property I 
have found no evidence to entitle me to 
conclude that the complainant and her 
husband have sustained any other loss. There 
is nothing before me to suggest that the 
bank would have been prepared to advance 
them a mortgage on the whole property or, if 
so, in what amount. And even if I knew what 
funds might have been available to them, 
there is no way of determing whether they 
would have outbid the tenant of the shop, 
who, I note was prepared to pay the full 
valuation price without a quibble."(22)
However, in a recent case Sir Anthony Barrowclough 
appeared to be willing to accept a claim for hypothetical 
loss:
"In addition, it seemed to me that, as the 
person principally affected by the 
development, the complainant was entitled to 
something more than a simple apology, and
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that some tangible recompense was called for 
to reflect the distress the episode had 
caused him and his wife and the possibility, 
albeit slight, that the outcome would have 
been different had it not been for the 
Department's maladministration. When I put 
this suggestion to the Principal Officer he 
said that, though he regretted the fact that 
the complainant had lost his right to 
challenge the decision, he saw the outcome 
of any redetermination of the appeal that 
there might have been as far too speculative 
to justify any payment from public funds. 
That said, he expressed himself ready to 
offer the complaint an ex-gratia payment of 
£250 in recognition solely of the distress 
and frustration which he and his wife had 
been caused by the Department's poor 
handling of his representations and 
subsequent correspondence. I told the 
Principal Officer that I did not think that 
it was possible, in cases such as this, to 
determine the degree of distress and 
frustration justifiably experienced by the 
complainant - and consequently the 
appropriate level of compensation - without 
giving some weight to the likelihood or
otherwise of the outcome having been 
different if the maladministration had not 
occurred. That factor would, as I saw it, 
undoubtedly weigh with the complainant, 
coupled of course with the other main factor 
which would be less the degree to which the 
development which had been permitted would 
impact on his amenities and the amenities of 
his property, compared with the impact of 
the other possible outcomes. It seemed to 
me, in all the circumstances of the 
complainant *s case that equity would be 
served if an ex-gratia payment of £500 were 
to be made to him by the Department."(23)
It is not yet clear whether this was merely an unique 
case, or whether hypothetical loss is now a consideration 
in assessing compensation.
(c) Review/Reconsideration of the Individual Case
This is more common where the complaint has been that 
there was impartiality or that there was not an adequate 
hearing. The PCA has no power to declare a decision to be 
void/invalid, but he can suggest to the department that 
they review their decision in light of his findings.
One of the main areas here, is where the PCA 
discovers that not all relevant factors have been taken
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into consideration. If this is the case, and it was a 
material fact, the PCA will recommend that the decision be 
reconsidered.(24) Of course there is no guarantee that the 
reconsideration will mean that the complainant is 
successful. If review is not possible under the procedure, 
an opportunity to submit a fresh application will be 
offered.(25)
In cases where an oral hearing was denied, such an 
opportunity may be granted, though on some occasions this 
results from the Departments own initiative, rather than 
from the PCAfs prompting.(26) In another case in this 
area, a Footpaths Preservation Society were deprived of an 
opportunity of an oral hearing of their objections to a 
proposal. Sir Alan Marre was pleased to report, that the 
Department had decided to withdraw the unmade order, and 
reopen the whole procedure, and thus afford the Society an 
opportunity to object orally.(27)
In cases of delay, review is sometimes used as a 
means of remedying a loss which is not financial, which 
stems from the delay.(28) For instance, one complainant 
lost his statutory right of appeal, as a result of the 
expiry of the time limit, whilst he was awaiting an answer 
to a submission he made to the Department concerning an 
alleged error in the decision letter.(29) The Department 
denied and then admitted the error. As a result of this 
delay, the complainant lost the opportunity to exercise 
his statutory right of appeal. The PCA established that it
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was open to him to make a fresh application for planning 
permission to his local planning authority; from which he 
could again appeal to the Department, if necessary, 
however, Sir Alan Marre stressed that this did not 
necessarily mean planning permission would be granted, and 
in fact indicated that it seemed unlikely from the facts 
that it would.(30)
In another case, there was a six-week delay in 
dealing with a claim for attendance allowance, as a result 
the complainant1s mother died before she could be 
medically examined in connection with the claim.(31) The 
PCA accepted that in all probability, if it had not been 
for the delay, the examination would have taken place, but
all he could offer was the suggestion that this fact, plus
the other evidence should be placed before the appeal
board, in the hope of still being able to satisfy all
necessary conditions.(32)
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(d) Apologies
The most common outcome to all cases where the PCA 
has been critical of departmental action or procedure, is 
for the department to tender apologies to the complainant 
via the PCA. In various sources, successive PCAs have 
expressed a certain amount of satisfaction with this 
outcome, in that they perceive that this is what most 
complainants desire from the process, an apology and an 
acknowledgement that they were right. Certainly, there are 
cases where apologies are undoubtedly the most suitable 
remedy, where other remedial action would be 
inappropriate; such cases include delay where there has 
been no real hardship, financial or otherwise as a result; 
and cases where no reasons have been given for the action 
taken and this has led to a misunderstanding between the 
parties.
It must also be said that the PCA expects such 
apologies to be fulsome. Sir Cecil Clothier reprimanded a 
department for a grudging apology:
"I think it a pity nevertheless that in the 
terms of their reply to the complainant they 
were not somewhat less defensive, selective, 
and unapologetic. Even if it is technically 
correct that the Department’s employees in 
the county court were not directly engaged 
in exercising the Department’s
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administrative functions, it is scarcely 
surprising that the citizen should look for 
explanations and apologies, when a public 
service fails, to the Department which 
provides it. I do not think it would have 
derogated from the Department's strict view 
of its legal liability for administrative 
error to have given the complainant an 
apology for what had been done under their 
apparent aegis. Merely to say that they were 
sorry that he should have been refused 
credit and put to some embarrassment and 
inconvenience, but that the real blame lay 
elsewhere, seems to me not enough to meet 
the case."(33)
However, the question must be raised as to whether 
this is not letting the department off somewhat lightly. 
The PCA sets great store by the fact that an investigation 
by his office is considered to be a serious matter within 
Whitehall circles, but does the proposal of just being 
able to say 'sorry' at the end of it, really an incentive 
to the department to improve its practices? It could be 
argued that even though a delay did not cause the 
complainant hardship (in any form), does not mean that the 
department should not be penalised in some way. However, 
the terms of the PCA's remit, which require him to find 
injustice as well as maladministration preclude this.
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(e) Review of Departmental Procedure
This occurs both on its own, or in combination with 
one of the above, more individual remedies. This can be 
seen as a non-individual remedy in that on its own it does 
not benefit the complainant. Rather, it remedies the 
departmental procedure, and thus promotes better 
administration in general.
Again it occurs right across the catalogue of 
procedural errors.(34) It can mean a general review of the 
procedure concerned to improve its efficiency, it may mean 
the revision of a leaflet(35), or the issue of new 
instructions to the staff of the department.(36)
The PCA can also go further than remedying 
departmental procedures. The Select Committee on the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration has 
suggested that the PCA should inform Parliament, when he 
discovers that the working of legislation is producing an 
effect, that he believes to unintentional by Parliament. 
This gives Parliament the opportunity to amend such 
provisions, if this is in fact the case.(37)
On occasions the PCA will acknowledge that future 
remedy of the situation will be of little comfort to the 
complainant concerned. It is at this point that one is 
forced to consider what the PCA considered to be his most 
important role - identifying maladministration and
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promoting good administration in general, or seeking 
remedies for individual cases of maladministration.
SECTION II PCA's Restrictions on the Grant of Remedies
Mention was made in the previous section as to 
limitations surrounding the grant of financial 
compensation. This Section deals with the limitations 
which apply universally to the grant of remedies by the 
PCA.
(a) Departmental and Administrative Considerations
One of the first arguments used by the department 
against the granting of a substantive remedy such as 
compensation, is the 'floodgate' principle. This is used
with varying degrees of success. In one case, it was used
along with the suggestion of uneconomic expenditure 
disproportional to the injustice. Sir Idwal Pugh 
commented:
"The Department have declined to do so. They 
fear that it would encourage similar refund
requests, difficult to check for their bona
fides but awkward in equity to refuse if the 
complainant has had a refund, from up to 
600,000 other vehicle-owners whose licences 
were renewed during the same fortnight. Such
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consequential requests could, on their 
estimate, cost up to £4 millions in refunds 
plus the expense of the additional 
administrative burden. I think the 
Department attach undue weight to the 
problems, the number, and therefore the 
cost, of the refund requests likely to have 
to be met in practice. And in any event it 
must be questioned whether any individual 
clearly shown to have suffered through 
maladministration, even though it involved 
his overpaying only £10, should necessarily 
be refused a tangible remedy in the shape of 
a refund merely because of official 
unwillingness to face coping with similar 
claims from others. I therefore consider the 
Department's response to be a less than 
satisfactory outcome to my 
investigation.”(38)
However, the 'floodgates' principle has been accepted 
as worthy of departmental consideration, when it was 
agreed that the department must be careful not to make 
special exceptions, which would leave them open to claims 
of inconsistency between cases.(39)
The PCA is more likely to accept economic arguments if 
it has been suggested that the remedy should be positively 
extended to others in a similar situation, if the
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department is willing to make an attempt:
"They have explained - and I accept - that 
tracing these from departmental and PAT 
records would require expense out of all 
proportion to the accounts which would be 
due. They propose instead to publicise the 
position through the agency of the ex- 
service organisations and the War Pensions 
Committees and see this as offering the best 
practical prospect of tracking down the few 
cases concerned."(40)
The PCA will also accept that administrative 
principles may prevent a remedy being granted in the form 
suggested. For instance, one department had to reject the 
suggestion that they pay the costs of a new application to 
the department, as this gesture might be seen as 
prejudicial to a possible neutral adjudication by the 
Secretary of State at a later date. Instead they offered 
the equivalent amount in the form of an ex-gratia payment 
for the inconvenience already suffered.(41)
(b) Complainant's Conduct
In general this means any action taken, or not taken 
by the complainant which impedes the department. For 
example, if a complainant writes unnecessary letters about 
his case to the department, which require to be answered,
-233-
he diverts their attention from actually dealing with his 
case; for example a local office was swamped by over 70 
letters from the complainant and from the people that he 
requested to intervene on his behalf.(42) Such behaviour 
can be categorised as follows.
(i) Failure to inform the department of relevant 
facts.
If the complainant could have helped to prevent the 
department's maladministration, then the PCA will be less 
willing to grant a remedy, other than perhaps an apology 
for the fault that can be attributed to the department.
For example, in one case dealing with delay, the 
matter concerned a son leaving school, the PCA felt that 
it was not incorrect of the Department to assume that this 
was after the Summer Term, whereas it in fact was after 
the Spring Term, but as this had not been made clear by 
the complainant in his letter, the PCA did not feel that 
the Department merited criticism.(43)
This category would also include the cases where the 
complainant alleged that they had not been given an 
opportunity to be heard, but on investigation, the PCA 
finds that they have been approached for information, but 
have chosen not to take that opportunity to present their 
information.(44)
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(ii) Failure to comply with regulations/ 
instructions
This is most common in delay cases, where the 
complainant has not complied with given instructions;(45) 
or has followed the wrong procedure(46) which includes 
writing illegibly on the form(47) or erroneous completion 
of the relevant documentation;(48) or has been dilatory 
himself;(49) or if he has not been specific enough in his 
request;(50) or has shown negligence in the conduct of his 
own affairs, eg not informing himself of the terms and 
conditions of the scheme,(51) then the PCA may feel that 
the remedy offered (if any) should reflect the 
complainant's own contribution to the delay. This also 
applies to other errors, for instance in the case of 
misleading advice, if it can be established that the 
complainant was aware of the risks involved in his action 
or it could be said that he should have been aware of 
them, then compensation will not be granted.(52) In one 
such case, the complainant attended a talk at his 
workplace before his retirement at which he was given 
incorrect advice by an official, who was later reprimanded 
for his part in encouraging misrepresentations from the 
public. The PCA took the view that the man should have 
been well warned by the circumstances in which the advice 
was given (the official had prefaced his remarks with the 
words 'They won't tell you this at the DHSS), and the fact
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that the course coordinator had warned them to check all 
advice in case it became out-of-date.(53)
However, the department may not escape criticism, 
if the PCA feels that the department should have realised 
that a mistake had been made;(54) or that the 
complainant's culpability is negligible compared to the 
department's errors.(55)
(iii) Complainant's non-co-operation in the procedure.
This is closely related to the above category. Whereas 
the complainant's actions in the above category may have 
been inadvertent, the complainant's action here is wilful. 
An example is found in the delay category where Sir Alan 
Marre concluded:
"There has been some delay in making a 
repayment to him, but he has contributed to 
that delay by his failure to answer letters 
written to him by the tax offices, or to 
complete income tax returns issued to him, 
and if this continues it can only prolong 
the delay in bringing his income tax affairs 
up to date."(56)
In another case, the PCA noted that the complainant's 
attitude had caused the Australian Department of Veterans' 
Affairs (who had been assisting as the complainant resided
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there) to take the very unusual action of refusing to have 
any more dealings with him.(57)
(iv) Failure to take action to mitigate loss.
In assessing the suitability of a remedy, particularly 
a financial one, the PCA expects that the complainant will 
take all action available to him to mitigate the loss and 
its effects on him. For example, the PCA described a delay 
in one case as 'inexcusably long', but he felt that no 
remedy other than an apology was due, as the Company 
concerned had access to information on which to base the 
decision without waiting for the Department.(58)
In another case, the PCA felt that the complainant had 
failed to take mitigating steps to reduce the financial 
loss caused. The complainant had been strongly urged, even 
by her own advisers to make a payment on account to avoid 
interest, but she did not do so. The PCA felt that 
financial compensation for the interest accrued during 
delays, was not a suitable remedy.(59)
(c) Error That Has No Effect On The Outcome Of The Case
Another consideration for the PCA is whether the error 
concerned had an effect on the outcome of the case. If in 
his judgment it did not, it is unlikely that an individual 
remedy will be recommended, although he may still
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recommend that the department reviews its procedure.
This would appear to be a dangerous route as it seems 
to necessitate considering matters of substance rather 
than procedure. However to a large extent the approach 
would appear to be dictated by the need to find 
'injustice1 to the complainant, as well as 
maladministration.
It has already been seen how this is a major 
consideration for the PCA in dealing with the cases that 
allege that not all relevant factors have been taken into 
consideration. If the omitted factor is not deemed to have 
been material to the case by the PCA, then he will not 
recommend that the case be reviewed, as he is of the 
opinion that no factor other than a material factor would 
affect the outcome of the case, [it is at this point that 
it appears that the PCA is unsure of why he is reviewing 
procedural errors in the first place. It could be argued 
that all procedural errors affect the decision, in that 
whether or not it is the correct decision it is tainted by 
the errors in the procedure. However, the PCA also feels 
that he has to find hardship on the complainant's part, 
amounting to 'injustice' - it is not enough, that the 
decision has been marred by procedural errors.
The PCA demands that persons making complaints to him 
do so with 'clean hands* - "I take the view that anyone 
who refers a complaint to me alleging maladministration on 
the part of a Government Department which has caused him
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to suffer injustice must come with clean handsl,(60)
The PCA also holds the view that there may be 
maladministration, but there is no injustice if the 
complainant benefits as a result.(61) 'Injustice' appears 
to amount to delay which causes financial loss or other 
hardship to the complainant, and impartiality, or a defect 
in the hearing which is so severe that it means that if 
the error had not occurred, the decision or outcome in the 
case would have been different. Thus, if the error is very 
small, it will not be deemed to have caused injustice, 
this was illustrated in one case where the delay amounted 
to a very small part of the whole process, and Sir Cecil 
Clothier maintained that 'its significance should not be 
exaggerated.'(62)
In one unusual case, Sir Cecil Clothier could not see 
the injustice complained of by an immigration service:
"But it is less easy to understand that they 
should be so anxious to ensure that one 
recommended for deportation should be 
deported that they are prepared to criticise 
the authorities for not arranging this with 
administrative haste rather than ensuring 
that the person concerned could exercise all 
his legal rights. I do not suppose they 
would be slow to seek my intervention if 
they thought that such administrative action 
was being improperly used."(63)
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It is also to be found in cases of error where the PCA has 
stated that although there has been an error, it had not 
affected the outcome of the case.(64) In another case, 
there was delay in reviewing a trainee driving 
instructor's licence, due to the loss of a file, (ie 
avoidable human error). He sought compensation for being 
unable to continue his work. However, the PCA ascertained 
that it was extremely unlikely that the decision would 
have been favourable, and therefore the PCA did not feel 
that compensation was appropriate.(65)
Errors in the consultation process will also be 
analysed in this way. In one case Sir Alan Marre 
criticised the department for not granting an oral 
hearing, when it was clearly requested, however, he did 
not believe that it would have affected the outcome:
"With regard to the later developments, 
while I fully recognise the complainant's 
justifiable sense of grievance at not being 
seen. It seems to me that all relevant 
considerations from the company's point of 
view were very clearly set out in the 
correspondence before and after the 
authorisation was withdrawn. The Department 
have taken account of what was said in that 
correspondence both by the complainant 
himself and by the Member of Parliament and 
they have maintained their decision not to
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restore the authorisation; and I see no 
reason to think that they would have come to 
different decision if representations had 
been made orally as well as in writing.”(66)
(d) No Remedy Available
This situation ie where the PCA finds 
maladministration and the requsite injustice, but cannot 
provide a remedy, can arise in two ways. First of all, the 
department concerned may refuse to grant the remedy 
suggested, and the PCA is left to record that there has 
been injustice caused by maladministration, which has not 
been remedied.(67)
Secondly, it may well be that in the particular 
situation, circumstances prevent a remedy from being 
granted. This is usually related more to the first two 
remedies listed. For example, a decision was taken without 
proper representations from an affected party, the 
Secretary of State was unable to reverse his decision, and 
thus no remedy was available to that individual. However, 
it was stated that the Department of the Environment (the 
department concerned) was to improve its procedures in the 
future.(68)
The PCA may also feel that he is not the appropriate 
person to grant a remedy, and that the complainant should 
seek his remedy elsewhere, eg in court.(69)
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CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter has displayed the various remedies used 
by the PCA. There are several points that can be made 
which support the proposition that this is another area of 
strength. First of all the PCA can match the appropriate 
remedy to the error. Here, he uses an element of 
proportionality, illustrated by his self-imposed 
limitations. For example when he insists on awarding 
compensation based only on direct loss, or where the 
complainant is not exactly unblameworthy in the situation. 
This is also aided by the fact that there does not have to 
be a 'winner and loser' as in the more adversarial 
techniques of dispute resolving.
Secondly his position benefits from the fact that 
none of his previous cases bind him. He is sometimes more 
successful in obtaining a remedy such as compensation when 
the department knows it will not necessarily held to it in 
future cases.
It should be noted that the PCA does not have the 
power to overturn decisions, though this is often what the 
complainants wish him to do. However, this is line with 
other dispute-resolving mechanisms confined to procedural 
errors. Given this superimposed limitation the PCA makes 
reasonably good use of his ability to obtain suitable 
remedies to administrative procedural error.
The thesis will now turn to the U.K. courts for a
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comparative study to enable the PCA's work to be seen in 
perspective.
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CHAPTER SEVEN THE COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL
ERROR
SECTION I - The Courts
(a) An Introduction & History
The Courts are the second area of study in this 
consideration of the review of procedural error. The 
Courts exercise control over such administrative error by 
the process of judicial review, or by the process of 
statutory appeal.(Though the second is more often 
associated with substantive matters, procedural errors may 
also arise.) For many years the Courts were at the 
forefront of Administrative Law (though such a term might 
not have been recognised then) and its remedial procedure, 
for the simple reason that no other avenue existed to the 
aggrieved citizen, other than political redress through 
his M.P.
It would be wrong to view judicial review as a purely 
20th. Century phenomenon - it existed much earlier - but 
its importance increased last century with the growth of 
the functions of local government and its associated 
boards. What has changed is the main focus of judicial 
review - the main administrative tasks are contained 
within central government, and more use is made of such 
bodies as quangos and tribunals. The growth of central
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government, as we know it today, has been traced 
elsewhere.(1) A number of factors played their part, the 
Northcote-Trevelyan Report(2) making the civil service a 
more professional body; the advent of easy national 
communications; the growth of the Welfare state, in that 
central government assumed more control for the relief of 
poverty - it now had the effective means to do so - in the 
form of a highly-organised and able civil service, and 
national communications.
It did seem, however, that control of this new 
administrative body could become a problem, the Courts did 
not seem to intervene too readily. Early warnings were 
sounded by Lord Hewart in his book 'The New Despotism' in 
1929.(3)
The explosion of what is known as the welfare state 
on the national scene, after the Second World war, was 
inevitably going to bring the matter to a head. The sheer 
proliferation of bodies and associated regulations, meant 
that even more people were being brought into regular 
contact with the administration, and thus more complaints 
were going to arise as a result of this contact. They 
looked to the Courts for remedies. It has to be said that 
the Courts let them down.
It would seem that the judges did not want to expand 
their use of judicial review to keep track of the new 
developments in the administrative process - to some 
extent they even contracted the basis established in
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earlier times.(4) The late forties, the fifties and the 
early sixties were undoubtedly the twilight period of 
judicial review. The failure of the Courts to protect the 
citizen, led to various reports, which are documented 
elsewhere.(5)
The most interesting reason put forward by the 
Courts for their reluctance to intervene, was that the 
remedies lay in the political processes of Parliament - it 
was the function of M.P.s to check the excesses of the 
Executive. It would now be appropriate to consider the 
approach of the Courts to judicial review in more detail.
(b) The Approach of the Courts to Judicial Review.
Before studying individual examples of the treatment 
of administrative procedural errors before the Courts, it 
is necessary to examine some of the principles that have 
been used by judges in judicial review cases, thus giving 
a background on which to base more detailed investigation.
As we have seen, during the middle part of this 
century (in some cases, there is evidence of earlier 
instances(6)) the courts were very reluctant to become 
involved in judicial review of administrative action. They 
set out strict guidelines as to when they 'could1 
intervene; cases which fell outwith these guidelines were 
the prerogative of Parliament, and political remedies. The 
distinction was drawn between 'judicial' and
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'administrative* functions of a body - if the function 
complained of was deemed to be a 'judicial' function ie it 
had the characteristics of a 'judicial' nature, then the 
Courts felt that judicial review was applicable.(7) 
However, if it did not have these characteristics, then it 
was a purely 'administrative' function, and was deemed not 
to be within the Court's remit.
Needless to say, the distinction was never clear-cut 
- the original definition of 'judicial' was loosely based 
around the idea of a 'lis inter partes', ie a dispute 
between two sides, with a third party as arbiter/judge. 
Thus a tribunal would qualify, if there were two parties 
arguing their side of the case, and the third party 
(administrative body) was judging the merits of each case. 
Obviously, less clear-cut was the case of a form of 
inquiry, where viewpoints were being stated, but the panel 
hearing the arguments may be involved in the decision, in 
that they are calling for information from all interested 
parties, in order to be able to reach a decision.
Such cases caused many problems. A body could be 
performing a 'judicial* function in one task, and an 
'administrative' function in the next - the distinction is 
not always obvious to the lay-person(nor it has to be said 
to the lawyer!).
It is pointless to suggest that the Courts operate in 
a vacuum - the judges are at least unofficially aware of 
public feeling. It was not unnoticed, by at least a number
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°f judges, of the growing unease surrounding what could be 
seen as unchecked administrative power. The Franks Report, 
the clamour for a British ombudsman, the burgeoning of the 
tribunal system, must have made it clear, that the 
'public1 needed more redress in such matters, it is 
arguable whether the Courts had failed, either because 
they did not identify the problem, or because they felt 
that they did not have the power, or else they were 
reluctant to use any power. It may be that the second 
proposition is the correct one, and that their 
constitutional role, prevented them looking any further 
than 'judicial' functions - that it was not their role to 
curb the Executive, but that of Parliament; and if 
Parliament was failing in its role, that was for 
Parliament to remedy and not the Court.
Whatever the reason, a change was coming in judicial 
attitude, as the Franks report was digested; as the debate 
continued on the ombudsman concept; in other words in the 
early 1960's, the judges made their move - several 
decisions indicated the change. For example the classic 
cases of Anisminic(8) and Ridge v. Baldwin(9) indicated 
that the judges (or at least some of them) had decided 
that their role did allow them to check administrative 
action in a more positive manner than before - zealous 
even! There was no doubt that the judges had thrown down 
the gauntlet, the Courts would have a role to play in this 
new area of 'administrative law'. It could be seen as a
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conservative backlash - a return to Dicey - the ordinary 
courts are the place to remedy excesses, new areas of 
dispute resolution are not required - Britain has no 
'droit administratif.'
The Courts had of course, boxed themselves in, the 
judicial/administrative distinction excluded a large 
number of cases. The distinction had been stretched in a 
number of cases, to accommodate the need to intervene 
which was felt. The problem was in the 'all or nothing' 
stance; if the function was 'administrative' no remedy was 
available, as the standards of procedure required of 
'judicial' functions, were not applicable.
Without immediately abandoning the distinction, a new 
form of relief was given for cases, which fell into the 
administrative function category. Bodies or persons 
exercising these functions had a duty to act 'fairly'. 
Arguably, 'fairness' was a new concept.(10) Whether it was 
entirely new is doubtful, such a notion can be clearly 
found in early cases.(11) It certainly opened up new 
vistas for judicial review. Slowly, the
judicial/administrative distinction became less important. 
Classification was not so necessary, if the duty to act 
fairly could be applied. Recently, the courts appear to 
be returning to the distinction again.(12)
These were by no means the only restrictions placed 
on judicial review of administrative procedural error.
Many others existed, such as whether there was a 'right'
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involved, or merely a ’privilege1.(13) Whether the 
relationship that existed was that of ’master & servant* 
and thus to be seen as a private law matter etc.(14)
The case that introduced the new generation of 
fairness was decided in 1967 - the same year as the PCA's 
office got under way.(15) Gradually, judicial review grew 
- many controversial cases came before the Courts. In 1977 
& 1981 new procedures were introduced to facilitate speed 
and ease for such applications.(16)
At the same time, another judicial review test was 
gaining ground - that of ’legitimate expectation*. Only 
this time, it was not an expansionary move, but a 
constricting one; it narrowed the grounds for judicial 
review to cases where the applicant had a ’legitimate 
expectation’ of certain standards of procedure. This 
doctrine had not started out as such, it had in fact been 
used as a lacuna in a judgment by Lord Denning, who whilst 
deciding against the applicant in that particular case, 
had obviously not wanted to close the door to judicial 
review in this area.(17) It now promises to be an 
uncontrollable monster, impossible to define, and judging 
by the cases, nay on impossible to apply consistently.(18) 
Certainly, this test, along with the distinctions now 
being drawn between public and private law rights, and its 
implications for standing, makes it appear that as we 
enter the 1990*s, judicial review is on the retreat from 
the frontlines of Administrative law.
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SECTION II THE Courts and Impartiality
This is not designed as a comprehensive appraisal of 
the judicial review of procedural error - for the subject 
is well-documented elsewhere.(19) It is merely to provide 
background for comparison with the procedural error 
catalogue, and the PCA’s approach.
The courts’ attitude to impartiality on the part of 
the decision-maker is contained in the maxim - nemo iudex 
in causa sua. This applies to all areas of the law, not 
merely the administrative law branch. It is within the 
inherent power of the court to review inferior courts’ 
procedure, thus some of the cases, illustrative of the 
applied principles, come from outwith the ambit of 
Administrative law.
There are various sources of possible bias on the 
part of the decision-maker; pecuniary interest in the 
outcome of the case; a personal relationship with one of 
the parties; personal beliefs and attitudes, or prior 
involvement with the case; and clash of capacity. Each 
will be studied in turn.
(a) Pecuniary interest.
Pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case is the 
classic example of disqualifying interest. The standard 
case here is Dimes v. The proprietors of the Grand 
Junction Canal. (20) It was held that the Lord Chancellor,
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Lord Cottenham, should not have heard the case on account 
of a small shareholding in the company (of which he was 
unaware at that time). Lord Campbell delivered the famous 
judgment on the matter:
" ... No-one can suppose that Lord Cottenham 
could be, in the remotest degree, influenced 
by the interest that he had in this concern; 
but, my Lords, it is of importance that the 
maxim that no man is to be a judge in his 
own cause should be held sacred. And that is 
not to be confined to a cause in which he is 
a party, but applies to a cause in which he 
has an interest... And it will have a most 
salutary influence on these tribunals when 
it is known that this High Court of last 
resort, in a case in which the Lord 
Chancellor of England had an interest,
considered that his decree was on that
account a decree not according to the law, 
and was set aside. This will be a lesson to 
all inferior tribunals to take care not only 
that in their decrees they are not 
influenced by their personal interest, but 
to avoid the appearance of labouring under 
such an influence.n(21)
In a later case, a decision by a local authority to
grant planning permission for a roadhouse, was quashed on
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the basis that one of the councillors was acting as the 
agent for the landowner, in the negotiations for the sale 
to the developer.(22)
(b) Personal Relationship
A close family relationship between the decision­
maker and one of the parties is a disqualifying interest. 
This is particularly well-documented by Scottish 
authorities.(23) Friendship is a less certain ground; in 
Cottle v. Cottle, a rehearing was ordered in a matrimonial 
case, as a result of the wife’s mother informing the 
husband that the magistrate was a family friend, and thus 
was biased in their favour.(24)
(c) Personal Attitudes and Beliefs
It is unlikely that personal*beliefs and/or attitudes 
will amount to a disqualifying interest. For instance, 
belonging to a temperance organisation is not enough to 
bar a justice from sitting on a licensing court.(25) In 
England, however, a clear statement by a justice, that he 
would be betraying his beliefs if he granted a licence, 
was held to be enough to disqualify. (26) This has not been 
the case in Scotland, despite very strong indications of 
personal inflexibility of a justice in this area.(27)
This, of course, takes the matter into the realms of 
prejudgment of the issue, and the closing of the decision­
maker’s mind to the arguments of the case. This point was
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illustrated in a recent case, where it was held that so 
long as a fair trial was given, it was not a matter for 
objection that a member of the licensing committee had 
previously published his own opinion, that sex shops (it 
was requirement for them to be licensed) should not be 
permitted.(28)
As to personal animosity between one of the parties 
and the decision-maker, old Scottish authorities suggest 
that this might be a disqualification, in very extreme 
cases.(29) However, whether this would apply in the modern 
world is perhaps questionable. Certainly, it has been held 
recently that a judge should not ridicule a party in 
court.(30)
Prior involvement in the case is objectionable, if it 
means that a fresh approach is lacking, and a participant 
has prejudged the issue. For instance, in one case it was 
held that in deciding whether a police officer should be 
compulsorily retired, a police authority should not have 
commissioned a medical examination from a doctor, who had 
recently pronounced unfavourably on the officer’s mental 
condition.(31)
(d) Clash of Capacity
A decision-maker may have some connection with the 
case as a result of his role in another capacity or 
function. The question is, to what extent should this 
preclude him from presiding in that instance?
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The decision-maker may be a member of the body which 
has brought the prosecution, or case. If he played no part 
in the decision to bring the action, there is usually no 
objection.(32) However, if as a member or officeholder of 
that body, he/she has proposed the decision to prosecute, 
or has taken an active part in it, then they will be 
disqualified.(33)
Connection with a party to the case may also be 
objectionable.(34) There are a number of cases governing 
the conduct of clerks to the court in this area. In one of 
the most famous examples, a clerk was a member of a firm 
of solicitors, acting for a party in civil proceedings, 
arising from the same incident, which was the subject of 
the criminal proceedings, in which he officiated.(35) This 
was held to be unacceptable, for although there was no 
suggestion of actual bias, the appearance of any 
possibility of bias had to be avoided.(36)
A definite objection will arise, where a body has 
delegated a decision-making/reporting function to a 
committee or sub-committee, and when it comes to 
deliberate on the matter themselves, members of that 
committee/sub-committee are present.(37) This is even more 
objectionable if the members are vociferous in their 
support for one side or viewpoint.(38) In the same vein, 
it is undesirable to have the person who was responsible 
for an initial decision, sitting with a body, which is
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acting as a review/appeal mechanism from that 
decision.(39)
(e) Test for Possible Bias
The courts have required a standard test to determine 
the effect of possible bias. There has been much confusion 
over whether the test is fa reasonable suspicion* of 
bias(40) or fa real likelihood* of bias,(41) not least in 
the opinions given by the judges themselves.
The latest judicial theory is that the ’reasonable 
suspicion* test is applicable to cases involving 
’judicial* functions; and the 'real likelihood' test is 
applicable to cases involving 'administrative' functions, 
thus reviving the flagging distinction between 'judicial' 
and 'administrative' functions.(42)
The conclusion of most commentators has been that 
there is little distinction between the tests. It may 
appear that the 'real likelihood’ test is more difficult 
to satisfy in theory, but in practice, it is suggested, it 
makes little difference. In fact, Cane went so far as to 
say:
"The outcome depends on a judgment by the 
court on the facts of the particular case.
If the court feels the decision ought to be 
quashed for bias, it will choose terminology 
which enables it to reach that result, 
similarly if it thinks the opposite."(43)
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(f) Exceptions to and Variations on the Rules.
(i)Necessity.
It is a fairly sound judicial principle, that if all 
the possible decision-makers are afflicted with the same 
disqualifying interest, then necessity demands that one of 
them shall sit regardless.(44) One of the most famous 
cases in this area was, The Judges v. Attorney-General for 
Saskatchwan(45) where the judges had to decide the 
constitutionality of the legislation which made their 
salaries liable to income tax.
(ii) Waiver
The affected party in a case may waive his objection 
to the disqualifying interest, under certain restrictions. 
For instance, he must know of the interest in full(46). 
Alternatively, he will be held to have forfeited his right 
to objection, if he does not take the earliest opportunity 
to exercise this right.(47)
(iii) Departmental/Administrative bias.
The courts have recognised the problems of dealing 
with allegations in decisions concerning policy. As de 
Smith states - "How far is it appropriate for courts to 
judicialise administrative procedure in order to provide 
proper safeguards for individual interests?"(48)
The seminal case here, is Franklin v. Minister of
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Town & Country Planning.(49) The case revolved around the 
plans for a New Town at Stevenage. The Minister 
responsible for the plans and the associated policy of 
developing new plans, attended a public meeting, where he 
was faced with a hostile crowd, - he made defiant remarks 
to the effect that like it or not, the plans would go 
ahead. The decision was challenged on the basis that the 
Minister had made up his mind, before considering the 
report from the public inquiry. The House of Lords ruled 
that this was not a ground for objection. Lord Thankerton 
voiced the following opinion:
"My Lords, I could wish that the use of 
the word 'bias' should be confined to its 
proper sphere. Its proper significance, in 
my opinion, is to denote a departure from 
the standard of even-handed justice which 
the law requires from those who occupy 
judicial office, or those who are commonly 
regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, 
such as an arbitrator. The reason for this 
clearly is that, having to adjudicate as 
between two or more parties, he must come to 
his adjudication with an independent mind, 
without any inclination or bias towards one 
side or the other in the dispute. ,..[l]n 
the present case, the respondent having no 
judicial duty, the only question is what the
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respondent actually did, that is, whether in 
fact he did genuinely consider the reports 
and the objections."(50)
The reasoning based on the classification of 
functions, has been criticised.(51) However, there is a 
general acceptance that departmental policy is a fact of 
administrative life, and so long as objections etc. are 
evaluated properly, then it cannot be the basis for 
objection to a decision. The potential problems with any 
other attitude were identified as early as 1932 in the 
Donoughmore Report, which stated:
"An easy-going and cynical Minister, rather 
bored with his office and sceptical of the 
value of his Department, would find it far 
easier to apply a judicial mind to purely 
judicial problems connected with the 
Department's administration than a Minister 
whose head and heart were in his work....
Parliament should be chary of imposing on 
Ministers the ungrateful task of giving 
judicial decisions in matters in which their 
very zeal for the public service can 
scarcely fail to bias them 
unconsciously."(52)
Even although, the problem as per 'judicial' 
functions, has been remedied by the increased use of 
independent tribunals, the basis of the problem is still
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there. All administrative bodies have policies, which they 
believe in, and from which therefore, they are naturally 
reluctant to depart. The courts have recognised that 
administrative law will always be beset by these 
considerations; obviously, having a policy cannot be a 
disqualifying factor from taking a decision - if it was, 
administration would shut down. But to return to de 
Smith's problem, where do you draw the line?
The courts have accepted that a Minister who was a 
member of a body, which expressed provisional support for 
an airport development plan, was still capable of reaching 
an impartial decision.(53) Or where the Secretary of State 
for Scotland, had before assuming office, offered support 
as a backbench M.P. to a constituent's objections to a 
grant of planning permission, there was no objection to 
his deciding the appeal.(54)
It has been accepted that a predetermined party 
policy will have been adopted in local government planning 
matters.(55) Ministers* backing for policy has come before 
the courts again since the Franklin decision. In the case 
of R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Gwent CG 
it was stated that whilst it was acceptable that the 
Minister should have a policy, if there were special 
reasons in any case, he must consider them and be prepared 
to depart from the policy.(56) However, if a Minister were 
to commit himself in some way to one course of action, 
then this could be seen as objectionable. For instance in
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a New Zealand case, a Council was held unable to consider 
fairly objections to a proposed scheme, on account of the 
fact that the council had entered into a contract relating 
to the work to be carried out on the scheme.(57)
(g) Less Traditional Examples of Partiality
(i) Bias in the Process - Failure to Consider All Relevant 
Factors
The Courts usually deal with cases where material 
considerations have been overlooked, or irrelevant ones 
regarded, under the judicial review principle of 
reasonableness.
If a decision-maker overlooks an important fact, then 
his decision may be overturned. For example, it would be 
an error if the Secretary of State did not consider the 
costs of alternative proposals;(58) or in immigration 
cases, if he did not take into account special 
circumstances surrounding the case, such as the 
applicant's special position within his community•(59) It 
will also be a fault, if the decision-maker applies the 
wrong test/procedure in reaching his decision.(60)
There is a certain amount of flexibility allowed as 
to what relevant facts should be considered; just because 
a decision-maker could look at any factor that related to 
the public interest, does not mean that it will be an
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error, if he does not do so.(61) However, if the decision­
maker esteems one relevant consideration too highly, to 
the detriment of other relevant factors, then this may 
also be considered to be an error.(62)
Allowing considerations, which are not necessary to 
the process, to influence the decision will also be an 
error. It is in this particular area, that bias is most 
likely to be suspected. For instance, the biased political 
considerations, which influenced a local authority to 
withdraw certain newspaipers from its libraries, caused the 
decision to be quashed.(63) It may not be an irrelevant 
consideration for one government department to consider 
other functions, than its own, if there is an overlap of 
matters, in one decision.(64)
However, the mere presence or consideration of an 
irrelevant factor may not be fatal, if it did not have an 
influence on the decision,(65) or if it did, it operated 
in the party's favour.(66)
(ii)Inconsistency
Inconsistency can occur in two major forms.
Misleading advice can be given as to what procedure will 
be adopted,(this usually happens on a one-off basis) or 
the normal procedure may be departed from in the one 
particular case.
As to the first group, the Courts have mainly shown
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reluctance to intervene; there is no great wish to 
introduce the concept of 'estoppel1 into the 
administrative law field* Lord Denning (or Denning J as he 
then was) raised the possibility in the case of Robertson 
v.Ministry of Pensions.(67) A man had been informed by the 
War Office that he would be eligible for a war pension. As 
a result, the man did not proceed to gather further 
evidence to support his claim. It was, however, the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Pensions to make awards, 
and this department purported to revoke his pension. It 
was held that they were bound by the actions of another 
Crown servant, and that the public should be able to rely 
on such assurances. This approach did not find great 
judicial favour.(68)
In general, wrong advice given by an official will 
not bind the authority concerned..<(69) The Courts have laid 
down two exceptions to this rule.(70) First of all, if 
there is a statutory power to delegate functions to 
offices of the authority, and there are special 
circumstances which make it reasonable for the party 
concerned to think that the officer had the power to make 
an irrevocable decision.(71) Secondly, if an authority 
waived a procedural requirement, then it could not claim a 
defect in the procedure, because of this lack of 
formality.(72)
No subsequent cases of this type have definitively 
departed from the above.(73) However, misleading advice
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may have a 'knock on' effect, in the eyes of the court. 
Where a local authority erroneously informed students that 
they were ineligible for a grant, and then time-barred 
their applications, the Court held this to be unfair and 
an abuse of their discretion.(74)
The main fear surrounding the extension of the 
doctrine of estoppel, is that authorities, by stating that 
they will do something, and thus being bound by that 
statement, will be able to increase their powers by 
themselves, leastways, they will be fettering their 
discretion, and perhaps be taking a bad decision.(75)
The undesirability of such leniency towards the 
careless granting of advice should not be forgotten. It 
can mean that citizens can not safely arrange their
affairs with any great ease, if they cannot reasonably
>
rely on the advice proferred by the decision-making body. 
The solution that is proposed, is that although such 
decisions should not be disturbed (ie the authority does 
not have to stand by its statements), the misled member of 
the public should be granted compensation, for any loss 
suffered as a result.(76) The doctrine of negligent 
misstatement could be used as a remedy here.(77)
In matters pertaining to the second category, the 
Courts have been less 'lenient' on erring authorities. In 
general,the Courts will expect bodies to abide by their 
published criteria, in reaching a decision.(78) If it is 
to be departed from, then it is expected that the party
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concerned, will be inforrned. (79) Most recently, these 
cases have been founded on one interpretation of the 
doctrine of 'legitimate expectation'.(80) In R.v.Home 
Secretary, ex p Ruddock, it was held that criteria for the 
tapping of telephones involved a legitimate expectation 
that they would be followed, unless there was a change of 
policy.(81)
Therefore the Courts are willing to see advice given 
in the form of published guidelines adhered to, but are 
less willing to interfere in individual cases where 
misleading advice has been given. The distinction that 
can be made, is that to some extent in publishing 
guidelines, the authority has fettered its discretion to 
some visible extent, whereas in the individual cases, this 
is not necessarily the case, and it may simply be 'bad' 
advice.
SECTION III - The Courts and the Duty to Consult
(a) Adequacy of Notice.
It is generally accepted that if a 
hearing is to be given to a party, but that party has had 
no notice of it, then the party is effectively deprived of 
their opportunity to be heard.(82) If notice is sent but 
not received, however, this may not invalidate the 
proceedings.(83) There is also some authority for the
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proposition, that if there is no dispute as to the facts 
of the case, and no prejudice to the party affected, then 
the notice is not required.(84)
If notice is required, and it is served, then it must 
also be adequate, or else it will be little better than no 
notice.(85)
As to content, it must state specifically the time 
and place of any hearing(86), and the charges/subject- 
matter to be dealt with, must be clearly stated as 
well.(87) For example, notice given on action concerning 
matter A, cannot be adequate notice for action on matter 
B.(88)
Normally, lack of notice or inadequate notice will 
invalidate the proceedings, however, in certain 
circumstances, it may be excused. Statutory intervention 
has meant that the common law has become less important 
here.(89) One of the main statutory innovations is the 
need to prove that the party has been 'substantially 
prejudiced' before the procedural defect will nullify the 
hearing.(90)
(b) Who Should be Consulted?
The first point that requires 
consideration is whether persons other than the main 
parties to the matter, have a right to be heard in the 
case. In many administrative situations, for example,
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planning and associated matters, there are statutory rules 
governing the right to be heard, though there is some 
discretion on the part of the inspector/reporter, to hear 
other interested parties.(91) There is no rule at common 
lav;, which states that there is a right to be heard at 
public inquiries merely by virtue of being a member of the 
public.
However, there may be a requirement to notify the 
hearing, and allow parties, likely to be affected by a 
decision, to speak. For example, it has been held that 
existing taxi-licence holders in Liverpool should have 
been given the opportunity to comment on the effect on 
their business, of increasing the number of available 
licences.(92) If such a right would be available to an 
individual, it will be open to an organisation, 
representing the individual's (and others') interests.(93)
(c) At What Stage in the Process should Hearing be Given?
The point at which consultation takes place, can be 
seen as important, for the further down the path to one 
decision the process goes, it is possibly more difficult 
to have any influence - there is more resistance to be 
overcome. The courts, however, have been reluctant to 
intervene to order a hearing at an initial stage, 
especially where there is an opportunity to be heard at a 
later stage in the process. This has ranged from the view
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that a local planning authority taking the initial 
decision to make a slum-clearance order, does not have to 
consult an objecting landlord, as there would be an 
opportunity for him to voice his opinion at a later 
stage(94); to cases of suspension from office, without a 
hearing, because the suspension was pending a full 
inquiry.(95) Whilst in the former case, the order was 
ineffective until the Minister approved it, and thus it 
could be argued, that there was very little effect on the 
objector's position, the suspension from office does mean 
harm to a person's reputation at the very least, and thus 
can be seen as a much more serious matter.
Following on from this, is the question of whether a 
defective hearing can be corrected by a later appeal 
hearing, which is free from defect? The above argument 
applies, along with the simple point that although a fair 
hearing was eventually granted at the appeal stage, there 
should in fact have been two 'fair* hearings, the initial 
one, and the appeal stage - so thus in fact, there was 
only one granted. This was the reasoning taken in the case 
of Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders.(96) This 
was rejected as being too wide by the Court in Calvin v. 
Carr, at least as far as associations whose rules have 
been accepted contractually by members, are concerned.(97) 
A modified approach was taken in Lloyd v. McMahon, where 
it was stated that a procedurally correct second hearing 
will suffice, so long as this body can look at all aspects
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of the cases, and is not confined to hearing points of 
law, being bound by findings of fact.(98)
Thus under the above conditions, a hearing very much 
later in the proceedings than intended, will suffice.
(d) Form of Hearing
The word 'hearing* usually means an 
oral hearing.(99) Naturally, if an oral hearing is granted 
to one side, it must also be offered to the 
other/others.(100) It has been long accepted, however, 
that in administrative cases
(& others) a hearing can be constituted by written 
submissions.(101) A 'paper hearing' may be a convenient 
term to adopt, to distinguish it from an oral hearing. 
Paper hearings, to be acceptable must satisfy certain 
criteria. For instance, a decision cannot be made on 
preliminary written submissions made by parties, when the 
impression given by the tribunal was that an oral hearing 
would be granted.(102) The Party must be told of the 
matter involved,(103) and given a fair opportunity to 
reply to other evidence or objections before the 
tribunal.(104)
The most recent approach of the Courts (at least of 
the House of Lords) is that a paper hearing is adequate 
for even quite serious charges/matters. In the case of 
Lloyd v. McMahon, 49 Liverpool City Councillors were
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surcharged by the district auditor for wilful
misconduct.(105) The councillors were fully advised of the
charges made against them, and were given the opportunity
to submit their representations in writing. They did so,
and they also gave no indication that they wanted an oral
hearing.
The Court of Appeal felt that the serious nature of 
such charges warranted an oral hearing (which they said 
was supported by previous practice in such cases). The 
House Of Lords rejected this, stating that the procedure 
adopted was suitable to the charges, and fair to the group 
in the circumstances. A point of difficulty here, appears 
to have been the original lack of request for an oral 
hearing.
It would therefore appear that a paper hearing with 
most of the attributes of a typical oral hearing will be 
acceptable to the courts.
(e) Adequate Disclosure of Information About Case/Matter.
It is a judicially accepted principle that parties 
have the right to know the case against them, so that they 
are able to answer allegations/objections etc..(106) Thus, 
if the evidence is to be considered and used by the 
decision-maker in his deliberations, then generally a 
party should be able to see this information.(107) In 
general, a decision-maker must not use information that
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has not been placed before it and on which there has been 
no argument.(108) Thus, an inspector may not use 
information formed on a site visit, without informing the 
parties of the nature of that impression.(109)
Nor should a tribunal base their conclusions on a 
previous decision which has not been disclosed to the 
parties.(110) However, as the reasons for using procedures 
such as tribunals, is because of the decision-maker's 
expertise in the field, it can be difficult to draw the 
line, as to when he can use this expertise in reaching a 
decision. It would appear that decision-makers can use 
this knowledge in a general way, providing that their 
reasoning, is disclosed, but if there is a more tangible 
or identifiable source ie a document, this should be 
revealed.(Ill)
There are some limitations on how full a disclosure 
should be made, it may not always be necessary for the 
actual documents to be handed over, so long as their 
substance is made clear to the parties. For instance, it 
may be held that it is not in the public interest for the 
source of information to be revealed, so long as an 
indication of the content of such information is given 
even if details are not given, so as to protect the 
source.(112) The functions of some forums may not require 
full disclosure, so the rule appears to be that so long as 
a comprehensive outline of the case is given to the 
parties, including points against them, then the body has
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acted fairly. This is particularly true of investigative 
bodies.(113) For instance, in a recent case, it was held 
that the Monopolies and Mergers Commission investigating a 
company take-over, need not supply all the evidence 
supplied by one party to the other party, so long as both 
parties were aware of the decisive issues and arguments, 
and that there was no manifest unfairness.(114)
There may also be reasons which allow the tribunal to 
prevent the disclosure of a medical report to the party 
themselves, though it will be revealed to the 
representative or their own medical advisor.(115)
A decision-maker must always act even-handedly as 
between the parties. Thus, he should not hear evidence 
from one party without disclosing it (or at least its 
nature) to the other side.(116) Therefore, a compulsory 
purchase order was quashed, after an inspector had asked 
residents about their wishes during a site inspection, and 
had failed to inform the objectors of the answers, which 
were prejudicial to their case.(117)
There is also an identifiable approach to a 
Minister's functions in the area of inquiries. This stems 
from a realisation that a department may not be in a 
position to be clearly even-handed, on account of work 
done with the local planning authority before objections 
were raised to the plans. There are many statutory 
regulations to govern this area now, and de Smith notes 
that these are well-adhered to by the departments.(118)
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There is also the problem of inter-departmental 
communications; should these be disclosed? The point was 
never clearly settled at Common law(119), however, the 
courts have ruled that the Minister is entitled to rely 
upon the opinion of another government department without 
opening up to debate.(120)
The courts have also upheld the principle that a 
Minister is not obliged to adopt the report of the 
inspector/reporter.(121) Members of the public are very 
often disgruntled when the report's recommendations are 
rejected, as the inaccurate view is taken, that if you 
'win' the inquiry, you have 'won' the decision. However, 
in one case where a report was rejected, a decision was 
held to be invalid as there was no basis for rejecting the 
inspector's finding of fact.(122) Also, although the 
report is only one of a number of sources available to the 
Minister, the courts will intervene if he relies on 
another source, that has been emphatically rejected by the 
inspector as worthless.(123) On the whole, the standard 
required of the reports are that they must state the case 
fairly, giving an outline of the party's case in fact, in 
law, and the inspector's own opinion, thus facilitating 
the Minister in reaching his decision, by providing him 
with all the facts of the case.(124)
Thus although the courts recognise the need to know 
the case against a party, and the need to be able to 
counter evidence brought against the party - there is no
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absolute right of disclosure of evidence, particularly in 
investigative procedures, of which inquiries are a major 
category.
(f) The Right to be Heard Fully
The time and place of a 
hearing should be suitable to allow a party with the right 
to be heard to attend. This means, that if necessary, an 
inspector/reporter should adjourn a hearing, though this 
is tempered by a reluctance on the part of courts to 
interfere lightly in this area, as it is recognised that 
, it is an unenviable task for the inspector/reporter to 
arrange a venue and a time mutually suitable to all 
parties.(125) As a result of this consideration, a party 
must immediately raise any known objection to an 
unsuitable date, as soon as possible. In one case, a woman 
was unable to attend or to be represented at a public 
local inquiry, as it was being held on a religious 
holiday. It was held that there was no breach of natural 
justice as a result, as she had had ample time to object 
to the date of the inquiry.(126)
As to the actual hearing, it may amount to a de facto 
denial of a hearing, if time is not allowed for a party to 
produce evidence or a witness, if it is important to the 
case.(127) On the other hand, a party must state his case, 
eg he cannot just 'object' to a planning decision, he must
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state the basis of his appeal, or face the prospect of it 
being dismssed.(128)
(g) The Right to Cross-Examination
In an oral hearing the 
opportunity to cross-examine is a prerequisite. The courts 
are usually willing to accept that a denial of this right 
amounts to a breach of natural justice.(129) In fact if 
there is statutory procedure does not cover this aspect of 
conduct of the tribunal, then the courts may be prepared 
to the rule that this right is to be implied.(130)
However, another case suggests that the right is only 
activated by a party’s request for it, there is no denial 
of justice if the tribunal does not offer him the 
facility.(131)
However, if the court feels that the ’hearing* in 
question, is not a formal process designed to arrive at a 
final decision, then there may be no denial of natural 
justice by refusing an opportunity to cross-examine.(132) 
For example, in a hearing, the main purpose of which was 
to collect information, the use of cross-examination would 
be inappropriate.(133)
Thus the courts require a right to cross-examination 
in formal oral hearings, but may relax this requirement, 
if the hearing is an informal one, with no definitive 
outcome.
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(h) The Right to Legal Representation.
The courts have never 
really accepted that the right to representation (legal at 
any rate) is a principle of natural justice. Most of the 
judiciary are not receptive to the idea, for example Lord 
Justice Fenton Atkinson’s words in a leading case: 
fl[T]his is the first case where it has been 
suggested that the rules of natural justice 
demand a right to legal representation, 
before such a tribunal. If such a rule is 
indeed contrary to natural justice, a very 
large number of persons, including our 
legislators, must have been very insensitive 
over a long period of years to what natural 
justice requires."(134)
There is some authority for the proposition that the 
right to representation can be based on agency, in that if 
a person has a right to be heard, then he can appoint an 
agent to so do.(135) This has not gained much 
support.(136)
Can the right to legal representation be excluded 
totally? The problem arises more often in relation to 
domestic tribunals. There is one school of judicial 
thought which states that the rules can bar legal 
representation without exception.(137) Lord Denning, 
however, suggested that the door to legal representation 
should never be totally shut by a tribunal, they should be
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prepared to exercise discretion to allow it in certain 
cases.(138) His suggestion is that the legal 
representation should be available where the matter 
concerns a person's livelihood, or reputation. Other 
functions, such as as investigating and report-making may 
not justify a right to legal representation, in Lord 
Denning's views. Such matters might include for instance, 
the work of the inspectors under the Companies Act.(139) 
The right to legal representation has been a major 
concern in the area of prisoners' rights. In Fraser v. 
Mudge, the Court of Appeal decided that the principles of 
natural justice did not give a prisoner the right to legal 
representation on a disciplinary charge hearing, before 
the prison's Board of Visitors.(140) This principle has 
continued with the House of Lords recently ruling, that 
even on a charge amounting to a crime (or the equivalent), 
a prisoner has no right to legal representation.(141)
Other recent cases have stated that it is still 
within the Board of Visitors*s discretion to allow legal 
representation; and that in certain cases, it would be 
wrong to disallow it.(142) In one of these cases, the 
relevant facts that the Board should consider, were 
listed. The Board should note the seriousness of the 
charge and its potential penalty; whether points of law 
are likely to arise; the individual's own ability to 
present his case; and the need for speed in reaching a 
decision.(143)
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Thus it would appear that now the courts may still be 
reluctant to pronounce that legal representation is a 
in general, but they are less happy about the 
removal of all possibility of legal representation in some 
cases.
To some extent the courts' reluctance to accept a 
right to representation, is based on the assumption that 
it will be in the form of a lawyer. Legal representation 
was seen as incompatible with the ideas of administrative 
law, lawyers would judicialise the processes, encumber 
them and slow them down. This is typified by Lord 
Denning's speech in the Enderby Town Football Club case: 
"In many cases it may be a good thing for 
the proceedings of a domestic tribunal to be 
conducted informally without legal 
representation. Justice can often be done in 
them better by a good layman than by a bad 
lawyer. This is especially so in activities 
like football and other.sports where no 
points of law are likely to arise, and it is 
all part of the proper regulation of the 
game."(144)
There is a slight desire to leave 'experts' to get on 
with the procedure. This may well be a good reason - but 
there has also been statements by Lord Denning to the 
effect that the best kind of representation is that 
offered by a lawyer.(145) It also appears that the courts
-278-
do not wish to be seen to be slowing down procedure.(146) 
The dividing line may have to be drawn by having regard to
the substance of the case, as has been suggested by the
courts, ie looking at the accusations and their likely 
effect, to decide whether legal representation is 
required.(147)
(i) The Competency of the Tribunal
This encompasses a 
number of points; first of all, to what extent is the 
delegation of the duty to consult permissible by the 
decision-maker. For example, does a statutorily named 
decision-maker have to take the decision himself or can he
delegate it to another? It is firmly established that if a
statute names a government minister as the decision-maker, 
then it is assumed that Parliament intended the normal 
procedures of government to operate - ie that this 
function may be executed by an official in the Minister's 
department.(148)
In other administrative areas it is permissible for 
the decision-maker to delegate the task of receiving 
evidence and reporting on the case; however, the substance 
of all submissions and objections must be reported to the 
decision-maker, an omission could invalidate the 
decision.(149)
The second area of difficulty is an overlap into the
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field of the duty to be impartial. To what extent is a 
tribunal competent to hold a new hearing after a previous 
hearing has been condemned as unfair? The general approach 
is that if it is possible to reconstitute the tribunal 
with different members, this should be done.(150) However, 
this may not be possible, in which case 'necessity1 
demands that the same decision-maker hear the case again, 
and so long as there are no new procedural defects, this 
will be acceptable.(151)
SECTION IV - The Courts and Other Procedural Errors
(a) Delay
The Courts have never really classified delay as 
a procedural error, in its most serious manifestations, it 
would qualify as an abuse of discretion/power.(152) For 
instance, the courts have held that a delay would be an 
abuse of power if it were deemed to be unfair.(153) A 
recent attempt by a pressure group to remedy delays within 
the social welfare system failed, but again it was 
stressed that delay might be a form of abuse of power, if 
it qualified under the 'Wednesbury' rule.(154)
Therefore, as the 'Wednesbury* test is a strict one 
and difficult to meet, it is unlikely that the courts will 
be called upon to remedy many intrinsic delays.
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(b) Duty to Give Reasons
There is no common law rule in 
this country which states that a decision-making body must 
give reasons for its decisions.(155) This is despite the 
fact that the Donoughmore Committee in 1932, called the 
giving of reasons "the third principle of natural 
justice"(156); as well as judicial comments, eg Lord 
Denning stating that "the giving of reasons is one of the
fundamentals of good administration."(157)
This does not mean, however, that the issue has been 
totally ignored by the judiciary.(158) The emphasis is on 
the fact that it is not a fault in itself at common law. 
There are two clear areas where the courts take note of 
the failure to give reasons: (a) where it can be taken as 
an indication of another form of procedural defect; and
(b) where there is a statutory duty to give reasons.
Looking to the first category, failure to give 
reasons for a decision can make an underlying error 
difficult to detect, eg an error of law by the decision­
maker, and thus makes a right of appeal difficult if not 
impossible, to establish. (The same argument can be made 
for establishing a case for judicial review.) The courts 
appear quite keen to prevent failure to give reasons 
becoming an effective bar to further action by one party,
for example, in the case of Padfield v. Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, the Minister did not
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explain his decision - Lord Pearce took the following 
line:
"I do not regard a Minister's failure or 
refusal to give away any reasons as a 
sufficient exclusion of the court's 
surveillance. If all the prima facie reasons 
seem to point in favour of his taking a 
certain course to carry out the intentions 
of Parliament in respect of a power which it 
has given him in that regard, and he gives 
no reason whatever for taking a contrary 
course, the court may infer that he has no 
good reason and that he is not using the 
power given by Parliament to carry out its 
intentions."(159)
This approach follows an earlier Privy Council 
decision, in that case a Canadian Minister had effectively 
blocked a taxpayer's right of appeal, by not giving 
reasons for his decision, Lord Greene MR made the 
following observations:
"Their Lordships find nothing in the 
language of the Act or in the general law 
which would compel the Minister to state his 
reasons for taking action... But this does 
not necessarily mean that the Minister by 
keeping silent can defeat the taxpayer's 
appeal, to hold otherwise would mean that
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the Minister could in every case, or at 
least, the great majority of the cases, 
render the right of appeal given by the 
statute completely nugatory. The Court is, 
in their Lordships1 opinion, always entitled 
to examine the facts which are shown by 
evidence to have been before the Minister 
when he made his determination. If those 
facts are in the opinion of the Court 
insufficient in law to support it, the 
determination cannot stand. In such a case 
the determination can only have been an 
arbitrary one."(160)
However, even if required to give reasons to 
facilitate further redress, it may not mean that the 
explanation has to be comprehensive. In R.v.Lancashire CC 
ex p Huddleton, no reasons were given by County Council 
for refusal to exercise discretion, the Court stated that 
when the other party had been granted leave for judicial 
review, an explanation should be given. In response a 
minimal statement was given, which the Court 
accepted.(161)
The second area where there has been judicial 
activity is where there is a statutory duty to give 
reasons for the decision. Most of the statutory 
intervention in this area, follows the Franks Committee 
recommendation.(162) The major piece of legislation in
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this area is now the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971, 
which imposes a duty to give reasons (written or oral) on 
request.(163) This duty applies to the tribunals listed in 
the Act,(164) and to ministers taking decisions, after 
public inquiries. However, the courts have always 
responded to enforce earlier statutory duties in this 
area.(165)
So what standards have the Courts set where they 
recognise the duty to give reasons? First of all, as there 
is no determinable common law rule in this field, the 
courts will not compel a decision-maker to state his 
reasons, if there is no statutory obligation for him to so 
do. This was particularly well illustrated where there was 
in fact a statutory exemption from the duty to give 
reasons placed on tribunals. Woolf J (as he then was) felt 
that there was a possibility of injustice where leave to 
appeal from a decision of a social security commissioner, 
was refused without reasons. Although there was an 
exemption to the duty to give reasons, Woolf J argued that 
there was nothing to prevent the commissioner from giving 
his reasons.(166) This approach was criticised by the 
Court of Appeal in a later case.(167) The Court of Appeal 
felt that this approach was 'unconstitutional* in its 
attempts to overrule a statutory dispensation.
However, if there is a clear duty to give reasons, 
what standards, if any, do the Courts require? The general 
idea seems to be in line, with the previous area
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discussed, in that the lack of reasons must not hinder any 
further possible redress, and as such the reasons given 
must explain the basis for the decision, unless this is 
clearly obvious, and must satisfy the parties that no 
error has occurred.(168) Lord Denning's consideration of 
the statutory requirement made of tribunals, led to the 
following statement in Iveagh v. Minister of Housing & 
Local Government:
"The whole of the purpose of the 
enactment is to enable the parties and the 
courts to see what matters he [the Minister] 
has taken into consideration and what view 
he has reached on the points of fact and law 
which arise. If he does not deal with the 
points that arise, he fails in his duties: 
and the court can order him to make good the 
omission."(169)
In some cases, this does not seem to mean that they 
have to give lengthy explanations; for example in one case 
a two-line reason for the decision to demolish a house, 
rather than rehabilitate it, was accepted by the Court of 
Appeal.(170) Standard or formula reasons may be 
acceptable(17l) - so long as they do not become a 'ritual 
incantation' in the words of Lord Donaldson MR.(172) 
Although, exactly where the difference lies is not clear.
Thus the Courts appear to be reasonably willing to
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uphold a statutory duty to give reasons, but are reluctant 
to extend the principle to the common law.
SECTION V Remedies Available to the Courts
In general, the basic rule as regards the outcome of 
the cases now appears to be that if there is a breach of 
the rules of procedural error, the administrative decision 
in question will be void.(173) In practical terms, this 
means that the matter will be referred back to the 
decision-making body for new consideration, with hopefully 
error-free procedure.(174) This certainly applies to 
'natural justice' cases; however, if a decision-making 
body has failed to give reasons for its decision, and the 
court feels that this is reprehensible, it may well simply 
order the body to give its reasons without affecting the 
validity of the decision.(175) The remedies normally 
available in such cases, the prerogative remedies, are 
discretionary, which means that the court can refuse to 
grant them to an applicant.(176) As has been seen, 
judicial reluctance to interfere with decisions involving 
inconsistency, as per misleading advice, has led to the 
possibility of compensation being used as a remedy, 
possibly via the award of damages for negligent 
mistatement.(177)
There has been some question over whether there can 
be a breach of natural justice, where the procedural
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defect could not have had any effect on the decision, or 
at least whether the court should interfere in such a 
case.
On the whole, this line has been decisively rejected 
by the judges; the reasoning being succinctly summarised 
by Megarry J (as he then was):
"As everybody who has anything to do with 
the law well knows, the path of the law is
strewn with examples of open and shut cases
which somehow, were not; of unanswerable 
charges which in the event were fully 
explained; of fixed and unalterable 
determinations that, by discussion, suffered 
a change."(178)
Despite this noble statement, there have been cases 
where the courts have refused to -remedy a defect in the
procedure on the grounds that it could not have affected
the outcome; where a body had a statutory duty to act in a 
certain way on the given facts(l79); and where street- 
vendors had not seen the objections lodged against them, 
the judge, on inspection of the evidence, assured them 
that they could not have affected the decision.(180)
A more worrying trend is for the courts to withhold 
remedies from what they see as undeserving applicants.
This is possible as has been mentioned, as the prerogative 
remedies for judicial review, are discretionary.(181) The 
reasons for considering the applicant undeserving are
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diverse; one court held that it would not grant relief to 
'those who sleep on their rights', after a student had 
waited seven months before applying for judicial 
review;(182) the nature of their offence is serious and 
deserves a severe penalty;(183) or because the applicants 
were persistent offenders;(184) or their moral conduct is 
found to be wanting.(185)
The obvious problem is that the Courts do not wish 
to hinder administrative procedures by offering a last 
refuge for complainants with 'hopeless' cases, by 
sanctioning the quashing of decisions resulting from a 
defective procedure, however, the words of Megarry J hold 
true. Wade suggests that the Courts should appreciate the 
need to correct procedural defects in administrative 
matters, where the decision-making body's discretion 
prevails, and thus the applicant might have a better 
chance of success; the need in statutory tribunals may not 
be so great, as the outcome may be governed by 
statute.(186)
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CHAPTER EIGHT - CONCLUSIONS
The first three sections of this chapter set out the 
empirical conclusions of the research. The review of 
procedural error by first the PCA and then the Courts, is 
tested by using the Procedural Error Catalogue as a basis 
for neutral assessment. Finally the two institutions and 
their interaction are considered by reference to the same 
neutral base. The fourth section draws out the wider 
implications of the findings for both institutions, but 
with the emphasis on the office of the PCA.
SECTION I The PCA and the Procedural Error Catalogue
(a) Bias
In the first category of procedural error, the PCA's 
work covers nearly the same sort of errors as the 
Catalogue records under 'Failure to be impartial'. The 
most notable area of difference is that of victimisation, 
which the PCA investigates. This is not a clear category 
in the Catalogue, and really has been developed by the 
nature of the complaints submitted to the PCA; as was 
seen, it is rarely upheld - lack of understanding of the 
process usually being the underlying cause. It is worth 
noting that this illustrates one of the strengths of the 
office, the ability to defuse such situations. The belief
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may be genuine on the part of the complainant. However, he 
may be convinced otherwise by the PCA demonstrating by his 
investigation that there has been no such persecution. It 
also seems to be part of the PCA's role to explain the 
necessary procedures of the government department.
The PCA also receives a number of complaints on the 
basis that 'like cases have not been treated as like' as 
the Catalogue defines this kind of error, ('Inconsistency 
between cases' as per the PCA.) Many of these prove not to 
have an identical basis for comparison, but the PCA, like 
the Catalogue, accepts that administrative discretion may 
provide reasons for a difference in treatment. As a 
safeguard the PCA investigates the soundness of the 
reasons given.
Perhaps the most notable work of the PCA in this area 
has been in cases involving misleading advice given by a 
department, which leads to inconsistent treatment 
(Inconsistency within a case, per the PCA). Whilst the PCA 
can be criticised for setting quite a high standard of 
proof for such cases, he has developed the treatment of 
such mistakes as errors, and has highlighted a serious 
administrative problem. He has tried to strike the balance 
between the necessity not to fetter administrative 
discretion and the undesirability of department's escaping 
from the consequences of their incompetence. On the whole 
such misleading advice, which causes financial loss, as a 
result of the complainant's reliance upon it, will be
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deemed an error by the PCA.
In the more traditional areas, (classified as bias in 
the decision-making process, and inherent bias) the PCA is 
in line with the Catalogue. One small point was noted on 
occasions, that the PCA was prevented from looking at the 
effect of pre-stated opinion, on tribunals, as most of the 
proceedings of tribunals are outwith his jurisdiction.
This is a superimposed limitation which does prevent the 
expansion of the PCA's jurisprudence in this area. The 
other limitation applicable to the above is that the PCA 
will not comment on matters relating to Government policy.
Overall, the main impressions to be drawn are that, 
first of all, the PCA accepts that administrative 
procedures are, by their nature, susceptible to a 
'background' level of 'bias'['inherent bias'] and that a 
completely impartial approach would be almost impossible 
to achieve. This is a recognition of the fact that, if 
complete impartiality was insisted upon, it would be at 
the expense of efficient administration. This does not 
conflict with the views reflected in the Catalogue, which 
also recognised this fact. The impression formed is that 
the PCA is quite comfortable with this concept, but will 
usually check that any such levels are no more than are 
necessary for efficient administration.
The second major conclusion is that the PCA is on the 
whole more concerned with actual bias, rather than with 
the appearance of bias. The mere possibility of bias, or
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as he has himself referred to it -'Justice not seeing to 
be done', will not amount to maladministration.
(b) Errors in the Consultation Process
In the second heading of procedural error, the PCA is 
particularly concerned with the procedure leading up to a 
hearing (be it paper or oral). This is partly because the 
procedure of many hearings (eg tribunals) is outside his 
jurisdiction. The bulk of any work that he does do in this 
area, concerns the variety of planning inquiries.
Statutory procedures are also laid down for many of the 
processes for consultation that he receives complaints 
about, so unless the department/inspector is given 
discretion in relation to what procedure to adopt, the PCA 
does not criticise matters in this regard. [There is, as 
has been noted, the possibility of comment, if the 
authority for the process is a Statutory Instrument.]
So within these limitations, what areas does the PCA 
cover? He has done a lot of work in relation to the 
provision of adequate notification of the existence of the 
decision-making process. This may just be notification, 
with no further participation opportunity for the person, 
or it may be notification as to their rights of 
participation. In either case, the PCA expects that the 
notification will be as comprehensive as possible.
However, the PCA is aware of administrative constraints
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here, and the duty is not absolute. Providing the 
department have taken reasonable steps to ensure 
notification, the PCA will not be unhappy about small 
errors. He is also aware of such constraints as a duty of 
confidentiality on the part of the department, in certain 
areas. But the positive side is the desire shown for the 
provision of as much information as possible, and also a 
trend in the later encumbents to adopt a more sceptical 
attitude to pleas of administrative constraints from 
departments.
The PCA's consideration of who is entitled to be 
heard on a matter, requires that as many people as 
possible should be heard, but that administrative 
efficiency should not be compromised as a result. Thus the 
duplication of information received, is to be avoided. The 
PCA appears to trust the department's own judgment on this 
matter. This is also the guiding principle as to the 
choice of whether the matter should be given a paper or 
oral hearing.
An oral hearing should be granted, if the subject- 
matter would be further illuminated by such a procedure, 
and if the department feel that they have enough 
information without it, then the PCA will not be critical. 
He will expect however, the department to inform the party 
of their reasoning. Even if an oral hearing is afforded, 
the PCA accepts that it may not be a formal process. The 
emphasis appears to be on the opportunity to be heard to
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provide relevant information; and that there is no 
particular benefit to the process, by the provision of an 
oral hearing. [The PCA does acknowledge the perceived 
benefits to the complainant.] This is not necessarily out 
of line with the Procedural Error Catalogue, although 
whether the emphasis is so much on the 
convenience/advantage to the administrative process is 
doubtful. The perceived advantage to the process should be 
the enhanced public confidence in the system.
One of the PCA's strengths in this area, is his 
insistence that the party should be told the case against 
him, and also that he should have as much access as 
possible to relevant information, including, in some cases 
the other side's submissions. However, in the second 
category, the PCA accepts limitations, such as the need to 
preserve confidentiality; or that the scale of the 
operation would seriously dent administrative efficiency. 
Although the PCA will probe such claims made by the 
department, there is still the impression that he is 
willing to accept these, perhaps too readily. Complete 
confidentiality is discouraged, though pruning of 
information to protect sources is acceptable to him. The 
Procedural Error Catalogue does admit that there will 
probably have to be limitations on the availability of 
information, it does not the claim the duty to be 
absolute; and certainly the PCA attempts to ensure that 
these are not unreasonable.
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As to the actual procedure of the hearing, as was 
noted, the PCA's jurisdictional limitations, means a 
paucity of case material in this field. Certainly, the PCA 
has taken account of most of the accepted prerequisites of 
an oral hearing, such as cross-examination, though it will 
be remembered, that he was happy to accept that a hearing 
granted by a department to further the administrative 
process, will not be expected to have such formalities.
The main shortfall from the Procedural Error Catalogue is 
in relation to representation. The PCA has not really 
dealt directly with a major complaint in this area, but 
supports the idea that if professional help is required by 
the citizen to disentangle himself from the mess created 
by a department, then such expense should be reimbursed - 
but this relies on the fact that there is 
maladministration to be contended, it is not thought 
necessary in the normal course of administrative business.
Overall, it would be fair to say that the Procedural 
Error Catalogue envisages the opportunity of puting one's 
case fairly - it is not specific in the procedural 
requirements necessary for this to be achieved, but does 
generally emphasise the need for parties to be well- 
informed. To this extent, the PCA mirrors the Procedural 
Error Catalogue, adopting the stance, that there'will 
always be limitations on the duty, which are acceptable so 
long as they are not unreasonable; and to some extent with
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the later PCAs, there is also the suggestion that such 
limitations should be able to be justified in each case.
(c) Other Procedural Errors
As to the other procedural errors, the majority of 
the PCA's work has been concerned with delay. The common 
problem to both the PCA and the Catalogue is determining 
what constitutes delay. Obviously, it is somewhat 
impractical to set a time-limit, beyond which constitutes 
delay, although it was observed that that was what JUSTICE 
proposed. The general consensus is that 'delay' cannot be 
accurately assessed in units of time, for example, two 
months would be an excessive period for a decision to be 
taken in the field of social security, if it related to an 
emergency payment. Whereas, it would be less unacceptable 
in relation to a planning appeal.
Therefore the PCA's work has been analysed on a 
different basis and the spectrum of types of delay has 
been outlined. This is based on the cause of the error, 
and it is this criteria that the PCA appears to use in 
determining whether the delay is justifiable or 
unjustifiable.
It must be stated clearly that these divisions are 
merely a guide for understanding. They are not completely 
insular in that not every case will fall clearly into a 
particular category. Elements of all, or of some of the
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divisions may be found in some cases. Nor does the 
classification of a delay into a specific category 
automatically determine the PCA's verdict on whether or 
not the delay is justifiable. For instance the delay in a 
case of complexity may not be justifiable if the PCA's 
safeguards have not been implemented.
The division relating to delay as a result of human 
error contained examples where no reason could be 
identified in the process by the PCA - a situation in fact 
of total inaction. Almost invariably, this was seen to 
incur strong condemnation from the PCA. This puts this 
division at the end of the spectrum most likely to be 
considered to be unjustifiable.
What is also clear from many cases is that the PCA 
is not content merely to identify the individual error. He 
is also concerned with why the system failed to identify 
the problem. Could a better system of supervision be 
introduced to ensure that such a halt in the progress of a 
case can be identified sooner in the future?
This can also be seen at the other end of the 
spectrum, in the categories most likely to be identified 
as justifiable delay (ie delay as a result of 
procedural/substantive complexity), where the PCA's 
mitigation requirements were identified. Again this to 
ensure that the system provides safeguards against 
unnecessary, additional delay entering the process.
Here it is very clear that the PCA is looking to the
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system as a whole, and not just to the individual case. 
However, the one area that he is reluctant to enter is 
where the delay is caused by resource constraints which 
are the result of government policy. He will make 
reference to the fact, and it is then open to individual 
M.P.s or the Select Committee on the PCA to take up the 
cudgels.
As to the duty to give reasons, the PCA is not 
confined merely to a desire to see reasons given for a 
decision; although he does emphasise this need, 
particularly, in relation to the prevention of 
misunderstandings. In contrast to the Catalogue, he 
apparently feels that this should be a spontaneous 
reaction on the part of the department, and should not 
have to be activated by a request from the client. In 
addition, there is an obvious thread running through his 
reports, that he considers the general provision of 
information and explanations to the client to be of 
paramount importance. He does accept that there may be 
constraints in this area, such as the need to preserve 
confidentiality by the department, but the necessity of 
such restrictions in each case is probed. Again the 
reasoning behind this is that such communication between 
the department and their client prevents misunderstandings 
and subsequent complaints. However, it has to be noted 
that failure in this category will bring criticism from 
the PCA. Nevertheless, it rarely amounts to
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maladministration on its own.
Thus on the whole, the PCA operates roughly in line 
with the procedural error catalogue. The errors listed may 
bring criticism from the PCA; they may not be good 
administration, but that does not necessarily mean that 
they will fall into the category of 'maladministration' 
which the PCA reserves for the more serious examples of 
the above errors, or more often a combination of the above 
errors.
Section II The Courts and the Procedural Error Catalogue
The purpose of this section is to consider how the 
Courts' definition of procedural error corresponds with 
the Catalogue.
(a) Duty to be impartial
The Courts' consideration of the duty to be 
impartial tends to concentrate on the traditional areas, 
and ultimately on the principle of 'nemo iudex in causa 
sua1. Thus such areas as clash of capacity, personal and 
pecuniary interest etc. are the main subjects for judicial 
review. The adopted test, whether it be 'reasonable 
suspicion' or 'real likelihood' does not demand that there 
be actual bias present, before the decision will be 
affected. But it can be discerned that tangible interests, 
such as shareholding, personal relationship, or a visible
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clash of capacity, involving active participation in each 
capacity, will be greater indicators of potential bias, 
than nebulous (in the Courts* eyes) concepts such as 
personal attitudes or beliefs.
It is also to be noted that the Courts do make 
concessions to the needs of the administrative process, 
with the doctrine of departmental bias, which accepts that 
the need to formulate administrative policies will 
generate a 1 background* level of support/bias towards such 
policies on the part of the department. The problem in the 
past, (and the constant, potential danger) is that the 
Courts, not being well versed in administrative matters, 
may well overcompensate for administrative needs. This 
could be seen clearly at the time when the Courts 
supported the idea that the principles of *natural 
justice* did not apply to bodies exercising purely 
administrative functions; it was corrected to a certain 
extent by the development of the doctrine of 'fairness*.
As to the newer areas, such as treating like cases as 
like, and misleading advice emanating from departments, 
the Courts, whilst not completely rejecting such values, 
are obviously not keen to encourage their development as 
grounds for judicial review. The administrative 
consideration of not fettering discretion, appears to be 
too high an obstacle for them to overcome. Also 
consideration of the doctrine of ultra vires 
considerations hinders them - for obviously, the Court
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cannot direct an authority to maintain an illegal 
decision. So far, there has been little attempt to 
negotiate these fences.
Of course in the traditional approach, these 
categories, along with the consideration of all relevant 
facts/non-consideration of irrelevant facts, are not 
classified as procedural errors in the same way as the 
principles of 'natural justice'. The consideration of all 
the relevant facts is a well-established principle of 
review, but the others are definitely subject to judicial 
whim, and as such cannot really be said to be established 
categories, and thus it can be said that the Courts do not 
cover these areas of the Procedural Error Catalogue.
(b) Error in the Consultation Process
Obviously, the second grouping, is akin to home 
territory for the Courts, with the principle of 'audi 
alteram partem'. The Courts do not cover all aspects of 
the duty to consult, as listed in the Catalogue, though 
some aspects are more strongly defended than others.
Starting with the issue of adequate notice, the 
Courts desire that this should be provided, as it is 
crucial to the consultation process - though as was noted, 
statutory provisions may require evidence of 'substantial 
prejudice' to the party denied notice before action can be 
taken.
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An area peculiar to the Courts1 attention, has been 
the issue of whether a procedurally correct 'appeal1 
hearing can effectively cancel the negative effects of a 
previous, incorrect first hearing. The latest reasoning 
appears to be that, so long as the 'second' hearing is 
identical in its remit as the first, the second will count 
as a fair hearing. The obvious defect, as pointed out, is 
that this effectively denies an 'appeal' hearing in that 
particular process and, as such, may be at variance with, 
at the least, the spirit of the Catalogue.
In the same area, so long as a 'hearing* is 
eventually afforded, the Courts are not swayed by 
arguments that it should take place early in the 
proceedings. Also, the latest judicial approach, appears 
to accept 'paper' hearings, which meet certain criteria 
(usually in relation to countering evidence, perhaps 
roughly equivalent to opportunities afforded in oral 
hearings) as adequate.
Therefore, although the Courts will require a party 
to be given a hearing, that is all that it amounts to - an 
opportunity to be heard. There are no specific 
requirements to grant a hearing as early as possible in 
the process. Nor does it have to be an oral hearing as 
opposed to a paper hearing. But again the Procedural Error 
Catalogue is non-specific, in this field as well. Even if 
an oral hearing is granted, it need not be formal; 
however, if a formal hearing is to be held, then it will
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be an error, if for example, cross-examination, is not 
allowed on request of the party.
The Courts also support the right to adequate 
disclosure of information, in that relevant considerations 
to be used in the decision-making process, should be 
disclosed. How full this disclosure should be, appears to 
depend on the nature of the body concerned. If its 
function is in the main, investigative, with no formal 
outcome as such, to the proceedings, it is less likely to 
have to make full disclosure, so long as the party is made 
aware of the substance of the evidence. So again, 
limitations are acknowledged.
Another area that the Courts have considered is the 
right to legal representation - this is certainly an issue 
on which the Courts diverge from the Catalogue. The Courts 
do not champion the right; in fact instead of it being a 
positive issue, it is more a negative one, in that the 
Courts are fighting a rearguard action, in deciding 
whether it is acceptable to exclude such representation. 
The consensus appears to be that it would be wrong for a 
body to rule that it would never allow such 
representation, and that certain factors could probably 
impose a duty to allow it. On occasions, the debate has 
touched on representation by lay persons, but on the 
whole, it has centred around the desirability/non­
desirability of legal representation.
-303-
(c) Other Procedural Errors
In the area of other procedural errors, the Courts 
fall short of the Catalogue in a major way. Delay will 
only be considered as an error by the Courts if it amounts 
virtually to perversity on the part of the decision­
maker. Thus it can be said that the Courts would only 
consider the most serious and unique cases of delay, 
certainly not routine delays. Therefore, only a small part 
of the Catalogue in this area would be covered by the 
Courts.
Perhaps the most serious departure form the 
Catalogue, is that of the enforcement of the duty to give 
reasons. Despite being called the 'third principle of 
natural justice* in 1932, by the Donoughmore Committee,(1) 
the U.K. Courts have failed to elevate it to that exalted 
position - in fact it is doubtful whether it has even got 
off the ground. The position has been well stated by 
JUSTICE in its 1971 Report:
"No single factor has inhibited the 
development of English Administrative Law as 
seriously as the absence of any general 
obligation upon public authorities to give 
reasons for their decisions."(2)
It is this failure to rigidly enforce a non- 
contentious, accepted administrative principle, even 
during the expansionist period, that warns that the Courts
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are unlikely to embrace the more controversial parts of 
the Catalogue.
Section III The PCA and the Courts
This Section will consider how the PCA and the Courts 
interact in the review of administrative procedural error.
(a) Failure to be impartial
Under the first group of procedural error, the first 
notable difference between the PCA and the Courts, is that 
the PCA deals with a much broader spectrum of errors. For 
instance, the Courts do not deal with complaints of 
victimisation as such. Certainly, the Courts have 
considered complaints of inconsistency, but it is obvious 
that the judiciary are not keen to develop this area of 
review. The PCA, on the other hand, now has an 
identifiable routine for dealing with such complaints. On 
the whole he has done so very successfully, by by-passing 
the difficulties of supporting ultra vires decisions, by 
the device of ex-gratia compensation. The PCA has 
certainly pioneered the ’newer* areas of procedural error 
in relation to partiality.
In the more traditional areas of bias (as identified 
above) the work of the two institutions certainly 
overlaps. For example, there is joint recognition of such
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limitations, as the doctrine of necessity. That is , both 
institutions recognise that sometimes a decision must be 
taken by someone with an interest in the matter if he is 
the only qualified person available. However, there are 
differences in approach, which makes it difficult to say 
with conviction, that the review procedure is being 
duplicated.
First of all, the PCA is restricted in his work of 
review to government departments in the main, thus the 
’background* level of administrative bias is second nature 
to him. It affects all his review work - what is an 
acceptable level of departmental bias, and what is not. On 
the other hand, in developing the jurisprudence of ’nemo 
iudex in causa sua*, the Courts have had to develop the 
category of ’administrative/departmental* bias in relation 
to the review of such bodies, and thus it is not such a 
familiar, and possibly, comfortable concept for them. For 
all the PCA*s use of the concept is more pervasive, it 
does not appear to have made much in the way of apparent 
differences in the outcome of the such cases..
Both the Courts and the PCA have dealt with 
complaints that a Minister was determined to force through 
his policy despite opposition. The evidence in each case 
was the fact that the Minister had made a speech strongly 
favouring his policy. Both institutions were willing to 
accept such statements, as facts of political life, so 
long as the Minister made his decision, having properly
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considered all the representations presented.
Secondly, the PCA is less concerned with the 
possibility of bias, than the existence of actual bias. 
This may be a by-product of the investigative nature of 
his functions, in that he is looking for substance in the 
complaint. It also relates to the need to find ’injustice1 
as well as maladministration. It is the case, that 
successive PCAs have mentioned the judicial maxim of 
’Justice must be seen to be done’ or similar, but, 
although the outward potential for bias may draw criticism 
from the PCA, it will not be counted as maladministration 
(so therefore, injustice is not even a consideration). 
That, presumably would be reserved for actual bias, which 
as was noted, evidence for which has not been uncovered by 
the PCA.
The Courts, on satisfaction of the adopted test, will 
condemn the appearance of bias. The Courts* reasoning for 
this is partly concerned, with maintaining public 
confidence in the system. It might be argued for the PCA, 
that his declaration that he has found no evidence of 
bias, would amount to the same thing.
(b) Imperfections in the Consultation Process
The Courts and the PCA work pretty much in parallel 
in the second area of error. It may be that the PCA is 
often more concerned with the build-up to the hearing,
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rather than with procedural aspects of the hearing itself. 
This is partly due to some of the actual hearing 
procedures being outwith his remit; but then it would have 
to be added that the Common law principles have to a 
certain extent, diminished in importance, as more 
'hearings* are regulated by statutory procedures.
Both require adequate notice, both in timing and 
content, but both also accept that a process cannot be 
invalidated by lack of such, if reasonable steps were 
taken to ensure that such notice was effective, eg non­
delivery situations.
As to the form of hearing, it would appear that both 
institutions are more concerned with a 'hearing' being 
afforded, than anything else. To a certain extent, the 
Courts would appear to want to match the following 
criteria: that the party can fully develop his case, and 
have an opportunity to counter adverse evidence also put 
forward. The PCA is merely concerned with the party being 
able to put his case; but it has to be said that the PCA 
feels that this should be developed with the benefit of 
adequate disclosure of information - so there may be a 
hidden element of countering adverse evidence. Anyway, 
such distinctions are minor. As to the vexed question of 
the necessity of oral hearings, the PCA believes that 
these should only be granted to facilitate information 
gathering by the decision-making body; the Courts appear 
to be questioning any such right, so long as the paper
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hearing is deemed adequate.
Other similarities in attitude include that the error 
lies in denying a request for cross-examination etc., 
rather than in the failure to offer the opportunity. Also 
an awareness of the difficulties in time-tableling such 
events as planning inquiries, and a reluctance to throw 
further difficulties into the system.
The Courts and the PCA also both set limitations on 
the necessity of making full disclosure of all relevant 
material to the parties, for example in the case of 
medical reports. Or where the need for confidentiality has 
been established in an individual case.
On the question of legal representation, it was seen 
that the PCA relies on the legal precedent set in 
particular circumstances, and does not criticise 
departments for following this.
(c) Other Procedural Errors
The PCA has obviously developed his work in the 
remaining categories of procedural error, in a much more 
determined manner than the Courts. The PCA's work in the 
field of delay, when analysed, provides a valuable insight 
into the variety of the forms of that error. The PCA's 
approach is realistic, in that he accepts that some delays 
are inevitable, and it is the role of good administration 
to minimalise such delays and their effects; but they
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cannot always be prevented; yet he condemns slovenly 
procedures and mistakes which lead to delay.
The Courts, however, appear to recognise the enormity 
of the task of attempting to quantify delay; and have 
decided not to tackle it, unless the delay is so 
unreasonable, as to amount to an abuse of power. This
again would appear to look to the cause of the delay, in
that it is envisaged that such delay would occur through 
wilfulness on the part of the administrator. However, 
although the Courts have not closed the door, they are not 
throwing it wide open either. It is fair to mention that 
both institutions are reluctant to condemn, as 
administrative error, delay that is caused by resource 
constraints, as a result of governmental fiscal policy. In 
general, it would seem that this is an area destined to 
remain the prerogative of the PCA, as between the two.
As to the duty to give reasons, it has been noted 
that the Courts have missed an opportunity to enforce an 
important administrative principle to the full. The PCA, 
on the other hand, emphasises the need to communicate at
all stages in the process, but is less likely to call any
failure 'maladministration1, though it will attract his 
criticism. It would appear that his mission here is to 
promote the idea, not penalise the failure to use it. Thus 
although he is sending clearer signals as to the 
desirability of the doctrine, it must be asked, if his 
review role is really any better than that of the Courts.
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(d) Conclusions from the comparison
Thus, drawing on the Catalogue, it has been 
demonstrated that the PCA encompasses the same spectrum in 
dealing with complaints, and the Courts only a small 
section of this spectrum. As has been seen above, to a 
certain extent, their work in the review of procedural 
error overlaps. Does this mean that there is a duplication 
of functions?
To a certain extent serious inroads into the Courts' 
jurisdiction are prevented by the requirements of the 1967 
Act, that the PCA should not investigate a complaint which 
has a possible legal remedy - this includes judicial 
review. There is a discretion open to the PCA to 
investigate such cases, if it appears to him to be 
reasonable to so do. However, the PCA has mentioned in the 
course of some complaints that further redress on such 
matters should be through the Courts, but in other cases 
the PCA exercises his discretion.
However, the overlap is less obvious, when 
consideration is given to the fact that the PCA does not 
always find maladministration, in the examples of 
procedural error, whereas, if found the courts will 
condemn such errors. The fact remains that the two review 
mechanisms both work in the same areas, and deal with the 
same types of errors in some cases. Is this duplication?
In the end the answer is no, because of the outcome of
-311-
such cases from each mechanism, in terms of remedy and 
approach. The approach is different in that the Courts are 
adversarial and deal with only the facts presented to them 
by the parties. Whereas the PCA investigates the matter 
for himself, and thus is responsible for the fact-finding. 
In both cases, the remedies available are discretionary, 
but after that the differences are more manifest.
The Courts1 usual remedy is that the decision is in 
effect quashed, occasionally in the areas away from the 
traditional principles, the Court may direct the decision­
making body to state its reasons, or in other cases, 
compensation in the form of damages for negligent 
misstatement will be awarded. In other words, the Courts 
remedy is all or nothing - most applicants would be quite 
happy to see the decision quashed (or at least until they 
realise that it does not mean that the Courts have stated 
that the body took the wrong decision, and that if the 
proper procedure is followed, the body could arrive at the 
same decision.), but there is no alternative.
The PCA may present more variety and flexibility in 
his remedies, but the ultimate sanction of the Courts is 
lacking in that he cannot quash any decision; although he 
may suggest that the department review the particular 
decision in light of his findings. There is ultimately no 
power in his recommendations; all remedies are negotiated 
between his office and the department concerned, the 
Select Committee intervening if necessary. If there has
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been a quantifiable loss on the part of the complainant, 
he can secure an ex-gratia payment as compensation; but he 
stops short of using financial penalties as a means of 
punishing the department for maladministration - it is 
simply a matter of reparation.
More often than not, the PCA produces the 
departmental apology as the only remedy. Quite often, it 
is claimed, that all complainants want is such 
vindication.
The PCA is free to decide what remedy will be 
appropriate, but it should not be imagined that the Courts 
will provide a more sure remedy. It has been observed that 
the Courts will use their discretion, to withhold remedies 
from undeserving applicants. The PCA can be identified as 
using a 'contributory negligence' scale against the 
complainant's own conduct, in articulating the appropriate 
remedy.
Another obvious contrast between the two mechanisms, 
is that the Courts will usually only be dealing with one 
particular error in each case; the PCA often identifies a 
number during his investigation. This is a consequence of 
the difference in his adopted approach. It has been 
observed, that the higher the number of errors, the more 
likely the PCA is to decide that there was 
maladministration in the case.
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Section IV - Evaluation
This Section will address the wider implications of 
the above findings in relation to the PCA’s role in the 
administrative system.
The problems of the PCA are both self-imposed and 
superimposed. As has been seen, the PCA investigates a 
wide range of procedural error - in many cases he is 
critical of departments, though not always to the point of 
finding maladministration. The main limitation is, of 
course, the statutory framework which controls his office, 
which is superimposed. As has been seen, his jurisdiction 
is controlled, but this thesis is more concerned with the 
work within his remit; extending his jurisdiction would 
only increase the number of departments and subjects in 
his remit, it would not change the nature of procedural 
error.
(a) Superimposed Limitations on the PCA
(1) Statutory Framework & The Constitutional Role. The 
statutory framework does first and foremost establish his 
constitutional position, and it is this role which limits 
the expansion of his work. At the moment, he is akin to an 
officer of Parliament. As such he is a device to assist 
M.P.s in their task of helping constituents with 
grievances against government departments. As such the
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M.P. filter must remain in place, otherwise the connection 
with Parliament is loosened, if not severed. (This is not 
an argument in favour of the merits of the M.P. filter, 
but simply a statement of the facts of the PCA’s life - 
you cannot alter the relationship with Parliament, without 
altering his constitutional role.)
One of his main assets is the Select Committee, with 
their associated powers. This is particularly true in 
relation to forcing departments into providing appropriate 
remedies. If the connection with the M.P.s, and thus with 
the power of the House, were loosened, the PCA's 
enforcement powers would be lessened. In reality these 
powers are quite considerable. Very few cases remain 
unremedied. At the moment, it is really quite unnecessary 
for the PCA to have enforcement powers based in the legal 
system. First of all, this is effectively barred by his 
constitutional role. He is part of the Legislature's 
checks against the Executive, and as such he draws 
authority from the Legislature. To attempt to cross into 
the Judicial arena, at the last stage of his 
investigation, makes very little constitutional sense. His 
function is to report to Parliament, this is usually in 
the form of the Select Committee who demand that their 
authority is recognised. To suggest that a legal remedy is 
required, would be to admit that Parliament is unequal to 
the task.
Secondly, such powers really do appear to be
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unnecessary, because the withholding of remedies proposed 
by the PCA is rare, [it is perhaps true to say, that the 
PCA suggests remedies that need to be enforced rarely 
enough.] Even if such powers were placed in the PCA's 
hands, the Courts would no doubt require the more informal 
investigation procedures to go, thus a judicial structure 
could well be placed on investigations, and the PCA'S 
approach changed completely. The argument concludes with 
the idea that if a judicial structure is to be used, then 
why not just go to the Courts in the first place.
Thus the 1967 Act sets the PCA in a very firm 
constitutional position, which would take radical 
restructuring to remove. In effect, such innovations as 
direct access, and legal enforcement powers are more 
suited to ombudsmen; the Parliamentary Commissioner is a 
different beast.
Therefore the PCA's constitutional role is set as an 
adjunct to Parliament.
(2) Superimposed Limitations and His Jurisdiction. The 
1967 Act allows the PCA's jurisdiction to be expanded. It 
has been expanded on several occasions, but this does not 
necessarily change the type of error that is encountered. 
Only rarely was it observed, that his imposed remit 
prevented the PCA from taking his investigations further. 
It is submitted that this is not a major obstacle to the 
PCA's work.
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(b) Self-Imposed Limitations
These limitations are much more important, as they 
can be corrected without the intervention of outsiders. 
These are the limitations that the PCA has consciously, or 
unconsciously, placed on his work.
(i) Adherence to a case by case approach. A clearly self- 
imposed limitation, is the lack of coherence in his work. 
His approach is on a case-to-case basis, with very little 
attention being paid to his findings, other than on that 
individual basis. There is no attempt by him to gather 
together classification of maladministration, or to try to 
produce guidelines as to how to avoid it. JUSTICE has 
suggested that he is in a very good position to draw up 
guidelines for good administration, but successive PCAs 
see themselves as little more than investigators of 
maladministration - they are not the instigators of good 
administration. Yet, in such matters as delay, the PCA 
often considers the general state of the administrative 
process, to ensure that it is designed to detect delay 
early on, so they cannot claim to be exclusively 
interested in remedying the individual complaint alone.
Even in their preferred function, the use of even 
rough guidelines from past experience would surely aid 
investigation. It is not unknown for the PCA to make 
reference to previous cases involving the same error and
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department, so it would not be difficult for them to 
expand on this slightly.
It would certainly aid the M.P.s in perhaps sending 
in more complaints realising that the problem is within 
the remit of the PCA, and to deter them from submitting 
those outwith his jurisdiction.
(ii) The Interpretation of His Remit. The main limitation 
identified on the PCA's work in the review of procedural 
error, is that of the statutory test of 'injustice* as a 
result of 'maladministration'.
It could be argued, that this is in fact a 
superimposed limitation, in that the formula is laid down 
in statute. It is submitted that it is in fact a self- 
imposed limitation, as a result of the interpretation, the 
PCA chooses to place on it. The PCA adopts the formula as 
a double test. First, maladministration has to be found, 
eg a procedural error of some kind, then the PCA decides 
whether this error has in fact caused injustice to the 
complainant. Injustice here seems to mean quantifiable 
loss or detriment of some kind. It is clearly possible for 
the PCA to accept that maladministration causes injustice; 
that it would be a rare occasion when one occurs without 
the other, yet the PCA persists in withholding remedies on 
account that 'no injustice was caused to the complainant'.
This does not only mean that he restricts his ability 
to help complainants: he involves himself unnecessarily in
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the merits of the case. It has been stated on a number of 
occasions that the PCA does not wish to involve himself in 
the merits of the decision, and he is precluded by statute 
from doing so, without first finding maladministration. 
Yet, in deciding whether there has been injustice, the PCA 
would appear to be emerging himself unnecessarily in the 
substantive issues of the case.
(c) Strengths of the PCA
One of the PCA's strengths is his flexibility in 
providing remedies. The most obvious here has been the 
development of remedies in the case of misleading advice. 
It was such cases that Mitchell highlighted as one of the 
more serious problems facing administrative law - he 
obviously felt that it was beyond’ the reach of an 
ombudsman. Yet it has been to some extent a success story 
- the PCA has been able to deal with the requirements of 
the administrative situation, the need not to breach the 
doctrine of ultra vires in sanctioning illegal actions; 
the need to protect discretion, and yet not to allow 
departments to escape the consequences of incompetency, by 
negotiating compensation in the form of ex gratia 
payments. The Courts have been unable to tackle the same 
problem successfully, and commentators such as Wade and de 
Smith have noted how much more comfortably the PCA handles 
the matter.(3)
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Of course, the PCA's flexibility can also mean that 
the remedies are not always forthcoming, they can be 
deemed unnecessary, or little more than an apology is 
secured. But as has been seen, the aggrieved citizen is 
also at the mercy of the Court's discretion, in relation 
to the prerogative remedies.
The other favourable asset of the PCA is the fact 
that he is dealing constantly with administrative matters, 
and as such gains more insight into the needs of the 
administration. His investigative role helps here. This 
means that he can evaluate claims of administrative 
constraints more effectively. The problem to be guarded 
against here, is that of 'institutionalism' in that the 
PCA could becomes too familiar with the problems of 
administration, and become overly sympathetic to them. 
There are occasions when this can’be detected. One of the 
remedies to at least the suspicion of this, is to include 
the complainant more in the investigation procedure.
(d) Constructive Criticisms of the PCA's Work.
The PCA does suffer from a definitional problem as 
regards his role - it is not so much the lack but the 
transitory nature of the so-called definition. His 
constitutional role is set as the Parliamentary 
Commissioner, yet commentators persist in analysing his 
office in terms of the independent ombudsman principle. If
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the office were independent, then the matters of the M.P. 
filter, and lack of enforcement powers would seem absurd, 
but that is ignoring constitutional fundamentals. It is 
not so much moving the goalposts as shifting the entire 
pitch. Instead of trying to move the immovable, more 
encouragement should be given to removing the self-imposed 
limitations. The PCA reviews a great variety of alleged
procedural error, yet rarely is much comment directed to
this.
It would be better if the comment was directed to why 
the PCA is so reluctant to call procedural errors 
maladministration, preferring instead to merely rebuke the 
department with criticism. Is there a possibility that he 
equates maladministration with illegality, and that is why 
he is so reluctant to use the term? Or is 
maladministration to be defined as a combination of
procedural errors in the one case?
The other general observation that can be made is 
that many commentators, as well as M.P.s, appear to assume 
that the PCA is performing the role of an administrative 
appeal body. Many complaints are basically applications 
for reconsideration of an unpopular decision. The 
statutory framework categorically prevents this function 
for the Parliamentary Commissioner, yet the idea persists. 
It can be explained by the fact that many people have not 
yet grasped the fact that he is not an independent 
ombudsman.
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(e) The Courts
(i) The Courts & the PCA. Undoubtedly the PCA moves into 
potential judicial review situations. The obvious example 
of this is the television licence debacle, that ended in 
the case of Congreve v. Home Office,(4) which the PCA also 
investigated. Successive PCAs have used judicial phrases 
such as 'natural justice' in their reports. Is such 
potential duplication necessary? Should the Courts be 
allowed to get on with such matters alone.?
Certainly, when Mitchell wrote in the early 1960s, 
the Courts were in no way going to be much help to the 
aggrieved citizen in resolving matters in the Procedural 
Error Catalogue, except for an extremely narrow band, 
occupied by the very limited principles of 'natural 
justice* formulated by the judges’ at this time. No doubt, 
the imposition of a public law system on these judges 
seemed to Mitchell to be the only solution. Yet something 
caused a revolution in judicial circles. It may have been 
the realisation that such a system might inevitably be 
foisted upon them by legislation, if the Executive 
continued to be unchecked. Perhaps it was the fear of a de 
facto establishment of such a regime, such as the PCA, 
along with the burgeoning tribunal system. Whatever the 
reason, it provoked a conservative backlash by the judges, 
determined to prove that 'droit administratif* was 
unnecessary.
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(ii) Self-imposed limitations of the Courts. Whatever the 
reasons, judicial review expanded - many forms of 
procedural error were reviewed. But as has been seen, it 
was not a fully comprehensive list. Areas of the 
procedural error catalogue are still perceived as 'no-go1 
areas for the courts. Estoppel in relation to wrong 
advice, delay in the process are all areas where there has 
been little enthusiasm to whole-heartedly embrace the 
ideas; perhaps the saddest failure has been the lack of 
resolve to insist that decision-making bodies give 
reasons. Not only is the Courts' list of reviewable 
procedural error shorter than the PCA's, it is apparently 
getting shorter. It has been noted that doctrines such as 
legitimate expectation are reducing the opportunities for 
judicial review in traditional areas. These are self- 
imposed limitations placed by the judiciary.
It is not clear why these restrictions are being 
introduced, perhaps, the increase of litigation in this 
field is perceived to be a potential problem as per 
resources. What it does prove is that the principles of 
Administrative law are far from settled, and it is 
submitted that the law is still too volatile to be the 
only basis for the review of administrative error, even in 
the narrow spectrum, in which the Courts apply themselves. 
The judges are blowing hot and cold - the expansionist 
period may be over, and there may be an increase of 
aggrieved citizens finding that the Courts will not help
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them. It is on this basis that the work of the PCA gains 
increasing importance in that it provides at least some 
cover for areas not deemed by the Courts to be within 
their jurisdiction.
(f) Concluding Observations or Mitchell Revisited.
In conclusion, it is time to discuss J.D.B.
Mitchell's predictions.(5) It will be remembered that 
Mitchell felt that the ombudsman idea was a red herring.
He did not believe that such 'tinkering' with the system 
would improve matters. His argument was that an 
administrative court system was the required. The answer 
lay in reform of the legal system and not the 
Adminis tration.
The PCA has out performed Mitchell's expectations in 
relation to the problems he reviews. The PCA investigates 
areas such as estoppel, that Mitchell identified as a 
serious problem, which the Courts have not.(6)
It is not made clear why Mitchell felt that the law 
was the better solution, certainly if the alternative was 
merely an 'administrative palliative', then it would be 
understandable. But, as has been seen, that would now be 
an unworthy tag for the PCA. Perhaps he felt that a remedy 
would be guaranteed with the Courts but, as has been seen, 
even during the halcyon days of the Courts, this was never 
guaranteed.
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Of course it can be argued that Mitchell accepted 
that the Courts, as they stood, could not perform the 
envisaged function, and that a separate system of public 
law courts was required. Without entering into this 
debate, it must be pointed out that the PCAfs 
administrative orientated and investigative approach are 
more akin to an envisaged approach of such a system. So 
perhaps it is this approach that should be encouraged.
However, where Mitchell has been proved correct is in 
the fact that the underlying needs of the system have 
still not been articulated. Whether, the creation of the 
office of PCA is partly or wholly responsible for this, 
can probably never be answered satisfactorily. The U.K. 
system is not perfect. The cracks, as Mitchell predicted, 
have been successfully papered over. But it was only a 
temporary repair job, the structural imperfections, such 
as the absence of an administrative appeal body, were 
ignored, and are now resurfacing. As a result the office 
of the PCA is suffering, in that there is an attempt to 
force the office into a role which it cannot 
constitutionally perform. There is undoubtedly room for 
improvement both in the system in general, and the office 
of PCA specifically. Mitchell was right. It cannot all be 
performed by the PCA.
What the solution is for the overall problems of the 
U.K. administrative system, is not a topic for this 
thesis. What this thesis hopefully demonstrates is that
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the PCA is performing a valuable role in the review of 
administrative procedural error; that this function can 
and should co-exist alongside the Courts1 review of such 
matters, as the PCAfs spectrum of review is greater; and, 
finally, that comment should be directed towards 
encouraging the development of this role in the areas 
indicated, instead of demanding the PCA to be something he 
is not.
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FOOTNOTES
NOTE: (1) Two main works of reference are H.W.R.Wade, 
Administrative Law (6th.edition, 1988) and S.A. de.Smith, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th.edition,ed. 
Evans,). These are cited as Wade and de Smith 
respectively, throughout the footnotes.
(2) In presenting the cases reported by the PCA the 
following notation has been adopted: the number of the 
case, followed by the name and number of the volume of the 
PCA Reports in which it appears.
(3) References are made to interviews given to the 
writer by Sir Anthony Barrowclough, (then PCA) Sir Cecil 
Clothier (former PCA; on 16th.June, 1988; and by Mrs.de 
Ste Croix(then Clerk to the Select Committee on the PCA) 
on 17th. June, 1988.
CHAPTER ONE
(1) Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 S.5(1)(a) ?
(2) fThe Parliamentary Ombudsman* Gregory & Hutchesson, 
[1975] M
(3) In particular see C.Harlow and G.Drewry, **A ’Cutting 
Edge*? The Parliamentary Commissioner and M.P.s*' [1990] 53 
MLR 745 which examines the working relationship between 
M.P.s and the PCA.
(4) The Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 Section 5
(5) [1982] 1 WLR 1155 at pll73.
(6) *The Ombudsman Fallacy* J.D.B. Mitchell, [1962] PL 24 
at 24 5
(7) The most important evaluation of the content of his 
work was that of Gregory & Hutchesson in 1975
(8) See Chapter 7 for full list of such sources.
(9) Resolution (77) 31 made on 28th.September, 1977, the 
annex to the Report was also useful.
(10) Recommendation No.R (80) 2, made on 11th.March, 1980
(11) JUSTICE Report, 1971
(12) Some commentators would argue that the courts are 
more concerned with substantive judicial review (see 
J.Jowell & A.Lester ’Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive 
Principles of Administrative Law. [1987] PL 368). Geoffrey 
Marshall has also argued that the PCA is also inextricably 
concerned with substantive matters - see 
’Maladministration* [1973] PL 32
(13) See ’Constitutional Conventions* Chapter V
(14) Proportionality is listed as a basic principle in 
Recommendation No.R (80) 2 [Concerning the Exercise of 
Discretionary Powers by Administrative Authorities.]
(15) See Recommendation No.R.(80)2, the second principle 
listed requires that the relevant factors should be 
considered, and irrelevant factors ignored(* factor * is to 
include the legal basis for the decision); and that the 
decision-making body should ascertain all material
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information. See also, JUSTICE Report (1971), the third 
recommendation is that the body should take all reasonable 
steps to ascertain the material facts.
(16) This is contained in the third principle within 
Recommendation No.R(80)2, - the main principle is equality 
before the law; that like cases must be treated in a like 
manner, and discrimination avoided.
(17) Guidelines are specifically mentioned in the sixth 
heading in Recommendation No.R.(80)2, with the proviso 
that discretion should not be fettered. The seventh 
heading deals with the need for publicising of guidelines. 
The eighth heading, requires reasons to be given if there 
is a departure from the guidelines. Legal commentators 
have classified the departure from guidelines as a
1 substantive* error (see Wade p.424, and C.F.Forsyth, ’The 
Provenance & Protection of Legitimate Expectation* [1988] 
CLJ 238 at 240/241), however, Forsyth’s definition states 
that it does not involve the merits of the decision being 
considered, and therefore, there would not be a clash with 
the definition of 'procedural* error used here.
(18) See Resolution (77) 31 - first principle requires 
that parties should be notified of their right. The 
JUSTICE Report (1971) - first recommendation notes that 
the body must take all reasonable steps to inform the 
parties.
(19) See Resolution (77) 31 - first principle.
(20) The JUSTICE Report (1971) - first recommendation.
(21) See the JUSTICE Report (1971) - first recommendation; 
Resolution (77) 31 (first principle) is more definite, in 
that it does not make any qualification to this right, it 
merely states that the party shall be informed of this 
right.
(22) The three main sources are not specific as to whether 
a 'hearing' should be in written or oral form, for the 
purposes of the thesis, it will be assumed that some 
circumstances will dictate the choice of form, and thus 
there is room for error.
(23) Resolution (77) 31, first and second principles; the 
second principle states that if a person makes a request, 
he should be given access to the relevant factors of the 
case, the qualification here, is that it should be by 
appropriate means.
The JUSTICE Report (1971), heading 4, which requires the 
body to supply material information upon a reasonable 
request, is qualified by heading 8, which gives the 
exceptions to this duty as prejudice to national security, 
or delay in making the request (2 months is suggested).
(24) How far this isactually required is not clear, there 
is perhaps some indication that it would not necessarily 
be a fault. The JUSTICE Report (1971) requires that a 
person is given a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations (see first recommendation); in the fourth 
recommendation, concerning the supply of material 
information by the body, this only applies to requests for
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information relating to the discharge of the body’s 
duties, or the exercise of its powers. This may not 
include revealing evidence submitted by the other side.
Resolution (77) 31 requires that the relevant facts 
upon which the act (decision) is intended to be based, 
should be revealed, this may allow access to the other 
side’s evidence (see second principle); the first 
principle also requires that the opportunity be given to 
put forward facts and arguments, and where appropriate 
evidence.
(25) Resolution (77) 31 (third principle) suggests that it 
should be possible for a person to be assisted or 
represented in the administrative process.
(26) Resolution (77) 31 (fourth principle) - if the act 
adversely affects the rights, duties, or interests of the 
person concerned, it is essential that it should be 
reasoned. The reasons should be given at the time the 
decision is taken, or subsequently on request.
Recommendation No.R(80) 2 (8th. recommendation) 
requires reasons where there is a departure from 
guidelines, where it will adversely affect the rights, 
liberties or interests of the person concerned,
The JUSTICE Report (1971) (9th. recommendation) 
requires that affected parties should at least be notified 
of the decision. Further the seventh recommendation 
requires that a written statement of reasons , justifying 
the decision, shoule be given on request, unless it would 
be (a) prejudicial to national security; (b) there has 
been two months1 delay in making the request; and/or (c) 
the request is made by a person not particularly or 
materially affected by the decision, and the giving of 
such a statement would be contrary to the interests of any 
person so affected.
(27) See the JUSTICE Report (1971) seventh recommendation.
(28) Resolution (77) 31 fifth principle requires an 
indication of possible remedies should be given if it is 
the decision/act is a written one.
(29) The JUSTICE Report (1971) (5th.heading); see also 
6th. heading, that a decision taken under a statutory 
power or discretion, (as opposed to a statutory duty) must 
be made within a reasonable time.
(30) Recommendation No.R(80)2 - 5th. recommendation
(31) See Recommendation No.R(80)2, - 10th. recommendation.
CHAPTER TWO
(1) See later chapter - this was a period of culmuniation 
eg Lord Hewart’s ’The New Despotism* 1929.
(2) See ’Occasion for Ombudsman* by T.E.Utley, for The 
Society for Individual Freedom 1961.
(3) See the Report of the public inquiry into the disposal 
of land at Crichel Down [1954] Cmd 9176. One of Sir Andrew 
Clark’s observations was extremely interesting - it was 
that the hostility against Commander Marten, engendered in
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the officials, was the result of *a feeling of irritation 
that any member of the public should have the temerity to 
oppose or even question the acts or decisions of officials 
of a Government or State Department." Sir Thomas Dugdale 
resigned over the matter. Commander Marten’s tenacity was 
recognised in the preface of JUSTICE’S 1961 Report - ’The 
citizen and the Administration* see below.
(4) Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals & 
Inquiries Cmnd 218 (1957) - their remit was ** ...to 
consider and make recommendations on (a) the constitution 
and working of tribunals other than the ordinary courts of 
law, constituted under any Act of Parliament by a Minister 
of the Crown or for the purposes of the Minister’s 
functions, (b) the working of such administrative 
procedures as include the holding of an enquiry or hearing 
by or on behalf of a Minister, or an appeal, or as the 
result of objections or representations, and in particular 
the procedure for the compulsory purchase of land."
(5) See Stacey; it should be noted that the English 
tradition of xenophobia in relation to ideas not 
originating at home, is obvious here. Administrative law 
has suffered from this, along with the British tradition,
- in combination, this led to an unserving loyalty to 
arguably, a misinterpretation of the work of A.V. Dicey, 
and was probably largely responsible for the situation 
which Administrative law was in, in the 1950s.
(6 ) JUSTICE is the British section of the International 
Commission of Jurists. The interest in the institution 
continued, with *0ur Fettered Ombudsman* report in 1977, 
and the recommendations in the JUSTICE/A11 Souls report in 
1988 (Administrative Justice - Some Necessary Reforms - 
Report of the Committee of the JUSTICE-A11 Souls review of 
Administrative law in the UK)
(7) "The citizen and the Administration" JUSTICE 1961 - 
the report was named after the original chairman, who died 
before the report’s completion; the chairmanship was 
assumed by Lord Shawcross. The remarks are taken from his 
preface to the report.
(8 ) [1962] PL 24; see in general the 1962 edition of 
Public Law for a variety of articles on the ombudsman 
concept.
(9) See for instance Utley op.cit.
(10) Stacey, Gregory & Hutchesson; Douglas L. Capps, 
’Britain’S Ombudsman: the politics of adoption*, 
unpublished thesis, University of Glasgow.
(11) Schedule 2 of the 1967 Act - as amended by 
Parliamentary Commissioner (Consular Complaints) Act 1981, 
and Parliamentary & Health Service Commissioners Act 1987 
see below.
(12) Sir Edmund Compton held this post from 1958 to 1966.
(13) This early appointment caused controversy, as it was 
seen as assuming that the Bill would be passed almost as 
it stood. The argument for the appointment was that this 
would allow the PCA to start his investigations almost
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immediately after the successful passage of the Bill. See 
HC Deb. Vol. 733 Col 698.
(14) First Report of the PCA 1967/68 HC 6
(15) His comments to the author (Interview 16th.June 1988)
(16) Comment to the author during interview - for 
criticism see ’Our Fettered Ombudsman*
(17) Figures from interview (16th.June, 1988)
(18) See Section 4 (departments) & Section 5 (subjects) of 
the 1967 Act.
(19) ’Our Fettered Ombudsman* JUSTICE 1977
(20) Parliamentary Commissioner (Consular Complaints) Act 
1981 & see previously SI 1979/915.
(21) Parliamentary & Health Service Commissioners Act 
1987; and note also a change was made by stautory 
instrument to insert the new Office of the Minister for 
the Civil Service (SI 1987/2039.
(22) See Annual Report for 1988 Session 1988/89 HC 301, as 
well as comments made to author during interview.
(23) A device known as the M.P. filter, originally 
suggested as a temporary measure. Now, there is no real 
sign of it being removed, though Sir Cecil Clothier 
expressed a wish to the author, that the PCA should have 
the power to investigate cases on his own iniatative. Sir 
Anthony Barrowclough expressly stated that he did not want 
this power. Section 5 of the 1967 Act. The usual procedure 
on receiving such a request used to be to write to the 
member of the public concerned, and explain the situation, 
with the offer of forwarding their complaint to an M.P. 
for referral back. It should be noted that this did not 
have to be their own constituency M.P.. The present 
procedure is that the letter is referred to the 
constituency M.P., and he is given the opportunity to 
refer the case back.
(24) Section 6(3) of the 1967 Act.
(25) Section 5(2) of the 1967 Act.
(26) Sir Cecil Clothier used this example in 
conversation(interview 16th.June, 1988); that if I.C.I. 
approached him with a complaint, which gave grounds for 
judicial review, it is unlikely that he would have agreed 
to instigate an investigation on the grounds that they 
could well afford court action; however, if it were an 
ordinary member of the public, particularly a pensioner, 
there was more call for use of his discretion. Sir Cecil 
rejected complaints relating to the IR’s agreement 
concerning the Fleet Street Casual Workers, who had evaded 
their obligations, the case eventually found its way to
court as R.v.Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p National
Federation of Self-Employed [1982] AC 617
(27) Schedule 2 of the 1967 Act.
(28) Section 5(l)(a) of the 1967 Act.
(29) For further illumination see: Stacey.
(30) It is at this point that one can fully understand 
J.D.B. Mitchell’s message. It would be wrong to try to 
achieve such a major aim through such an office. If the
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principles of an administrative appeal court are what are 
desired, then such a desire should be translated into 
such, and not foisted on the PCA. Nor should the 
PCA/ombudsman be held up as the answer to all 
administrative law’s problems.
(31) Debate on the Second Reading of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner Bill: 734 HC Deb. (5th. series) col. 51
(32) See eg. Beatson & Matthews, p.854/856 (2nd.Ed.).
(33) Second Report of the Select Committee on the PCA 
1967/68 HC 350 paragraph 14. In the same report the 
Committee also suggested the concept of the ’Bad Rule’ - 
ie a rule, which despite being applied correctly, caused 
injustice (which of course would be a prerequisite) & 
hardship. At paragraph 17 PCA should enquire whether 
given the effect of the rule in the case under his 
investigation, the Department had taken any action to 
review the rule. If found defective and revised, what 
action had been taken to remedy the hardship sustained by 
the complainant? If not revised, whether there had been 
due consideration by the Department of the grounds for 
maintaining the rule.'
(34) Second Report of the Select Committee on the PCA 
1970/71 HC 513 paragraph 20
(35) See Geoffrey Marshall, 'Maladministration* [1973] PL 
32; and more recently, 'Constitutional Conventions’
Chapter V
(36) (1984) 61 L.S. Gaz. 3108
(37) See later chapter on the PCA’s work
(38) The test suggested was that of "unreasonable, unjust 
or oppressive action" see 'Our Fettered Ombudsman 
paragraph 67
The Select Committee felt that this would not cover any 
situation that was not now protected. See their 4th.
Report for Session 1977/78 HC 615/444
(39) This procedure was adopted in 1978. It obviously 
circumvents the need to return the complaint to the 
complainant, and thus risk losing the complaint if the 
complainant loses heart as a result of the cumbersome 
procedure. The M.P. filter was envisaged as a temporary 
measure by the Whyatt Committee. It became a necessity to 
the Bill's continuing passage through Parliament. It has 
subsequently been criticised by JUSTICE in Our Fettered 
Ombudsman in 1977, and the JUSTICE ALL SOULS Report of 
1988. Needless to say, the Select Committee on the PCA has 
not favoured its abolition - see the Select Committee on 
the Parliamentary Commissioner 4th. Report Session 1977/78 
HC 615/444; and see also Session 1987/88 HC 706. See also 
Lionel Cohen, 'The Parliamentary Commissioner and the MP 
Filter.' [1972] PL 204
(40) Each decision of the Screening Unit is passed to Sir 
Anthony Barrowclough, via the Deputy Commissioner, his 
stated practice is to review each decision. He stated that 
he was unlikely to question a decision to investigate, but 
he might query whether a complaint was in fact within his
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jurisdiction. Presumably, he will also consider whether to 
exercise discretionary powers here, if the possiblity has 
not already been indicated to him.
(41) In 1988, the director of the Inland Revenue unit was 
a qualified accountant, and had been recruited from 
outside the civil service. His successor had also been 
recruited from outwith the civil service ranks - although 
it is too soon to say whether a precedent has developed, 
it rather suggests that the experiment was succesful, in 
itself.
(42) The civil servants seconded to the Screening Unit are 
usually Executive Officers. All the civil servants are 
seconded on a three-year basis. The general consensus is 
that it is considered to be a popular career-move on their 
part, and from their superiors point of view, they gain 
valuable insight into the principles of good 
administration. The selection process begins with notices 
circulated throughout the civil service, inviting 
applications. In 1988, the PCA had a staff of 8 6 . There is 
no statutory rule which requires the office to be staffed 
in this way. However, successive encumbants of the office 
have found this to be the most satisfactory way, as their 
[the seconded civil servants] experience of the system is 
invaluable, particularly in relation to saving time (ie no 
need to learn the system before starting), as well as 
individual knowledge. Sir Cecil Clothier recounted to the 
author, a case where an officer, seconded fom M.A.F.F., 
rendered valuable assistance with his knowledge of sheep- 
dipping, acquired in his previous post.
(43) Negotiations are always conducted between the 
Permanent Secretary and the PCA - the office has resisted 
any suggestion of communications at a lower level.
(44) Section 8(3) of the 1967 Act.
(45) Section 8(4) of the 1967 Act reserves these papers.
However, it has been suggested that the legislation does 
not preclude the PCA obtaining them, if (probably) the 
Prime Minister sanctioned this move, he merely cannot 
compel their production.(See Geoffrey Marshall, 
’Constitutional Conventions' p.89). It is likely that if 
such permission were granted they would be 'for his eyes 
only', and a ban would be placed on revealing their 
contents to others.
(46) Section 8(2) & Section 9 (obstruction and contempt
powers) of the 1967 Act gives these powers to the PCA.
This view was expressed by Sir Anthony Barrowclough, in 
his Clydesdale Bank Public Law Seminar - 'The Ombudsman - 
My Office* delivered at the University of Glasgow, 22nd. 
February, 1988
(47) This has been continually emphasised, and is one of 
the reasons why those directly involved in the office are 
happy to see it continue at its present size - providing 
the personal 'Rolls-Royce' treatment to each case.
(48) There appears to be no statutory basis for this 
practice, Section 10(2) of the 1967 Act, imposes a duty to
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send a copy of his report to the department, but there is 
no requirement for them to see the draft; Section 7(1) 
merely requires the department to have an opportunity to 
comment on the allegations.
(49) This reaction was recorded by Paul Burgess: 'Whose 
side is the ombudsman on?' [1983] 63 New Society 55. This 
stance has been dismissed as fallaciously based, in that 
the PCA is designed to be impartial, and not designed to 
be the citizen's champion at court. However, whilst that 
point is true, and the PCA is probably best described as 
an adjunct service to M.P.s, the procedure adopted on 
investigation can appear to be heavily-weighted towards 
the Administration, and their justification of their 
conduct. See also the views of the Select Committee on the 
matter of the Commissioner interviewing clients, and 
allowing them to cross-examine the departmental officials
- 1st. Report for Session 1970/71 HC 240 paragraphs 3 & 4.
(50) This was explained during the interview with Sir 
Anthony Barrowclough, on 16th. June, 1988.
(51) See later for this procedure.
(52) This reasoning was adopted from the practice of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, who obtains an agreed 
statement of facts before his report goes before the 
Public Accounts Committee.
(53) This approach will be by telephone, or if necessary, 
a visit by the investigating officer.
(54) See the complaints of Mrs. Ward and Mrs. Wilson in 
the Burgess article [op. cit.].
(55) Sir Anthony Barrowclough in conversation with the 
author. Such complaints/inquiries are directed to the 
Select Committee. The committee members will seek 
information from the PCA's office on the investigation, 
and seek to assure themselves that such action was not 
unreasonable, but they will refrain from interfering 
directly.
(56) Section 10(3) of the 1967 Act.
(57) Mrs. de St. Croix estimated that the Select Committee 
had a 90% success rate with the cases referred to it. The 
cases sent to the Committee would be around 6/7% of the 
PCA's total caseload, she estimated.
(58) The average time for a complaint to be processed was 
10 months 18 days in 1987 and 12 months 2 days in 1988 - 
see Annual Report for 1988 Session 1988/89 HC 301
(59) The input of the Select Committee into the 
development of the PCA has been recorded elsewhere. The 
Select Committee on the PCA remained unchanged during the 
1979 revamp of the select committee system. It is not one 
of the more glamourous committees, it rarely grabs the 
headlines; it does not involve foreign travel; and much of 
its work is perceived as boring, as many long documents 
have to be read. The result is that the membership is made 
up of younger Conservatives, in training for the more 
prestigous committees, and Labour members with a 
background in local health authorities (re Health Service
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Commissioner side of the office). The Select Committee is 
chaired by Sir Anthony Buck who has been on the Committee 
since its inception. For more on the work of the Select 
Committee on the PCA, see Roy Gregory 1982 P.L. 49 - 'The 
Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner 1967- 
1980'
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CHAPTER THREE
(1) Case No.C.561/81 (Selected Cases 1982 Vol 4) p.84 
paragraph 11; Case No.lB/882/77 (Investigations Aug/Oct
1978); Case No.C.404/G (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.447/G (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.235/G (3rd. 
Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.lOO/T (1st. Report, 1973/74); 
Case No.C.287/T (1st. Report, 1974); Case No.C.458/J (6 th. 
Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.158/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77); 
Case No.5/184/78 (Investigations Aug/Oct 1978); Case
No.C.978/80 (Selected Cases 1982 Vol 3); Case No.C.978/80 
(selected Cases 1982 Vol 3); CASe No.lA/109/78 
(Investigations Novl978/Jan 1979); Case No.C.495/K 
(Investigations Aug/Oct 1977); Case No.lB/882/77 
(Investigations Aug/Oct 1978); Case No.C.552/82 (Selected 
Cases 1984 Vol 1); Case No.C.461/85 (Selected Cases 1987 
Vol 1); Case No.lA/418/78 (investigations Feb/April 1979); 
Case No.5/538/78 (investigations Aug/Oct 1978); Case 
No.3B/745/77 (Investigations Aug/Oct 1978): Case 
No.5/394/77 (Investigations Feb/April 1978); Case 
no.5/228/78 (investigations Feb/April 1979); Case 
No.C.167/B (4th. Report, 1971/72); Case No.C.467/G (5th. 
Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.146/G (4th. Report, 1972/73); 
Case No.C.40/T (1st. Report, 1974); Case no.3A/753/77 
(5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.lB/17/77 (5th. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.C.74/79 (4th. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.425/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.391/80 (3rd. 
Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.29/81 (1st. Report, 1982/83); 
Case No.C.452/81 (2nd. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.403/82 
(1st. Report, 1983/84).
(2) Case No.C.287/T (1st. Report, 1974)
(3) Case No.C.5191/K (4th. Report, 1976/77); Case 
No.C.694/K (4th. Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.234/79 
(Selected Cases 1980 vol 2); Case No.C.249/G ( 3rd.
Report, 1972/73) p.115 paragraph 28 "There has obviously 
been unpleasantness at many of the interviews he has had 
with officials, from the evidence on both sides, I have 
formed the opinion that this stems from the fact that the 
Department do not treat the complainant differently from 
other claimants and do not accord him the exceptional 
degree of trust that he thinks would be reasonable. I 
consider that the Department’s usual procedures for 
dealing with claims from people of an unsettled mode of 
life are reasonable and I see no reason for them to vary 
these, exceptionally, in the complainant’s case." See also 
Case No.C.595/81 (2nd. Report, 1982/83)
(4) Case No.C.127/G (3rd. Report, 1972/73); and see Sir 
Idwal Pugh’s approach in Case No.C.620/v (6 th. Report, 
1975/76) p.90 paragraph 15 "I cannot say what has happened 
between the complainant and officials at the office during 
the visits he has made since 1971. I can only say that I 
am not persuaded by such evidence as is available that he 
has been victimised or ill-treated by the Department’s
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officials. I recognise that he would prefer not to have to 
attend that office at all but he is in the category of
claimants for whom it was all set up. I accept that it is
within the Department’s discretion to create such an 
office and that there may be advantage to claimants that
justifies their doing so. I have found no shortcomings by
the Department in dealing with the complainant’s claims 
for benefit or evidence of discrimination against him in 
determining his claims."
(5) Case No.C.313/T (2nd. Report, 1974); Case No.C.177/V 
(3rd. Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.411/V (5th. Report, 
1975/76); Case No.C.162/K (5th. Report, 1975/76); Case 
No.C.568/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.495/K 
(investigations Aug/Oct 1977);Case No.C.396/81 (Selected 
Cases 1983 Vol 3); Case No.C.432/85 (Selected Cases 1986 
Vol 4); Case No.C.204/G (4th. Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.875/V (3rd. Report, 1976/770; Case No.750/81 
(Selected Cases 1984 Vol 2).
(6 ) Case No.C.549/J (6 th. Report, 1974/75) p.80/81 
paragraphs 17 & 19 -
’There were inexcusable shortcomings in the handling by 
the local office of the various claims made by the 
complainant between November 1973 and September 1974. He 
was put to unnecessary inconvenience over appointments.
The fares reimbursement was wrongly calculated, and his 
request to appeal about this was mishandled. He was 
initially, denied payment of the increase in invalidity 
benefit for his wife, contrary to departmental 
instructions, and the arrears due for this were 
miscalculated and put right only belatedly. Arrears of 
supplementary benefit due for 1973 were also paid very 
belatedly. He was not informed of a decision for a later 
period to withhold supplementary benefit. And a request 
for an urgent visit in connection with another application 
for supplementary benefit was not met for three weeks. 
Failures of this kind are more inexcusable when the 
individuals affected are, or may be, in financial 
difficulty and deeply distressed.
From the series of errors that occurred I am not 
surprised that the complainant got the impression that 
there was a campaign of harassment against him. But I 
accept the Department’s assurance that this was not so, 
and that the failures wer due to administrative weakness 
and human error."
See also Case No.C.517/84 (4th. Report, 1985/86) - PCA not 
altogether happy.
(7) Case No.C.546/T (3rd. Report, 1974/75) p.23 paragraph 
37; see also Case No.5/843/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78) - 
anonymous letter, badly handled; Case No.2/443/77 (7th. 
Report, 1977/78); and see Case No.C.175/87 (1st. Report, 
1988/89) p . 8 paragraph 21; Sir Anthony Barrowclough 
commented: "I can understand Customs* feeling that
Mr.X ought to have been liable to pay the duty which, if 
the packages had been declared explicitly as containing
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lighters, the Post Office would undoubtedly have demanded 
as a condition of delivery to him the goods he had 
purchased. But it does not follow that the legislation in 
fact made him liable to pay that duty.... The issue is, of 
course, one of law which it would be for the courts and 
not for me to determine.”
(8 ) Case No.C.561/81 (Selected Cases 1982 Vol 4) p.84 
paragraph 11; Sir Cecil Clothier stated his approach as 
follows:
”1 know from other cases which I have investigated 
that Inland Revenue inquiries into suspected non­
disclosure of income can be extremely disquieting to the 
individuals concerned. But it is a necessary function of 
that Department to pursue inquiries where they have reason 
to believe that tax may have been lost because of the 
submission of inaccurate business accounts and returns. In 
this connection it is important that an Inspector*s 
actions should not be judged with the benefit of 
hindsight;.... What I have to consider, therefore, is 
whether the actions of the Inspector at any particular 
stage in an inquiry are reasonable given the information 
held at that time.
(9) Case No.lB/882/77 (investigations Aug/Oct 1978); Case 
No.C.396/81 (Selected Cases 1983 vol 3)
(10) Case No.C.396/81 (1st. Report, 1983/84)
(11) Case No.C.203/J (3rd. Report, 1974/75)
(12) Case No.C.123/J (3rd. Report, 1974/75)
(13) Case No.C.57/T (1st. Report,1973/74)
(14) Case No.C.911/80 (Selected Cases 1982 Vol 2)
(15) Case No.5/184/78 (Investigations Aug/Oct 1978) - 
allegations that the local DHSS office was prejudiced 
against the complainant’s family; Case No.C.524/82 
(Selected Cases 1984 Vol 1) - a vindictive and contemptous
attitude towards the complainant’s son, as a result of his
previous conduct consisting of leaping over a counter and 
smashing the glass with a chair! Case No.C.561/81 
(Selected Cases 1982 Vol 4) - younger tax inspectors were 
prejudiced in certain types of inquiry; Case No.C.276/82 
(Selected Cases 1983 Vol 4) - discrimination against a 
prisoner as a result of alleged report of subversive 
activities; Case No.1A/1051/78 (investigations May/July
1979) - vindictiveness of a tax Collector as a result of 
the complainant’s disagreement with a colleague of his; 
Case No.C.127/84 (Selected Cases 1985 Vol 3) - allegation 
of harassment as complainant worked for a voluntary 
welfare organisation. Case No.C.309/T (3rd. Report, 1974)
- allegations of collusion between Governors of a School 
and the School inspector, to remove teacher from office - 
neither Department nor HMI were responsible for the 
dispute; Case No.C.282/K (4th. Report, 1976) - allegations 
of prejudice as a result of complainant being epileptic; 
Case No.C.284/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77) - allegations of 
general bias against students.
(16) Case No.C.156/J (3rd. Report, 1974/75) - ethnic
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dicrimination claim, in fact benefit cut because of 
complainant1s refusal to have a medical examination; Case 
No.C.620/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76) - no evidence.
(17) Case No.2/1021/78 (Investigations May/July 1979) 
p.179 paragraph 22, and see also Annual Report 1979
(18) Eg Case No.5/394/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.3A/436/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78).
(19) Case No.2/476/77 (Investigations Aug/Oct 1978) 
pparagraphs 19,24,32 & 33 in particular. See also Case 
No.C.400/K (1st. Report, 1976/77) - discrimination against 
one group of prisoners by Prison officers - but not within 
the PCA* s jurisdiction, though he agreed that there had 
been discrimination there was no evidence to suggest that 
the Northern Ireland Office had supported this; Case
No.2/392/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78).
(20) One of the earliest PCA reports, in the time of Sir 
Edmund Compton, dealt with inconsistency of approach in 
dealing with claims for compensation for internment in the 
concentration camp at Sachsenhausen (3rd. Report,
1967/68). This would appear to a consideration for 
departments in formulating their administrative practices 
- eg. Case No.lB/685/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.lB/706/77 (7th. REport, 1977/78); Case No.C.55/81 (3rd. 
Report, 1981/82).
(21) Case No. C.241/B (4th. Report, 1971/72); Case 
No.C.490/G (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.457/G (5th. 
Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.565/G (5th. Report,1972/73) ; 
Case No.C.22/T (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.402/G 
(3rd. Report, 1972/73);Case No.C.216/T (1st. Report,
1974); Case No.C.350/J (4th. Report, 1974/75); Case 
No.C.134/V (1st. Report, 1975/76).,- similarity, but not 
enough to warrant comparison; Case No.C.512/V (5th.
Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.914/V (6 tli. Report, 1975/76) 
p.228 paragraph 16 - "It would not be appropriate for me 
to discuss any other person*s tax liablity in this report, 
but the evidence I have been given in the course of 
investigating the complainant s own case indicates that 
the circumstances were not in fact identical.";Case 
No.C.226/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.280/k (4th. 
Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.525/80 (Selected Cases 1981 
Vol 4); Case No.C.852/80 (Selected Cases 1981 Vol 4); Case 
No.C.451/79 (Selected Cases 1980 Vol 3); Case No.3B/759/78 
(Investigations Feb/April 1979); Case No.C.759/K 
(Investigations Aug/Oct 1977); Case No.C.475/81 (Selected 
Cases 1983 vol 3)] - Also Case No.C.405/B (4th. Report, 
1971/72); Case No.C.394/G (1st. Report, 1972/73) - 
accepted reasons for different treatment - but asked to be 
treated the same on the grounds of ‘natural justice*; Case 
No.C.451/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.83/80 (1st. 
Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.697/80 (3rd. Report, 1980/81); 
Case No.C.484/82 (4th. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.91/86 
(1st. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.512/86 (1st. Report, 
1987/88); Case No.C.893/80 (6 th. Report. 1980/81).
(22) Case No.C.568/T (3rd. Report, 1974;
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(23) Case No.C.919/78 (4th. Report, 1979/80).
(24) Case No.C.469/J (3rd. Report, 1974/75) p.81 paragraph 
8 ; Case No.C.223/V (5th. Report, 1975/76) - policy on 
qualified teacher status varied according to requirements; 
Case No.C.54/V (1st. Report, 1976/77) - Department had to 
give effect to the new government policies in the Housing 
Act 1974 which created a duty to act in the way that they 
did - the Department were not responsible for the 
inconsistent situation.
(25) Case No. C.454/79 (6 th. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.741/85 (3rd. Report, 1987/88); Case No.3B/759/78 
(1st. Report, 1979/80).
(26) Case No.C.120/j (3rd. Report, 1974)p.167/168 
paragraphs 12 & 13; see also Case No.C.470/T (2nd. Report, 
1974) p.39 paragraph 14 - "On the other hand I thought 
that I ought to invite the Department to consider further 
whether there had been sufficient justification for the 
distinction that had been between the case of the man from 
whom a late appeal was admitted and to whom a refund was 
made, and that of the complainant. They have reviewed the 
circumstances in both cases. They make the point that the 
other person raised the question of his tax liablity much 
earlier - in fact, over three years earlier - than the 
complainant after the relevant assessments had been made. 
Even so, it was 2% years after his assessment that the 
other man first raised his objection, compared with the 
normal 30-day limit for appeals. And it is now the 
Department’s view that they went too far in accepting an 
appeal from him (though there is no question now of going 
back on that). In the circumstances they remain of the 
view that the action they took iri the other case would not 
justify their making a refund to the complainant." Case 
No.C.384/J 94th. Report, 1974/75) - the other case was a 
mistake, but ex-gratia payment was awarded; Case No.C443/B 
(4th. Report, 1971/72) - student grant paid in error, 
department tried to reclaim it, student successfully 
claimed that another student had been in same position but 
had not been asked to repay. Case No.C.20/G (4th. Report, 
1972/73) - grant given to the Company’s three 
establishments in England, but one not given in Scotland 
- grants given in error - remedy - did not seek repayments 
of the grants made; Case No.C.460/G (5th. Report, 
1972/73)p.199 paragraph 18.
(27) Case No.C.487/T (3rd. Report, 1974) p.12/13 & 14 
paragraphs 4,9 & 10
(28) Case No.C.253/86 (1st. Report, 1987/88).
(29) Case No.C.1216/78 (4th. Report, 1979/80) p.51 
paragraph 1 2 .
(30) Case No.C.117/77 (Investigations Aug/Oct 1977); &
Case No.C.5/85 (Selected Cases 1986 Vol 2). In the former 
case all comparative cases had been dealt with according 
to guidelines issued; in the latter, one case had not.
(31) Case No.C.5/85 (Selected cases 1986 Vol 2) p.96 
paragraph 32
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(32) Case No.C.219/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78) p.275
paragraph 16.
(33) Case No.C.275/82 (Selected Cases 1984 vol 2) p.69 
paragraph 35. See also Case No.C.420/G (1st. Report, 
1973/74) p.169/170 paragraph 31 - Although in my opinion, 
the Department’s attitude to their own starting date rule 
was inconsistent and tended to operate to the company’s 
disadvantage, I do not consider that it can be shown to 
have directly influenced their decision that there were no 
special circumstances justifying the waiver of the time- 
bar.’’ Case No.C.870/V (1st. Report, 1976/77) - where 
department agreed to reconsider decision as a result of 
representations made, including the point that had been 
treated differently from similar cases; Case No.C.462/G 
(5th. Report, 1972/73) p.32 paragraph 20 - ”(I accept that 
in one other case .... a period of 1 2  weeks assistance was 
approved i error and was excessive and inconsistent with 
other cases and the Department have taken action to 
prevent a recurrence)."
(34) Case No.C.198/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.C.378/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.5/77 (1st. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.213/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78); 
Case No.lB/326/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.lA/649/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Cae No.lA/802/77 
(5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.lA/725/77 (5th. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.3B/338/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.C.3B/390/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3B/474/77 
(5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3B/541/77 (5th. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.5/821/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.3A/897/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/59/78 (1st. 
Report, 1978/79); Case No.lA/18/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); 
Case No.3B/758/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.Case 
No.2/770/78 (1st. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.327/79 (4th. 
Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.516/80 (5th. Report, 1980/81); 
Case No.C.483/80 (1st. Report, 1981/82); Case Nos.C.611/80 
& W.85/80-81 (3rd. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.34.6/81 
(3rd. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.1004/80 (2nd. Report, 
1982/83); Case No.C.581/82 (2nd. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.398/82 (2nd. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.252/82 (2nd. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.188/83 (3rd. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.C.314/83 (7th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.313/84 
(1st. Report, 1984/850; Case No.C.466/84 (3rd. Report, 
1984/85); Case No.C.292/83 (3rd. Report, 1984/85); Case 
No.C.157/84 (4th. Report, 1984/850; Case No.C.665/84 (5th. 
Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.773/84 (1st. Report, 1985/86); 
Case No.C.170/85 (1st. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.459/83 
(1st. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.114/85 (3rd. Report, 
1985/86); Case No.C.697/85 (5th. Report, 1985/86); Case 
No.C.554/85 (1st. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.238/85 (3rd. 
Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.606/86 (2nd. Report, 1987/88); 
Case No.C.137/87 (3rd. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.228/86 
(3rd. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.249/86 (5th. Report, 
1987/88); Case No.C.264/82 (6 th.Report, 1983/84).
Failure to give proper advice: Case No.C.254/79 (6 th.
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Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.716/81 (2nd. Report, 1982/83); 
Case No.C.823/81 (2nd. Report, 1982/83); Case NO.C.363/87 
(1st. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.367/82 (2nd. Report, 
1983/84); Case No.C.457/82 (3rd. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.202/83 (6 th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.506/84 (5th. 
Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.277/86 (3rd. Report, 1986/87); 
Case No.C.589/86 (3rd. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.201/86 
(5th. Report, 1987/880; Case No.C.114/87 (5th. Report, 
1987/88); Case No.C.605/87 (6 th. Report, 1987/88); Case 
NO.C.456/K (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3A/1048/78 
(2nd. Report, 1979/80).
(35) Case No.C.574/81 (5th. Report, 1981/82); Case 
No.IB/13/78 (1st. Report, 1978/79).
(36) Case No.C442/G (5th.Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.370/G 
(5th.Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.114/G (3rd.Report, 
1972/73); Case No.C.122/T (1st.Report, 1973/74); Case 
No.C.118/T (1st. Report, 1973/74); Case No.C.486/T
(3rd.Report, 1974); Case No.C.422/T (1st. Report, 1974) - 
PCA accepted that the enquiry was made, but could not 
establish what he was told; Case No.C.139/V (6 th.Report, 
1974/75); Case N0 .C.8 /J (1st.Report, 1974/75); Case 
No.C.248/v (3rd.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.225/V 
(5th.Report,1975/76); Case No.C.406/V (5th.Report, 
1975/76); Case No.C.693/V (5th.Report, 1975/76); Case 
NO.C.696/V (6 th.Report, 1975/76); Case N0.C.709/V 
(6 th.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.249/V (1st. Report, 
1976/77); Case No.C.493/K (4th.Report, 1976/77); Case 
No.C643/K (4th.Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.412/G 
(4th.Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.206/77 (1st. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.C.355/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.C.236/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case No.2/451/77 (5th. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/340/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); 
Case No.5/857/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.4/9/78 
(7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3A/398/78 (1st. Report, 
1978/79); Case No.5/501/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.3A/288/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.3A/873/78 
(4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.lA/465/78 (4th. Report, 
1978/79); Case No.lB/474/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.3A/644/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.4/653/78 
(1st. Report, 1979/80); Case No.5/733/78 (2nd. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.3A/1034/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.5/1187/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.3A/81/79 
(2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.lB/443/78 (2nd. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.33/231/79 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.c.75/79 (4th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.39/79 (6 th. 
Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.428/79 (6 th. Report, 1979/80); 
Case No.c726/78 (8 th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.347/79 
(9th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.853/80 (3rd. Report, 
1981/82); Case No.C.292/81 (5th. Report, 1981/82); Case 
No.C.222/82 (4th. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.178/82 (1st. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.406/82 (2nd. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.C.84/82 (2nd. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.329/82 
(3rd. Report, 1983/34); Case No.C.598/82 (6 th. Report, 
1983/84); Case No.C.218/82 (7th. Report, 1983/84); Case
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No.C.294/83 (7th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.624/82 (4th. 
Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.419/84 (5th. Report, 1984/85); 
Case No.C.688/84 (1st. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.127/85 
(4th. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.220/85 (5th. Report, 
1985/86); Case No.C.352/86 (3rd. Report, 1986/87); Case 
No.C.255/86 (1st. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.566/86 (3rd. 
Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.383/87 (6 th. Report, 1987/88); 
Case No.C.318/87 (1st. Report, 1988/89); Case No.C.631/83 
(8 th. Report, 1983/84).
(37) Case No.C.78/K (1st. Report, 1976/77) p.29 paragraph 
13 - "Both the complainant and her friend agreed that what 
the friend said at the interview with my officer had been 
discussed between them. I therefore cannot regard this 
corroboration as conclusive." also the evidence was 
brought forward very late after the event, as well as the 
PCAfs consideration that it would be very serious 
maladministration, if it were established. See also Case 
No.C318/T (2nd.Report, 1974) - where it was established 
that the witness could not speak to the facts; Case
No.5/410/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78) p.97 paragraph 17 "I 
cannot uphold the solcitors* contention that the 
Department fabricated evidence to support their argument 
that there had been no misdirection on which ex gratia 
payment of arrears could be justified. That being so, I do 
not uphold their complaint."
(38) Case No.C.95/K (4th.Report, 1976/77) p.22 paragraph 
17
(39) Case No.C.78/K (1st.report 1976/77) as regards new 
evidence; Case No.C.709/V (6 th.Report, 1975/76); Case 
No.C.461/81 (3rd. Report, 1981/82).
(40) Case No.C.453/T (3rd.Report, 1974); Case No.C.262/V 
(3rd.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.406/V (5th.Report, 
1975/76); Case No.C.722/V (6 th.Report, 1975/76); Case 
No.C.302/K (3rd.Report, 1976/77); Case No.5/600/78 (1st. 
Report, 1978/79); Case No.5/864/77 (1st. Report, 1978/79); 
Case No.lA/437/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.461/81 
(3rd. Report, 1981/82).
(41) Case N0 .C.I6 6 /J (3rd.Report, 1974/75) p.55 paragraph 
6 . See also Case No.C.228/G (1st.Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.62/J (1st.Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.195/K
(3rd.Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.44/V (6 th.Report, 
1975/76); Case No.C.95/K (4th.Report, 1976/77); Case 
no.15/191/78 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.595/80 
(5th. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.113/82 (1st. Report, 
1982/83); Case No.C.834/81 (4th. Report, 1982/83); Case 
No.C.121/85 (1st. Report, 1985/86).
(42) Case No.C.368/J (4th.Report, 1974/75) - persistent 
wrong advice, led to a loss of pension, given extra- 
statutory equivalent. Case No.C.443/J (4th.Report, 
1974/75); Case No.C.898/V (3rd.Report, 1976/77) - 
compensation paid; Case no.C.606/86 (2nd. Report.
1987/88); Case No.3A/57/79 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.356/82 (1st. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.398/82 (2nd. 
Report, 1983/84).
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(43) Eg. Case No.C.478/G (5th.Report, 1972/73) - agreed 
advice was misleading but legal advice allowed the 
Department to stand by it; Case No.C.243/T
(3rd.Report.1974); Case N0 .C.8 I/T (1st.Report, 1973/74); 
Case No.C.131/T (1st.Report, 1974); Case No.C.262/V 
(3rd.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.183/K (1st.Report, 
1976/77) - established but no compensation; Case 
No.C.53/77 (5th.Report, 1976/77) - leaflet *designed* for 
men, did not set out the different position for married 
women. See also Case No.C.515/G (4th.Report, 1972/73) - 
certificate issued.
(44) Case No.3A/57/79 (2nd. Report, 1979/80).
(45) Case No.C.131/ (1st.Report, 1974); Case No.C.207/K 
(3rd.Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.68/77 (5th.Report, 
1976/77); Case No.C.191/77 (5th.Report,1976/77); Case 
No .C.409/k (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.26/77 (1st. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.119/87 (1st. Report, 1988/89).
(46) Case No.C.377/V (1st.Report, 1975/760; Case 
No.C.307/K (1st.Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.268/K 
(1st.Report, 1976/77); cf. Case No.C.564/G (5th.Report, 
1972/73) - Department not satisfied enough of their own 
error to award compensation - PCA agreed; Case 
NO.3A/440/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3A/149/78 
(7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/76/79 (2nd. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.3A/485/78 (1st. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.541/81 (4th. Report, 1982/83)
(47) Case No.C.726/K (4th.Report, 1976/77) p.290/291 
paragraphs 14 & 15. See also Case No.C.736/V (1st.Report, 
1976/77); Case No.3B/977/78 (1st. Report, 1979/80) - 
exchange controls; Case No.2/709/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79) 
- government policy change; 4th. Report, 1980/81 - 
government policy change; Case No.lA/164/78 (7th. Report, 
1977/78) - change in legislation; Case No.3A/199/78 (1st. 
Report, 1978/79) - law prevents advice being honoured;
Case No.C.362/83 (7th. Report, 1983/84) - law prevented 
the present arrangement continuing; Case No.C.188/83 (3rd. 
Report, 1983/84).
(48) Case No.C.304/77 (1st. Report. 1977/78); Case 
No.3A/231/78 (1st. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.164/85 
(4th. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.601/85 (1st. Report, 
1986/87) p.84/85 paragraph 34: "I have seen that when 
Officer A took Mr A fs telephone call.... he observed *1 
got the impression he wants everything on the cheap - he 
doesn*t want to pay solicitors1 or court costs to have his 
maintenance payments settled in a manner that he can get 
maximum tax relief.* I think that fairly sums up Mr.A*s
approach to the matter Indeed , as I see it, it was
Mr.A*s reluctance to incur the cost of obtaining 
professional advice which was responsible initially at 
least, for the delay in putting the payments to his 
children on a tax-effective footing.
(49) Case No.C.279/79 (6 th. Report, 1979/80).
(50) Case No.3A/343/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79) - pension; 
Case No.5/590/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79) - benefit; Case
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No.C.251/87 (1st. Report, 1988/89) - benefit; Case
No.C.827/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81).
(51) Case No.C.141/86 (1st. Report, 1987/88); cf. Case 
No.lA/1090/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80) - where it was held
not to be maladministration that the department failed to
tell him that there was an alternative way to achieve his 
aims.
(52) Case No.C.598/79 (6 th. Report, 1979/80) p.47 
paragraph 4.
(53) Case No.C.829/81 (2nd. Report, 1982/83) p.76 
paragraph 12; Case No.C.281/83 (1st. Report, 1984/85);
Case No.C.156/84 (3rd. Report, 1985/86); Case No.3A/994/78 
(2nd. Report, 1979/80).
(54) Case No.C.180/81 (1st. Report, 1981/82); Case
No.C.567/84 (5th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.5/529/77 (5th. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.3A/64/79 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); 
Case No.C.274/85 (4th. Report, 1985/86).
(55) Case No.5/1050/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.712/86 (2nd. Report, 1987/88).
(56) Case No.C.310/81 (1st. Report, 1982/83)
No.C.610/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/80).
(57) Case No.2/761/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78)
No.2/803/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78).
(58) Case No.C.480/77 (1st. Report. 1977/78)
No.3A/788/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79).
(59) Case No.C.342/81 (1st. Report, 1982/83)
No.IB/533/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78).
(60) Case No.5/415/78 (1st. Report, 1979/80)
No.C.544/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81).
(61) Case No.C.408/G (5th.Report, 1972/730; Case 
No.C.416/T (2nd.Report, 1974); Case No.C.910/v 
(6 th.Report, 1975/76); Case No.53/77 (5th.Report,
1976/77).
(62) Case No.C.741/85 (3rd. Report, 1987/88) p.78 
paragraph 24.
(63) Case No.lB/810/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78) p.188 
paragraph 1 1 .
(64) At one time a married woman could elect to pay half 
contributions, but as a result she lost the right to her 
own pension, and had to rely on her husband’s 
contributions towards a joint pension.
(65) Case No.C.79/T (1st.Report, 1973/74); Case No.C.702/J 
(6th.Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.221/J (3rd.Report, 
1974/750; Case No.C.438/V (3rd.Report, 1975/76); Case 
No.C.378/v (5th.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.650/K
(5th.Report, 1976/77); see also Case No.C.650/K 
(5th.Report, 1976/77) p.39 paragraph 9;
"But it is the practice of the Secretary of State to 
exercise discretion in this way only if there is evidence 
of official misdirection or failure to give the 
appropriate advice at a time when it would actually have 
been possible for the half-test to have been satisfied.
The justification for this, which i have accepted in 
principle in other cases I have investigated, is that
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tase
Case
Case
Case
Case
otherwise the woman concerned would be in a better 
position than if, at the relevant time, she had been told 
correctly that she could not satisfy the half-test."
(6 6 ) Case No,C.438/V (3rd.Report, 1975/76); Case 
No.C.378/V (5th.Report,1975/76); Case No.C.650/K 
(5th.Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.454/77 (1st. Report, 
1977/78) - no repayment as she had already obtained more 
than their value in sickness and unemployment benefit;
Case No.C.667/85 (4th. Report, 1985/86)
(67) Case No.C.353/G (3rd.Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.678/V (3rd.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.563/J 
(1st.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.745/79 (9th. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.C.412/83 (7th. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.223/85 (5th. Report, 1984/85).
(6 8 ) Case No.C.479/J (6 th.Report, 1974/750 p.76 paragraph 
8 ; see also Case No.C.335/80 (3rd. Report, 1980/81); Case 
No.C.547/84 (3rd. Report, 1984/85).
(69) Case No.C.209/G (4th.Report, 1972/73) p.7 paragraphs 
16 & 17. See also Case No.C.302/K (3rd.Report, 1976/77) - 
where reliance was a factor allowing misunderstanding to 
be established, but did not allow compensation for the 
loss of a job; Case No.C.728/V (6 th.Report, 1975/76) - 
where prospective student continued with the course, even 
after learning that no supplementary benefit was payable 
to him; cf. Case No.C.566/K (4th.Report,1976/77) - where 
student was misled as to travelling expenses, and even 
although this was not the main reason for starting the 
course, the PCa obtained a review of her case.
(70) Case No.C.728/85 (1st. Report, 1986/87).
(71) Case No.C.494/83 (1st. Report, 1984/85) p.40 
paragraphs 22 + 23.
(72) Case N0 .C.I8 6 /V (6 th.Report, 1974/75) - she told the 
PCA that she would have done without the t.v., if she had 
been correctly advised; see also Case No.2/426/78 (7th. 
Report, 1977/78).
(73) Case No.c.368/V (1st.Report, 1975/76). See also in 
this area; Case No.C.143/G (4th.Report, 1971/72) - 
sickness benefit paid whilst abroad; Case No.C.508/B 
(4th.Report, 1971/72) - widow told that tax not due - half 
of the arrears remitted; Case No.C.515/G (4th.Report, 
1972/73); Case No.C.502/T (2nd.Report, 1974); Case 
NO.C.479/J (6 th.Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.413/V
(3rd.Report, 1975/76) - after the PCa presented new 
evidence as to hardship; Case No.C.377/V 
(Ist.Report,1975/76); Case No.C.484/B (4th.Report, 
1971/72); Case No.C.897/V (3rd.Report, 1976/77); Case 
No.C.779/V (4th.Report, 1976/77); see also Case No.C.566/K 
(4th.Report,1976/77) - where the PCA obtained a review of 
the case by the Department. Also Case No.C.169/B 
(4th.Report, 1971/72) - where IR would not agree to the 
remedy, & Sir Alan Marre recorded that there had been an 
injustice which had not been remedied.
(74) Case No.C.441/G (4th.Report, 1972/73).
(75) Case No.C.544/81 (5th. Report, 1981/82) p.72
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paragraph 16.
(76) Case No.C.897/V (3rd.Report, 1976/77) p . 6 6  paragraph 
11
(77) Case No.C.87/K (1st. Report, 1976/77) p e79 paragraph 
11
(78) Case No.C.283/G (4th. Report, 1972/73); Case
No.C.118/G (3rd. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.lOO/T (1st. 
Report, 1973/74) - tone of remarks made at a hearing 
before General Commissioners made complainant suspect 
collusion between Chairman & Inspector - PCa not upheld. 
Case No.C.200/T (3rd. Report, 1974) - claimed bias towards 
College in report - no evidence of this; Case No.C.126/T 
(2nd. Report, 1974); Case No.C.245/J (4th. Report,
1974/75) - p.47 paragraph 23 "As to the visit itself, I 
can understand that, since the complainant was 
disappointed with the outcome of the appeal, she should 
wonder whether the fact that the inspector had arrived and 
departed with the Boardfs representative had had any 
connection with the rejection. But there is no doubt in my 
mind that it was a coincidence that the inspector and the 
Board*s representative should have met as they arrived for 
the visit, that they did not go off together to view the 
other site which had been mentioned, and that they did not 
at any time take the opportunity to discuss the case 
alone. Nor have I found any irregularities or shortcomings 
in the inspector*s conduct of the site visit and his 
subsequent consideration of the case that would entitle me 
to question the merits of his decision.**; Case No.C.558/T 
(1st. Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.843/V (1st. Report, 
1976/77); CASe N0 .C.I6 O/T (1st. Report, 1974); Case 
No.C.208/K (1st. Report, 1976/77) - claimed that his 
neighbour as a local officer had influenced local council 
against him - PCA held not a matter for the inspector;
Case No.C.202/84 (Selected Cases 1985 Vol 1): Case 
No.C.4/787/78 (Investigations Feb/April 1979); Case 
No.C.4/749/77 (Investigations Feb/April 1978); Case 
No.C.4/453/78 (Investigations Nov 1978/Jan 1979)
(79) Case No.C.494/79 (Selected Cases 1980 Vol3) p . 8  
paragraph 16
(80) Case No.C.494/79 (Selected Cases 1980 Vol 3) p.6/7 
paragraphs 6/7 - also appeared to be more worried about 
the lunchtime arrangements see p.7 paragraph 8 - but 
recorded there was to be a review of these practices; see 
also Case No.C.91/86 (1st. Report, 1987/88) - not present 
when other side put forward their case, but held that it 
did not affect the outcome.
(81) Case No.C.236/K (3rd.Report, 1976/77) p.45 paragraph 
18
(82) Case No.C.508/J (6 th. Report, 1974/75) p.45 
paragraphs 1 0  & 1 2
(83) Case No.C.283/G (4th. report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.245/J (4th. Report,1974/75); Case No.C.404/J (4th. 
Report, 1974/75); Case N0 .C.I6 8 /V (1st. Report,1975/76); 
Case No.C.783/V (5th. Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.140/K
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(1st.Report,1976/77); Case No.C.267/K (3rd. Report, 
1976/77) - though this attracted criticism of department's 
procedure. See also Case No.5/79/78 (investigations 
Aug/Oct 1978); Case No.C731/K (Investigations Aug/Oct 
1977); Case No.4/749/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.4/787/78 (1st. Report, 1979/80) - complaint was made 
after the decision.
(84) Case No.C.9/T (5th. Report, 1972/73) p.63 paragraph 
24. See also Case No.C.256/V (3rd. Report, 1975/76); Case 
No.C.894/80 (Selected Cases 1981 Vol 4); Case No.3B/638/78 
(Investigations May/July 1979);
Also whether enough time given to his case - Case 
No.C.448/J (6 th. Report, 1974/75) - allowing one party to 
much time to prepare case, to the detriment of objectors; 
Case No.C.350/K (4th.Report, 1976/770 - claimed not enough 
time to put case, not upheld; Case No.15/421/78 
(investigations Novl978/Jan 1979) - complaint that the 
Department was allowed longer to prepare case for tribunal 
than he was - could have applied for an extension was the 
PCA's verdict.
(85) Case No.C.214/t (1st. Report, 1974) p.169/170 
paragraph 13 - due to other errors the process had already 
been invalidated, so the PCA did not need to take further 
action. See also Case No.C.448/j (6 th. Report, 1974/75) - . 
where one party allowed too much time to prepare their 
case to the detriment of objectors, see p.31 paragraph 13; 
Case No.C.355/T/39/J (3rd. Report, 1974) - possible 
partiality in not consulting local authorities, or local 
amenitiy groups; cf. Case No.C.252/B (4th. 1971/72) - 
where the draft letter to the other potential purchaser 
was shown to the successful purchaser - not really 
criticised by the PCA; Case No.C.439/G (5th. Report, 
1972/73) - where DTi refusal to refer company to 
Monopolies Commission, did not show bias towards that 
company.
(8 6 ) Case No.4/406/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78) p.41/42 
paragraphs 12 & 13
(87) 7th. Report, 1979/80 p.18 paragraph 44
(8 8 ) Case N0 .C.8 6 /G (1st. Report, 1972/73).
(89) Case No.C.328/87 (3rd. Report, 1988/89)
(90) 3rd. Report, 1967/68 p.18 paragraph 6 6 ; and see also 
Case No.lA/835/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78).
(91) Case No.C.64/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78) p.48 paragraph 
25
(92) Case No.C.238/B (4th. Report, 1971/72); Case 
No.C.327/B (4th. Report, 1971/72); Case No.C.524/B (4th. 
Report, 1971/72); Case N0 .C.I6 8 /B (4th. Report, 1971/72); 
Case No.C.436/G (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.462/G 
(5th. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.439/G (5th.Report, 
1972/73); Case No.C.415/G ( 4th. Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.344/G (4th. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.431/G (4th. 
Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.483/G (4th.Report,1972/73); 
Case No.C.424/G (4th.Report, 1972/73): Case
Nos.C.116/195/G (3rd. Report, 1972/73);Case N0 .C.II8 /G
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(3rd. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.138/G (3rd. Report, 
1972/73); Case No.C.366/G (3rd. Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.284/G (1st. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.246/G (1st. 
Report, 1972/73); Case N0 .C.8 /T (1st. Report, 1973/74); 
Case N0 .C.8 I/T (1st.Report, 1973/74); Case No.C.268/T 
(1st. Report, 1973/74); Case No.C.46/T (1st.Report, 
1973/74); Case No.C.31/T (1st.Report, 1973/74); Case 
NO.C.399/T (3rd. Report, 1974); Case No.C.444/T 
(2nd.Report, 1974); Case No.C.389/T (2nd.Report, 1974); 
Case no.C.292/T (2nd.Report, 19740; Case No.C.387/T (2nd. 
Report, 1974); Case No.C.543/T (2nd. Report, 1974); Case 
No.C.146/T (1st.Report, 1974); Case No.C.383/T (1st. 
Report, 1974); Case No.C.306/T (1st. Report, 1974); Case 
No.C.336/T (1st.report, 1974); Case Nos.C.71/125/175/T 
(1st.Report, 1974); Case No.C.449/J (6 th. Report,
1974/75); Case No.C.514/J (6 th. Report, 1974/75); Case 
No.W.304/74-75/Cl7/V (6 th.Report. 1974/75); Case 
No.C.278/J (6 th. Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.216/J 
(4th.Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.266/j (4th.report, 
1974/75); Case No.C.350/J (4th.Report, 1974/75); Case 
No.C18/V/360/J (3rd. Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.94/J 
(3rd.Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.406/T (3rd. Report, 
1974/75); Case N0 .C8 /J (1st. Report, 1974/75); Case 
NO.C.199/J (1st.Report, 1974/750; Case No.C.509/T 
(1st.Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.12/J (1st.Report, 
1974/75); Case No.C.27/J (1st.Report, 1974/75); Case 
No.C.283/V (3rd.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.847/V.W 18/75- 
76 (3rd.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.357/J 
(Ist.Report,1975/76); Case No.C.683/J 
(Ist.Report,1975/76); Case No.C.276/v (1st. Report, 
1975/76); Case No.C.268/V (1st. Report, 1975/760; Case 
No.C.134/V (1st.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.434/V (6 th. 
report, 1975/76); Case No.C.96/B (1st.Report, 1972/73); 
Case No.C.595/v (5th.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.689/V 
(5th.Report, 1975/76); Case N0 .C.6 O6 /V (5th.Report, 
1975/76); Case No.C.825/V (5th.Report, 1975/76); C.819/V 
(6 th.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.757/V (6 th.Report, 
1975/76); Case No.C.925/V (6 th.Report, 1975/76); Case 
No.C.13/K (1st. Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.87/K (1st. 
Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.372/K (1st.Report, 1976/77); 
Case No.C.59/K (1st.Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.71/K 
(1st.Report, 1976/77); Case NO.C.513/K (3rd.Report, 
1976/77); Case N0 .C.6 6 6 /K (4th.Report, 1976/77); Case 
No.C.742/K (4th.Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.534/K 
(4th.Report, 1976/77); Case No. 672/K (5th.Report, 
1976/77); Case No.C.805/K (5th.Report, 1976/77); [Case 
No.C.626/K (5th.Report, 1976/77)]; Case No.C.593/V 
(6 th.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.743/K (1st. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.C.791/K (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.C.6/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.89/77 (1st. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.119/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78); 
Case No.C.46/K (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.120/77 
(1st. Report, 1977/78); Case No.15/459/77 (5th. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.4/845/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case
-349-
No.2/216/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.lB/614/77 
(5th. Report, 1977/78);Case No.4/522/77 (5th. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.3B/53/77 (5th, Report, 1977/78); CAse 
No.3B/398/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3A/633/77 
(7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.4/78/78 (7th. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.C.4/189/78 (1st. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.15/579/77 (1st. Report, 1978/79); Case No.2/752/77 
(1st. Report, 1978/79); Case No.2/752/78 (1st. Report, 
1978/79); Case No.lB/215/78 (1st. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.2/789/77 (1st. Report, 1978/79); Case No.5/376/78 
(4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.15/226/78 (4th. Report, 
1978/79); Case No.3B/553/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.4/123/78 (1st. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.4/158/78 
(1st. Report, 1979/80); Case No.4/535/78 (1st. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.4/793/K (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.4/374/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.15/781/78 
(2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.15/934/78 (2nd. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.15/1023/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.4/171/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.394/78 (4th. 
Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.589/79 (9th. Report, 1979/80); 
Case No.C.68/80 (9th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.83/80 
(1st. Report, 1980/81); Case Nos.C.13/80 & C.377/80 (3rd. 
Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.192/80 (3rd. Report, 1980/81); 
Case Nos.C.373/80 & C.511/80 (5th. Report, 1980/81); Case 
No.C.1031/80 (1st. Report, 1981/82); Case NO.C.576J80 
(1st. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.1022/80 (3rd. Report, 
1981/82); Case No.C.670/81 (5th. Report, 1981/82); Case 
No.C.799/81 (5th. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.29/81 (1st. 
Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.87/82 (lst. Report, 1982/83); 
Case No.C.790/81 (lst. Report, 19.82/83); Case No.C.595/81 
(2nd. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.379/81 (4th. Report, 
1982/83); Case No.C.801/81 (4th. Report, 1982/83); Case 
No.C.890/81 (4th. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.247/83 (8 th. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.414/83 (8 th. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.C.561/85 (5th. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.93/85 
(3rd. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.431/87 (6 th. Report, 
1987/88); Case No.C.155/87 (6 th. Report, 1987/88); Case 
No.2/515/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.15/643/78 
(4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.496/87 (5th. Report, 
1987/88); Case No.15/7/78 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.C.462/g (5th. Report, 1972/73) p.32 paragraph 20
(93) Case No.776/82 (8 th. Report, 1983/84).
(94) Case No.C.341/81 (3rd. Report, 1981/82).
(95) Case No.3/834/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79);Case
No.C.133/81 (lst. Report, 1981/82); Case No.3B/31/78 (lst. 
Report, 1978/79).
(96) Case No.C.452/G (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.114/J (3rd. report, 1974/75); Case No.C.155/J (lst. 
Report, 1974/75); Case No. C.73/V (3rd. Report, 1975/76); 
Case No.C.526/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.587/K 
(3rd. Report, 1976/77); Case No .C.300/k (3rd. Report, 
1976/77); Case No.C.632/K (4th. Report, 1976/77); Case 
No .C.633/k (5th. Report, 1976/77); Case No .C.626/k (5th. 
Report, 1976/77); Case No.lA/683/77 (5th. Report,
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1977/78); Case No.2/812/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.4/19/78 (1st. Report, 1978/79).
(97) Case No.C.155/J (lst. Report, 1974/75) p.158 
paragraph 6 . Consider also, the vzar pension cases, and the 
guidelines for reopening tribunals - Case No.C.593/V (6 th. 
Report, 1975/76) p.87 paragraph 8 ” I know from previous 
complaints of this type that in deciding whether to join 
in an application to the President of the PATs, the 
Department are guided by what was said in the High Court 
case of * Grand v. Minister of Pensions* in 1952. In that 
case the Judge said *It is undesirable to send a case back 
for hearing by the Tribunal because new evidence has 
become available, unless that evidence is cogent and so 
strong that it is unlikely that the Tribunal would be able 
to disregard it. To do so would merely raise hopes in the 
mind of the appellant which would have no chance of being 
fulfilled. * 11 Also Case No.C417/J (4th. Report, 1974/75).
(98) Case No.C.258/K (lst. Report, 1977/78); Case
No.5/813/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.6/756/77 (7th. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.15/620/78 (2nd. Report.
1979/80); Case No.C.108/79 (9th. Report, 1979/80); CAse 
No.C.193/80 (lst. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.45/82 (2nd. 
Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.484/82 (4th. Report, 1982/83); 
Case No.C.627/85 (4th. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.306/86 
(lst. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.93/86 (lst. Report, 
1986/87); Case No.C.111/86 (3rd. Report, 1987/88); Case 
No.C.413/87 (6 th. Report, 1987/88).
(99) Case No.C.546/G (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.47/T (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.304/G (lst. 
Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.527/T (3rd. Report, 1974);
Case No.C.90/J (3rd. Report, 1974); Case No.C.405/J (4th. 
Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.717/V (5th. Report, 1975/76); 
Case No.15/607/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.lB/475/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.579/79 
(8 th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.230/80 (3rd. Report, 
1980/81); Case No.C.381/80 (3rd. Report, 1980/81); Case 
No.C.624/80 (3rd. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.610/80 (5th. 
Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.440/81 (lst. Report, 1982/83); 
Case No.C.634/82 (3rd. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.432/85 
(5th. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.543/86 (3rd. Report, 
1987/88); Case No.C.690/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81); Case 
No.C.233/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/820/77 
(1st. REport, 1978/79); Case No.C.301/86 (3rd. Report, 
1987/88); Case No.C.815/K (lst. Report, 1977/78).
(100) Case No.C.90/J (3rd. Report, 1974) p.165 paragraph 
14
(101) Case No.C.494/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76) p.13 
paragraph 18
(102) Case No.5/657/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case
No.2/443/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.43/79 (4th. 
Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.644/80 (3rd. Report, 1981/82); 
Case No.C.316/83 (7th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.lA/472/78 
(1st. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.314/79 (6 th. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.5/608/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79).
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(103) Case No.C.292/83 (3rd. Report, 1984/85) p.32/33 
paragraph 2 1 .
(104) Case N0 .C.6 6 /V (6 th. Report, 1974/75); see also CAse 
No.C.409/J (6 th. Report, 1974/75): Case No.C.269/J (3rd. 
Report, 1974/75);Case No.C.473/J (6 th. Report,1974/75) ; 
Case No.C.560/84 (4th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.175/84 
(5th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.77/84 (3rd. Report, 
1985/86); Case No.C.336/86 (2nd. Report, 1987/88).
(105) Case No.C.466/T (lst. Report, 1974/75); Case 
No.C.647/J (6 th. Report, 1974/75); Case N0 .C.6 8 /J (6 th. 
Report, 1974/75).
(106) Case No.C.264/G (4th. Report, 1972/73); Case No. 
C.23/J (3rd. Report, 1974) - the PCA was not convinced 
that the Department did not confuse the sites and give the 
decision on the wrong one (as was the case in the decision 
letter, although the department claimed that the mistake 
was only in the decision letter); Case No.C.817/V (6 th. 
Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.486/81 (lst. Report, 1982/83); 
Case No.15/39/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.353/81 
(6 th. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.225/81 (2nd. Report, 
1982/83); Case No.6/727/77 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.6/263/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.133/79 (6 th. 
Report, 1979/80).
(107) Case No.C.435/G (4th. Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.506/G (4th. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.548/G (4th. 
Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.473/T (3rd. Report, 1974/75); 
Case No.C.196/K (lst. Report, 1976/77); other cases not 
necessarily war pension cases include, Case No.C.126/77 
(lst. Report, 1977/78); Case No.15/454/78 (lst. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.C.156/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81); Case 
No.C.246/83 (6 th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.138/87 (6 th. 
Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.251/87 (1st. Report, 1988/89); 
Case No.C.764/81 (2nd. Report, 1983/84) p.37 paragraph 29 
"...I consider that it would have been wiser to have 
provided the Department and the tribunal with a full copy 
of the polimyelitis vaccination record card so that any 
question about the significance of the markings on the 
front and reverse of the card could have been given full 
consideration by the tribunal."; Case No.C.752/82 (3rd. 
Report, 1983/84;; see also footnote (13)
(108) Case No.C.228/T (2nd. Report, 1974)
(109) Case No.C.468/G (5th. Report, 1972/73) p.22 
paragraph 2 2
(110) Case NO.C.499/K (5th. Report, 1976/77) p.18 
paragraphs 12 & 13 & 14; see also in this area - Case 
No.C.121/B (4th. Report, 1971/72); Case No.C.257/G (4th. 
Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.500/G (lst. Report, 1974);
Case No.C.484/J (4th. Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.154/V 
(5th. Report, 1975/76). [Also see Case No.C.870/V
(lst.Report, 1976/77) - all decisions taken in ignorance
nf T*plp\7flnf I
(111) Case No.R.532/83 (8 th. Report, 1983/84).
(112) Case No.C.876/81 (lst. Report, 1983/84).
(113) Case No.C.481/B (1st.Report, 1972/73) p.27 & p.28
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paragraphs 16 & 19; see also Case No.C.43/G (4th.Report, 
1972/73) - where the complainant had had an argument with 
one examiner on a previous occasion, he requested not to 
have that examiner again, but necessity required it - PCA 
felt that the examiner would be able to compensate; Case 
No.C.568/84 (Selected Cases 1986 Vol 1) - a surveyor of a 
vessel had issued a bad report previously - PCA made no 
criticism, appreciation of the working practices and the 
possiblities of delay; Case No.C.190/J/51/V (3rd.Report, 
1974/75) - necessity demanded that former DHSS officer 
employee ‘signed on* at his former place of work, but the 
manager had offered to handle his case personally to save 
embarassment; cf. Case No.413/J (lst.Report, 1975/76) - 
where it was alleged that the DHSS office favoured former 
employees - not upheld.
(114) Case No.C.496/B (lst.Report, 1972/73) p.37 paragraph 
26. See also Case No.C.173/G (3rd.Report, 1972/73) - where 
it was alleged that the inspector relied on a biased view 
put forward by the Council, the Council was biased as a 
result of the complainant’s previous conduct as a local 
councillor. PCa did not uphold this complaint.
(115) Case No.C.lll/J (6 th.Report, 1974/750 p . 6 6  paragraph 
16
(116) Fourth Report, 1983/84 - ’Investigation of a 
complaint about delays in reviewing a conviction for 
murder.'
(117) Case No.C.483/J (6 th.Report, 1974/750 p.39-41 
paragraphs 12 & 17,18, & 19. See also Case No.C.265/83 
(Selected Cases 1984 Vol 4) p.24 paragraph 18 - ”ln his 
complaint to the Member, the complainant questioned the 
propriety of allowing an officer whom he had already 
accused of victimising him to deal with his claim. I am 
told that the casepapers were held by this officer to 
protect the complainant’s privacy and to ensure that they 
were not freely available to members of staff with whom he 
had previously worked. I am satisfied that in taking this 
course the officer’s motives were perfectly proper, 
although with hindsight I think that it would have been 
wiser if he had asked someone else to take over the case.”
(118) Case No.C.64/K (6 th.Report, 1975/760 p.135 paragraph 
6 . He also noted that a new right of appeal to 
specifically constituted Medical Appeal Tribunals had been 
established.
(119) Case No.C.1022/80 (Selected Cases 1982 Vol 2) 
p.35/36 paragraph 11
(120) Case No.C.687/81 (lst. Report, 1983/84).
(121) Case No.C.268/T (1st. Report, 1973/74); Case 
No.C.306/T (lst.Report, 1974) - both cases were considered 
to concern local government matters.
(122) Case No.C.442/K (4th.Report, 1976/770 p.260 
paragraph 1 0
(123) Case No.C.5/116/78 (investigations Aug/Oct 1978); 
see also CAse No.C.518/V (3rd.Report, 1975/76) - a 
complaint that an independent inspector of an electricity
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meter had stated ’that a fault was unlikely to be found* - 
what the inspector had actually said was ’that it was 
unlikely that a fault such as the complainant had 
suggested would be found*.
(124) Case No.C.162/V (3rd.Report, 1975/76) p.189 
paragraph 19
(125) Case No.C.519/B (4th.Report, 1971/72)
(126) Case No.C.129/G (4th.Report, 1972/73) - he was 
informed that this procedure had now been adopted.
(127) Case No.C.597/85 (Selected Cases 1987 Vol 1) p.22 
paragraph 18
- It might be suggested that with such statements Sir 
Anthony Barrowclough opens himself up to the charge of 
naivity in asking the Inspector if he was biased - the 
immortal "Well, he would say that, wouldn’t he" springs to 
mind. There is no reason why he should not give the 
official a chance to state his view - it is part of his 
function - but he does seem to place heavier emphasis on 
this, rather than the objective evidence he could obtain.
(128) Case No.C.20/T (2nd.Report, 1974)p.41 & p.43 
paragraphs 31,32,&40. See also Case No.C.46/T (lst.report, 
1973/74) - where complainants had alleged that the Home 
Office had been unduly influenced by their connection with 
the Fire Service, into granting a cpo for a new fire 
station site - not upheld; Case No.C.316/T (lst. Report, 
1974/75) - suggestion that change in a report had come 
about by undue influence by another department - but it 
was in fact the correction of an error, spotted by the 
other department.
(129) Case N0 .C.I8 O/B (4th.Report, 1971/72) p.63 
paragraphs 40 & 41
(130) Case No.C.802/84 (Selected Cases 1985 Vol 4) p.167 
paragraph 19 - Discrimination may be alright as well, if 
it is a by-product of the administrative process - see 
Case No.C410/V (3rd.Report, 1975/76) p.61 paragraph 14 - 
"There is apparent discrimination in favour of wives where 
it is a first and recent marriage for both parties. 
However, I am satisfied that this arises not from any 
policy of sex discrimination but from a local management 
decision at Delhi to speed the entry certificate 
arrangements for a small group of applicants whose cases 
present little difficulty and can be dealt with without 
significantly affecting the time others have to wait." - 
Other cases are totally unfounded eg. Case No.C.9/T
(5th.Report, 1972/73) - complainant alleged that 
Department were biased against the large out-of-town 
supermarkets he wanted to develop.
(131) Case No.C.220/K (lst.Report, 1976/77) p.226/227 
paragraph 37.
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CHAPTER FOUR
(1) Case No.C.289/G (4th. Report,1972/73) - failure to 
follow the necessary guidelines, urgent action taken; Case 
No.C.361/T (3rd. Report,1974); Case No.C.419/T (3rd. 
Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.43/J (lst. Report,1974/75); 
Case No.C.331/T (3rd. Report,1974/75); Case No.C.9/V 
(5th.Report, 1975/76); Case No.C.367/K (4th. Report, 
1976/77); Case No.C.777/K (5th. Report, 1976/77). Cases 
where there was no fault on the part of the department - 
Case No.3B/398/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No. 5/53/78 
(7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.lA/290/78 (4th.
Report,1978/79); Case No.C82/80 (3rd. Report, 1980/81).
See also Case No.C.568/84 (lst. Report, 1985/86) p.167 
paragraph 39; Case No.3A/446/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); 
Case No.C.333/80 (1st. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.529/82 
(6 th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.395/85 (lst. Report, 
1988/89); Case No.C.670/87 (lst. Report, 1988/89); Case 
No.C.328/88 (3rd. Report, 1988/89); Case No.C.249/81 (lst. 
Report, 1981/82) - notice was given late.
(2) Case No.C.43/G (4th. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.644/V 
(5th. Report, 1975/76) - there is no obligation on 
department to notify a person that they are due to claim a 
pension, although there is a departmental practice which 
does this- department not at serious fault if this breaks 
down. Case No.C.714/K (lst. Report, 1977/78) - no legal 
duty to inform third party objectors that a planning 
appeal had been remitted to the Secretary of State for re­
hearing & determination, by the High Court. Case No. 
6/239/K (5th. Report, 1977/78) - procedure changed, 
introduced more consultation. Case No. 3A/640/77 (7th. 
Report, 1977/78) - did not need to be consulted before 
being removed from the Job Register. Case No.lB/493/78 
(4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C304/80 (9th.
Report,1979/80); Case No. C.136/81 (5th. Report, 1981/82) 
p.22 paragraph 15; Case No.C637/82 (6 th. Report, 1983/84) 
p.22 paragraph 48; Case No. IB/215/78 (lst. Report, 
1978/79) - no duty to consult employee before the decision 
taken as to whether employer or employee liable for 
underpaid tax.( cf position of employer later ); Case 
No.3A/640/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78) - no need to inform 
before removal from employment register; Case No.C.82/80 
(3rd. Report, 1980/81) - no need to inform about decision 
to handcuff at trial, his legal representative could have 
objected.
(3) Case No.C.324/T (3rd. Report, 1974) - but the PCA felt 
that they should at least be informed of their decision; 
on same subject see also Case No.C.278/V/430/J (4th.
Report,1974/75) - complainant felt that urns were not 
buildings, but the PCA felt that was a matter for the 
courts, complainant alleged that he could not afford to go 
to court - Marre p70 paragraph 8 " It is, however, not 
open to me to act as an alternative court of appeal on
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such an issue. 11
(4) Case No.C.72/K (lst. Report, 1976/77)
(5) Case No.C.72/K (lst. Report, 1976/77) p.19 paragraph 
16
(6 ) Case No.C.236/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77) p.41/42 
paragraphs 7/8
(7) Case No.C.167/G (3rd. Report,1972/73) - told of 
decision and reason for it; see also Case No.C.441/T (1st. 
Report,1974/75). Case No. C.288/K (4th. Report, 1976/77) - 
did not amount to maladministration, despite the failure 
to notify of roadworks blocking access to nursery 
business.
(8 ) Case No.C.676/78 (9th. Report,1979/80) p.22 paragraph
(9) Case No.C.215/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77) p.131 & 132/133 
paragraphs 7&15
(10) Case No.C.213/T (1st. Report, 1973/74) - compensation 
was awarded for loss of amenity - this also has elements 
of bias. Case No.C.4/36/77 97th. Report, 1977/78) - 
failure to consult a local authority before a sale of land 
by the Department; Case No.C.313/81 (4th.Report, 1982/83)
- failure to seek consent, ventillation system evidently 
thrust upon him.
(11) Case No.4/453/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79) p.17/18
paragraph 9;Case No.C.568/84 (lst. Report, 1985/86) - Sir 
Anthony Barrowclough felt that owners of a vessel should 
have received further warning after the Department’s 
delay, that their vessel was likely to be confiscated.
This was despite the fact that they had had a previous 
indication of the likely course of action.
(12) Case No.C.410/85 (5th. Repor.t, 1987/88)
(13) Case No.4/36/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78) p.43 paragraph 
15; cf Case No.C.113/80 (1st. Report, 1980/81) see p.57 
paragraphs 17 & 18 - where promise to inform was not 
honoured, whilst criticism for this, Sir Cecil Clothier 
did not feel that it had caused injustice.
(14) Case No.C.140/81 (6 th. Report, 1980/81)
(15) Case No.C.319/K (4th. Report, 1976/77)- PCA found the 
departmental requirements were a minimum of 4 days - still 
critical in this case.Also, Case No.3B/494/78 (4th.
Report, 1978/79) p.244 & 248 paragraphs 10 & 21:
' The complainant claimed that he had received 
inadequate notice about the examination on 29 April 1977 
..• and that he had not been given any information about 
the car. He told my officers that although he was 
available all day on 28 April he did not receive a 
telephone call from the Department until 4.30 and 5.00pm., 
when an official told him that at 1 1 . 0 0  am the following 
day he was examing a car following an appeal against the 
issue of a certificate by his testing station, and that he 
knew no details of the car. The complainant told my 
officers that if he had been given the information about 
the certificate and the car which the local authority 
passed to the Department prior to their examination... he
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could have established from his own records whether the 
certificate was a ’pass' or a 'fail* and also which of the 
nominated testers had issued it. he maintained that if he 
had known that the examination involved an appeal against 
the issue of a MOT certificate (a'pass*) he would have 
attended, but the Department were too vague and casual in 
providing information about their vehicle examinations: he 
felt that an examiner ought to be given prior warning by 
letter. The Drepartment have said that on 28 April 1977 
they made a number of attempts to telephone the 
complainant's garage, but were unable to get through until 
late afternoon, and that the complainant was unable to 
attend the examination because of the short notice and a 
previously arranged appointment. The Department have no 
record of their offfical's telephone conversation with the 
complainant, but they have said that there is no reason 
why he should not have provided details about the 
certificate and car which had been provided by the local, 
authority, if the complainant had requested it. The 
Department have told me that in order to be able to take 
action against the examiner or tester they must be able to 
show that when originally tested the vehicle could not 
have been in a condition to pass the test; an examination 
must therefore generally be arranged promptly, and 
certainly before the vehicle has been repaired of has had 
significant further use. Normally the Department try to 
carry out an examination within 14 days of the original 
MOT test or as soon as possible thereafter, and the 
telephone is used to give the examiner and tester the 
opportunity to attend if they wish. In a letter to the 
Member on 4 April 1978 the Secretary of State said that he 
did not consider it sensible to allow a delay by ensuring 
that a garage could have a written invitation to attend an 
examination. And the Department have told me that as 
little as one day's notice to an authorised examiner is 
not uncommon....
Since many of these complaints might have been 
resolved by the complainant's attending the vehicle 
inspections, it is unfortunate that on both occasions this 
did not happen, no doubt due to the very short notice. 
Although it is not now possible to establish exactly what 
occurred on the first occasion, he was aware in advance of 
the second inspection, and in his situation, having had 
one warning letter the4 previous year, it would have been 
wiser for him to attend in spite of the short notice and 
the other appointment."
(16) Case No.C.290/K (4th. Report, 1976/77) p.251/252 
paragraph 9
(17) Case No.3B/1227/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80) p.257 
paragraph 15
(18) Case Nos.C.255/464/T (2nd. Report,1974); Case
No.2/758/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78) - Department failed to 
honour a gratuitous undertaking to inform the complainant 
when inquiry would be held - but Sir Idwal Pugh concluded:
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11 but I do not consider that the Department's failings 
in these two respects caused the complainant any 
significant injustice. Along with the other actual and 
potential objectors, she had all the opportunities which 
the law required to be given for knowing when and where 
the joint inquiry into the rights of way order and the 
coal working authorisation was to be held. Indeed, she was 
present for part of the time at that joint inquiry. If she 
was not by then aware what it was all about, the main 
responsiblity for her unawareness must, in my judgment 
rest elsewhere than on the Department."
(19) Case No.C.755/K (5th. Report, 1976/77) p.56 paragraph 
9.
See also Land Compensation Act 1973 - cases involving 
associated publicity arrangements - Case No.C.llO/K (3rd. 
Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.2/K (lst. Report, 1976/77); 
Case No.5/687/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.
4/1125/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case Nos.6/502/77, 
6/617/77, 6/64/78 (lst. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.4/1125/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); 
cf. Sixth Report, 1977/78 - separate report to Parliament
- Land Compensation Act 1973 - lack of publicity and 
notice of closing date, only one notice printed, at 
holiday time and the notice was not as eye-catching as 
others - injustice not remedied; Case No.6/165/77 (5th. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.6/701/77 (5th. Report. 1977/78).
See also Case No.6/694/77 (7th. Report,1977/78) - where 
change in taxation practice of University lecturers' fees
- announcement in Gazette was•adequate, as far as the PCA 
was concerned, even though it omitted the right of appeal; 
Case No.5/448/78 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/687/78 
(4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.15/781/78 (2nd. Report, 
1979/80) - OK considering resource constraints; Case 
No.C.256/86 (3rd. Report, 1988/89).
Cases where publicity/information not adequate: 6 th. 
Report, 1976/77; Case No.C.29/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78); 
3rd. Report, 1978/79; Case No.3A/411/78 (4th. Report, 
1978/79); Case No.5/376/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.3B/86/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.654/83 (lst. 
Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.801/81 (4th. Report,
1982/83);[Select Committee on PCA lst. Report for 
1978/79].
(20) Case No.C.429/T (3rd. Report,1974) - see also Case 
No.C.169/T (lst. Report,1974) - where information was 
available to the complainant as to his right of appeal.
(21) Case No. C.441/T (lst. Report, 1974/75) p.40 
paragraphs 9,12 & 13
(22) Case No.C.134/79 (6 th. Report, 1979/80) p.15 
paragraph 18; see also Case No.C.584/83 (lst. Report, 
1984/85) - where plans incorrectly showed development 
further away than it would actually be, no public inquiry 
held as a result - compensation granted.
(23) Eg Case No.C.361/79 (9th. Report, 1979/80) - adequate 
notice before change in court fees.
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(24) Case No.C.572/G (lst. report,1973/74) - direct party 
p.50 paragraph 17: 11 on the first point, the Department 
have explained that it used to be their practice (and 
still was when the appeals were lodged in 1971) to offer 
dates to parties for agreement before an inquiry was 
aaranged. But, following a review7 of procedure to cope 
with the increasing number of appeals and growing delays 
in the holding of inquiries, that practice (which was 
atime-consuming one) was abandoned and the parties are now 
simply informed of the intended date for an inquiry." Cf. 
Case No.C.652/J (lst. Report, 1975/76) - where promoters 
consulted as to timing.
(25) Case No.C.652/J (1st. report,1975/76) p.47 paragraph 
22
(26) Case No.C.380/T (3rd. report,1974) - not less than 21 
days notice - Town and Country Planning (Development 
Plans) Direction 1965 - this was satisfied; Case 
No.C.477/G (1st. Report,1973/74), and Case No.C.414/G 
(4th. Report,1972/73) - where errors admitted, PCA 
obtained further compensation.
(27) Case No.C.189/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77); cf Sir Cecil 
Clothier accepted that it was not the function of the 
Inland Revenue to advise on procedure before the General 
Commissioners, but added that IR could have told the 
complainant to consult the Clerk to the Commissioners - 
Case No.lB/865/78 (1st. Report, 1979/80)
(28) See footnote (3) Section I, Case No.C.324/T (3rd. 
report,1974); Case No.C.278/V/430/J (4th.Report,1974/75). 
See also Case No.C.458/B (lst. Report, 1972/73) - siting 
of P.O. Sorting Office-P.O. at the time was a government 
department - did not need planning permission from the 
local planning authority - but sought clearance under 
Circular 100 - not the practice of the LPA at the time to 
do so, see p.24 parargraph 13. See also, Case
No.C.321/T/360/T (3rd. Report,1974/75) p.179 paragraph 51: 
" As regards the ore terminal, I recognise that the 
Secretary of State was under no statutory obligation to 
provide an opportunity for public representations about 
the application for planning permission for that 
development within that area which had already been zoned 
for industrial development following the public inquiries 
in 1969/70 into the proposed amendment of the Development 
Plan for the area. But, since the application was in 
respect of a site closer to the village of Fairlie than 
the one which had been shown on the plan used at the 
1969/70 inquiry, I can understand why the Associations - 
especially the FCA - felt aggrieved that they had not been 
given an opportunity of further comment so that the full 
strength of their views in light of the revised siting 
could have been deployed. I accept, however, that before 
taking his decision on the application the Secretary of 
State was well aware of the fact that the revised siting 
would bring the terminal closer to Fairlie and would thus 
aggravate the adverse effect of the development on the
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village. That being so, I cannot say that I think it 
likely that the outcome would have been different if an 
opportunity had in fact been given for further 
representations to be made."
(29) Case No.C.53/K (1st. Report, 1976/77) p.151 paragraph 
9 - the ironic point here, was that the complaint was that 
the inquiry was unnecessary. ( consider a transfer to 17C
- form of hearing)
(30) Case No.C.33/47 (5th. Report, 1987/88).
(31) Case No.C.714/K (1st. Report, 1977/78) p.30 paragraph 
9
(32) Case No.C.56/T (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case No.Cll/85 
(3rd. Report, 1985/86) -(Sir Anthony Barrowclough) both 
the Town Council and the Parish Council should have been 
consulted as to which one should have responsiblity for 
the allotments concerned.
(33) Case No.C.371/J/W.11/74 (3rd. Report, 1974/75)
p.187/188 paragraph 21; see also Case N0 .C.I6 O/V (1st. 
Report, 1975/76)
(34) Case Nos.C.355/T/39/J (3rd. Report, 1974) p.187 
paragraph 47
(35) Case No.C.214/T (lst.Report, 1974) p.168 paragraph 6
- Section 34 of the Coast Protection Act 1949
(36) Case No.C.367/V (3rd. Report, 1975/76) p.173 
paragraph 9; Case No.C.140/81 (6 th. Report, 1980/81)
(37) Case No.C.290/K (4th. Report, 1976/77) p.251 
paragraph 8
(38) Case No.C.516/G (lst. Report, 1973/74) p.23 paragraph 
26
(39) Case No.C.116/195/G (3rd. Report,1972/73)
(40) See also Case No.C.403/G (3rd. Report,1972/73); Case 
No.C.554/T (lst. Report,1974/75) - The PCA fully supported 
the Departmental contention that there is no duty to 
consult before the decision to 'call in' a proposal p.181 
paragraph 15: " There is no requirement that objectors 
must be consulted by the Secretary of State or informed by 
him if he decides to leave the decision to the local 
planning authority, objections and other relevant evidence 
fall to be considered when the merits of the proposal 
itself come to be considered either by the Secretary of 
State, if he has 'called in * the case or by the local 
planning authority if he has not."
See also on the limited grounds of intervention Case 
No.C.513/J (lst. Report, 1975/76) - decision of the local 
council, Department can only intervene if it failed in its 
duty to 'secure the expeditious,convenient and safe 
movement of traffic'
(41) Case No.C.71/125/175/T (lst. Report,1974) p.166/67 
parargraph 104
(42) Case Nos.C.222/308/J (lst.Report, 1974/75)
(43) Case Nos.C.222/308/J (1st. Report, 1974/75) p.184 
paragraph 1 1
(44) Case No. C.238/B (4th. Report, 1971/72) p.26/27 
paragraphs 6-10; Case No.C.465/G (1st. Report, 1973/74)-
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although the Department offered an oral hearing after 
reconsidering the case. Case No.C.380/T (3rd. Report,1974) 
- no statutory requirement for public inquiry - p.52 
paragraph 15 ' The Council had assumed that there would be 
an inquiry before the application was decided, because 
they understood that was the normal course of action and 
because they received no intimation that one would [not??] 
be held. The Department for their part were not aware that 
the Council were under the impression that there was sure 
to be an inquiry nor did they do anything themselves to 
lead the Council to expect that an inquiry would be held.
I am satisfied that there is no legal requirement that a 
public inquiry must be held in such circumstances, and 
that the Department gave due consideration to all relevant 
facts before they decided that an inquiry was not 
justified here. From what I have seen in other cases I am 
also satisfied that that decision was consistent with 
normal practice, and I see no grounds to question it."
Case No.C.444/K (lst. Report, 1976/77) - PCA satisfied 
that written representations offered a full and adequate 
opportunity.
(45) Case No.C,528/T (2nd. Report, 1974) p.16 paragraph 11
(46) Case No.C.337/K (4th. Report, 1976/77) p.293 
paragraph 1 1
(47) Case No.C.337/K (4th. Report, 1976/77) p.294 
paragraph 13 & 14
(48) Case No.C.886/81 (1st. Report, 1983/84) p.132 
paragraph 54
(49) Case No. 4/814/77 (lst. Report,1978/79) - Section 45 
of the Town and Country Planning (Sc) Act 1972 for 
guidelines on this provision
(50) Case No. 4/814/77 (lst. Report, 1978/79)
(51) Case No.2/918/78 (1st. Report, 1979/80) p.99 
paragraph 2 0
(52) Case No.C.264/82 (6 th. Report, 1983/84) p . 8 8  
paragraph 17 & p.92 paragraph 31. See also Case
No.C.705/82 (7th. Report, 1983/84) p.81 paragraph 27 & 
p.83 paragraph 32: "Finally, consideration of the 
employer*s past performance may play a part only where a 
doubt about 'reasonable care* or ’good faith* remains 
after all the facts have been obtained: a good record must 
not be taken to excuse an inadequate or superficial 
explanantion. I accept that Regulation 26(3) does not 
oblige the Collector to take the employee’s views into 
account. But neither, I suggest, does it prevent his doing 
so if his examination of the empolyer’s explanation 
suggests that course as a useful way of establishing the 
facts.
I conclude that Mr X has suffered injustice as 
aconsequence of the Collector’s Regulation 26(3) direction 
and that his decision to make that direction was taken 
with maladministration."
(53) Case No.C.289/T (lst. Report,1974)
(54) Case No.C.293/B (4th. Report,1971/72); Case
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N0 .C.I8 O/B (4th. Report, 1971/72)
(55) Case No.C.293/B (4th. Report,1971/72) p.70 paragraphs 
42 & 43
(56) Case No.3B/844/78 (1st. Report, 1979/80) p.176/177 
paragraph 1 2
(57) Case No. C.620/J (5th. Report, 1975/76) p.156 
paragraph 19
(58) Case no. C.579/80 (5th. Report, 1980/81) p.75 
paragraph 31
(59) Case N0 .C.I6 6 /G (lst. Report,1972/73) p.69 paragraph 
34
(60) Case No.C.316/G (3rd. Report, 1972/73); Sir Idwal 
Pugh criticised a similar action, but held that it was not 
enough to affect the decision - Case No.C.595/V (5th. 
Report, 1975/76) p.89 paragraph 19 - ” It is not 
surprising, I think, that the complainant did not 
understand the position either then or when the inquiry 
took place. Nor is it surprising that when he subsequently 
saw the Technical Memorandum, and noted its date, it 
reinforced the scepticism he had already expressed about 
the validity of the RCUfs [Road Construction Unit*s 
evidence.”
(61) Case No. 6/239/K (5th. Report,1977/78)p.335/336 
paragraphs 28/29
(62) Case No.C.89/J (lst. Report, 1974/75) pl78 paragraphs 
8 & 9; on this area, see also Case No.C.40/T (lst.
Report,1974) where the complaint of not knowing the case 
against him, was not upheld by the PCA.
(63) Case No.C.119/V (6 th. Report, 1974/75) p.136 
paragraph 9; Case No.C.403/82 (lst. Report, 1983/84) - Sir 
Cecil Clothier gave support to this view.
(64) Case No. C.162/83 (4th. Report, 1984/85) p.18/19 
paragraph 37; Case No.C.162/83 (4th. Report, 1984/85)
(65) Case No.C.455/T (3rd. Report, 1974); Case No.C.211/J 
(6 th. Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.481/79 (6 th. Report, 
1979/80) - Department of Transport - information as to 
the health of a driver; Case No.C.481/79 (6 th. Report, 
1979/89); Case No.5/608/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79) - 
caution.
(6 6 ) Case No.C.396/81 (lst. Report, 1983/84) p.81 
paragraph 25 - though he has expressed support of Marrefs 
views.
(67) Case No. 5/151/78 (lst. Re4port,1978/79) p.10 
paragraph 18
(6 8 ) Case No.C.519/B (4th. REport, 1971/72) - copy of the 
appeal document sent to the complainant (as was the normal 
practice) not the Department’s fault and the Department 
supported the application for a rehearing at the tribunal. 
Case No.C.258/V (5th. REport, 1975/76) see p . 6 8  paragraph 
17; Case No.lB/493/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case
No.4/893/77 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.IB/232/78 
(lst. Report, 1979/80).
(69) Case No.C.622/V (1st. Report, 1976/77) p.184 
paragraph 5
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(70) Case No.C.622/V (1st. Report, 1976/77) p.186 
paragraphs 16 & 17
(71) Case No.C.314/T/580/J (3rd. Report, 1974/75) - PCA 
commented that the complainant’s exertions in writing over 
1 0 0  letters to try and obtain this information seemed 
rather unnecessary. See also Case No.5/692/77 (lst. Report 
1978/79) - complainant mistakenly believed that his duty 
under the Official Secrets Act prevented him releasing 
important information regarding his health - PCA confirmed 
that he was mistaken in his belief - open to him to ask 
permission to disclose. Case No. IB/882/77 (1st. report, 
1978/79); Case No.C.481/79 (6 th. Report, 1979/80)
(72) Case No.15/285/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78) p.13/14 
paragraph 8
(73) Case No.C.467/86 (lst. Report, 1987/88) p.5/6 
paragraph 16
(74) Case No.C.736/V (1st. Report, 1976/77) p.47 paragraph 
1 0  & p.50 paragraph 16
(75) Case No.C.29/G (lst. Report, 1972/73) p.89 paragraph 
9/10 ’’Rule 22 of the Pensions Appeals Tribunal Rules 
applies to any case where the medical history of the 
appellant includes material which in the opinion of the 
Secretary of state should not, in the appellant’s 
interests, be disclosed to him. The rule provides that in 
such a case the undesirable material shall be omitted from 
the copy of the statement of Case sent to the appelllant 
by the Department but the copies of the Statement which 
are sent to the tribunal and to the appellant’s 
representative shall contain the material omitted from the 
appellant’s own copy.The Tribunal have to decide whether 
or not, in the interests of the appellant, the portions 
that were omitted from the appellant’s copy should be 
disclosed to him. The Tribunal may order all or any of 
those portions to be communicated to him or they may hear 
the appeal without all or any of them being so 
communicated. But the Tribunal must take any omitted 
portions into consideration before deciding the appeal.
The Department rely on the advice of their doctors in 
deciding whether Rule 22 should be applied to any appeal 
proceedings and if so, what part of the medical evidence 
is likely to be injurious to the appellant. Obviously the 
omission of injurious material from the appellant’s 
Statement of CAse requires considerable care if the 
purpose of the Rule is not to some extent defeated by the 
appellant’s becoming aware of its application in his case. 
The Rule is applied not by altering the wording of medical 
records but by omitting parts that are considered to 
constitute harmful material. When it comes to giving in 
the Statement of Case the medical opinion of the 
Department’s doctors and the reasons for rejecting the 
claim, these are so worded as to avoid references 
considered likely to prove injurious to the appellant; and 
if they include a true diagnosis of a condition which it 
is thought wrong to communicate to him, the diagnosis will
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usually be referred to by a general term."
Also Case No.C.179/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77); Case No.
C.5/53/78 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.15/433/78 (2nd. 
Report, 1979/80) - difficulty and delay in receiving copy 
of Statement of Case before meeting with the local War 
Pensions Committtee - Sir Cecil Clothier felt 
confidentiality should be on lines with PAT procedure - 
Department agreed to revise.
(76) Case No.C.257/82 (6 th. Report, 1983/84) p.36 
paragraph 2 2
(77) See Case No.C.159/G (4th. Report, 1972/730 p.219 
paragraph 51.
(78) Case No.C.346/T (3rd. Report, 1974); see also Case 
No.C.429/J (3rd. Report, 1974/75) - where standard 
procedure was not to issue medical reports, but in this 
particular case, it had formed part of the Statement of 
Case, freely available to the complainant and his 
representatives - ’Department acted with quite unnecessary 
rigidity* p.126 paragraph 5
(79) Case No.C.132/T (lst. Report,1973/74) pl6 paragraph 
21 - MOD - concerned the refusal of certificate of 
exemption from estate duty - perhaps the difference lies 
in the fact that it was an internal administrative matter 
- not before an outside tribunal.
(80) Quoted in Case No.C.363/T (1st. Report, 1974) p.14/15 
paragraph 5.
(81) Quoted in Case No.C.569/G (lst. Report, 1973/74); see 
also Case No.C137/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78)
(82) Section 13 of the Education Act 1944 - ’’Under Section 
13 of the Education Act 1944, proposals to establish, 
cease to maintain, significantly to enlarge, or 
significantly to change the character of county or 
voluntary schools require the approval of the Secretary of 
State. Section 13 also provides that:
(a) when such proposals are submitted by a local 
education authority, the authority must publish notices of 
the proposals in a prescribed manner, and any ten or more 
local government electors may, within two months of the 
publication, submit objections to the Secretary of State;
(b) proposals may be approved by the Secretary of State 
after making such modifications, if any, as appear to her 
to be desirable.” - as quoted in Case No.C.363/T (lst. 
Report 1974); the procedure was changed in the Education 
Act 1980 which set up local appeals committees, thus 
removing the problem from the Department.
(83) Case No.C.569/G (lst. Report, 1973/740 p.28 paragraph 
22; see also Case No.C.516/G (lst. Report, 1973/74); Case 
No.C.363/T (lst. Report, 1974); Case No.3B/53/77 (5th. 
Report, 1977/78). See also Case No. C.428/K (4th. Report, 
1976/77) - not an education case but a plannig case. 
Further submissions p.42 paragraph 10 ”The Department have 
explained to me that if an inspector considered any 
supplementary comments had a substantial bearing on the 
case it is unlikely that he would proceed to a decision
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without giving the other party an opportunity to make 
further comment." Sir Cecil Clothier also supported this 
view see CAse No.C.90/82 (4th. Report, 1982/83)
(84) Case No.C.363/T (1st. Report, 1974) p.16 paragraph 10 
- S.13 of the Education Act 1944; see also Case No. 
4/374/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78) - where PCA did not feel 
that non-circulation of representations received after 
cut-off date, was a point of criticism. See also Case
No.4/123/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80) - part of the history 
of the case, deals with this issue, and as a result before 
the PCA’s intervention department had 1 in interests of 
natural justice* decided to rehear the case. See also Case 
No.C.90/82 (4th. Report, 1982/83) for Sir Cecil Clothier’s 
support.
(85) Case No.C.759/81 (2nd. Report, 1982/83) p.103 
paragraph 24
(8 6 ) Case N0 .C.6 6 8 /J (lst. Report, 1975/76) p.64 
paragraphs 1 1  & 1 2
(87) Case No. C.843/V (lst. Report, 1976/77); Case 
No.C.483/K (4th. Report, 1976/77) - though Department 
should follow up these claims by complainant, if at all 
possible - Case No.3B/398/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No. 15/643/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79) - Department acceded 
to request by complainant to add documents to the 
Statement of Claim. Case No.4/1210/78 (2nd. Report, 
1979/80) - PCA considered whether Department should have 
taken greater care in posting documents (Council’s written 
statement of Case) to complainant: "The complainant 
considered that the Council’s statement should have been 
sent by recorded delivery as it was an important document 
in the appeal process. This view’has been put to the 
Department. They have told me that they do nowadays use 
the recorded delivery service for enforcement appeal 
decision letters, since these are documents of special 
importance; but that for reasons of economy it is not 
their normal practice to use the recorded delivery service 
for the very large amount of procedural correspondence in 
appeal cases, which for enforcement appeals alone averages 
more than 5,000 each year. They are not aware of any other 
instances in which their practice of sending out copies of 
local planning authority statements by ordinary post has 
appeared to have resulted in their not being received by 
appellants. I have no grounds for questioning the 
Department’s general policy in this respect and 
accordingly I do not criticise them for using normal 
postal arrangements ...."
Also Case No.C.759/81 (2nd. Report, 1982/83); Case 
No.C.220/85 (5th. Report, 1985/86).
(8 8 ) Case Nos.C.255/464/T (2nd.Report, 1974); Case
No.4/893/77 (4th. Report, 1978/79), p.237 paragraphs 19 & 
20; Case No.C.152/84 (lst. Report, 1984/85) - interesting 
side issue of inablity to object as he was in prison at 
the time - not really resolved on this point; Case 
No.5/800/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78).
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(89) Case No. C.851/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76) p . 6 6  
paragraph 1 0
(90) Case No.4/893/77 (4th. Report,1978/79); Case 
No.4/347/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80)
(91) Case No.C.656/V (5th. Report, 1975/76); Case 
No.3A/4/79 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.4/742/77 (7th. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.lA/853/77 (lst. Report,
1978/79); Case No.3A/4/79 (2nd. Report, 1979/80).
(92) Case No.C.350/K (4th. Report, 1976/77)
(93) Case No.4/893/77 (4th. Report,1978/79) p.235 
paragraph 13; see also Case No.4/347/78 (lst. Report, 
1979/80)
(94) Case No.4/374/77 (5th. Report,1977/78) p.35 paragraph 
9; see also Case No.C.258/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81) - 
hearing in prison, complainant misinformed that witness 
had been discharged - only at court - PCA ’disturbed* but 
did not think his appearance would have helped the cause; 
Case No.C.600/84 (5th. Report, 1984/85) - Home Office 
consideration of petition of prisoner (really an example 
of all relevant facts and their consideration) - 
indirectly deals with the relevant rules concerning prison 
disciplinary offence hearings and witnesses p.63 paragraph 
8 - ’’Under the Home Office Standing Orders a prisoner 
accused of a disciplinary offence is handed written notice 
of the charge against him and must be given the 
opportunity to make a written reply to the charge, to name 
any witnesses he wishes to give evidence and to prepare 
his defence. At the adjudication the accused prisoner must 
be given the opportunity to present his case and to 
question witnesses. Guidance on adjudications issued by 
the Prison Department to Governors states that if the 
prisoner asks to call witnesses, whether named in advance 
or during the adjudication, he should be asked to say what 
he thinks their evidence will show or prove, unless the 
Governor is satisfied (after any submission from the 
accused) that the witnesses will not be able to give 
useful evidence, they should be called. If the Governor 
decides not to call a witness requested by the accused, 
the accused should be told why and given the opportunity 
to comment. The reason for such a decision should be 
recorded in the record of adjudication." In the case the 
charge was dropped by the Governor in the interests of 
natural justice - he was not happy with the procedure.
(95) Case No.4/347/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80)
(96) Case No.C.147/J (4th. Report, 1974/75) p.37 paragraph 
17; see also Case No.C.395/T (3rd. Report,1974) - where 
oral hearing finished and the Secretary of State making 
his decision, only a duty to consult parties if new 
evidence, or new issue of fact raised at this stage (other 
than government policy) - PCA agreed that availablity of 
housing land was not a new issue but a policy matter; Case 
No.6/694/77 (7th. report, 1977/78) - claimed that 
Department at inquiry produced new evidence apart from 
that needed for mere rebuttal of objectors* evidence - PCA
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did not think so.
(97) Case NO.C.631/K (5th. Report, 1976/77) p.19/20 
paragraph 8 ; Case NO.C.372/K (lst. Report, 1976/77) p.232 
paragraph 8
(98) Case No.4/374/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78) p.36 
paragraph 1 0
(99) Case No.4/347/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80)
(100) Case N0 .C.6 6 O/V (1st.Report, 1976/77) p.194 
paragraph 7 + p.197 paragraph 15; Case No.2/848/77 (4th. 
Report, 1978/79) - letter from solicitor withheld, no 
permission from the Home Secretary as required by the 
Prison Rules, the PCA felt this action to be justified; 
cf. Case No.C.197/86 (2nd. Report, 1987/88) - letter 
stopped, felt that it was a means of circumventing a 
previous stoppage of a letter to a TV presenter, the PCA 
felt this was not enough to justify stopping a letter to 
the solicitor.
(101) Case No.C.2/J (3rd.Report, 1974)
(102) Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Administration lst. Report, 1974/75 HC 454 and the 
Chairman of IRfs letter to the Committee of 16th. June, 
1975; other professional fees are also included in this 
ruling, see Case No.lB/51/78 (4th. REport, 1978/79); Case 
No.lA/1013/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.829/81 
(2nd. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.1026/80 (lst. Report, 
1981/82).
(103) Case No.lB/855/77 (lst. Report, 1978/79) p.197 
paragraph 12; Case No.C.456/79 (9th. Report, 1979/80);
Case No.C.653/80 (lst. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.87/82 
(lst. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.396/81 (lst. Report, 
1983/84); Case No.C.828/81 (2nd. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.509/82 (7th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.627/85 (4th. 
Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.363/82 (lst. Report, 1983/84). 
Cases where it was held not to be necessary to engage 
professional help: Case No.5/394/77 (5th. Report.
1977/78); Case No.C.579/80 (5th. Report, 1980/81)
(104) Case No.C.456/86 (lst. Report, 1988/89) p.32 
paragraph 13 - this is presumably because the procedure is 
such that professional help should not be necessary to 
formulate the complaint.
(105) Case No.C.497/G (5th. Report, 1972/73) p.54 
paragraph 32.
(106) Case No.C.447/V (5th. Report,1975/76)
(107) Case No.C.734/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76) see p.57 
paragraph 7
(108) Case No.C412/T (3rd. Report, 1974) pl91/192 
paragraphs 14,15 & 16; see also Case No.C.260/G (3rd. 
Report,1972/73)
(109) Case No.C.114/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78) p.314 
paragraph 6
(110) Case No.C260/G (3rd. Report,1972/73) p.197 paragraph 
10 "I note, however, that they made objections to the 
development proposals, that a Council officer commented on 
their objections, and that the inspector recorded the
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exchange of views and made his recommendations."; Case 
No.C.284/G (lst. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.94/J 
(3rd.Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.199/J (lst.
Report,1974/75); Case N0 .C.6 O6 /V (5th. Report, 1975/76); 
Case No.C.71/K (1st. Report, 1976/77);[See also Case No. 
C.372/K (lst. Report, 1976/77) - re ’weight* given to 
written representations over oral representations]; Case 
No. 15/7/78 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.2/752/78 (lst. 
Report, 1978/79); Case No.4/941/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80)
- legal provision preventeed the Department considering 
representation from person in the complainant’s position - 
Department criticised for the clumsy way of handling it; 
Case No. C.192/80 (3rd. Report, 1980/81)
(111) Case No.C.203/86 (3rd. Report, 1986/87) p.70/71 
paragraphs 18/19; Case No.C.45/87 (5th. Report, 1987/88).
(112) Case No.C.886/81 (lst. Report, 1983/84) p.132 & 136 
paragraphs 54 & 6 6  (written representations)
(113) Case No.C.278/J (6 th. Report, 1974/75); Case 
No.C.207/G (lst. Report, 1972/73) - not a public inquiry, 
therefore, the inspector entitled to exclude 
representations about the effect on general amenity from 
his report - where they were not relevant to the purpose 
of the inquiry; Case No.C.258/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81) - 
hearing on a disciplinary charge in prison - 2 questions 
out of 17 disallowed as not being relevant to the charge.
(114) Case No.C.549/87 (1st. Report, 1988/89).
(115) Case No.C.41/T (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.51/T (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.207/G (lst. 
Report, 1972/73) p.206 paragraph 21; Case No.C.508/K (3rd. 
Report, 1976/77)
(116) Case Nos.C.321/T/360/T (3rd. Report, 1974/750 pl79 
paragraph 50
(117) Rule 12 of the Town and Country Planning (inquiries 
Procedure) Rules 1969 as explained in Case No.C.395/T 
(3rd. Report, 1974); Case No. C372/K (1st. report,
1976/77) - public meeting to hear local views on proposals 
for local government ward boundary changes - written 
representations accepted after public meeting and then 
’followed* see p.232 paragraph 8 -"The Home Office 
consider that the procedure followed in these reviews 
affords very full opportunities for the expression of 
local views and differences of opinion. So far as it is 
open to me to comment on the procedural aspect ieon the 
part of the Home Office play, I share that view. But 
inevitably there comes a stage at which no further 
reconciliation of opposing views is possible, and the Home 
secretary must reach a final decision.... The decision he 
reached was one he was entitled to take and I am satisfied 
that, in reaching it, he took account of all the relevant 
facts and opinions that had been brought to the Home 
Office’s attention. I can understand the complainant’s 
concern, after he and other association representatives 
had taken the trouble to attend the public meeting on 19 
May 1975, when he learned that later representations made
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by others who had not attended the meeting had been taken 
into account. But this was not contrary to established 
practice and, from the Home Office’s point of view, I do 
not think it would be fair to say that these later 
representations had been allowed to ’overide* .. the views 
of those who had attended the meeting. It seems to me that 
the Department considered the whole matter entirely on its 
merits. I therefore do not uphold the complaint about the 
way the Home Office dealt with the final phase of the 
consultative powers, although I consider the complainant 
was entitled to the courtesy of an earlier and more 
informative interim reply to his letter....”
(118) See for instance Case No.76/T (3rd. Report, 1974)
(119) Case No.C.347/J (4th. Report, 1974/75); Case 
NO.C.437/T (2nd. Report, 1974)
(120) Case No.C.347/J (4th. Report, 1974/75) p.59 
paragraph 25
(121) Case No.C.665/81 (5th. Report, 1981/82).
(122) Case No.C.683/J (1st. Report, 1975/76); Case 
No.C.256/V (3rd. Report,1975/76); Case No.4/613/77 (1st. 
Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.894/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81)
(123) Case No.C.96/T (1st. Report,1973/74)
(124) Case No.C.140/K (lst. Report, 1976/77); Case 
No.C.428/K (4th. Report, 1976/77) - where it was also 
established that the inspector had spent longer at the 
site than the complainant was aware; Case No.4/453/78 
(4th. Report, 1978/79);Case No.4/787/78 (lst. Report, 
1979/80)
(125) See Case no. C.894/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81) p.27 
paragraph 19
-369-
CHAPTER FIVE
(1) Case No. C.104/T (lst. Report 1974)
(2) Case No. C.206/V (3rd. Report 1975/76)
(3) Case No.C320/V (5th. Report, 1975/76) p.119 paragraph 
13, almost 6 months delay. See also Case No. C.719/V 
(6 th.Report, 1975/76) - 2 year delay in awarding full 
entitlement to supplementary benefit ’inexcusable*.
(4) Case No. C.21/V (1st. Report 1975/76) p.163 paragraph
22; echoed in Case No.370/J (4th. Report 1974/75)[worried 
by delay in allowing prisoner to exercise permission to 
write to M.P.],and Case No. C.481/J (3rd. Report 1974/75- 
a four month delay in answering petition - p.128 paragraph
8 -"the more especially since the purpose of the petition
was to secure a remedy for what he considered to be an 
illegal sentence of imprisonment." - however, c.f. Case 
No. C.573/V (3rd. Report 1975/76) same series of reports 
as first case - illustrates the difficulties in 
generalising as result of case-by-case approach. See also 
4th. Report, 1983/84 Investigation of a complaint about 
delay in reviewing a conviction for murder.
(5) discussed later
(6 ) Case No. C683/J (lst. Report 1975/76)
(7) Eg Case No.5/795/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.lA/72/78 (4th. Report, 1978/78) - though improvements 
in the system were suggested; Case No.2/917/78 (2nd. 
Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.701/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/80)
- review of the system; Case No.C336/80 (5th. Report, 
1980/81) - seasonal peak but department had taken all 
economic measures to prevent delays; Case No.C.717/82 
(6 th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.460/83 (lst. Report, 
1984/85).
(8 ) See Case No.C.139/K (1st. Report,1976/77); Case No.C. 
170/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77)
(9) Case No.C.518/G (4th. Report 1972/73)p.159 paragraph 
1 1
(10) Introduction of stricter documentary requirements 
equated acceptable delay in this area - see Case No. 
C.358/V (3rd. Report 1975/76) For other such IR cases see 
Case No.C108/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78)
(11) Case No. C.909/V (lst. Report,1976/77) p.206 
paragraph 28, paragraph 8
’Although the administrative actions of the Home Office 
are in general within my jurisdiction, paragraph 7 of 
Schedule 3 to the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 
specifically debars me from investigating the exercise of 
the power of a Secretary of State to make a reference in 
respect of any person to the Court of Appeal. The advice I 
have been given is that this means not only that I am 
entitled to investigate the correctness of a decision 
whether to exercise the power, but also that I am not 
entitled to investigate whether the factors the Home 
Secretary took into account were the right factors; or 
whether advice which he, or his officials sought or
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consultations which he, or they, made (in order to reach a 
decision whether to exercise the power) were properly 
sought or made. And I am advised that it follows that I am 
precluded from investigating the referral of the matter to 
the Lord Chief Justice. My investigation of the complaint 
set out in paragraph 6 has therefore been limited to 
establishing whether there was any avoidable delay by the 
Home Office in considering the information and 
representations between the various dates mentioned in the 
complaint and 18 June 1975, when the case was referred to 
the Appeal Court."
(12) Case No. C.206/G (3rd. Report 1972/73) where it took 
6 months to prepare the lengthy statement of case.
(13) Case No. C.372/G (3rd. Report 1972/73) - prolonged 
representations by parties - no undue delay in comparison 
with time taken at other stages elsewhere; Case No.C.41/V 
(lst. Report 1975/76) - choice of inquiry procedure made 
by the Department caused delay, but was chosen to give the 
complainant a better opportunity of presenting his
case;and the complainant added to the delay himself.
(14) Case No.C.217/V (1st. Report 1975/76); Case 
No.C.386/J (6 th. Report 1974/75).Case No.C.252/V (3rd. 
Report 1975/76) - dealt with a prolonged period of 
uncertainty:"It is several years since the Department 
published their proposals for the motorway, and no final 
decision has yet been taken on that particular section of 
it. The planning of a major route through populated and 
attractive areas raises many problems, and the involvement 
of the public in the statutory procedures for choosing a 
route inevitably makes this a lengthy process. A balance 
must be struck between on the one-hand the need for early 
decisions to remove uncertainty, and on the other hand the 
need to ensure that all the implications, and all points 
of view, are fully and properly considered. Meantime, 
unfortunately, the interests of individuals can be 
adversely affected until the lengthy processes are 
completed and a decision reached. Some measure of relief 
is afforded to those people whose property is directly 
affected by a route put forward by the Department, because 
the statutory blight provisions enable them to serve 
notice on the Department requiring them to buy the 
affected property. But the complainant’s property is not 
within the scope of the existing statutory blight 
provisions and he can claim no relief for the 
inconvenience he is suffering. Only a change in the law 
could help people in his position. As matters stand, the 
Department cannot do more to bring the uncertainty to an 
end than to work as quickly as possible towards a final 
decision..... My investigation has satisfied me that so 
far there has been no unreasonable delay by the Department 
in their handling of the case." See also, Case No.C.53/K 
(1st. Report, 1976/77) - where it was Departmental policy 
to hold public inquiry, despite the fact that there were 
no statutory objectors - p.151 paragraph 9 "this seems to
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me to be a reasonable policy provided proper consideration 
is given to the balance between the interests of those 
with statutory rights and those with none. I am satisfied 
from my investigations that the Department gave careful 
consideration to all factors, including the knowledge that 
both the complainant and the Council had reasons for 
wanting an early decision, before concluding that the 
balance in this case required an inquiry."
(15) See Case No.C.291/T (lst. Report, 1974) p.81 
paragraph 1 1
(16) Case No.C.223/G (lst. Report 1972/73)pl0 paragraph 
10. See also Case No.C.503/J (1st. Report 1975/76), and 
Case N0 .C.6 I/J (3rd. Report 1974) - good reasons for delay 
in surtax assessment.
(17) Case No. C.517/K (5th. Report,1976/77) p.168 
paragraph 225
(18) Case No.C.136/K (lst. Report, 1976/77); See also Case 
No.C.177/K (lst. Report, 1976/77) p.172 paragraph 9 and 
Case No.C.444/K (1st. Report,1976/77) ; Case No.C.859/V 
(6 th. Report,1975/76) - part of the delay in this case due 
to this.
(19) See Case No.C.528/K (4th. Report, 1976/77); Case No. 
C.915/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76); Case No.3A/648/77 (5th. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.4/626/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); 
Case No.5/501/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No,3A/872/78 
(4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.309/87 (5th. Report, 
1987/88).
(20) Case No.C.448/J (6 th. Report 1974/75)
(21) Case No.C.448/J (6 th. Report 1974/75) p.31 paragraph 
13
(22) Case No.C.145/G (1st. Report 1972/73)
(23) Another case where need for legal consultation has 
been deemed allowable - Case No.C.196/G (lst. Report 
1972/73), where a delay of 7 weeks before the issue of a 
report from the DTi was allowed on grounds that the 
decision involved many considerations, including legal 
ones.
(24) Case No. C.356/G (3rd. Report 1972/73) - there was 
then a need to consult the County Council - however it is 
important to note that there was an earlier delay due to 
inaction, which the PCA criticised. See also Case 
NO.C.141/K (1st. Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.55/77 (5th. 
report, 1976/77) - part of delay excusable on this ground.
(25) Case No. C.169/T (lst. Report 1974)
(26) Case No.3/86 (5th.Report, 1985/86) p . 6 paragraph 11; 
see also Case No.C.196/85 (lst. Report, 1986/87)
(27) Case No.C.214/J (3rd. Report 1974/75); Case 
No.3A/773/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78)
(28) Case No.C.488/J (2nd. Report 1974); See also Case 
No.C.224/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77) - some criticism; Case 
No.C.528/K (4th. Report,1976/770 p.105 paragraph 20 - " My 
investigation has satisfied me that the time taken to 
conclude this complex case did not result from 
Departmental failings in handling the complainant’s claim,
-372-
and that a minor omission on their part at a later stage 
of the case was not significant,"
(29) Case No.C.573/V (3rd. Report 1975/76) cf. other 
statements as regards prisoners - a matter of balancing? 
See also Case No.C.536/V (lst. Report 1975/76). Other 
cases in this general area include: Case No.C.255/77 (lst. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/880/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); 
Case No.2/793/77 (lst. Report 1978/79) - decision to 
release a prisoner from Broadmoor. Case No.15/727/78 (4th. 
Report, 1978/79); CAse No.2/747/77 (4th. Report, 1978/79); 
Case No.15/27/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.2/917/78 
(2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.409/80 (lst. Report, 
1980/81); Case No.C.404/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.385/80 (5th. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.799/80 (lst. 
Report, 1981/82) - part dealing with complexity delay 
unavoidable; Case No.C.552/82 (,4th. Report, 1982/83); Case 
No.C.269/82 (lst. Report, 1983/84); CAse No.C.291/82 (2nd. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.313/82 (2nd. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.C.717/82 (6 th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.596/84 
(5th. Report, 1984/85).
(30) Case No.C.494/B (4th. Report 1971/72); Case No. 
C.300/B (4th. Report 1971/72); Case No.C.541/T (3rd.
Report 1974); Case No.C.386/J (6 th. Report 1974/75); Case 
No.C.138/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.229/77 (lst. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.637/K (1st. Report, 1977/78); 
Case No.C.797/K (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/636/77 
(5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/842/77 (5th. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.C.525/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/80);
(31) Case No.C.425/J (3rd. Report 1974/75)
(32) Case No.C.294/J (3rd. Report 1974/75) although some 
element of delay is ‘inescapable1 in this area, there were 
inexplicable delays within the Investigation Section, when 
not waiting for information. See also Case No.5/636/77 
(5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3A/698/77 (5th. Report, 
1977/78); CAse No.3A/704/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.3A/735/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.15/757/78 
(4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.4/898/77 (4th. Report, 
1978/79); Case No.5/30/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.lA/1013/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80); Case No.3A/923/78 
(2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.3A/208/78 (2nd. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.2/499/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.610/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/800 - clerical errors as 
well; Case No.C.104/80 (1st. Report, 1980/81) - ‘lack of 
imagination* ‘inexcusable*; Case No.C.152/81 (lst. Report, 
1981/82); Case No.C.102/79 (9th. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.77/82 (2nd. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.398/83 (7th. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.697/83 (lst. Report, 1984/85). 
Slightly less criticism made in the following cases: Case 
No.3B/953/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80) - administrative 
shortcomings criticised; Case No.C.501/80 (6 th. Report, 
1980/81); Case No.C.38/83 (lst. Report, 1984/85) - lack of 
vigour; Case No.C.757/84 (3rd. Report,1985/86) - need to 
reorganise the system.
(33) Case No.C.347/V (lst. Report 1975/76); Case
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No.C.368/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78)
(34) Case No C.877/V (3rd. Report 1976/77) p215 paragraph 
21.
(35) Case No.C.347/J (4th. Report 1974/75)-over a six 
month period, one letter and two telephone calls were not 
deemed to be enough on the Department s part; Case 
No.C.776/V (3rd. Report 1975/76)-where delay of one month 
on the part of the Department was not excessive, 
considering negotiations between other parties going on 
for eight years! See also Case No.C.145/V (lst. Report 
1975/76) delay on the part of accountants.
(36) Case No.C.347/J (4th. Report 1974/75); Case 
No.C.493/J (6 th.Report 1974/75); Case No.C.559/J (6 th. 
Report 1974/75). The PCA was also concerned that such a 
system had broken down in one of these cases.
(37) Case No.C.730/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76) - not enough 
reminders to the solicitors concerned; Case No.C.539/79 
(9th. Report, 1979/800; Case No.C.888/80 (5th. Report, 
1980/81); Case No.C.152/81 (lst. Report, 1981/82); Case 
No.C.289/85 (lst. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.656/87 (6 th. 
Report, 1987/88).
(38) Case No.5/466/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78) p.115 
paragraph 17
(39) Case No.C.915/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76); Case 
No.C.331/K (4th. Report, 1976/77)
(40) Case No. C.290/T (1st. Report 1974); (8 ) Case 
No.C.513/V (lst.Report 1975/76); Case No.C.503/J (lst. 
Report 1975/76),when suggestion put to MAFF by 
complainant1s solicitors they responded quickly. Also Case 
No.C.l/T (5th. Report 1972/73) - checks on public funds 
must be efficient - here there was an overlap of 
enquiries; Case No.C.528/K (4th. Report, 1976/77) - 
interim payment made; Case No.361/80 (5th. Report,
1980/81).
(41) Case No. C.444/J (3rd. Report 1974/75); Case 
No.C.358/V (3rd. Report 1975/76)
(42) Case No.C.308/V (3rd. Report,1975/76) at p.161, 
paragraphs, and at p.162 paragraph 7 - the PCA did find 
a small delay within the control of the Public Trustee, 
but he considered it to be very small; and at p.162/163 
paragraph 8 - however intrim distributions had been made. 
See also Case N0 .C.IO6 /G (4th. Report 1972/73) - delay 
partly attributable to the disbanding of the Land 
Commission causing ‘inevitable delays*. Also Case
No.C.525/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.631/83 (8 th. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.383/82 (lst. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.C.460/83 (lst. Report, 1984/85) - sick leave; Case 
No.C.603/88 (3rd. Report, 1988/89).
(43) Case No.C.541/T (3rd. Report 1974) at p.114 paragraph 
11 - the PCA went on to criticise the fact that the 
complainant had not been kept informed about the reasons 
for the delay.
(44) Case No.C.189/G (3rd.Report 1972/73) - Public trustee 
had mitigated the effects of 4% years delay by making
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interim payments, and most of the blame for the delay had 
been placed on the solicitors involved.
(45) Case No.2/380/78 (1st. Report. 1978/79); Case
No.3B/768/78 (4th. Report. 1978/79): Case No.lA/455/78 
(4th. Report, 1978/79).
(46) Case No.C.874/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81) - 
administrative error - failure to follow instructions;
Case No.C.620/86 (2nd. Report, 1987/88) - remedial action 
not taken soon enough.
(47) Case No.C.473/84 (3rd. Report, 1984/85) p.44/45 
paragraph 7
(48) Case No.C.288/T (1st. Report 1974) p.39 paragraph 13 
- some of the delays in this case were held to be 
avoidable.
(49) Case No.C.313/J (4th. Report 1974/75) p.54 paragraph 
1 2  - longer delay than necessary.
(50) Case N0 .C.8 6 /K (1st.Report,1976/77) p75/76 paragraph 
12
(51) Case No.C.182/T (1st. Report 1973/74) - part of 
major delays - training new inspectors to combat the 
delays; Case No.C.115/T (1st. Report 1973/74) p.60 
paragraph 13 " lam satisfied that the primary cause for 
complaint originated in the pressure which has affected 
all appeals recently.11; Case No.C.542/T (1st. Report 
1974/75).
(52) Case No.C.48/77 (5th. Report, 1976/77); Case 
No.C.724/V (6 th. Report,1975/76); Case No.C.573/81 (5th. 
Report, 1981/82);
(53) Case No.C.300/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77)
(54) Case No.C137/J (1st. Report 1974/75) p.126 paragraph 
12&13; Case No.C.549/T (1st. Report 1974/75); Case 
No.C.173/J (1st. Report 1974/75). Case No.C.187/T (1st. 
Report 1974) - experienced staff lost due to move of 
Nationality Division, and an abnormal workload. A third 
area where recurring delay was identified, was at the 
DVLC, in reissuing and renewing licences - the PCA 
discovered that they were the result of errors and the 
lack of a system for correction - this merited very strong 
criticism - 11 I am glad therefore to report that the 
procedures are being overhauled and amended to minimise 
the risks of repetition of errors and delays. Such an 
overhaul is clearly much needed. * 1 Case N0 .C.8 8 /J (1st. 
Report 1974/75) at p.53 paragraph 10, and also Case 
N0 .C.I8 6 /J and Case No.C.255/J (1st. Report 1974/75).
(55) Case No.C.485/T (3rd.Report 1974) p.109 paragraph 14; 
Case No.C.128/J (4th. Report 1974/75) - unnecessary delay 
of over 8 months in answering a letter -held in spite of 
pressure of work and staff sickness.; Case No.C.440/J 
(4th. Report 1974/75) - delay of 3 months * inexcusable *, 
despite the reorganisation of local valuation offices, and 
the heavy pressure of work in this particular office; Case 
No.C.659/J (6 th. Report 1974/75) - shortage of experienced 
staff at a time of heavy pressure, however 2 month delay 
in repayment of tax 'excessive1; Case No.C.460/T
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(2nd.Report 1974) - 5 month delay in issuing a provisional 
driving licence, difficulties in the early months of the 
DVLC; Case No.C.278/T (1st. Report 1973/74) - delay still 
1 unjustifible1 despite heavy pressure of work and staff 
summer leave; and Case No.C.208/G (1st. Report 1972/73) - 
heavy pressure of work, not an excuse for delay in 
notifying surtax office.
(56) Case No.C.429/G (3rd.Report 1972/73); see also Case 
No.C.113/G (3rd. Report 1972/73) (Public Trustee),heavy 
pressure - very little undue delay; case No.C.472/T (2nd. 
Report 1974) - delay of 3 months - responded on own 
intiative on realising the urgency; Case No.C.240/T (2nd. 
Report 1974) - 14 week delay, when complainant had been 
told that it would be 'within a short time' - number of 
factors including heavy pressure of work - still could 
have been more 'expedious'; Case No.C.208/G (3rd. Report 
1974/75) - delay of 3 months 'unfortunate' - 'heavy 
administrative burden'; Case No.C.274/V (3rd. Report 
1975/76) new local office with 'teething troubles' - but 
not enough to mitigate the delay totally.
(57) Case No.C.536/T (1st. Report 1974/75) Department of 
the Environment planning appeals section - heavy pressure 
of work - at p.46 paragraph 1 2
(58) Case No.C.540/V (5th. Report, 1975/76); case 
No.C.640/V (5th. Report, 1975/76); Case No.C366/K (1st. 
Report, 1976/77) - 'flu epidemic & increase in workload 
over the Christmas period still criticised. See also Case 
No.3B/652/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/838/77 
(7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/576/78 (1st. Report, 
1978/79); Case No.1A/842/78 (1st..Report, 1979/80) - 
'inexcusable'; Case No.5/1044/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); 
Case No.3A/208/78 (2nd. Report, !979/80); Case No.C.57/81 
(6 th. Report, 1980/81) - periods of inaction; Case
No.77/82 (2nd. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.524/79 (8 th. 
Report, 1979/80) - Land Registry; Case No.C.251/82 (4th. 
Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.610/87 (3rd. Report, 1988/89); 
Case No.C.656/87 (6 th. Report, 1987/88) - explained but 
did not excuse 'appalling' delay; Case No.C.228/86 (3rd. 
Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.671/86 (1st. Report, 1987/88); 
Case No.C.413/87 (6 th. Report, 1987/88);
(59) Case No.C.48/77 (5th.Report, 1976/77)
(60) In particular, Case No.C.44/77 (5th. Report,
1976/77); See also Case No.C.658/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76). 
Although, presumably the department would have been well 
aware of the impending legislation in order to make 
suitable provision.
(61) Case No. C.55/77 (5th. Report, 1976/77) p.177 
paragraph 9.
(62) Case No.C.876/81 (1st. Report, 1983/84) p.30 
paragraph 45
(63) Case No.4/409/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78 p.46 paragraph 
13. See also Case No.C.346/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78) - 
mild criticism from Sir Idwal Pugh; Case No.C.603/88 (3rd. 
Report, 1988/89).
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(64) Case No.C.566/86 (3rd.Report, 1987/88) p.67 paragraph 
21; see also Case No.C.343/84 (4th. Report, 1984/85); Case 
No.C.32/85 (1st. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.318/87 (1st. 
Report, 1988/89).
(65) Case No.C.366/79 (6 th. Report, 1979/80) p.19 
paragraph 15
(6 6 ) Case No.C.525/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/80)
(67) Case No.C.320/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/80) p.80
paragraph 9
(6 8 ) Case No.C.447/80 (3rd. Report, 1980/81); Case 
No.C.560/81 (3rd. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.748/81 
(2nd.Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.248/82 (4th. Report, 
1982/83); Case No.C.801/81 (4th. Report, 1982/83); Case 
No.C.581/82 (2nd. Report, 1983/84). Cf. Case No.C.223/85 
(5th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.697/85 (5th. Report, 
1985/86).
(69) Case No.C.782/V (3rd Report 1975/76)
(70) Case No.C.430/K (4th. Report.1976/77); see also Case
No.5/406/78 (1st. Report, 1978/79).
(71) Case No.3B/505/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78) p.308 
paragraph 17
(72) Case No.C.724/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76); see also Case 
No.C.55/77 (5th. Report, 1976/77) - where there was the 
consideration of local government reorganisation. Also 
Case No.3B/839/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78). Other cases in 
this area: Case No.lA/864/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80) - 
transfer of work - failure to pursue; Case No.C.265/79 
(4th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.366/79 (6 th. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.C.799/80 (1st. Report, 1981/82)
(73) Case No.C.183/88 (3rd. Report, 1988/89).
(74) Case No. C.296/T (2nd. Report 1974); Case No.C.98/77
(lst. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.434/77 (1st. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.3A/38/79 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.155/80 (lst. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.539/79 (9th. 
Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.707/80 (6 th. Report,1980/81); 
Case No.C.874/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.1022/80 
(3rd. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.280/81 (5th. Report, 
1981/82); Case No.C.138/82 (2nd. Report, 1982/83); Case 
No.C.222/82 (4th. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.672/82 (3rd. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.432/84 (5th. Report, 1984/85); 
Case No.C.171/85 (3rd. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.341/85 
(3rd. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.313/86 (2nd. Report, 
1987/88); Case No.C.203/87 (lst. Report, 1988/89); Case 
No.5/67/78 (7th. Report, 1977/78).
(75) Case No. C.869/V (5th. report, 1975/76) paragraphs 
4+5+6
(76) Case No.C.576/79 (lst. Report, 1980/81).
(77) Case No.C.496/67 (5th. Report, 1987/88).
(78) Case No. C.5/J (2nd. Report 1974); Case No.C.480/K 
(4th. Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.120/81 (lst.
Report,1981/82); Case No.C.631/83 (8 th. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.C.512/86 (lst. Report, 1987/88); Case No.5/6/78 
(7th. Report, 1977/78).
(79) Case No.C.142/K (6 th. Report 1975/76) - 3 day delay
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in contacting another office. See also Case No.C.875/80
1(oibo$?p0 Jt> 1981/82); Case No.C.556/81 (5th. Report, 
1981/82); Case No.C.187/81 (5th. Report, 1981/82) - 
possible fault; Case No.C.527/2(8)1 (1st. Report,
1982/83); Case No.C.192/81 (lst. Report, 1982/83}; Case 
No.C.546/81 (4th. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.687/81 (lst. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.282/83 (8 th. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.C.817/81 (5th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.373/87 
(6 th. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.242/83 (lst. Report, 
1984/85).
(80) Case No.5/891/77 (lst. Report, 1978/79)
(81) Case No.lB/477/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.C.456/86 (lst. Report, 1988/89)
(82) Case No. C.458/V (5th. Report,1975/76); see also CAse 
No.C.138/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.282/77 (1st. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/340/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); 
Case No.C.5/405/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.C.lA/720/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3B/869/77 
(5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3A/871/77 (7th. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.lB/567/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.3B/85/78 (7th. Report, 1977/78);Case No.3A/414/78 (4th. 
Report, 1978/79); Case No.3B/496/78 (4th. report,
1978/79); Case No.lA/598/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.lB/865/78 (1st. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.446/79 
(8 th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.740/79 (8 th. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.C.239/80 (lst. Report, 1980/81); Case 
No.C.135/80 (5th. Report, 1980/81) - incorrect action;
Case No.C.690/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81) Case No.C.36/81 
(3rd. report, 1981/82); Case No.C.586/81 (lst. Report, 
1982/83); Case No.C.251/82 (4th. Report, 1982/83); Case 
No.C.801/82 (3rd. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.205/84 (lst. 
Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.573/84 (lst. Report, 1984/85); 
Case No.C.237/84 (4th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.343/84 
(4th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.831/34(84?) (5th.
Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.164/84 (1st. Report, 1985/86); 
Case No.C.782/84 (lst. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.682/83 
(1st. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.431/85 (3rd. Report, 
1985/86); CAse NO.C.288/85 (4th. Report, 1985/86); Case 
No.C.697/85 (5th. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.33/86 (lst. 
Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.93/86 (1st. Report, 1986/87); 
Case No.C.601/85 (lst. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.618/85 
(3rd. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.224/86 (3rd. Report, 
1986/87); Case No.C.348/86 (1st. Report, 1987/88); Case 
No.C.388/86 (3rd. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.498/86 (3rd. 
Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.410/85 (5th. Report,1987/88); 
Case NO.C.413/87 (6 th. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.414/87 
(6 th. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.509/82 (7th. Report, 
1983/84); Case No.C.590/85 (5th. Report, 1985/86); Case 
No.C.668/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81). Case No.lB/810/77 
(lst. Report, 1978/79) - fault traced to one individual 
officer who was described as having personal difficulties; 
Case No.C.290/84 (3rd. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.223/85 
(5th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.515/87 (3rd. Report, 
1988/89); Case No.C.142/86 (3rd. Report, 1986/87) -
assistant manager's inaction, Department's own 
investigation had shown that he had 'knowingly and 
delibrately failed to take the necessary action which led 
to claimants suffering unnecsssary delay in receiving 
benefit awarded to them.'
(83) Case No. C.497/J (4th. Report 1974/75) p.16 paragraph 
18; Case No.C.640/V (5th. Report, 1975/76); Case
No.C.249/81 (lst. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.70/82 (2nd. 
Report, 1982/83)
(84) Case No. C.76/J (lst. Report 1974/75); Case 
No.lA/309/78 (lst. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.166/80 
(3rd. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.405/80 (5th. Report, 
1980/81); Case No.C.875/80 (lst. Report, 1981/82); Case 
No.C.433/81 (3rd. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.288/83 (7th. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.80/84 (1st. Report, 1984/85).
(85) Case No. C.558/J (lst. Report 1975/76)
(8 6 ) Case No.4/87/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80)
(87) Case No. C.311/G (3rd. Report 1972/73); Case 
No.C.284/T (lst. Report 1974) - a periodic check was 
introduced. Case No.C.838/V (6 th. report, 1975/76) - loss 
of letter; Case N0 .C.8 8 /V (3rd. report, 1976/77) - papers 
going astray. Case No.C.772/K (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.C.434/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78); Case No.lB/39/78 (lst. 
Report, 1978/79); Case No.5/803/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80); 
Case No.C.3A/1228/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case
No.C.329/79 (4th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.709/81 (2nd. 
Report, 1982/83) - not proven - given the benefit of the 
doubt; Case No.C.282/83 (8 th. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.413/85 (3rd. Report, 1985/86); CAse No.C.183/88 (3rd. 
Report, 1988/89).
(8 8 ) Case No.5/297/78 (7th. Report. 1977/78); Case 
No.lB/493/78 (4th, Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.395/85 
(lst. Report, 1988/89).
(89) Case No.C.780/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81)
(90) Case No. C.284/T as above.
(91) Case No.C.500/V (5th. Report, 1975/76); Case
No.C.780/80 (6 th. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.256/82 (4th. 
Report, 1982/83).
(92) Case No.C.878/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76)
(93) Case No.C.212/77 (1st. Report, 1977/78)
(94) Case No.C.797/K (1st. Report. 1977/78); Case 
No.C.475/87 (lst. Report, 1988/89).
(95) Case No.C.772/K (lst. report, 1977/78); Case
No.c.98/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.212/77 (lst. 
Reprt, 1977/78); Case No.C.434/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78); 
Case No.C.190/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.692/K 
(lst. Report, 1977/78); Case No.lA/566/77 (5th. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.lA/321/78 (lst. Report, 1978/79) - slow 
to use information; Case No.15/787/77 (lst. Report, 
1978/79) - slow to use the information; Case No.3A/1228/78 
(2nd. Report, 1979/800; Case No.1A/1049/78 (2nd. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.C.1129/78 (4th. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.585/80 (5th. Report, 1980/81) - allowing matter to 
drift; Case No.C.500/80 (1st. Report, 1981/82) - 'half-
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heartedness and neglect1; Case No.C.756/81 (3rd. Report, 
1985/86); Case No.C.621/83 (8 th. Report, 1983/84) - 
1 failure to keep things moving*; Case No.C.818/84 (4th. 
Report, 1985/86) - inefficiency in following up matters; 
Case No.C.722/85 (3rd. Report, 1986/87); Case No.77/82 
(2nd. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.6/83 (7th. Report, 
1983/84); Case No.C.242/83 (lst. Report, 1984/85); Case 
No.C.440/86 (lst. Report, 1987/88).
(96) Case No.5/861/77 (lst. Report. 1978/79); Case 
NO.3B/950/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.354/84 
(4th. Report, 1984/85);
(97) 4th.Report, 1983/84 p.23 paragraph 58. See also Case 
No.C.175/81 (4th. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.267/82 (2nd. 
Report, 1983/84) - partly complainant's fault; Case 
No.C.828/81 (2nd. Report, 1983/840; Case No.C288/83 (7th. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.672/83 (8 th. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.C.59/83 (4th. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.357/85 
(5th. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.264/84 (lst. Report, 
1986/87) - failure to provide proper guidelines; Case 
No.C.231/85 (lst. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.454/85 (3rd. 
Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.220/86 (lst. Report, 1987/88); 
Case No.C.327/87 (5th. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.346/86 
(2nd. Report, 1987/88) - 'Although I have not upheld the 
specific complaint against the immigration authorities at 
Heathrow, I am satisfied that the complainant's interests 
would have been better protected if the Home Office, 
having perceived the need for an improved Port Precautions 
Scheme, had pursued that objective more vigourously and 
introduced the new scheme within a much shorter time of 
the coming into force of the Child Abduction Act 1984 than 
was thye case. In regretting that' the existing system had 
not perated as effectively as they would have wished on 9 
April 1986 and that the new system was not by then in 
place, the Department have pointed out - and I accept - 
that the procedures, even under the revised arrangements, 
are very much a 'last ditch' attempt to prevent unlawful 
removal, and that thye HO have never been able able to 
guarantee that they would be effective in any given case. 
In the circumstances, I regard the apologies which the 
Principal Officer has offered as an appropriate outcome of 
my investigation."
(98) Case No.C.455/86 (2nd. Report, 1987/88) p.18 
paragraph 17
(99) Case No.C.70/82 (2nd. Report. 1982/83); Case
No.C.658/82 (lst. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.757/80 (6 th. 
Report, 1980/81) p.83 paragraph 17
(100) Case No.lB/990/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.206/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/80)[IR]; Case No.2/422/78 
(4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.5/733/78 (2nd. Report, 
1979/800; Case No.C.3B/540/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80) - 
failure to take action; 3rd. Report, 1979/80 - failure to 
take action; Case No.C.14/80 (5th. Report, 1980/810; Case 
No.C.888/80 (5th. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.57/81 (6 th. 
Report, 1980/810; Case No.C.433/81 (3rd. Report, 1981/82);
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Case No.C.586/81 (lst. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.225/81 
(2nd. Report, 1982/83); Case No.77/82 (2nd. Report, 
1982/83); Case No.C.197/82 (1st. Report, 1983/84) - 10 
years to collect tax after assessment; Case No.C.355/82 
(2nd. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.764/82 (6 th. Report, 
1983/840; Case No.C.798/82 (6 th. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.615/82 (6 th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.697/83 (lst. 
Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.713/84 (5th. Report, 1984/85); 
Case No.C32/85 (1st. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C289/85 
(lst. Report, 1985/86) - case overlooked; Case No.C.72/85 
(3rd. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.171/85 (3rd. Report, 
1985/86); Case No.C.34/85 (3rd. report, 1985/86); Case 
No.C.306/86 (lst. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.330/86 (2nd. 
Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.410/85 (5th. Report, 1987/88); 
Case No.C.610/87 (3rd. Report, 1988/89); Case No.C.515/87 
(3rd. Report, 1988/89); Case No.C.119/88 (3rd.
Report,1988/89).
(101) Case No. C.367/B (4th. Report 1971/72); also Case 
No. C.144/G (lst. Report 1972/73); or Case No.C.177/T 
(5th. Report 1972/73) - industrial action whilst 
introducing a new system.
(102) Case No. C.434/G (4th. Report 1972/73); Case No. 
C.546/G (5th. Report 1972/73); Case No. C.47/T (5th.
Report 1972/73); Case No. C.366/T (2nd. Report 1974); Case 
No. C.2/J (3rd. Report 1974); Case No. C.459/T (3rd.
Report 1974); Case No. C.127/J (1st. Report 1974/75); Case 
No. C.303/J (3rd. Report 1974/75); Case No. C.387/J (3rd. 
Report 1974/75); Case No. C.61/V (4th. Report 1974/75); 
Case No. C.645/J (6 th. Report 197-4/75); Case No. C.694/J 
(6 th. Report 1974/75); Case No. C65/V (6 th. Report 
1974/75); Case No.C.192/V (6 th. Report 1974/75); Case 
No.C.637/K (lst. Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/782/77 (5th. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.lB/605/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78) 
Case No.lB/766/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.539/79 
(9th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.118/83 (3rd. Report, 
1983/84); case No.C.672/83 (8 th. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.510/85 (3rd. Report, 1985/86); Case No.C.729/85 (6 th. 
Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.549/87 (lst. Report, 1988/89); 
Case No.C.446/88 (3rd.Report, 1988/89).
(103) Case No. C.459/T (3rd. Report 1974); and also 4% 
months delay in issuing a family allowance book - Case No. 
C.303/J (3rd. Report 1974/75)
(104) Case No. C.434/G (4th. Report 1972/73) - no follow 
up action taken after relative apparently repudiated the 
old. im
(105) Case No. C.694/J (6 th. Report 1974/75)
(106) Case No. C.65/V (6 th. Report 1974/75)
(107) Case No. C.366/T (2nd. Report 1974) - failure to
claim PAYE tax by the IR; and Case No.C.546/G (5th. Report
1972/73) - failure to note liablity for 4 years.
(108) Discussed below. See Case No.C.859/V (6 th. report, 
1975/76); Case No.C730/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76); Case 
No.C.690/79 (9th. Report, 1979/80).
(109) Case No.C.645/J (6 th. Report 1974/75)
-381-
(110) Case No.C.602/84 (lst. Report, 1985/86).
(111) Case No.C.724/V (6 th.Report, 1975/76) - not keeping 
informed of the reasons for the delay; Case No.C.541/T 
(3rd.Report,1974); Case No.C.494/B (4th.Report, 1971/720; 
Case No.C.48/77 (5th.Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.138/77 
(lst. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.229/77 (lst. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.C.637/K (lst. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.lB/832/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.lA/872/77 
(7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.lB/477/78 (4th. Report, 
1978/79); Case No.2/709/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.3A/823/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80); Case No.3A/1002/78 
(lst. Report, 1979/80); Case No.5/1074/78 (2nd. Report, 
1979/80); Case No.5/1153/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.3A/81/79 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.271/79 (4th. 
Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.726/78 (8 th. Report, 1979/80); 
Case No.C.921/80 (1st. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.500/80 
(1st. Report, 1981/820; Case no.C.433/81 (3rd. Report, 
1981/82); Case No.C.876/81 (1st. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.291/82 (2nd. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.615/82 (6 th. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.621/83 (8 th. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.C.205/84 (lst. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.624/82 
(4th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.65/85 (lst. Report, 
1985/86); Case No.C.77/84 (3rd. Report, 1985/86); Case 
No.C.273/85 (3rd. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.348/86 (lst. 
Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.729/85 (6 th. Report, 1987/88); 
Case No.C.183/88 (3rd. Report, 1988/89); Case No.5/795/77 
(7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.1A/1049/78 (2nd. Report, 
1979/80).
(112) Case No.C.250/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.C.756/K (1st. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.456/K (1st. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.495/K (lst. Report, 1977/78); 
Case N0.3B/134/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case
No.15/607/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/30/78 (4th. 
Report, 1978/79); Case No.lB/284/78 (4th. Report,
1978/79); Case No.5/228/78 (lst. report, 1979/80); Case 
No.4/135/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80); Case No5/733/78 (2nd. 
Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.1222/78 (4th. Reporyt,
1979/80); Case No.C.312/79 (6 th. report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.85/81 (3rd. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.274/81 (5th. 
Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.556/81 (5th. Report, 1981/82); 
Case No.C.636/81 (5th. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.414/83 
(8 th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.113/84 (3rd. Report, 
1984/85); Case No.C.157/84 (4th. Report, 1984/85); Case 
No.C.365/86 (3rd. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.741/85 (3rd. 
Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.542/87 (3rd. Report, 1988/89).
(113) Case No.C.723/K (lst. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.15/390/78 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.15/421/78 
(4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.451/80 (lst. Report, 
1981/82); Case No.C.586/81 (1st. Report, 1982/83); Case 
No.C.556/83 (5th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.155/87 (6 th. 
Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.20/82 (2nd. Report, 1982/83).
(114) Case No.C.791/K (lst. report, 1977/78); Case 
No.C.461/K (lst. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.421/77 (lst. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.120/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78);
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Case No.5/647/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.lA/23/78 
(7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.6/756/77 (7th. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.6/119/78 (lst. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.5/117/78 (4th. report, 1978/79); Case No.4/787/78 (lst. 
Report, 1979/80); Case No.3B/86/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); 
Case No.C.193/80 (1st. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.341/81 
(3rd. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.178/82 (lst. Report, 
1983/84); Case No.C.268/82 (lst. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.634/82 (3rd. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.605/82 (3rd. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.R.532/83 (8 th. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.C.461/85 (lst. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.60/86 
(3rd. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.286/86 (3rd. Report, 
1987/88); Case No.C.729/85 (6 th. Report, 1987/88).
(115) Case No.C.355/K & C.443/K (3rd.Report, 1976/77).
(116) Case No.C.524/B (4th.Report, 1971/72) p.41 paragraph 
16 & p.42 paragraph 18. See also CAse No.C.357/J
(lst.Report,1975/76)
(117) Case No.C.384/T (3rd.Report, 1974) p.59 paragraph 
25. See also Case No.C.132/T (lst.Report, 1973/74) p.16 
paragraph 21 "I think, however, that it would have led to 
a load better understanding of the issues involved if the 
Ministry had been more forthcoming in explaining the 
reasons for their decision.....11; Case No.C.200/T
(3rd.Report, 1974); Case No.C.5/J (2nd.Report, 1974); Case 
No.C.218/T (1st.report, 1974); Case No.C.29/V (6 th.Report, 
1974/75); Case No.C.128/j (4th.Report, 1974/75); Case 
NO.C.409/T (3rd.Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.94/K 
(1st.Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.466/K (3rd.Report, 
1976/77); Case No.C.319/K (4th.Report, 1976/77); Case 
NO.C.520/K (4th.Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.234/79 
(Selected Cases 1980 vol2).
(118) Case No.4/535/78 (1st. Report, 1979/80) p.199 
paragraph 13
(119; Case No.C.817/V (6 th.Report, 1975/76) p.32 paragraph 
12 - in the end the PCA helped establish that the 
complainant was in fact eligible for the grant. See also 
Case No.C.587/K (3rd.Report, 1976/77) - where the more 
important reasons for a decision were not stated in the 
decision letter; Case No.C.626/K (5th.Report, 1976/77) - 
errors in reasons given for failure on a MSC training 
course.
(120) Case No.C.495/T (2nd.Report, 1974).
(121) Case No.15/439/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78) p.221 
paragraph 13.
(122) Case N0 .C.6 6 6 /K (4th.Report. 1976/77); see also Case 
No.C.350/80 (lst. Report, 1980/81); Case Nos.C.13/80 &
C.377/80 (3rd. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.268/82 (1st. 
Report, 1983/84).
(123) Case No.C.517/K (5th.Report, 1976/77) see p.170 
paragraph 32.
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CHAPTER SIX
(1) Case No.2/601/77 (7th. Report, 1977/780; Case 
No.3B/534/77 (1st. Report, 1978/79) - paid private medical 
bills; Case No.15/787/77 (1st. Report, 1978/790; Case 
NO.3B/950/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80); Case No.2/770/78 
(lst. Report, 1979/80): Case No.C.346/81 (3rd. Report, 
1981/82); Case No.C.828/81 (2nd. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.756/81 (3rd. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.457/82 (3rd. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.188/83 (3rd. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.C.752/82 (3rd.Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.455/86 
(2nd. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.413/87 (6 th. Report, 
1987/88); Case No.C.183/88 (3rd. Report, 1988/89).
(2) Case No.C.356/82 (2nd. Report, 1983/84) p.13 paragraph 
25.
(3) Eg Case No.C.665/84 (5th. Report, 1984/85); and other 
cases dealind with inconsistency within cases.
(4) Case No.C.402/G (3rd. Report, 1972/73); Case
No.C.601/85 (lst. Report, 1986/87); Case No.6/239/K (5th. 
Report, 1977/78) - alternative footway provided; Case 
No.6/727/77 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.6/263/78 (4th. 
Report, 1978/79) - insulation obtained.
(5) See also under Right to Legal Representation.
(6 ) Case No.C.112/J (3rd. Report, 1974) p.81 paragraph 7
(7) Case No.lA/725/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
NO.C773/84 (1st. Report, 1985/86) - waiver of overpayment; 
Case No.C.672/84 (4th. Report, 1985/86).
(8 ) Case No.3B/869/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78).
(9) Case No.C.441/B (4th. Report, 1971/72); Case 
No.C.492/B (4th.Report, 1971/72) - delay, as a result 
contract was subject to betterment levy - ex gratia 
compensation and interest paid; Case No.C.331/B (4th. 
Report 1971/72) - delay means loss of pension - 
compensation equal to amount of lost pension.
(10) Case No.C.646/J (6 th. Report, 1974/75) p.55 
paragraphs 10 & 11; see also Case No.C.405/80 (5th.
Report, 1980/81).
(11) Case No.C.112/J (3rd. Report, 1974); Case No.C.2/J 
(3rd. Report, 1974) - solicitors engaged in delay in 
receiving a driving licence for work - fees paid. Case 
No.C.522/V (3rd. Report, 1975/76) expenses paid, incurred 
trying to recoup loss of stolen girocheque, (seemed to 
help that she could produce a copy of her letter and 
acknowledgement card, when the Department claimed no 
knowledge.); Case No.C.539/79 (9th. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.186/80 (3rd. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.921/80 (lst. 
Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.80/84 (1st. Report, 1984/85); 
Case No.C.138/87 (6 th. Report, 1987/88).
(12) Case No.C.114/J (3rd. Report, 1974/75) - not the 
Departments fault that the complainant was unable to get 
Local Authority grant for work (for which he needed 
relaxation of Building Regulations from the Department) at 
75% - in fact 50% grant obtained - a loss of £600. See
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also Case No.C.372/G (4th. Report, 1972/73) - financial 
loss due to vandalisation - could not accept vandalisation 
as direct result of the delay; Case No.C.183/77 (lst. 
Report, 1977/78); Case No.5/216/78 (7th. Report. 1977/78); 
Case No.4/898/77 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.3B/756/78 
(lst. Report, 1979/80) - only compensation for the 
expenses incurred in trying to register 1 cherished 
numberplate1 - f,For my part, however, I can see no pssible 
ground on which I could ask the Department to accept 
responsiblity for such a payment[£250 to buy back number] 
or for other expenses which the complainant may have 
chosen to incur. I consider their apology, together with 
their offer - which still stands - of registration of the 
complainant’s car under one of two alternative special 
numbers if available, without payment of the £50 fee; to 
be a quite sufficient outcome to the investigation. 11 p.174 
paragraph 17; Case No.C.454/85 (3rd. Report, 1986/87) see 
p.35 paragraph 25; Case No.C.348/86 (lst. Report.
1987/88); Case No.C.379/84 (lst. Report, 1985/86) - where 
woman only made complaint in terms of her children so that 
PCA did not feel that he could award compensation to her 
at the end of his investigation;
(13) Case No.C.50/G (4th. Report, 1971/72) p.183 paragraph 
8 "And I accept the Inland Revenue’s view that they can 
make assessments only on the basis of the established 
facts, and not on the position as it might have been.’’; 
Case No.C.427/G (3rd. report, 1972/73) - subsequent 
rearrangement of affairs - no influence; Case No.C.276/T 
(3rd. report, 1974) - surtax assessment delay. Case 
No.C.21/V (1st. Report, 1975/76) - ex gratia compensation 
paid to the complainant for extra unnecessary time spent 
in prison as result of administrative error by the Home 
Office - but this was before the PCA’s intervention - 
apologies added; Case No.C.456/86 (lst. Report, 1988/89) 
p.28 paragraph 25 "Whether the complainant would have 
succeeded in avoiding bankruptcy proceedings if he had 
received his payment from the Redundancy Fund in the first 
part of 1986 can only be a matter of speculation. However, 
given the scale of his financial difficulties, I am not 
myself persuaded that the administrative failings of DTI 
and DE, and the consequent delay in receipt of that 
payment, can realistically be seen as the cause of his 
having been made bankrupt."; Case No.C.175/81 (4th.
Report, 1982/83).
(14) Case No.C.356/82 (2nd. Report, 1983/84) p.13 
paragraph 26.
(15) Case No.5/821/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case
No.C.113/84 (3rd. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.36/85 (5th. 
Report, 1985/86).
(16) Case No.C.307/K (lst.Report, 1976/77) p.44 paragraph 
16.
(17) Case No.C.183/K (lst.Report, 1976/770.
(18) Case No.C.71/V (1st.Report, 1975/76). See also Case 
No.C.262/V (3rd.Report, 1975/76) - where a leaflet was
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misleading, but there was evidence that the complainant 
was warned that he went ahead at his own risk, if he 
proceded without official permission from the department; 
Case No.3A/57/79 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.823/81 
(2nd. Report, 1982/83); and see Case No.C.463/T 
(3rd.Report, 19740 p.31/32 paragraph 15; "Had I concluded 
nevertheless that he had been led by the terms of the 
leaflet he obtained to adopt a course he would not 
otherwise have taken, I should have been prepared to ask 
whether the Department should not accept some liablity for 
the expenses. But it does not seem to me from his evidence 
that he had been led to negotiate for a house on that 
basis."
(19) Case No.C.278/87 (5th. Report, 1987/88); Case
No.5/283/78 (1st. Report, 1978/79); Case No.2/528/78 (lst. 
Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.150/80 (lst. Report, 1980/81); 
Case No.C.320/81 (3rd. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.253/81 
(lst. Report, 1982/83); Case No.C.591/81 (1st. Report, 
1982/83); Case No.C.186/82 (3rd. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.605/87 (6 th. Report, 1987/88); Case No.C.794/84 (4th. 
Report, 1985/86).
(20) Case N0 .C.6 /G (lst.Report, 1972/73); see also Case 
No.C.728/V (6 th.Report, 1975/76) - no financial loss.
(21) Case No.C.329/G (4th.Report, 1972/73); Case No.557/79 
(9th. Report, 1979/80).
(22) Case No.C.275/83 (7th. Report, 1983/84) p.124 
paragraph 29.
(23) Case No.C.45/87 (5th. Report, 1987/88) p.31 paragraph 
24.
(24) Case No.C.121/B (4th. Report, 1971/72); Case 
No.C.500/G (lst. report, 1974); Case NO.C.154/V (5th. 
Report, 1975/76) - review not successful
(25) Case No.C.484/J (4th. Report, 1974/75)
(26) Eg Case No.C.465/G (lst. Report, 1973/74)
(27) Case N0 .C.I6 O/V (lst. Report, 1975/76)
(28) Case No.C.372/G (4th. Report, 1972/73) - delay, 
alleged that this led to house concerned being vandalised 
to the point of demolition (also obviously financial loss) 
- PCA felt that the blame could not be laid at the 
Department’s door entirely.
(29) In this case - Section 245 of the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1971 - appeal within six weeks of the 
decision.
(30) Case No.C.23/J (3rd. report, 1974) p.76 paragraph 8 - 
"I should add that thjis does not mean that permission 
would necessarily be given; indeed from the inspector’s 
comments in paragraph 6 it might be inferred that having 
regard to the character of the area, permission would be 
unlikely to be given. But it is for the appellant to 
decide in this situation whether it is practicable or 
desirable to follow such a course."
(31) Case No.C.141/J (1st. Report, 1974/75)
(32) It is interesting to speculate what the effect of an 
adverse PCA report would be. See also Case No.C.561/J
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(4th. Report, 1974/75) - delay in informing complainant of 
refusal of application for postgraduate student grant, led 
to loss of job - "But the complainant, for his part, has 
not claimed that his decision to reject the offer of a 
teacher felloship would have been affected if he had been 
told of the outcome of his application by the date he had 
expected."p.21 paragraph 16. Surely, this was the point of 
the complaint!!!
(33) Case No.C.500/78 (4th. Report, 1979/80) p.64/65 
paragraph 18
(34) Eg Case No.C.316/G 93rd. Report, 1972/730; Case 
No.C.371/J/W.11/74 (3rd. Report, 1974/75) [fair hearing]; 
Case No.C.267/K (3rd. Report, 1976/77); Case No.C.736/V 
(lst. Report, 1976/77) [impartiality cases] - Although, it 
has been observed that several complainants did address 
their letters in such terms ie 1 to prevent the same thing 
happening to others1; Case No.C.35/77 (lst. Report, 
1977/78); Case No.15/580/77 (7th. Report, 19777/78); Case 
No.2/747/77 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.75/79 (4th. 
Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.539/79 (9th. Report, 1979/80); 
Case No.C.433/81 (3rd. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.556/81 
(5th. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.828/81 (2nd. Report, 
1983/84); Case No.C.205/84 (1st. Report, 1984/85); Case 
No.C.242/83 (lst. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.290/84 (3rd. 
Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.596/84 (5th. Report, 1984/85); 
Case No.C.697/85 (5th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.306/86 
(lst. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.741/85 (3rd. Report, 
1987/88); Case No.C.549/87 (lst. Report, 1988/89); Case 
No.C.475/87 (1st. Report, 1988/89).
(35) Case No.C.327/79 (4th. Report, 1979/80); Case
No.C.398/82 (2nd. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.256/86 (3rd. 
Report, 1988/89); Case No.C.620/84 (lst. Report, 1985/86).
(36) Case No.C.658/82 (lst. Report, 1983/84).
(37) Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commisssioner 
for Administration 4th. Report, 1977/78 (HC 615).
(38) Case No.3B/338/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78) p.291 
paragraph 1 1 .
(39) Case No.3B/1244/78 (lst. Report, 1979/80).
(40) Case No.C.644/80 (3rd. Report, 1981/82) p.32 
paragraph 28; see also Case No.C.373/87 (6 th. Report, 
1987/88).
(41) Case No.C.876/81 (lst. Report, 1983/84).
(42) Case No.3A/841/77 (4th. Report, 1978/79); Case 
No.C.127/84 (4th. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.432/84 (5th. 
Report, 1984/85)
(43) Case No.C.333/G (4th. Report, 1972/73); see also Case 
No.C.486/B (1st. Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.386/G (1st. 
Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.258/T (3rd. Report, 1974);
Case No.C.515/J (1st. Report, 1975/76); Case No.6/788/77 
(7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.385/80 (5th. Report, 
1980/81); Case No.C.175/87 (lst. Report, 1988/89)•[See 
also Case No.C.691/J (lst. Report, 1975/76) - where a four 
month delay in receiving a pension, followed after an 
intimation of retiral two days before the event (but other
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shortcomings as well); and Case No.C.55/G (4th. Report, 
1971/72) - applied for a renewal of driving licence less 
than one week before a driving test, which had to be 
cancelled - no grounds for criticism.]
(44) Fair hearing cases where did not take the opportunity 
to give evidence/information.
(45) Case No.C.342/J (lst. Report, 1974/75); Case 
No.C.200/J (3rd. Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.24/V (6 th. 
Report, 1974/75); Case No.C.499/82 (3rd. Report, 1983/84); 
Case No.2/380/78 (lst. Report, 1978/79); Case No.C.306/77 
(lst. Report, 1977/78).
(46) Case No.C.159/J (3rd. Report, 1974); Case No.C.57/81 
(6 th. Report, 1980/81).
(47) Case No.C.125/V (6 th. Report, 1974/75)
(48) Case No.C.466/J (3rd. Report, 1974/75) - errors in
certificates to support a claim for tax allowances for 
wife and children abroad; Case No.C.621/83 (8 th. Report, 
1983/84).
(49) Case No.C.169/77 (lst. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.3A/1064/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.236/80 
(9th. Report, 1979/80); Case No.C.50/82 (2nd. Report, 
1983/84); Case No.C.196/85 (lst. Report, 1986/87).
(50) Case No.C410/81 (lst. Report, 1981/82).
(51) Case No.C.244/79 (4th. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.172/80 (5th. Report, 1980/81).
(52) Case No.C.594/85 (5th. Report, 1985/86); Case
No.C.352/86 (3rd. Report, 1986/87); Case No.C.252/82 (2nd. 
Report, 1983/84); Case No.6/511/77 (lst. Report, 1978/79).
(53) Case No.C.608/83 (lst. Report, 1984/85).
(54) Case No.C.342/J (1st. Report, 1974/75) - special 
circumstances - family allowance "book for family of 8  
children and a high reliance on benefit; and Case 
No.C.24/V (6 th. Report, 1974/75) - another DHSS case; Case 
No.C.465/81 (lst. Report, 1981/82).
(55) Case No.lA/161/78 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.C.387/81 (3rd. Report, 1981/820; Case No.C.45/82 (2nd. 
Report, 1982/830; Case No.C.252/82 (2nd. Report, 1983/84).
(56) Case No.C.232/G (3rd. Report, 1972/73) p.145 
paragraph 9; see also Case No.C.125/G (lst. Report, 
1972/73); & Case No.C.206/V (3rd. Report, 1975/76) - DHSS 
case, not supplying information when requested by the 
Department - partial blame for the delay. It can also lead 
to equal apportionment of the blame - Case No.C.194/V 
(3rd. Report, 1975/76); Case No.3A/648/77 (5th. report, 
1977/78); Case No.3A/784/77 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case 
No.C.lA/l69/78 (7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3B/568/77 
(7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3A/430/78 (4th. Report, 
1978/79); Case No.5/755/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.C.39l/80 (3rd. Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.752/79 (3rd. 
Report, 1980/81); Case No.C.14/80 (5th. Report, 1980/81); 
Case No.C.875/80 (lst. Report, 1981/82); Case No.C.978/80 
(5th. Report, 1981/82): Case No.C.561/81 (lst. Report, 
1982/83); Case No.C.7/82 (lst. Report, 1983/84); Case 
No.C.38/83 (lst. Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.343/84 (4th.
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Report, 1984/85); Case No.C.817/81 (5th. Report, 1984/85); 
Case No.C.309/87 (5th. Report, 1987/88).
(57) Case No.C.781/77 (4th. Report, 1979/80).
(58) Case No.C.337/J (1st. Report, 1974/75); see also Case 
No.5/15/78 (1st. Report, 1978/79); Case No.3A/800/78 (1st. 
Report, 1979/80).
(59) Case N0 .C.IO6 /G (4th. Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.136/G (1st. Report, 1972/73) - tax could have been 
paid on time, delay of the Collector only caused slight 
increase in the interest charges - no need for more than 
an apology; Case No.C.192/V (6 th. Report, 1974/75) - 
mitigating action could have been taken by solicitors - 
not the Departments fault. Case No.C.497/J (4th. Report, 
1974/75) - loss of education by daughter during dispute 
over choice of schools - complainant refused to register 
her at school offered - PCA felt that he could have 
registered her there without prejudice to the final 
decision; Case No.C.728/V (6 th. Report, 1975/76) - did not 
take evasive action to avoid the alleged hardship; Case 
No.C.197/82 (lst. Report, 1983/84).
(60) Case No.C.364/82 (7th. Report, 1983/84) p.70
paragraph 41; Case No.C.656/79 (9th. Report, 1979/80) -
complainant had broken immigration law and had been 
allowed to stay, could not claim of injustice; Case 
No.C.119/88 (3rd. Report, 1988/89).
(61) Case No.C.72/80 (1st. Report, 1980/81).
(62) Case No.C.972/80 (lst. Report, 1981/82).
(63) Case No.C.404/79 (8 th. Report, 1979/80) p.51
paragraph 14.
(64) Case No.C.145/B (4th. Report. 1971/72) see p.42; Case 
No.2/216/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.lB/722/77 
(7th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.C.865/80 (lst. Report, 
1981/82); Case No.C.591/81 (lst. Report, 1982/83); Case 
No.C.798/82 (6 th. Report, 1983/84); Case No.C.529/84 (lst. 
Report, 1985/86).
(65) Case No.C.311/G (3rd. Report, 1972/73); see also CAse 
No.C.230/J (3rd. Report, 1974/75) p. 74 paragraph 16 - "But 
I am satisfied that the delay had no effect on the 
outcome."
(6 6 ) Case No.C.293/B (4th. Report, 1971/72) p.70 paragraph 
43. See also Case No.C.497/G (5th. Report, 1972/73); Case 
No.C.96/T (1st. Report, 1973/74); Case No.C.43/G (4th. 
Report, 1972/73); Case No.C.167/G (3rd. report, 1972/73); 
Case No.C.441/T (1st. Report, 1974/75) see p.41 paragraph 
13; Case Nos.C.71/125/175/T (1st. report, 1974) see p.166 
paragraph 107.
(67) Case No.lB/483/78 (2nd. Report, 1979/80); Case 
No.3B/338/77 (5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3B/390/77 
(5th. Report, 1977/78); Case No.3B/474/77 (5th. Report, 
1977/78).
(6 8 ) Case N0 .C.I6 6 /G (lst. Report, 1972/73); Case
No.4/19/78 (1st. Report, 1978/79); Case No.4/406/77 (5th. 
Report, 1977/78) - house demolished before it could be
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listed.
(69) Case No.C.39/79 (6th. Report, 1979/80).
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CHAPTER SEVEN
(1) See Patrick Birkinshaw, 1 Grievances, Remedies and the 
State1 (1985) particularly Chapter 1; Wade (6th.ed.) p.12- 
22; de Smith (4th.ed.) Chapter 1 in general.
(2) Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1854) - The 
recommendations were put into effect in 1870. In general, 
it called for competitive examination rather than 
patronage for entry; promotion on the basis of merit as 
opposed to seniority; unified control of the service; and 
definite distinctions drawn between manual and 
intellectual occupation. The Report is reprinted in the 
Fulton Report (1968) Cmnd 3638 - the next major report on 
the Civil Service.
(3) See also, Sir Carleton Allen, 1 Bureaucracy Triumphant* 
(1931). There followed the Donoughmore Report - Committee 
on Ministers* Powers (1932) Cmd 4060, which failed to make 
the necessary impact.
(4) See Wade p.19 and references therein.
(5) The Franks Report - Committee on Tribunals & Enquiries 
(1957) Cmnd 218; The Whyatt Report - *The Citizen and the 
Administration* JUSTICE Report 1961 - recommendation for 
an ombudsman scheme.
(6) Eg such Scottish cases as Walsh v. Pollokshaws 
Magistrates 1907 SC(HL) 1 per Lord Loreburn at 3 "... They 
are entitiled to do both these things. Their duty is in 
the main administrative. And in coming to an 
administrative conclusion on questions of licensing 
policy, they may use their own judgment and hear whom they 
please.*'
(7) See Wade p.46-49; de Smith (4th.ed.) Chapter 2
(8) Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 
AC 147
(9) Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40
(10) Re H.K.(An Infant) [1967] 2 QB 617 - this is seen as 
the first 'modern' case in this field.
(11) Such a concept can be traced from early decisions 
such as Board of Education v. Rice [1911] AC 179, Lord 
Loreburn at 182 "I need not add that in doing either they 
must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, 
for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides 
anything."
See also, D.J.Mullan, 'Fairness, the New Natural Justice."
(1975) 25 University of Toronto Law Journal 281; Martin 
Loughlin, 'Procedural Fairness - A Study of the Crisis in 
Administrative Law Theory."
(12) See R.v.Amber Valley DC, ex p Jackson [1985] 1 WLR 
298; R.v.St. Edmondsbury BC, ex p Investors in Industry 
Commercial Properties Ltd. [1985] 1 WLR 1168;
R.v.Sevenoaks DC, ex p Terry [1985] 3 All ER 226 - where
it resumed importance in the test for bias.
(13) Nakkuda Ali v.Jayaratne [1951] AC 66;
R.v.Metropolitan Police Commissioners, ex p Parker [1953]
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1 WLR 1150; in a slightly more modified form in R.v.Gaming 
Board of Great Britain, ex p Beniam & Khaida [1970] 2 QB 
417: R.v. Barnsley MBC, ex p Hook [1976] 1 WLR 1052.
(14) See Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40 at 65- 
68
(15) Re H.K.(An Infant) [1967] 2 QB 617
(16) In 1977, Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 
SI 1977 No.1955; supplemented by Section 31 of the Supreme 
Court Act 1981.
(17) Schmidt v. Home Secretary [1969] 2 Ch 149
(18) In general see, Wade p.520-522; Brigid Hadfield, 
'Judicial Review & the Concept of Legitimate Expectation' 
[1988] 39 NILQ 103; C.F. Forsyth, 'The Provenance & 
Protection of Legitimate Expectation' [1988] 47 CLJ 238.
(19) Wade, Administrative Law (6th.ed.)[Wade]; de Smith, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th.ed.)[de 
Smith]; Jackson, Natural Justice (2nd.ed.1979).
(20) (1852) 3 HLC 759
(21) (1852) 3 HLC 759. Cf. R v. Barnsley Licensing 
Justices ex p Barnsley & District Licensed Victuallers' 
Association [I960] 2 QB 167 - a decision to grant a 
spirits licence to a local co-op society was held to be 
unobjectionable, despite the fact that 6 out of 7 justices 
were members of the society, and could as such, expect 
significant discounts on purchases of spirits if a licence 
was granted. This was so held under the terms of the 
relevant statute, but Wade has suggested that this is a 
borderline case.
(22) R. v. Hendon RDC, ex p Chorley [1933] 2 KB 696
(23) The rules are contained in the Declinature Act 1594,
& the Declinature Act 1681; for the limits of these rules 
see: Moubray's Trustees v. Moubray (1883) 10 R 460; Sir 
John Preston v. Mr. Robert Rule (June 21 1699) M 3421; 
Maxwell v. Lord Newton, March 1682 M 3420, Erskine v. 
Drummond 1787 M 2418; Calder v. Ogilvy 1712 M 197; William 
Dalgairns 1776 July 26, Bro Sup Vol 5 424; Sir A.
Moncrieff v. Lord Moncrieff (1904) 6 F 1021; Sir William 
Binny v. Hope (December 1687) M 3420; Goldie v. Hamilton 
16th. Feb. 1816 F.C.
(24) [1939] 2 All ER 535 - de Smith suggests that this is 
a marginal case. This does not preclude an appeal, if bias 
is obviously shown.
(25) R. v. Nailsworth Licensing J.J. ex p Bird [1953] 1 
WLR 1046; Goodall v. Bilsland 1909 SC 1152; M'Geehan v. 
Knox 1913 SC 688. See also cases of Ex p. Wilder (1902) 61 
DLR 656 - prejudice against motorists as a class, was not 
enough to disqualify; R. v. Deal Justices (1881) 45 LT 439 
- membership of a society for preventing cruelty to 
animals, did not prevent a justice sitting on a case 
brought by that society (it is a different if as a member, 
or an office-bearer, he made the decision to prosecute - 
see later). Cf Bradford v. McLeod 1985 SCCR 379 - where 
Sheriff made remark at social function to the effect that 
he would not give legal aid to striking miners, this was
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held to be enough to disqualify him from hearing legal aid 
cases involving striking miners.
(26) R. v. Halifax J.J. ex p Robinson (1912) 76 JP 233
(27) See Goodall v. Bilsland 1909 SC 1152; M'Geehan v.
Knox 1913 SC 688.
(28) R. v. Reading BC ex p Quietlynn Ltd. (1986) 85 LGR 
387; see also Bradford v. McLeod 1985 SCCR 379
(29) Lord Methven v. Lord Gray March 4 1545 M 3417 - 
deadly feud between a party and an inferior judge, was 
found a good reason for objection. See also Scheill v. 
Gudelad (6th. Feb.1561) M 3418 - where a judge's decision 
had been held inequitable, it was held that the party 
affected would be entitled to object to that judge in 
future cases.
(30) Hawthorn v. McLeod 1986 SCCR 150 - accused was asked 
to sing the version of 'The Sash* he had sung, the accused 
refused, upon which the Sheriff himself sang two verses 
from both versions. It was held that although such conduct 
in a sheriff was reprehensible, it had not prejudiced a 
fair trial for the accused. See also early case of Master 
of Glencairn v. Prior of St. Andrews (15th. Feb.1532) M 
3417 - biased remarks by judge gave grounds for 
disqualification - not just in criminal cases.
(31) R. v. Kent Police Authority, ex p Godden [1971] 2 QB 
662; see also R. v. Oxford Regional Mental Health Review 
Tribunal
ex p Mackman [1986] The Times 2 June: cf. R. v. Downham 
Market Magistrates Court, ex p Nudd [1988] The Times 14 
April. On the undesirablity of prejudgment see, R. v. 
Barnsley MBC ex p Hook
[1976] 1 WLR 1052; Mclnnes v. Onslow-Fane [1978] 1 WLR 
1520
(32) R. v. Pwllheli Justices ex p Soane [1948] 2 All ER 
815 - present at the meeting, but took no active part in 
the decision; R. v. Deal Justices (1881) 45 LT 439; R. v. 
Camborne Justices ex p Pearce [1955] 1 QB 41 - membership 
of prosecuting body.
(33) R. v. Gaisford [1892] 1 QB 381: R. v. Milledge (1879) 
4 QBD 332; R.v. Lee ex p Shaw (1882) 9 QBD 394
(34) See R. v. Altrincham J.J. ex p Pennington [1975] QB 
549 - a magistrate disqualified from hearing case 
concerning short measures of goods being delivered to 
schools, as he was a member of the local authority's 
education committee.
(35) R. v. Sussex J.J. ex p McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256
(36) [1924] 1 KB 256 as per Lord Hewart C.J. "It is said, 
and, no doubt, truly, that when that gentleman retired in 
the usual way with the justices, taking with him the notes 
of the evidence in case the justices might desire to 
consult him, the justices came to a conclusion without 
him, and that he scrupulously abstained from referring to 
the case in any way. But while that is so, a long line of 
cases shows that it is not merely of some importance but 
is of fundamental importance that justice should not only
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be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to 
be done.11
(37) Hannam v. Bradford Corpn. [1970] 1 WLR 937; cf Ward
v. Bradford Corpn. [1970] 70 LGR 27
(38) R. v. London County Council ex p Altkersdyk [1892] 1 
QB 190 - members of sub-committee employed lawyers to 
argue against an application before the full council;
Frome United Breweries Co. Ltd. v. Bath Justices [1926] AC 
586
(39) R. v. Assessment Committee for NE Surrey ex p F.W.
Woolworth & Co. Ltd. [1933] 1 KB 776 - held that a
valuation officer should not sit with the Assessment 
Committee when deliberating on an objection to an entry on 
the valuation list; Cooper v. Wilson [1937] 2 KB 309.
(40) Metropolitan Properties Co.(FGC).Ltd v. Lannon [1969] 
1 QB 577 per Lord Denning MR " There must be circumstances 
from which a reasonable man would think it likely or 
probable that the justice, or chairman, as the case may 
be, would or did, favour one side unfairly at the expense 
of the other. The court will not inquire whether he did, 
in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that 
reasonable people might think that he did. The reason is 
plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence: and 
confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away 
thinking: fThe judge was biased.1 "
(41) R. v. Camborne J.J. ex p Pearce [1955] 1 QB 41; R. v. 
Barnsley Licensing J.J. [1960] 2QB 417 per Devlin L.J. - 
real likelihood test was to be "determined on the 
probablities to be inferred from the circumstances, not 
upon the basis of the impressions that might reasonably be 
left on the minds of the party aggrieved, or the public at 
large."
(42) See the cases of R. v. Amber Valley DC ex p Jackson
[1985] 1 WLR 298; R. v. St. Edmundsbury BC ex p Investors 
in Industry Commercial Properties Ltd. [1985] 1 WLR 1168; 
R. v. Sevenoaks DC ex p Terry [1985] 3 All ER 226;
Steeples v. Derbyshire CC [1985] 1 WLR 256
(43) Peter Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law, 
1986 p.109. See also de Smith (4th. ed.) p.264 - " 
'Reasonable suspicion* tests mainly look to outward 
appearances, 'real likelihood* tests focus on the court's 
own evaluation of the probablities, but in practice the 
tests have much in common with one another, and in the 
vast majority of cases they will lead to the same result." 
For more detail on previous cases in this area see J. 
Beatson & M.H.Matthews, Administrative Law - Cases & 
Materials (1989 2nd. ed.) p.282/292
(44) It would certainly seem to be an established 
principle in Scotland eg Hercules Ins. Co. v. Hunter 
(1837) 15 S 800
See also de Smith p.276/277
(45) (1937) TLR 464
(46) R. v. Cumberland J.J. (1882) 52 JP 502. For more 
details see de Smith p.275/276; Wade p.482/483. However,
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it should be noted that there is authority in Scotland for 
the proposition that waiver cannot be exercised in cases 
where disqualification is due to family relationship: see 
Commissioners of Highland Roads v. Machray, Croall & Co. 
(1858) 20 D 1165 per Lord Ivory at p.116; Ommanney v.
Smith (1851) 13 D 678 (cited by Lord Ivory above). See 
also D. Maxwell, The Practice of the Court of Session 
p.119
(47) See de Smith p.275/276
(48) de Smith p.261
(49) [1948] AC 87
(50) [1948] AC 87 at 103
(51) Wade p.491/492 & Wade "Quasi-judicial & its 
Background (1949) 10 CLJ 216. See Woolf J (as he then 
was) in R. v. City of London Corpn. ex p Allan (1981) 79 
LGR 223 where he refers to Franklin as the flow-water mark 
of administrative law'. It is very much the reasoning of 
the 'twilight' period.
(52) Cmd. 4060 (1932) p.78 - The Committee on Ministers' 
Powers. The Franks Committee also considered this problem 
- see Committee on Administrative Tribunals & Enquiries , 
Cmnd 218 1957 59-61, 88-83.
(53) Re Manchester (Ringway Airport) Compulsory Purchase 
Order (1935) 153 LT 219
(54) London & Clydeside Estates Ltd. v. Secretary of State 
for Scotland 1987 SLT 459
(55) R. v. Amber Valley DC ex p Jackson [1985] 1 WLR 298 
esp. p.307/308
(56) [1987] 2 WLR 961 at 968; see also Stringer v.
Minister of Housing & Local Government [1970] 1 WLR 1281:1 
at 1298 - where a Minister deciding an appeal from a local 
planning authority. A general policy was allowable so long 
as it did not "preclude him from fairly judging all the 
issues which are relevant to each individual case as it 
comes up for decision." Also in this area, see Secretary 
of State for Education & Science v. Tameside MBC [1977] AC 
1014 - (decision on reasonableness, but noted Minister's 
own policy, and as a result must adopt suitable 
neutrality; CREEDNZ Inc. v. Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 
172 - a case similar to Franklin, but Wade believes the 
reasoning to be superior (Wade p.429); Bushell v.
Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75 - 
natural justice does apply to administrative acts in 
general; Lim v. Minister of the Interior, Malaya [1964] 1 
WLR 554
(57) Lower Hutt City Council v. Bank [1974] 1 NZLR 545
(58) Eckersley v. Secretary of State for the Environment
[1977] JPL 580; Prest v. Secretary of State for Wales
(1982) 81 LGR 193; R.v.Brent LBC ex p Gunning (1985) 84 
LGR 168; see also Brown v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment (1978) 40 P & CR 285 - did not consider the 
availablity of more suitable land; City Cabs
(Edinburgh)Ltd v. Edinburgh DC 1988 SLT 184
(59) R.v.Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Bakhtaur Singh
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[1986] 1 WLR 910; also R.v.Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex 
p Kumar [1986] The Times 13 August - no note taken of 
evidence of husband's devotion, in case of alleged 
marriage of convenience; R.v.Home Secretary, ex p 
Bugdaycay [1987] AC 514 - did not consider danger to 
deportee; R.v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p 
Bastiampillai [1983] 2 All ER 844.
(60) R.v.Home Secretary, ex p R [1987] The Times 8 June
(61) Rother Valley Railway Co Ltd v. Ministry of Transport
[1971] 1 Ch 515
(62) South Oxfordshire DC v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment [1981] 1 WLR 1092; cf Westminster Renslade 
Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment (1983) 48 P 
& Cr 255; Surrey Heath BC v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment [1986] The Times 3 November.
(63) R.v Ealing LBC ex p Times Newspapers Ltd. (1986) 85 
LGR 316 - see also R.v.Secretary of State for Education & 
Science, ex p Inner London Education Authority [1985] 84 
LGR 454
(64) Hanks v. Minister for Housing & Local Government. 
[1963] 1 QB 999
(65) R.v Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex p Owen 
[1985] QB 1153; R.v Secretary of State for Social 
Services, ex p Wellcome Foundation Ltd. [1987] 1 WLR 1166.
(66) Hanks v. Minister for Housing & Local Government
[1963] 1 QB 999.
(67) [1949] 1 KB 227
(68) See Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co.Ltd. 
[1951] AC 837
(69) Southend-on-Sea Corporation ,v. Hodgson (Wickford)
Ltd. [1962] 1 QB 416 - where confirmation was given to the 
view that no planning permission was needed to operate 
newly purchased builder's yard - held that authority was 
not bound by this advice given by the borough engineer. 
Also, Rootkin v. Kent CC [1981] 1 WLR 1186 - a decision to 
pay a pupil's school transport costs, could be revoked, 
when it was decided that it was based on an error of 
facts.
(70) In Western Fish Products Ltd. v. Penwith DC (1978) 38 
P & CR 7 also at [1981] 2 All ER 204 - the applicant was 
unsuccessful here, the Co had relied on the chief planning 
officer's oral assertion that an application for 'an 
established use' certificate was a mere formlity'.
(71) This explained the decision in Lever Finance Ltd. v. 
Westminster LBC [1971] 1 QB 222. However, it meant that 
Lord Denning's assertion in Robertson v. Ministry of 
Pensions [1949] 1KB 227, that the mere holding of office 
was enough, no longer stood.
(72) The Court cited Wells v.Minister of Housing & Local 
Government [1967] 1 WLR 1000, as an example of this.
(73) See Gowa v. attorney-General [1984] The Times 27 
December - Court of Appeal held that a colonial governor's 
letter could be binding, as a result of its 
misleading/incorrect contents; but see the House of Lords
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/decision [1985] 1 WLR 1003 where the House reached the 
same result, by different reasoning.
(74) See R.v.west Glamorgan CC ex p Gheissary [1985] The 
Times 18 December, this of course may also be seen as an 
example of not considering the relevant facts as to why 
the applications were late.
(75) There has been some comment that a distinction could 
be drawn between promised actions which are ultrs vires, 
and those intra vires - this is put forward in de Smith,
1 Constitutional and Administrative Law1 (4th.ed.) p.402; 
and M.A.Fazal, Reliability of Official Acts & Advice*
[1972] PL 43. However, Wade strongly dismisses this idea, 
as the public interest must also be protected, see Wade 
p.386
(76) Wade suggests this course, see p.385/387 - he also 
suggests that the PCA has shown the correct approach here; 
de Smith goes further and suggests that the appropriate 
redress would be through the associated ombudsman(p.l05).
(77) The doctrine was originally propounded in Hedley 
Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heeler & Partners Ltd.[1964] AC 465; 
other relevant cases include Ministry of Housing & Local 
Government v. Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223 - where a local 
authority was held liable for the careless search of land 
charge register, by a clerk; Culford Metal Industries Ltd. 
v. Export Credits Guarantee Dept. [1981] The Times 25 
March - government department held liable for negligently 
telling an exporter that he would be insured for loss.
(78) HTV Ltd. v. Price Commission [1976] ICR 170; A-G for 
Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629; R.v.Home 
Secretary, ex p Asif Mahmood Khan. [1984] 1 WLR 1337 - if 
the matter was to be decided on an entirely different 
ground from those circulared, then the party should be 
informed of this fact; R.v.Home Secretary, ex p Ruddock 
[1988] QB 000.
(79) R.vHome Secretary, ex p Asif Mahmood Khan [1984] 1 
WLR 1337
(80) See C.F.Forsyth, *The Provenance and Protection of 
Legitimate Expectation* [1988] CLJ 238
(81) [1988] QB 000; see also A-G for Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen 
Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629. Previously, cases were decided on 
the basis that it was unfair to depart from guidelines - 
see HTV Ltd. v. Price Commission [1976] ICR 170.
(82) See de Smith p.196; Wade p.540; see R.v.Oxfordshire 
Mental Health Review Tribunal ex p Home Secretary [1986] 1 
WLR 1180 (affirmed [1988] AC 120) - where Secretary of 
State not notified of hearing which decided to discharge 
patient, decision quashed.
(83) See R.v.Kensington & Chelsea Rent Tribunal, ex p 
MacFarlane [1974] 1 WLR 1486 - where the notice was 
served, but not received, the proceedings were held not to 
have been invalidated, but that the tribunal had 
discretion to reconsider its decision in light of 
representations made to it subsequently by the absent 
party.
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(84) Davis v. Carew-Pole [1956] 1 WLR 833, but see de 
Smith*s doubt in this area, p.197
(85) R.v.Thames Magistrates* Court, ex p Polemis [1974] 1 
WLR 1371; Brentnall v. Free Presbyterian Church of 
Scotland 1986 SLT 471; Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd.
[1984] AC 808; R.v.Liverpool Corpn., ex p Liverpool Taxi 
Fleet Operators' Association [1972] 2 QB 299;
R.v.Merseyside Chief Constable, ex p Calveley [1986] QB 
424
(86) Hopkens v. Smethwick Board of Health (1890) 2 QBD 712 
at 715
(87) M'Donald v. Lanarkshire Fire Brigade Joint Committee 
1959 SC 141; Hoggard v Worsbrough UDC [1962] 2 QB 93 - 
insufficient warning of what was proposed to be done to 
plaintiff's detriment.
(88) Lau Liat Meng v. Disciplinary Committee [1968] AC 
391; nor is it permissible for thetrue charge only to be 
revealed at the appeal stage - Annamunthodo v. Oilfields 
Workers Union [1961] AC 945.
(89) Eg. the provisions of the Town & Country Planning Act 
1971
(90) See McCowan v. Secretary of State for Scotland 1972 
SLT 163; Wilson v. Secretary of State for Environment
[1973] 1 WLR 1083; Gordonvale Investments Ltd. v.
Secretary of State for Environment (1971) 70 LGR 158. 
Statutory example, the provisions of the Town & Country 
Planning Act 1971.
(91) Compulsory Purchase Orders see SI 1976 No.746 rule 5, 
allows owner, lessee or occupier of the land, who has made 
formal objections, and the acquiring authority.
Planning Appeals see SI 1974 No.419, rule 7; No.420, rule 
9; 1981 No.1743, rule 8; all as amended by 1986 No.420; 
persons allowed to appear are the appelllant, the local 
planning authority, certain other local authorities in 
some circumstances, certain other people with legal rights 
in the land concerned, persons who have made formal 
objections in cases where advertisement of the application 
is required, and any person on whom the Secretary of State 
has required notice of it to be served.
(92) R.v.Liverpool Corpn., ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet 
Operators' Assoc. [1972] 2 QB 299; R.v.Great Yarmouth BC 
ex p Botton Bros. Arcades Ltd. [1987] The Times 31 July.
(93) See R.v.Liverpool Corpn., ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet 
Operators' Assoc. [1972] 2 QB 299.
(94) Fredman v. Minister of Health (1935) 154 LT 240 - 
order was inoperative until approved by Minister; see also 
Hanily v. minister of Local Government & Planning [1952] 2 
QB 444 - where it was held that as an objector had a right 
to a hearing, if he appealed to the Secretary of state, 
then the local planning authority did not have to afford 
him a hearing, when they took over their initial decision; 
however, contrast R.v.Great Yarmouth BC ex p Botton Bros 
Arcades Ltd. [1987] The Times 31 July. Also in a more 
general sense, see R.v.Secretary of State for Environment
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ex p Brent LBC [1982] QB 593 - an earlier 'hearing1 does 
not preclude the necessity to hear the parties at a later 
stage as well.
(95) See Furnell v. Whangarei High School Board [1973] AC 
660 - suspension from job as teacher; Lewis v.Heffer 
[1978] 1 WLR 1061 - suspension of officers from 
constituency party pending an inquiry. In this area 
generally, see Pearlberg v. Varty [1972] 1 WLR 534 - no 
right to be heard, when initial measures taken to impose 
back taxation.
(96) [1971] Ch 34, per Megarry J (as he then was), and 
also see Glynn v. Keele University [1971] 1 WLR 487;
R.v.Aston University Senate ex p Roffey [1969] 2 QB 538
(97) [1980] Ac 574 - where Lord Wilberforce identified 
three situations: (a) where original body or larger 
component of it reheard the case, this would be 
satisfactory; (b) situation where the relevant procedural 
structure required a fair hearing at both outset and 
appeal, this may be subject to review; (c) cases where 
theend result was fair despite procedural irregularity.
(98) Lloyd v. MacMahon [1987] AC 625
(99) See R.v.Immigration Tribunal ex p Mehmet [1977] 1 WLR 
795 - tribunal's decision and resulting deportation order 
quashed for failure to afford an oral hearing. It should 
be noted that it may not be possible for a party to waive 
their right to a hearing - Hanson v. Church Commissioners 
[1978] QB 823, R.v.Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner 
ex p Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 at 489/490.
(100) R.v.Kingston-upon-Hull, ex p Black (1949) 65 TLR 209
(101) R.v.Local Government Board ex p Arlidge [1914] 1 KB 
160 at 191; R.v.Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex p Jones 
(Ross) [1988] 1 WLR 477; Brighton Corpn. v. Parry (1972)
70 LGR 576; Kavanagh v. Chief Constable of Devon &
Cornwall [1974] QB 624; British Oxygen Co.Ltd. v. Board of 
Trade [1971] AC 610; R.v.Huntingdon DC ex p Cowan [1984] 1 
WLR 501; Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secretary of State 
for Environment [1976] 1 WLR 1255 at 1266; Lloyd v.
McMahon [1987] AC 625; Attorney-General v. Ryan [1980] AC 
718.
(102) R.v.Secretary of State for Wales, ex p Green (1969) 
67 LGR 560
(103) Brighton Corpn. v. Parry (1972) 70 LGR 576
(104) Kavanagh v. Chief Constable of Devon & Cornwall 
[1974] QB 624; British Oxygen Co.Ltd. v. Board of Trade 
[1971] AC 610 at 625; R.v. Huntingdon DC ex p Cowan [1984] 
1 WLR 501.
(105) [1987] AC 625.
(106) Kanda v. Government of Malaya [1962] AC 322, per 
Lord Denning: "If the right to be heard is to be a real 
right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a 
right inthe acused man to know the case which is made 
against him. He must know what evidence has been given and 
what statements have been made affecting him, and then he 
must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict
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them,”
See also Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v.
Evans [1982] 1 WLR 115; R.v.Home Secretary, ex p Benwell
[1985] QB 554: R.v.Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police 
ex p Stevenson [1986] The Times 22 april; R.v.Chief 
Constable of Avon & Somerset ex p Clarke [1986] The 
Independent 27 November; Maradana Mosque Trustees v.Mahmud 
[1967] 1 AC 13 - the Minister based his decision on part 
of the charges not revealed to the party; R.v.Home 
Secretary, ex p Awuku [1987] The Times 3 October - 
decision quashed as based on facts which party was not 
given full opportunity to explain; R.v.Bedfordshire CC ex 
p C (1986) 85 LGR 218 - decision not to return a child to 
its father quashed after the motherfs allegations (upon 
which the decision was based) were not put to him.
(107) Kanda v. Government of Malaya [1962] AC 322 - 
decision based on a report not made available to the 
party, decision quashed; R.v.Deputy Industrial Injuries 
Commissioner ex p Jones [1962] 2 QB 677; R.v. Assistant 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex p Howell [1986] RTR 52 
- decision based on adverse medical report not available 
to party; R.v.Kent Police Authority, ex p Godden [1971] 2 
QB 662 - no access to medical report; R.v.Huntingdon DC ex 
p Cowan [1984] 1 WLR 501 - licensing authority decision 
quashed, as did not reveal objections to the applicant.
(108) Sabey(H) & Co v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment [1978] 1 All ER 586; TLG Building Materials v. 
secretary of State for Environment (1980) 41 P & CR 243.
(109) R.v.Paddington & c Rent Tribunal, ex p Bell London 
Properties Ltd. [1949] 1 KB 666; Fairmount Investments 
Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Environment [1976] 1 WLR 
1255. See in general, Winchester CC v. Secretary of State 
for Environment (1978) 36 P & CR 455 - site inspection and 
new evidence.
(110) R.v.Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex p Ince
[1973] 1 WLR 1334 at 1345.
(111) In general see R.v.National Insurance Commissioners 
ex p Viscusi [1974] 1 WLR 646; Freeland v. Glasgow 
Licensing Board 1980 SLT 101.
(112) R.v.Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex p Beniam & 
Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417; see also R.v.Home Secretary, ex p 
Hosenball [1977] 1 WLR 766; Mclnnes v. Onslow-Fane [1978]
1 WLR 1520 held that Council of Boxing Board of Control 
did not have to give an applicant for a manager’s licence 
an outline of their objections to him.
(113) Eg Re Pergamon Press Ltd. [1971] Ch 388 - Board of 
Trade investigators did not need to disclose names of 
witnesses, nor transcripts of evidence, nor show adverse 
passages in draft report; R.v.Race Relations Board ex p 
Selvarajan [1975] 1 WLR 1686; R.v. Home Secretary, ex p 
Mughal L1974] QB 313 - suspected illegal immigrant did not 
have reports disclosed to him, but given full opportunity 
to understand and contradict case against him; Public 
Disclosure Board v. Issacs [1989] 1 All ER 137 where the
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Commission was held to be inquisitorial, thus they did not 
need to give the plaintiff the opportunity of rebutting a 
finding that the complaint made against the declarant was 
not made out before the Commission reached its decision. 
R.v.Home Secretary, ex p Gunnell [1984] The Times 7 
November - recommendation by Parole Board that prisoner be 
recalled to prison, the duty to act fairly does not 
require full disclosure of all adverse evidence. This 
decision has been criticised in Weeks v. UK [1987] ECHR 
Series A vol 114 (decision 2 March) as depriving the 
prisoner of a judicial decision, which is required under 
the European Convention.
(114) R.v.Monopolies & Mergers Commission, ex p Matthew 
Brown [1987] 1 WLR 1235.
(115) See R.v.Kent Police Authority, ex p Godden [1971] 2 
QB 662
(116) Errington v. Minister of Health [1935] 1 KB 249;
Lake District Special Planning Board v. Secretary of State 
for Environment (1975) 236 EG 417; Reading BC v. Secretary 
of State for Environment (1985) 52 P & CR 385
(117) Hibernian Property Co Ltd. v. Secretary of State for 
Environment (1973) 27 P & CR 197.
(118) de Smith p.207 -212
(119) This point would have been discussed in Buxton v. 
Minister of Housing & Local Government [1961] 1 QB 278 but 
the case failed on locus standi issue.
(120) Kent CC v. Secretary of State for Environment (1977) 
75 LGR 452
(121) Nelsovil Ltd. v. Minister of Housing & Local 
Government [1962] 1 WLR 404; Wipperman v. Barking LBC 
(1966) 17 P & CR 225.
(122) Coleen Properties Ltd.v. Minister of Housing & Local 
Government [1971] 1 WLR 433.
(123) French Kier Developments Ltd. v. Secretary of State 
for Environment [1977] 1 All Er 296.
(124) Gibbs (W.H.) Ltd. v. Secretary of State for 
Environment (1973) 229 EG 103; North Surrey Water Co. v. 
Secretary of State for Environment (1977) 34 P & CR 140.
(125) Priddle v. Fisher & Sons [1968] 1 WLR 1478: Re M (an 
infant) [1968] 1 WLR 1897; Rose v. Humbles [1972] 1 WLR 
33; Gill & Co (London) Ltd. v. Secretary of State for 
Environment [1978] JPL 373 - a c.p.o. was quashed as the 
inspector had refused an adjournment when an objector had 
become ill, despite the fact that there had been no 
objection to the adjournment from the other side.
(126) Ostreicher v. Secretary of State for the Environment
[1978] 1 WLR 810
(127) R.v.Medical Appeal Tribunal (Midland Region), ex p 
Carrarini [1966] 1 WLR 883; R.v. Thames Magistrates Court 
ex p Polemis [1974] 1 WLR 1371.
(128) Howard v. Secretary of State for Environment [1975] 
QB 235 at 245 - appellant in planning appeal who fails to 
state grounds of his appeal risks summary dismissal on 
merits•
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(129) Osgood v. Nelson (1872) LR 5HL 636 at 646 & 660; 
Marriott v. Minister of Health (1936) 154 LT 47 at 50;
R.V.Newmarket Assessment Committee [1945] 2 All Er 371 at 
373; Magistrates of Ayr v. Lord Advocate 1950 SC 102 at 
109; Nicholson v. Secretary of State for Energy (1978) 76 
LGR 693; Errington v. Minister of Health [1935] 1 KB 249 
at 272; Wednesbury Corpn. v. Minister of Housing and Local 
Government (No.2) [1979] 1 WLR 1401; R.v.Gartree Prison 
Visitors ex p Mealy [1981] The Times 14 November;
R.v.Blundeston Prison Visitors ex p Fox-Taylor [1982] 1 
All ER 646 (witness known to investigating officer, 
unknown to the prisoner, officer did not revealthis to the 
Board of Visitors); R.v. Deputy Industrial Injuries 
Commissioner ex p Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 at 490.
(130) Nicholson v. Secretary of State for Energy (1977) 76 
LGR 693.
(131) Ceylon University v. Fernando [1960] 1 WLR 223 at 
253 - this is perhaps an example of the unsatisfactory 
twilight period.
(132) Bushell v. Secretary of State for Environment [1981] 
AC 75
(133) Re Pergamon Press Ltd. [1971] Ch 388 at 400; see 
also R.v.Commission for Racial Equality ex p Cottrell & 
Rothon [1980] 1 WLR 1580 - an offer of a hearing was made 
by the Commission, after an investigation by them, it was 
held that at this hearing, the Commission were not 
required to produce witnesses for cross-examination. See 
also Herring v. Templeman [1973] 3 All ER 569; Kavarf&gh v. 
Chief Constable of Devon & Cornwall [1974] QB 624; Public 
Disclosure Commission v. Issacs [1989] 1 All ER 137; 
Chilton v. Saga Holidays pic [1986] 1 All ER 841;
R.v.Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p 
Tarrant [1985] QB 251 at 288-289.
(134) Enderby Town Football Club v. Football Association 
Ltd.[1971] Ch 591 at 609.
(135) R.v.Assessment Committee of St. Mary Abbotts, 
Kensington [1891] 1 QB 378 - right to appoint anyone other 
than someone obviously unsuitable to act on their behalf.
(136) The main argument against reliance on this theory is 
that it means that such agency could be excluded by 
tribunal rules, whereas it has been held that the 
principles of natural justice cannot be so
excluded.(Edwards v. SOGAT [1971] Ch 354) For discussion 
of this point, and topic in general see J.E. Alder, 
’Representation before Tribunals* [1972] PL 278
(137) See Cairns LJ in Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. 
[1971] Ch 591; see also Pett v. Greyhound Racing 
Association (No.2) [1970] 1 QB 46; Maynard v. Osmond
[1977] QB 240 - police disciplinary regulation, no 
discretion to allow legal representation; London Passenger 
Transport Board v. Moscrop [1942] AC 332; Taxi v. Central 
Radio Taxis (Tollcross) Ltd. 1987 SLT 506
(138) In Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football 
Association Ltd. [1971] Ch 591; Pett v. Greyhound Racing
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Association [1969] 1 QB 125 at 132; and to a certain 
extent in Maynard v. Osmond [1977] QB 240 at 252 (there 
was allowance for legal representation in a further appeal 
to the Home Secretary, in the circumstances of the case).
(139) See R.v.Race Relations Board, ex p Selvarajan [1975] 
1 WLR 1686 at 1693-1694, other examples used were the work 
of the Gaming Board - it could be said to apply to 
functions where there is only a duty to act fairly so that 
allowing legal representation may not fall into the duty 
to act fairly.
(140) [1975] 1 WLR 1132 - there was also consideration for 
the need for a speedy decision in this case. See also 
R.v.Board of Visitors for HM Prison, The Maze, ex p Hone 
[1988] 2 WLR 177
(141) R.v.Board of Visitors for HM Prison, The Maze, ex p 
Hone [1988] 2 WLR 177 - the House of Lords ruled that the 
European Court of Human Rights decision in Campbell & Fell 
v. UK (1984) 7 EHRR 165 did not support an absolute right 
to legal representation for prisoners in this country.
(142) R.v.Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p 
Tarrant [1985] QB 251; approved in R.v.Board of Visitors 
for HM Prison, The Maze, ex p Hone [1988] 2 WLR 177
(143) See R.v.Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex p Tarrant [1985] QB 251; see also R.v.secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex p Anderson [1984] QB 778
(144) Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football 
Association Ltd. [1971] Ch 591 at 605
(145) Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd. [1969] 1 
QB 125 at 132.
(146) Eg Fraser v. Mudge [1975] 1..WLR 1132; R.v.Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, ex p Tarrant [1985] QB 
251
(147) Lord Denning in R.V.Race Relations Board, ex p 
Selvarajan [1975] 1 WLR 1686; and R.v.Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex p Tarrant.[1985] QB 251
(148) Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] AC 120
(149) Jeffs v. New Zealand Dairy Production Marketing 
Board [1967] 1 AC 551 - Privy Council decided that the 
Board’s decision on zoning orders could not stand, as it 
had been based on the report of the committee of inquiry 
acting on its own initiative. R.v.Preston B.C. ex p 
Quietlynn Ltd. (1974) 83 LGR 308 - delegation was 
permitted under statutory rules, but the sub-group failed 
to report all the submissions and objections to the 
licensing committee making the decision, decision was 
quashed.
(150) Eg Metropolitan Properties (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon 
[1969] 1 QB 577
(151) R.v.Secretary of State for Environment, ex p Hackney 
LBC [1984] 1 WLR 592 - Secretary of State decided case 
after the decision was quashed for not hearing objections 
at proper stage; for cases where new procedral defects 
arise, see Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40 at 79
(152) See R.v. Home Secretary, ex p Phansopkar [1976] QB
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606; for the position on total inactivity see Teh Cheng 
Poh v. Public Prosecutor, Malaysia [1980] AC 458.
(153) R.v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p Preston
[1985] AC 835 - however, it was not in this case; see also 
R.v.Merseyside Chief Constable, ex p Calveley [1986] QB 
424 - where formal notice of complaints was not given for 
over two years, this excessive delay was held to 
invalidate the proceedings.
(154) R.v.Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p 
Child Poverty Action Group [1989] 1 All ER 1047 per Woolf 
LJ at p.1055 - case mentioned is Associated Provincial 
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 
223 - the ’test* is set out by Lord Greene MR at p.229 - 
!lIt is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. 
Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the 
phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory 
discretions often use the word ’unreasonable* in a rather 
comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is 
frequently used as a general description of the things 
that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted 
with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself 
properly in law. He must call his own attention to the 
matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude 
from his considerations matters which are irrelevant to 
what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, 
he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 
’unreasonably*. Similarly, there may be something so 
absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it 
lay within the powers of the authority. Warrington LJ in 
Short v Poole Corporation ([1926]„Ch 66) gave the example 
of the red-headed teacher, dismissed because she had red 
hair. This is unreasonable in one sense. In another it is 
taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so 
unreasonable that it might almost be described as being 
done in bad faith; and, in fact, all these things run into 
one another.”
(155) R.v.Gaming Board of Great Britain ex p Beniam & 
Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417 at431; Payne v. Lord Harris [1981] 
1WLR 754; R.v.Bristol CC ex p Pearce (1984) 83 LGR 711; 
R.v.Secretary of State for Social Services ex p Connelly
[1986] 1 WLR 421 at 431; Crake v. Supplementary Benefits 
Commission [1982] 1 All ER 498; Cannock Chase DC v. Kelly
[1978] 1 WLR 1; Mclnnes v. Onslow-Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520 
at 1532-1535; Macdonald v. R. [1977] 2 SCR 665; Wilkinson 
v. Barking Corporation [1948] 1 KB 721 at 728; Schmidt v. 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149 at 171 
& 173; O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 at 277.
(156) Committee on Ministers' Powers (Cmd 4060 (1932))
p. 80
(157) Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 QB 
175 at 191
(158) Woolf LJ criticised the Home Secretary’s refusal to 
give reasons in cases of refusal of political asylum in 
R.v.Home Secretary ex p Singh [1987] The Times 8 June. See
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also Pepys v. London Transport Executive [1975] 1 WLR 234.
(159) [1968] AC 997 at 1053
(160) Minister of National Revenue v. Wright's Canadian 
Ropes [1947] AC 109 at 123
(161) [1986] 2 ALL ER 941 - the special nature of this 
particular case, it was stated, allowed the court to 
accept this statement, albeit with reluctance; see A.W. 
Bradley [1986] PL 508 for comment.
(162) Committee on Administrative Tribunals & Enquiries 
(Cmnd 218 (1957)) - on tribunals see p.24 paragraph 98, 
and on enquiries see p.75-76 paragraph 351.
(163) Section 12 of the 1971 Act, consolidating the 
original provisions in the Tribunals & Enquiries Act of 
1958, which followed the Franks Report.
(164) These are listed in Schedule 1 of the 1971 Act.
(165) See cases of R.v.Sykes (1875) 1 QB 52 at 54;
R.v.Thomas [1892] 1 QB 426; Ex p Gorman [1894] AC 23 - 
there was a statutory duty on Licensing Justices to state 
which of four specified grounds of refusal, they had based 
their decision on, the Court insisted that, at least, the 
ground should be specified, even if actual reasons were 
not given. This of course, reflects upon the first 
category discussed as it affected the party's chances of 
further redress.
(166) R.v.Social Security Commissioner ex p Sewell (The 
Times [1985] 2 Jan & 2 Feb)
(167) R.v.Social Security Commissioner, ex p Connelly
[1986] 1 WLR 421.
(168) See R.v.Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Khan
[1983] QB 790; also Givaudan & Co..v, Minister of Housing & 
Local Government [1967] 1 WLR 250, where it was held that 
reasons which were partly inconsistent and unintelligible 
was a failure to conform to the requirements of 
legislation; Elliott v. Southwark LBC [1976] 1 WLR 499; 
Norton Tool Co Ltd. v. Tewson [1973] 1 WLR 45; Alexander 
Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree [1974] ICR 120; Albyn 
Properties v. Knox 1977 SC 108 (see Young & Watchman 1978 
SLT 201); Cairns (RW) Ltd. v. Busby Session 1985 SLT 493; 
Re Poyser & Mills Arbitration [1964] 2 QB 467 - 'proper' 
'adequate' & 'intelligible' reasons required; Edwin H. 
Bradley & Sons Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment [1982] JPL 43; French Kier Develpoments v. 
Secretary of State for the Environment [1977] 1 All ER 296
- vague, inadequate and unintelligible reasons given.
(169) [1964] 1 QB 395 at 410
(170) Elliott v. Southwark LBC [1976] 1 WLR 499; see also 
Westminster CC v. Great Portland Estates pic [1985] AC 661
- tribunal cannot be expected to give fuller reasons than 
the case allows.
(171) Bone v. Mental Health Review Tribunal [1985] 3 All 
ER 330; R.v.Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex p Clatworthy 
[1985] 3 All ER 699
(172) See R.v.Home Secretary, ex p Swati [1986] 1 WLR 477.
(173) There are some cases which suggest that the decision
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is voidable, but the leading academic commentators are 
quick to criticise the logic in this theory - see Wade 
p.493-495, & p.526-529; de Smith p.273-276. The reasoning 
would appear to have allowed the court only to act if 
there was no substantial prejudice or the like to the 
party, otherwise they could decline to interfere - see 
below on this point generally.
(174) The possible objections to this were discussed in 
the section relating to the duty to consult section, in 
particular relating to the competency of the tribunal.
(175) However, as has been seen the Court may well decide 
that the absence of a reasoned decision is a sign of 
arbitrariness and proceed accordingly
(176) See below.
(177) The doctrine of negligent mistatement can be found 
in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.
[1964] AC 465; other cases include, Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government v. Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223; Culford 
Metal Industries Ltd. v. Export Credits Guarantee Dept.
[1981] The Times 25 March. Wade supports this move towards 
compensation, as a solution to a difficult area in 
administrative law(p.385/387).
(178) John v. Rees [1970] Ch 345 at 402; see also Lord 
Wright in General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943] AC 
627 at 644 - "If the principles of natural justice are 
violated in respect of any decision it is indeed, 
immaterial whether the same decision would have been 
arrived at in the absence of the departure from the 
essential principles of justice. The decision must be 
declared no decision." - see recently, R.v.secretary of 
State for the Environment, ex p Brent LBC [1982] QB 593; 
Wade points out that the hearing eventually afforded in 
Ridge v. Baldwin ([1963] 1 QB 566) resulted in three 
members of the Watch Committee changing their minds; see 
also de Smith p.197
(179) Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 1578 - 
where teacher refused to register under statutory scheme, 
no choice but to dismiss him.
(180) R.v.Bristol CC ex p Pearce (1984) 83 LGR 711. Also 
see the judgment of Lord Evershed (& the lower courts) in 
Ridge v. Baldwin ([1963] 1 QB 566) where he suggested that 
there could no probable effect on the outcome; see also 
Byrne v. Kinematograph Society Ltd. [1958] 1 WLR 762.
(181) See Lord Denning MR in Hoffman- La Roche v.Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 at 320; see 
in general, J.A.G. Griffiths, 'The Politics of the 
Judiciary1.
(182) R. v. Aston University Senate ex p Roffey [1969] 2 
QB 538. Cf the approach taken in R. v. Diggines, ex p 
Rahmani [1985] QB 1109 confirmed [1986] AC 475 - where a 
mistake by the applicant's solicitors led to a hearing in 
their absence, this was held to be a procedural error; 
however, this decision was overturned in Al-Mehdawi v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [1989] 3 All ER
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843 - it was not a procedural impropriety if a person lost 
the opportunity of a hearing as a result of a mistake on 
the part of their advisors.
(183; Glynn v. Keele University [1971] 1 WLR 487. (NB the 
applicant had also failed to notify his address to the 
University, hence he coule not be contacted re the 
hearing.)
(184) Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [1980] 1 WLR 
582
(185) Ward v. Bradford Corporation (1971) 70 LGR 27 - a 
female trainee teacher had a man living with her, in 
college, against the regulations, there was a serious 
breach of natural justice in the conduct of the 
proceedings, the Court held that regardless of this, the 
correct decision had been reached. It appears that the 
Court was much influenced by the concern that the girl 
should not be allowed to continue training as a teacher.
(186) See Wade at p.535.
CHAPTER EIGHT
(1) Cmd 4060 (1932) p.80
(2) Administration Under Law, p.23. The call was renewed 
in the JUSTICE/A11 Souls Report, p.24; the importance of 
the duty was also noted in the Franks Report, Cmnd 218 
(1957) p.75-76 para.351
(3) See Wade p.385/387 and de Smith p.105
(4) [1976] QB 629
(5) See Chapter One and J.D.B.Mitchell, 'The Ombudsman 
Fallacy' [1962] PL 24
(6) J.D.B. Mitchell, The Ombudsman Fallacy, [1962] PL 24 
at28
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APPENDIX II
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
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DVLC —  Driver & Vehicle Licensing Centre
EO ---  Employment Office
FCO - Foreign & Commonwealth Office
H O  Home Office
IDN---- Industrial Disablement Benefit
IR ---  Inland Revenue
LEA Local Education Authority
LCD — - Lord Chancellor’s Department
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MOD -—  Ministry of Defence
MOT — - Ministry of Transport
MSC - Manpower Services Commission
OVB — -Overseas Branch
PAT --  Pensions Appeal Tribunal
PCA -— ; Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration
PIC --  Planning Inquiry Commission
PSA --  Property Services Agency
UBO -—  Unemployment Benefit Office 
UDC --  Urban District Council
